[XEN PATCH v6 1/3] x86/vmx: guard access to cpu_has_vmx_* in common code

Sergiy Kibrik posted 3 patches 3 months, 2 weeks ago
There is a newer version of this series
[XEN PATCH v6 1/3] x86/vmx: guard access to cpu_has_vmx_* in common code
Posted by Sergiy Kibrik 3 months, 2 weeks ago
There're several places in common code, outside of arch/x86/hvm/vmx,
where cpu_has_vmx_* get accessed without checking whether VMX supported first.
These macros rely on global variables defined in vmx code, so when VMX support
is disabled accesses to these variables turn into build failures.

To overcome these failures, build-time check is done before accessing global
variables, so that DCE would remove these variables.

Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>
Acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
changes in v6:
 - guard all of cpu_has_vmx_* macros
changes in v5:
 - change kconfig option name VMX -> INTEL_VMX
 - do not change .c files, only modify macros in vmcs.h
changes in v4:
 - use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) instead of using_vmx
---
 xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 90 ++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 60 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
index 58140af691..939b87eb50 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -298,69 +298,99 @@ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap;
 #define VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX                  0xffffffffffffffffULL
 
 #define cpu_has_wbinvd_exiting \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_tpr_shadow \
-    (vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_vnmi \
-    (vmx_pin_based_exec_control & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_pin_based_exec_control & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap \
-    (vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_secondary_exec_control \
-    (vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_tertiary_exec_control \
-    (vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_TERTIARY_CONTROLS)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_ept \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_dt_exiting \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_DESCRIPTOR_TABLE_EXITING)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_DESCRIPTOR_TABLE_EXITING)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_vpid \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)
 #define cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag \
-    (vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_MONITOR_TRAP_FLAG)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_pat \
-    (vmx_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_PAT)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_efer \
-    (vmx_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_EFER)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_GUEST_EFER)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_unrestricted_guest \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST)
 #define vmx_unrestricted_guest(v)               \
     ((v)->arch.hvm.vmx.secondary_exec_control & \
      SECONDARY_EXEC_UNRESTRICTED_GUEST)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_ple \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_invpcid \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_X2APIC_MODE)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_posted_intr_processing \
-    (vmx_pin_based_exec_control & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTERRUPT)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_pin_based_exec_control & PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTERRUPT)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_vmcs_shadowing \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMCS_SHADOWING)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VMCS_SHADOWING)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VM_FUNCTIONS)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VM_FUNCTIONS)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_virt_exceptions \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_pml \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_mpx \
-    ((vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) && \
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     (vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) && \
      (vmx_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS))
 #define cpu_has_vmx_xsaves \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_bus_lock_detection \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_BUS_LOCK_DETECTION)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_notify_vm_exiting \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_NOTIFY_VM_EXITING)
 
 #define VMCS_RID_TYPE_MASK              0x80000000U
 
-- 
2.25.1
Re: [XEN PATCH v6 1/3] x86/vmx: guard access to cpu_has_vmx_* in common code
Posted by Jan Beulich 3 months, 1 week ago
On 08.08.2024 12:08, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
> There're several places in common code, outside of arch/x86/hvm/vmx,
> where cpu_has_vmx_* get accessed without checking whether VMX supported first.
> These macros rely on global variables defined in vmx code, so when VMX support
> is disabled accesses to these variables turn into build failures.
> 
> To overcome these failures, build-time check is done before accessing global
> variables, so that DCE would remove these variables.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>
> Acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>

I can accept this is being kind of complete, so
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Howver, ...

> ---
> changes in v6:
>  - guard all of cpu_has_vmx_* macros

... this clearly isn't the case. For one ...
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> @@ -298,69 +298,99 @@ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap;
>  #define VMX_TSC_MULTIPLIER_MAX                  0xffffffffffffffffULL
>  
>  #define cpu_has_wbinvd_exiting \
> -    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING)
> +    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEL_VMX) && \
> +     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_WBINVD_EXITING)

... a few lines up from here there is cpu_has_vmx_virt_spec_ctrl. And
there are quite a few more in vmx.h (don't ask me why things are split
like this). Yet on the grounds that at least this one block of code
now is consistent, I think we can leave further adjustments to possible
later commits.

Jan