The MDS tries to enforce a limit on the total key/values in extended
attributes.  However, this limit is enforced only if doing a synchronous
operation (MDS_OP_SETXATTR) -- if we're buffering the xattrs, the MDS
doesn't have a chance to enforce these limits.

This patch forces the usage of the synchronous operation if xattrs size hits
the maximum size that is set on the MDS by default (64k).

While there, fix a dout() that would trigger a printk warning:

[   98.718078] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[   98.719012] precision 65536 too large
[   98.719039] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3755 at lib/vsprintf.c:2703 vsnprintf+0x5e3/0x600
...

URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55725
Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
---
 fs/ceph/xattr.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
index afec84088471..09751a5f028c 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
@@ -15,6 +15,12 @@
 #define XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX "ceph."
 #define XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX) - 1)
 
+/*
+ * Maximum size of xattrs the MDS can handle per inode by default.  This
+ * includes the attribute name and 4+4 bytes for the key/value sizes.
+ */
+#define MDS_MAX_XATTR_PAIRS_SIZE (1<<16) /* 64K */
+
 static int __remove_xattr(struct ceph_inode_info *ci,
 			  struct ceph_inode_xattr *xattr);
 
@@ -1078,7 +1084,7 @@ static int ceph_sync_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 			flags |= CEPH_XATTR_REMOVE;
 	}
 
-	dout("setxattr value=%.*s\n", (int)size, value);
+	dout("setxattr value size: ld\n", size);
 
 	/* do request */
 	req = ceph_mdsc_create_request(mdsc, op, USE_AUTH_MDS);
@@ -1176,8 +1182,13 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
 retry:
 	issued = __ceph_caps_issued(ci, NULL);
-	if (ci->i_xattrs.version == 0 || !(issued & CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL))
+	required_blob_size = __get_required_blob_size(ci, name_len, val_len);
+	if ((ci->i_xattrs.version == 0) || !(issued & CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL) ||
+	    (required_blob_size >= MDS_MAX_XATTR_PAIRS_SIZE)) {
+		dout("%s do sync setxattr: version: %llu blob size: %d\n",
+		     __func__, ci->i_xattrs.version, required_blob_size);
 		goto do_sync;
+	}
 
 	if (!lock_snap_rwsem && !ci->i_head_snapc) {
 		lock_snap_rwsem = true;
@@ -1193,8 +1204,6 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
 	     ceph_cap_string(issued));
 	__build_xattrs(inode);
 
-	required_blob_size = __get_required_blob_size(ci, name_len, val_len);
-
 	if (!ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob ||
 	    required_blob_size > ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob->alloc_len) {
 		struct ceph_buffer *blob;

On 5/20/22 7:54 PM, Luís Henriques wrote:
> The MDS tries to enforce a limit on the total key/values in extended
> attributes.  However, this limit is enforced only if doing a synchronous
> operation (MDS_OP_SETXATTR) -- if we're buffering the xattrs, the MDS
> doesn't have a chance to enforce these limits.
>
> This patch forces the usage of the synchronous operation if xattrs size hits
> the maximum size that is set on the MDS by default (64k).
>
> While there, fix a dout() that would trigger a printk warning:
>
> [   98.718078] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [   98.719012] precision 65536 too large
> [   98.719039] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3755 at lib/vsprintf.c:2703 vsnprintf+0x5e3/0x600
> ...
>
> URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55725
> Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
> ---
>   fs/ceph/xattr.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
>   1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
> index afec84088471..09751a5f028c 100644
> --- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
> @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@
>   #define XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX "ceph."
>   #define XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX) - 1)
>   
> +/*
> + * Maximum size of xattrs the MDS can handle per inode by default.  This
> + * includes the attribute name and 4+4 bytes for the key/value sizes.
> + */
> +#define MDS_MAX_XATTR_PAIRS_SIZE (1<<16) /* 64K */

The max size is changeable in MDS side. Possibly we should do something 
as mentioned in your ceph PR [1].

@Jeff, any better idea ?


[1] 
https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/46357/commits/741f8ba36f14774834c0d5618519425ccf1ccc85#r878966753

Thanks.

