arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
With Commit 7917f9cdb503 ("acpi/nfit: rely on mce->misc to determine
poison granularity") that changed nfit_handle_mce() callback to report
badrange according to 1ULL << MCI_MISC_ADDR_LSB(mce->misc), it's been
discovered that the mce->misc LSB field is 0x1000 bytes, hence injecting
2 back-to-back poisons and the driver ends up logging 8 badblocks,
because 0x1000 bytes is 8 512-byte.
Dan Williams noticed that apei_mce_report_mem_error() hardcode
the LSB field to PAGE_SHIFT instead of consulting the input
struct cper_sec_mem_err record. So change to rely on hardware whenever
support is available.
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/7ed50fd8-521e-cade-77b1-738b8bfb8502@oracle.com
Reviewed-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jane Chu <jane.chu@oracle.com>
---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c
index 717192915f28..a8274fd57add 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/mce/apei.c
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ void apei_mce_report_mem_error(int severity, struct cper_sec_mem_err *mem_err)
m.bank = -1;
/* Fake a memory read error with unknown channel */
m.status = MCI_STATUS_VAL | MCI_STATUS_EN | MCI_STATUS_ADDRV | MCI_STATUS_MISCV | 0x9f;
- m.misc = (MCI_MISC_ADDR_PHYS << 6) | PAGE_SHIFT;
+ m.misc = (MCI_MISC_ADDR_PHYS << 6) | __ffs64(mem_err->physical_addr_mask);
if (severity >= GHES_SEV_RECOVERABLE)
m.status |= MCI_STATUS_UC;
--
2.18.4
+ m.misc = (MCI_MISC_ADDR_PHYS << 6) | __ffs64(mem_err->physical_addr_mask); Do we want to unconditionally trust the sanity of the BIOS provided physical_address_mask? There's a warning comment on the kernel __ffs64() function: * The result is not defined if no bits are set, so check that @word * is non-zero before calling this. Otherwise, this looks like a good idea. -Tony
Luck, Tony wrote: > +m.misc = (MCI_MISC_ADDR_PHYS << 6) | __ffs64(mem_err->physical_addr_mask); > > Do we want to unconditionally trust the sanity of the BIOS provided physical_address_mask? > > There's a warning comment on the kernel __ffs64() function: > > * The result is not defined if no bits are set, so check that @word > * is non-zero before calling this. > > Otherwise, this looks like a good idea. It appears the kernel is trusting that ->physical_addr_mask is non-zero in other paths. So this is at least equally broken in the presence of a broken BIOS. The impact is potentially larger though with this change, so it might be a good follow-on patch to make sure that ->physical_addr_mask gets fixed up to a minimum mask value.
> It appears the kernel is trusting that ->physical_addr_mask is non-zero > in other paths. So this is at least equally broken in the presence of a > broken BIOS. The impact is potentially larger though with this change, > so it might be a good follow-on patch to make sure that > ->physical_addr_mask gets fixed up to a minimum mask value. Agreed. Separate patch to sanitize early, so other kernel code can just use it. -Tony
On 7/18/2022 12:22 PM, Luck, Tony wrote:
>> It appears the kernel is trusting that ->physical_addr_mask is non-zero
>> in other paths. So this is at least equally broken in the presence of a
>> broken BIOS. The impact is potentially larger though with this change,
>> so it might be a good follow-on patch to make sure that
>> ->physical_addr_mask gets fixed up to a minimum mask value.
>
> Agreed. Separate patch to sanitize early, so other kernel code can just use it.
>
Is it possible that with
if (mem->validation_bits & CPER_MEM_VALID_PA_MASK)
the ->physical_addr_mask is still untrustworthy?
include/ras/ras_event.h has this
if (mem->validation_bits & CPER_MEM_VALID_PA_MASK)
__entry->pa_mask_lsb =
(u8)__ffs64(mem->physical_addr_mask);
else
__entry->pa_mask_lsb = ~0;
which hints otherwise.
apei_mce_report_mem_error() already checks mem->validation_bits
up front.
thanks!
-jane
> -Tony
On Mon, Jul 18, 2022 at 09:11:33PM +0000, Jane Chu wrote: > On 7/18/2022 12:22 PM, Luck, Tony wrote: > >> It appears the kernel is trusting that ->physical_addr_mask is non-zero > >> in other paths. So this is at least equally broken in the presence of a > >> broken BIOS. The impact is potentially larger though with this change, > >> so it might be a good follow-on patch to make sure that > >> ->physical_addr_mask gets fixed up to a minimum mask value. > > > > Agreed. Separate patch to sanitize early, so other kernel code can just use it. > > > > Is it possible that with > if (mem->validation_bits & CPER_MEM_VALID_PA_MASK) > the ->physical_addr_mask is still untrustworthy? The validation_bits just show which fields the BIOS *says* it filled in. If a validation bit isn't set, then Linux should certainly ignore that field. But if it is set, then Linux needs to decide whether to use the value, or do a sanity check first. -Tony
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