[XEN PATCH v4 10/14] x86/vmx: guard access to cpu_has_vmx_* in common code

Sergiy Kibrik posted 14 patches 2 months, 1 week ago
There is a newer version of this series
[XEN PATCH v4 10/14] x86/vmx: guard access to cpu_has_vmx_* in common code
Posted by Sergiy Kibrik 2 months, 1 week ago
There're several places in common code, outside of arch/x86/hvm/vmx,
where cpu_has_vmx_* get accessed without checking whether VMX supported first.
These macros rely on global variables defined in vmx code, so when VMX support
is disabled accesses to these variables turn into build failures.

To overcome these failures, build-time check is done before accessing global
variables, so that DCE would remove these variables.

Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>
CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
changes in v4:
 - use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) instead of using_vmx
changes in v3:
 - using_vmx instead of cpu_has_vmx
 - clarify description on why this change needed
changes in v2:
 - do not touch SVM code and macros
 - drop vmx_ctrl_has_feature()
 - guard cpu_has_vmx_* macros in common code instead
---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c                  |  2 +-
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c    |  4 ++--
 xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 17 +++++++++++------
 xen/arch/x86/traps.c                    |  5 +++--
 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 057c61b4c3..be4d8ddfe7 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -5197,7 +5197,7 @@ int hvm_debug_op(struct vcpu *v, int32_t op)
     {
         case XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_ON:
         case XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_OFF:
-            if ( !cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
+            if ( !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) || !cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
                 return -EOPNOTSUPP;
             break;
         default:
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c
index 0496c52ed5..6f13ecf343 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c
@@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ void cpuid_viridian_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf,
         res->a = CPUID4A_RELAX_TIMER_INT;
         if ( viridian_feature_mask(d) & HVMPV_hcall_remote_tlb_flush )
             res->a |= CPUID4A_HCALL_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH;
-        if ( !cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
+        if ( !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) || !cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
             res->a |= CPUID4A_MSR_BASED_APIC;
         if ( viridian_feature_mask(d) & HVMPV_hcall_ipi )
             res->a |= CPUID4A_SYNTHETIC_CLUSTER_IPI;
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ void cpuid_viridian_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf,
 
     case 6:
         /* Detected and in use hardware features. */
-        if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses )
+        if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses )
             res->a |= CPUID6A_APIC_OVERLAY;
         if ( cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap || (read_efer() & EFER_SVME) )
             res->a |= CPUID6A_MSR_BITMAPS;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
index 58140af691..7421453899 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
@@ -306,7 +306,8 @@ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap;
 #define cpu_has_vmx_vnmi \
     (vmx_pin_based_exec_control & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap \
-    (vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && \
+     vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_secondary_exec_control \
     (vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_SECONDARY_CONTROLS)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_tertiary_exec_control \
@@ -316,7 +317,8 @@ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap;
 #define cpu_has_vmx_dt_exiting \
     (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_DESCRIPTOR_TABLE_EXITING)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_rdtscp \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_RDTSCP)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_vpid \
     (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)
 #define cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag \
@@ -333,7 +335,8 @@ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap;
 #define cpu_has_vmx_ple \
     (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_invpcid \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_INVPCID)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt \
     (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_APIC_REGISTER_VIRT)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery \
@@ -347,14 +350,16 @@ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap;
 #define cpu_has_vmx_vmfunc \
     (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VM_FUNCTIONS)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_virt_exceptions \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VIRT_EXCEPTIONS)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_pml \
     (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_PML)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_mpx \
-    ((vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) && \
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && (vmx_vmexit_control & VM_EXIT_CLEAR_BNDCFGS) && \
      (vmx_vmentry_control & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS))
 #define cpu_has_vmx_xsaves \
-    (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES)
+    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && \
+     vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_XSAVES)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_tsc_scaling \
     (vmx_secondary_exec_control & SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)
 #define cpu_has_vmx_bus_lock_detection \
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
index d2af6d70d2..27115712a4 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/traps.c
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ void cpuid_hypervisor_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf,
         if ( !is_hvm_domain(d) || subleaf != 0 )
             break;
 
-        if ( cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
+        if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
             res->a |= XEN_HVM_CPUID_APIC_ACCESS_VIRT;
 
         /*
@@ -1139,7 +1139,8 @@ void cpuid_hypervisor_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf,
          * and wrmsr in the guest will run without VMEXITs (see
          * vmx_vlapic_msr_changed()).
          */
-        if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode &&
+        if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) &&
+             cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_x2apic_mode &&
              cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt &&
              cpu_has_vmx_virtual_intr_delivery )
             res->a |= XEN_HVM_CPUID_X2APIC_VIRT;
-- 
2.25.1
Re: [XEN PATCH v4 10/14] x86/vmx: guard access to cpu_has_vmx_* in common code
Posted by Jan Beulich 1 month, 3 weeks ago
On 09.07.2024 08:05, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
> @@ -5197,7 +5197,7 @@ int hvm_debug_op(struct vcpu *v, int32_t op)
>      {
>          case XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_ON:
>          case XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_OFF:
> -            if ( !cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
> +            if ( !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) || !cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
>                  return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>              break;

Why at the use site here and ...

> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c
> @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ void cpuid_viridian_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf,
>          res->a = CPUID4A_RELAX_TIMER_INT;
>          if ( viridian_feature_mask(d) & HVMPV_hcall_remote_tlb_flush )
>              res->a |= CPUID4A_HCALL_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH;
> -        if ( !cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
> +        if ( !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) || !cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
>              res->a |= CPUID4A_MSR_BASED_APIC;
>          if ( viridian_feature_mask(d) & HVMPV_hcall_ipi )
>              res->a |= CPUID4A_SYNTHETIC_CLUSTER_IPI;
> @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ void cpuid_viridian_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf,
>  
>      case 6:
>          /* Detected and in use hardware features. */
> -        if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses )
> +        if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses )
>              res->a |= CPUID6A_APIC_OVERLAY;
>          if ( cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap || (read_efer() & EFER_SVME) )
>              res->a |= CPUID6A_MSR_BITMAPS;

... here (and in yet a few more places), but ...

> --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
> @@ -306,7 +306,8 @@ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap;
>  #define cpu_has_vmx_vnmi \
>      (vmx_pin_based_exec_control & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS)
>  #define cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap \
> -    (vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP)
> +    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && \
> +     vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP)

... for others right in the definitions, as was suggested before? Yet then
not consistently for all of them? Looks like if you did this consistently
here, you'd have no need at all to fiddle with any .c file.

Jan
Re: [XEN PATCH v4 10/14] x86/vmx: guard access to cpu_has_vmx_* in common code
Posted by Sergiy Kibrik 1 month, 3 weeks ago
22.07.24 14:43, Jan Beulich:
> On 09.07.2024 08:05, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
>> @@ -5197,7 +5197,7 @@ int hvm_debug_op(struct vcpu *v, int32_t op)
>>       {
>>           case XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_ON:
>>           case XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_OFF:
>> -            if ( !cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
>> +            if ( !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) || !cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
>>                   return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>               break;
> 
> Why at the use site here and ...
> 
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c
>> @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ void cpuid_viridian_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf,
>>           res->a = CPUID4A_RELAX_TIMER_INT;
>>           if ( viridian_feature_mask(d) & HVMPV_hcall_remote_tlb_flush )
>>               res->a |= CPUID4A_HCALL_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH;
>> -        if ( !cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
>> +        if ( !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) || !cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
>>               res->a |= CPUID4A_MSR_BASED_APIC;
>>           if ( viridian_feature_mask(d) & HVMPV_hcall_ipi )
>>               res->a |= CPUID4A_SYNTHETIC_CLUSTER_IPI;
>> @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ void cpuid_viridian_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf,
>>   
>>       case 6:
>>           /* Detected and in use hardware features. */
>> -        if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses )
>> +        if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses )
>>               res->a |= CPUID6A_APIC_OVERLAY;
>>           if ( cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap || (read_efer() & EFER_SVME) )
>>               res->a |= CPUID6A_MSR_BITMAPS;
> 
> ... here (and in yet a few more places), but ...
> 
>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
>> @@ -306,7 +306,8 @@ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap;
>>   #define cpu_has_vmx_vnmi \
>>       (vmx_pin_based_exec_control & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS)
>>   #define cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap \
>> -    (vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP)
>> +    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && \
>> +     vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP)
> 
> ... for others right in the definitions, as was suggested before? Yet then
> not consistently for all of them? Looks like if you did this consistently
> here, you'd have no need at all to fiddle with any .c file.
> 

these modifications in .c files are made mainly to track places where 
build fails and to highlight where global variables are causing a trouble.
cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag and fellow macros are used within VMX code 
mostly and don't need these checks inside of them most of the time -- at 
least so I felt.

As for those cpu_has_vmx_* macros that are modified in header -- these 
are being checked in a bit more tricky way, so instead of making complex 
conditionals even more complicated, I've integrated CONFIG_VMX condition 
check inside these macros instead.

Ofc we can proceed with only .h files modifications, if this is more 
consistent with what is planned for cpu_has_vmx_* checks in future.