-- Xiubo


> +
>   static int __remove_xattr(struct ceph_inode_info *ci,
>   			  struct ceph_inode_xattr *xattr);
>   
> @@ -1078,7 +1084,7 @@ static int ceph_sync_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>   			flags |= CEPH_XATTR_REMOVE;
>   	}
>   
> -	dout("setxattr value=%.*s\n", (int)size, value);
> +	dout("setxattr value size: ld\n", size);
>   
>   	/* do request */
>   	req = ceph_mdsc_create_request(mdsc, op, USE_AUTH_MDS);
> @@ -1176,8 +1182,13 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>   	spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
>   retry:
>   	issued = __ceph_caps_issued(ci, NULL);
> -	if (ci->i_xattrs.version == 0 || !(issued & CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL))
> +	required_blob_size = __get_required_blob_size(ci, name_len, val_len);
> +	if ((ci->i_xattrs.version == 0) || !(issued & CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL) ||
> +	    (required_blob_size >= MDS_MAX_XATTR_PAIRS_SIZE)) {
> +		dout("%s do sync setxattr: version: %llu blob size: %d\n",
> +		     __func__, ci->i_xattrs.version, required_blob_size);
>   		goto do_sync;
> +	}
>   
>   	if (!lock_snap_rwsem && !ci->i_head_snapc) {
>   		lock_snap_rwsem = true;
> @@ -1193,8 +1204,6 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>   	     ceph_cap_string(issued));
>   	__build_xattrs(inode);
>   
> -	required_blob_size = __get_required_blob_size(ci, name_len, val_len);
> -
>   	if (!ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob ||
>   	    required_blob_size > ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob->alloc_len) {
>   		struct ceph_buffer *blob;
>

On Mon, 2022-05-23 at 09:47 +0800, Xiubo Li wrote:
> On 5/20/22 7:54 PM, Luís Henriques wrote:
> > The MDS tries to enforce a limit on the total key/values in extended
> > attributes.  However, this limit is enforced only if doing a synchronous
> > operation (MDS_OP_SETXATTR) -- if we're buffering the xattrs, the MDS
> > doesn't have a chance to enforce these limits.
> > 
> > This patch forces the usage of the synchronous operation if xattrs size hits
> > the maximum size that is set on the MDS by default (64k).
> > 
> > While there, fix a dout() that would trigger a printk warning:
> > 
> > [   98.718078] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> > [   98.719012] precision 65536 too large
> > [   98.719039] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3755 at lib/vsprintf.c:2703 vsnprintf+0x5e3/0x600
> > ...
> > 
> > URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55725
> > Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
> > ---
> >   fs/ceph/xattr.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
> >   1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
> > index afec84088471..09751a5f028c 100644
> > --- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
> > +++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
> > @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@
> >   #define XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX "ceph."
> >   #define XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX) - 1)
> >   
> > +/*
> > + * Maximum size of xattrs the MDS can handle per inode by default.  This
> > + * includes the attribute name and 4+4 bytes for the key/value sizes.
> > + */
> > +#define MDS_MAX_XATTR_PAIRS_SIZE (1<<16) /* 64K */
> 
> The max size is changeable in MDS side. Possibly we should do something 
> as mentioned in your ceph PR [1].
> 
> @Jeff, any better idea ?
> 
> 
> [1] 
> https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/46357/commits/741f8ba36f14774834c0d5618519425ccf1ccc85#r878966753
> 
> Thanks.
> 
> -- Xiubo
> 
> 

Not really.

The idea in the github comment makes sense. Basically, make it so that
the setting isn't changeable at runtime and then have the client query
for the limit at appropriate times.

You can probably still defeat that by changing it and rebooting the MDS,
but I don't see that you can do much else.

