mm/filemap.c | 8 ++++++-- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
When a THP is present in the page cache, we can return it several times,
leading to userspace seeing the same data repeatedly if doing a read()
that crosses a 64-page boundary. This is probably not a security issue
(since the data all comes from the same file), but it can be interpreted
as a transient data corruption issue. Fortunately, it is very rare as
it can only occur when CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS is enabled, and it can
only happen to executables. We don't often call read() on executables.
This bug is fixed differently in v5.17 by commit 6b24ca4a1a8d
("mm: Use multi-index entries in the page cache"). That commit is
unsuitable for backporting, so fix this in the clearest way. It
sacrifices a little performance for clarity, but this should never
be a performance path in these kernel versions.
Fixes: cbd59c48ae2b ("mm/filemap: use head pages in generic_file_buffered_read")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15, v5.16
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/df3b5d1c-a36b-2c73-3e27-99e74983de3a@suse.cz/
Analyzed-by: Adam Majer <amajer@suse.com>
Analyzed-by: Dirk Mueller <dmueller@suse.com>
Bisected-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
---
mm/filemap.c | 8 ++++++--
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c
index 82a17c35eb96..1293c3409e42 100644
--- a/mm/filemap.c
+++ b/mm/filemap.c
@@ -2354,8 +2354,12 @@ static void filemap_get_read_batch(struct address_space *mapping,
break;
if (PageReadahead(head))
break;
- xas.xa_index = head->index + thp_nr_pages(head) - 1;
- xas.xa_offset = (xas.xa_index >> xas.xa_shift) & XA_CHUNK_MASK;
+ if (PageHead(head)) {
+ xas_set(&xas, head->index + thp_nr_pages(head));
+ /* Handle wrap correctly */
+ if (xas.xa_index - 1 >= max)
+ break;
+ }
continue;
put_page:
put_page(head);
--
2.34.1
On 2/23/22 16:59, Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) wrote:
> When a THP is present in the page cache, we can return it several times,
> leading to userspace seeing the same data repeatedly if doing a read()
> that crosses a 64-page boundary. This is probably not a security issue
> (since the data all comes from the same file), but it can be interpreted
> as a transient data corruption issue. Fortunately, it is very rare as
> it can only occur when CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS is enabled, and it can
> only happen to executables. We don't often call read() on executables.
>
> This bug is fixed differently in v5.17 by commit 6b24ca4a1a8d
> ("mm: Use multi-index entries in the page cache"). That commit is
> unsuitable for backporting, so fix this in the clearest way. It
> sacrifices a little performance for clarity, but this should never
> be a performance path in these kernel versions.
>
> Fixes: cbd59c48ae2b ("mm/filemap: use head pages in generic_file_buffered_read")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15, v5.16
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/df3b5d1c-a36b-2c73-3e27-99e74983de3a@suse.cz/
> Analyzed-by: Adam Majer <amajer@suse.com>
> Analyzed-by: Dirk Mueller <dmueller@suse.com>
> Bisected-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
> Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Replace with:
Reported-and-tested-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
Thanks!
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
> ---
> mm/filemap.c | 8 ++++++--
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c
> index 82a17c35eb96..1293c3409e42 100644
> --- a/mm/filemap.c
> +++ b/mm/filemap.c
> @@ -2354,8 +2354,12 @@ static void filemap_get_read_batch(struct address_space *mapping,
> break;
> if (PageReadahead(head))
> break;
> - xas.xa_index = head->index + thp_nr_pages(head) - 1;
> - xas.xa_offset = (xas.xa_index >> xas.xa_shift) & XA_CHUNK_MASK;
> + if (PageHead(head)) {
> + xas_set(&xas, head->index + thp_nr_pages(head));
> + /* Handle wrap correctly */
> + if (xas.xa_index - 1 >= max)
> + break;
> + }
> continue;
> put_page:
> put_page(head);
On Wed, Feb 23, 2022 at 03:59:18PM +0000, Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) wrote:
> When a THP is present in the page cache, we can return it several times,
> leading to userspace seeing the same data repeatedly if doing a read()
> that crosses a 64-page boundary. This is probably not a security issue
> (since the data all comes from the same file), but it can be interpreted
> as a transient data corruption issue. Fortunately, it is very rare as
> it can only occur when CONFIG_READ_ONLY_THP_FOR_FS is enabled, and it can
> only happen to executables. We don't often call read() on executables.
>
> This bug is fixed differently in v5.17 by commit 6b24ca4a1a8d
> ("mm: Use multi-index entries in the page cache"). That commit is
> unsuitable for backporting, so fix this in the clearest way. It
> sacrifices a little performance for clarity, but this should never
> be a performance path in these kernel versions.
>
> Fixes: cbd59c48ae2b ("mm/filemap: use head pages in generic_file_buffered_read")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.15, v5.16
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/df3b5d1c-a36b-2c73-3e27-99e74983de3a@suse.cz/
> Analyzed-by: Adam Majer <amajer@suse.com>
> Analyzed-by: Dirk Mueller <dmueller@suse.com>
> Bisected-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
> Reported-by: Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>
> Signed-off-by: Matthew Wilcox (Oracle) <willy@infradead.org>
> ---
> mm/filemap.c | 8 ++++++--
> 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/mm/filemap.c b/mm/filemap.c
> index 82a17c35eb96..1293c3409e42 100644
> --- a/mm/filemap.c
> +++ b/mm/filemap.c
> @@ -2354,8 +2354,12 @@ static void filemap_get_read_batch(struct address_space *mapping,
> break;
> if (PageReadahead(head))
> break;
> - xas.xa_index = head->index + thp_nr_pages(head) - 1;
> - xas.xa_offset = (xas.xa_index >> xas.xa_shift) & XA_CHUNK_MASK;
> + if (PageHead(head)) {
> + xas_set(&xas, head->index + thp_nr_pages(head));
> + /* Handle wrap correctly */
> + if (xas.xa_index - 1 >= max)
> + break;
> + }
> continue;
> put_page:
> put_page(head);
> --
> 2.34.1
>
Now queued up, thanks!
greg k-h
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