   -Sergiy
Re: [XEN PATCH v4 10/14] x86/vmx: guard access to cpu_has_vmx_* in common code
Posted by Jan Beulich 1 month, 3 weeks ago
On 24.07.2024 11:59, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
> 22.07.24 14:43, Jan Beulich:
>> On 09.07.2024 08:05, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
>>> @@ -5197,7 +5197,7 @@ int hvm_debug_op(struct vcpu *v, int32_t op)
>>>       {
>>>           case XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_ON:
>>>           case XEN_DOMCTL_DEBUG_OP_SINGLE_STEP_OFF:
>>> -            if ( !cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
>>> +            if ( !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) || !cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag )
>>>                   return -EOPNOTSUPP;
>>>               break;
>>
>> Why at the use site here and ...
>>
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c
>>> @@ -196,7 +196,7 @@ void cpuid_viridian_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf,
>>>           res->a = CPUID4A_RELAX_TIMER_INT;
>>>           if ( viridian_feature_mask(d) & HVMPV_hcall_remote_tlb_flush )
>>>               res->a |= CPUID4A_HCALL_REMOTE_TLB_FLUSH;
>>> -        if ( !cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
>>> +        if ( !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) || !cpu_has_vmx_apic_reg_virt )
>>>               res->a |= CPUID4A_MSR_BASED_APIC;
>>>           if ( viridian_feature_mask(d) & HVMPV_hcall_ipi )
>>>               res->a |= CPUID4A_SYNTHETIC_CLUSTER_IPI;
>>> @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ void cpuid_viridian_leaves(const struct vcpu *v, uint32_t leaf,
>>>   
>>>       case 6:
>>>           /* Detected and in use hardware features. */
>>> -        if ( cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses )
>>> +        if ( IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && cpu_has_vmx_virtualize_apic_accesses )
>>>               res->a |= CPUID6A_APIC_OVERLAY;
>>>           if ( cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap || (read_efer() & EFER_SVME) )
>>>               res->a |= CPUID6A_MSR_BITMAPS;
>>
>> ... here (and in yet a few more places), but ...
>>
>>> --- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
>>> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h
>>> @@ -306,7 +306,8 @@ extern u64 vmx_ept_vpid_cap;
>>>   #define cpu_has_vmx_vnmi \
>>>       (vmx_pin_based_exec_control & PIN_BASED_VIRTUAL_NMIS)
>>>   #define cpu_has_vmx_msr_bitmap \
>>> -    (vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP)
>>> +    (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) && \
>>> +     vmx_cpu_based_exec_control & CPU_BASED_ACTIVATE_MSR_BITMAP)
>>
>> ... for others right in the definitions, as was suggested before? Yet then
>> not consistently for all of them? Looks like if you did this consistently
>> here, you'd have no need at all to fiddle with any .c file.
>>
> 
> these modifications in .c files are made mainly to track places where 
> build fails and to highlight where global variables are causing a trouble.
> cpu_has_monitor_trap_flag and fellow macros are used within VMX code 
> mostly and don't need these checks inside of them most of the time -- at 
> least so I felt.
> 
> As for those cpu_has_vmx_* macros that are modified in header -- these 
> are being checked in a bit more tricky way, so instead of making complex 
> conditionals even more complicated, I've integrated CONFIG_VMX condition 
> check inside these macros instead.
> 
> Ofc we can proceed with only .h files modifications, if this is more 
> consistent with what is planned for cpu_has_vmx_* checks in future.

Going that route would imo also be more future proof towards guarding
calls to yet to be introduced VMX-only functions.

Jan
Re: [XEN PATCH v4 10/14] x86/vmx: guard access to cpu_has_vmx_* in common code
Posted by Paul Durrant 2 months, 1 week ago
On 09/07/2024 08:05, Sergiy Kibrik wrote:
> There're several places in common code, outside of arch/x86/hvm/vmx,
> where cpu_has_vmx_* get accessed without checking whether VMX supported first.
> These macros rely on global variables defined in vmx code, so when VMX support
> is disabled accesses to these variables turn into build failures.
> 
> To overcome these failures, build-time check is done before accessing global
> variables, so that DCE would remove these variables.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Sergiy Kibrik <Sergiy_Kibrik@epam.com>
> CC: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> CC: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> ---
> changes in v4:
>   - use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_VMX) instead of using_vmx
> changes in v3:
>   - using_vmx instead of cpu_has_vmx
>   - clarify description on why this change needed
> changes in v2:
>   - do not touch SVM code and macros
>   - drop vmx_ctrl_has_feature()
>   - guard cpu_has_vmx_* macros in common code instead
> ---
>   xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c                  |  2 +-
>   xen/arch/x86/hvm/viridian/viridian.c    |  4 ++--
>   xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 17 +++++++++++------
>   xen/arch/x86/traps.c                    |  5 +++--
>   4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
> 

Viridian changes...

Acked-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>