> > +
> >   static int __remove_xattr(struct ceph_inode_info *ci,
> >   			  struct ceph_inode_xattr *xattr);
> >   
> > @@ -1078,7 +1084,7 @@ static int ceph_sync_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
> >   			flags |= CEPH_XATTR_REMOVE;
> >   	}
> >   
> > -	dout("setxattr value=%.*s\n", (int)size, value);
> > +	dout("setxattr value size: ld\n", size);
> >   
> >   	/* do request */
> >   	req = ceph_mdsc_create_request(mdsc, op, USE_AUTH_MDS);
> > @@ -1176,8 +1182,13 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
> >   	spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
> >   retry:
> >   	issued = __ceph_caps_issued(ci, NULL);
> > -	if (ci->i_xattrs.version == 0 || !(issued & CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL))
> > +	required_blob_size = __get_required_blob_size(ci, name_len, val_len);
> > +	if ((ci->i_xattrs.version == 0) || !(issued & CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL) ||
> > +	    (required_blob_size >= MDS_MAX_XATTR_PAIRS_SIZE)) {
> > +		dout("%s do sync setxattr: version: %llu blob size: %d\n",
> > +		     __func__, ci->i_xattrs.version, required_blob_size);
> >   		goto do_sync;
> > +	}
> >   
> >   	if (!lock_snap_rwsem && !ci->i_head_snapc) {
> >   		lock_snap_rwsem = true;
> > @@ -1193,8 +1204,6 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
> >   	     ceph_cap_string(issued));
> >   	__build_xattrs(inode);
> >   
> > -	required_blob_size = __get_required_blob_size(ci, name_len, val_len);
> > -
> >   	if (!ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob ||
> >   	    required_blob_size > ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob->alloc_len) {
> >   		struct ceph_buffer *blob;
> > 
> 

-- 
Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>

On 5/23/22 6:43 PM, Jeff Layton wrote:
> On Mon, 2022-05-23 at 09:47 +0800, Xiubo Li wrote:
>> On 5/20/22 7:54 PM, Luís Henriques wrote:
>>> The MDS tries to enforce a limit on the total key/values in extended
>>> attributes.  However, this limit is enforced only if doing a synchronous
>>> operation (MDS_OP_SETXATTR) -- if we're buffering the xattrs, the MDS
>>> doesn't have a chance to enforce these limits.
>>>
>>> This patch forces the usage of the synchronous operation if xattrs size hits
>>> the maximum size that is set on the MDS by default (64k).
>>>
>>> While there, fix a dout() that would trigger a printk warning:
>>>
>>> [   98.718078] ------------[ cut here ]------------
>>> [   98.719012] precision 65536 too large
>>> [   98.719039] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3755 at lib/vsprintf.c:2703 vsnprintf+0x5e3/0x600
>>> ...
>>>
>>> URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55725
>>> Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
>>> ---
>>>    fs/ceph/xattr.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
>>>    1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
>>> index afec84088471..09751a5f028c 100644
>>> --- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
>>> +++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
>>> @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@
>>>    #define XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX "ceph."
>>>    #define XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX) - 1)
>>>    
>>> +/*
>>> + * Maximum size of xattrs the MDS can handle per inode by default.  This
>>> + * includes the attribute name and 4+4 bytes for the key/value sizes.
>>> + */
>>> +#define MDS_MAX_XATTR_PAIRS_SIZE (1<<16) /* 64K */
>> The max size is changeable in MDS side. Possibly we should do something
>> as mentioned in your ceph PR [1].
>>
>> @Jeff, any better idea ?
>>
>>
>> [1]
>> https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/46357/commits/741f8ba36f14774834c0d5618519425ccf1ccc85#r878966753
>>
>> Thanks.
>>
>> -- Xiubo
>>
>>
> Not really.
>
> The idea in the github comment makes sense. Basically, make it so that
> the setting isn't changeable at runtime and then have the client query
> for the limit at appropriate times.
>
> You can probably still defeat that by changing it and rebooting the MDS,
> but I don't see that you can do much else.

Yeah, sounds good.


>
>>> +
>>>    static int __remove_xattr(struct ceph_inode_info *ci,
>>>    			  struct ceph_inode_xattr *xattr);
>>>    
>>> @@ -1078,7 +1084,7 @@ static int ceph_sync_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>>>    			flags |= CEPH_XATTR_REMOVE;
>>>    	}
>>>    
>>> -	dout("setxattr value=%.*s\n", (int)size, value);
>>> +	dout("setxattr value size: ld\n", size);
>>>    
>>>    	/* do request */
>>>    	req = ceph_mdsc_create_request(mdsc, op, USE_AUTH_MDS);
>>> @@ -1176,8 +1182,13 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>>>    	spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
>>>    retry:
>>>    	issued = __ceph_caps_issued(ci, NULL);
>>> -	if (ci->i_xattrs.version == 0 || !(issued & CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL))
>>> +	required_blob_size = __get_required_blob_size(ci, name_len, val_len);
>>> +	if ((ci->i_xattrs.version == 0) || !(issued & CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL) ||
>>> +	    (required_blob_size >= MDS_MAX_XATTR_PAIRS_SIZE)) {
>>> +		dout("%s do sync setxattr: version: %llu blob size: %d\n",
>>> +		     __func__, ci->i_xattrs.version, required_blob_size);
>>>    		goto do_sync;
>>> +	}
>>>    
>>>    	if (!lock_snap_rwsem && !ci->i_head_snapc) {
>>>    		lock_snap_rwsem = true;
>>> @@ -1193,8 +1204,6 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>>>    	     ceph_cap_string(issued));
>>>    	__build_xattrs(inode);
>>>    
>>> -	required_blob_size = __get_required_blob_size(ci, name_len, val_len);
>>> -
>>>    	if (!ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob ||
>>>    	    required_blob_size > ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob->alloc_len) {
>>>    		struct ceph_buffer *blob;
>>>

Xiubo Li <xiubli@redhat.com> writes:

> On 5/20/22 7:54 PM, Luís Henriques wrote:
>> The MDS tries to enforce a limit on the total key/values in extended
>> attributes.  However, this limit is enforced only if doing a synchronous
>> operation (MDS_OP_SETXATTR) -- if we're buffering the xattrs, the MDS
>> doesn't have a chance to enforce these limits.
>>
>> This patch forces the usage of the synchronous operation if xattrs size hits
>> the maximum size that is set on the MDS by default (64k).
>>
>> While there, fix a dout() that would trigger a printk warning:
>>
>> [   98.718078] ------------[ cut here ]------------
>> [   98.719012] precision 65536 too large
>> [   98.719039] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3755 at lib/vsprintf.c:2703 vsnprintf+0x5e3/0x600
>> ...
>>
>> URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55725
>> Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
>> ---
>>   fs/ceph/xattr.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
>>   1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
>> index afec84088471..09751a5f028c 100644
>> --- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
>> +++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
>> @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@
>>   #define XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX "ceph."
>>   #define XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX) - 1)
>>   +/*
>> + * Maximum size of xattrs the MDS can handle per inode by default.  This
>> + * includes the attribute name and 4+4 bytes for the key/value sizes.
>> + */
>> +#define MDS_MAX_XATTR_PAIRS_SIZE (1<<16) /* 64K */
>
> The max size is changeable in MDS side. Possibly we should do something as
> mentioned in your ceph PR [1].
>

Right, as I mentioned in that PR, having clients that are aware of that
limit will allow them to behave correctly.  But the MDS still needs to
handle the case where these limits are exceeded (for ex. kernel clients
that don't know about this limit).  So, we still need to do something
similar to what I've proposed in there.

Cheers
-- 
Luís

> @Jeff, any better idea ?
>
>
> [1]
> https://github.com/ceph/ceph/pull/46357/commits/741f8ba36f14774834c0d5618519425ccf1ccc85#r878966753
>
> Thanks.
>
> -- Xiubo
>
>
>> +
>>   static int __remove_xattr(struct ceph_inode_info *ci,
>>   			  struct ceph_inode_xattr *xattr);
>>   @@ -1078,7 +1084,7 @@ static int ceph_sync_setxattr(struct inode *inode,
>> const char *name,
>>   			flags |= CEPH_XATTR_REMOVE;
>>   	}
>>   -	dout("setxattr value=%.*s\n", (int)size, value);
>> +	dout("setxattr value size: ld\n", size);
>>     	/* do request */
>>   	req = ceph_mdsc_create_request(mdsc, op, USE_AUTH_MDS);
>> @@ -1176,8 +1182,13 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>>   	spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
>>   retry:
>>   	issued = __ceph_caps_issued(ci, NULL);
>> -	if (ci->i_xattrs.version == 0 || !(issued & CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL))
>> +	required_blob_size = __get_required_blob_size(ci, name_len, val_len);
>> +	if ((ci->i_xattrs.version == 0) || !(issued & CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL) ||
>> +	    (required_blob_size >= MDS_MAX_XATTR_PAIRS_SIZE)) {
>> +		dout("%s do sync setxattr: version: %llu blob size: %d\n",
>> +		     __func__, ci->i_xattrs.version, required_blob_size);
>>   		goto do_sync;
>> +	}
>>     	if (!lock_snap_rwsem && !ci->i_head_snapc) {
>>   		lock_snap_rwsem = true;
>> @@ -1193,8 +1204,6 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>>   	     ceph_cap_string(issued));
>>   	__build_xattrs(inode);
>>   -	required_blob_size = __get_required_blob_size(ci, name_len, val_len);
>> -
>>   	if (!ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob ||
>>   	    required_blob_size > ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob->alloc_len) {
>>   		struct ceph_buffer *blob;
>>
>

Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de> writes:

> The MDS tries to enforce a limit on the total key/values in extended
> attributes.  However, this limit is enforced only if doing a synchronous
> operation (MDS_OP_SETXATTR) -- if we're buffering the xattrs, the MDS
> doesn't have a chance to enforce these limits.
>
> This patch forces the usage of the synchronous operation if xattrs size hits
> the maximum size that is set on the MDS by default (64k).
>
> While there, fix a dout() that would trigger a printk warning:
>
> [   98.718078] ------------[ cut here ]------------
> [   98.719012] precision 65536 too large
> [   98.719039] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 3755 at lib/vsprintf.c:2703 vsnprintf+0x5e3/0x600
> ...
>
> URL: https://tracker.ceph.com/issues/55725
> Signed-off-by: Luís Henriques <lhenriques@suse.de>
> ---
>  fs/ceph/xattr.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/fs/ceph/xattr.c b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
> index afec84088471..09751a5f028c 100644
> --- a/fs/ceph/xattr.c
> +++ b/fs/ceph/xattr.c
> @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@
>  #define XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX "ceph."
>  #define XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX_LEN (sizeof (XATTR_CEPH_PREFIX) - 1)
>  
> +/*
> + * Maximum size of xattrs the MDS can handle per inode by default.  This
> + * includes the attribute name and 4+4 bytes for the key/value sizes.
> + */
> +#define MDS_MAX_XATTR_PAIRS_SIZE (1<<16) /* 64K */
> +
>  static int __remove_xattr(struct ceph_inode_info *ci,
>  			  struct ceph_inode_xattr *xattr);
>  
> @@ -1078,7 +1084,7 @@ static int ceph_sync_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>  			flags |= CEPH_XATTR_REMOVE;
>  	}
>  
> -	dout("setxattr value=%.*s\n", (int)size, value);
> +	dout("setxattr value size: ld\n", size);

Oops!  Looks like someone ate a '%' char.  Oh well, I won't bother sending
out a new version for now as this is an RFC and the MDS side is what
really needs fixing.  In fact, the client-side may be something very
different from this RFC.

Cheers,
-- 
Luís

>  
>  	/* do request */
>  	req = ceph_mdsc_create_request(mdsc, op, USE_AUTH_MDS);
> @@ -1176,8 +1182,13 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>  	spin_lock(&ci->i_ceph_lock);
>  retry:
>  	issued = __ceph_caps_issued(ci, NULL);
> -	if (ci->i_xattrs.version == 0 || !(issued & CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL))
> +	required_blob_size = __get_required_blob_size(ci, name_len, val_len);
> +	if ((ci->i_xattrs.version == 0) || !(issued & CEPH_CAP_XATTR_EXCL) ||
> +	    (required_blob_size >= MDS_MAX_XATTR_PAIRS_SIZE)) {
> +		dout("%s do sync setxattr: version: %llu blob size: %d\n",
> +		     __func__, ci->i_xattrs.version, required_blob_size);
>  		goto do_sync;
> +	}
>  
>  	if (!lock_snap_rwsem && !ci->i_head_snapc) {
>  		lock_snap_rwsem = true;
> @@ -1193,8 +1204,6 @@ int __ceph_setxattr(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
>  	     ceph_cap_string(issued));
>  	__build_xattrs(inode);
>  
> -	required_blob_size = __get_required_blob_size(ci, name_len, val_len);
> -
>  	if (!ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob ||
>  	    required_blob_size > ci->i_xattrs.prealloc_blob->alloc_len) {
>  		struct ceph_buffer *blob;