[XEN PATCH 07/13] x86/hvm: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3

Federico Serafini posted 13 patches 5 months, 1 week ago
There is a newer version of this series
[XEN PATCH 07/13] x86/hvm: address violations of MISRA C Rule 16.3
Posted by Federico Serafini 5 months, 1 week ago
MISRA C Rule 16.3 states that "An unconditional `break' statement shall
terminate every switch-clause".

Add pseudo keyword fallthrough and missing break statement
to address violations of the rule.

As a defensive measure, return -EOPNOTSUPP in case an unreachable return
statement is reached.

Signed-off-by: Federico Serafini <federico.serafini@bugseng.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c   | 3 +++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c       | 6 ++++++
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c | 1 +
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c       | 1 +
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
index 02e378365b..6d0fba9285 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
@@ -2674,6 +2674,7 @@ static int _hvm_emulate_one(struct hvm_emulate_ctxt *hvmemul_ctxt,
 
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        break;
     }
 
     if ( hvmemul_ctxt->ctxt.retire.singlestep )
@@ -2764,6 +2765,7 @@ int hvm_emulate_one_mmio(unsigned long mfn, unsigned long gla)
         /* fallthrough */
     default:
         hvm_emulate_writeback(&ctxt);
+        break;
     }
 
     return rc;
@@ -2803,6 +2805,7 @@ void hvm_emulate_one_vm_event(enum emul_kind kind, unsigned int trapnr,
     default:
         ctx.set_context = (kind == EMUL_KIND_SET_CONTEXT_DATA);
         rc = hvm_emulate_one(&ctx, VIO_no_completion);
+        break;
     }
 
     switch ( rc )
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
index 7f4b627b1f..c263e562ff 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -4919,6 +4919,8 @@ static int do_altp2m_op(
 
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+        break;
     }
 
  out:
@@ -5020,6 +5022,8 @@ static int compat_altp2m_op(
 
     default:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
+        rc = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+        break;
     }
 
     return rc;
@@ -5283,6 +5287,8 @@ void hvm_get_segment_register(struct vcpu *v, enum x86_segment seg,
          * %cs and %tr are unconditionally present.  SVM ignores these present
          * bits and will happily run without them set.
          */
+        fallthrough;
+
     case x86_seg_cs:
         reg->p = 1;
         break;
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c
index 7fb3136f0c..2271afe02a 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hypercall.c
@@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ int hvm_hypercall(struct cpu_user_regs *regs)
     case 8:
         eax = regs->rax;
         /* Fallthrough to permission check. */
+        fallthrough;
     case 4:
     case 2:
         if ( currd->arch.monitor.guest_request_userspace_enabled &&
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
index 210cebb0e6..1eab44defc 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/irq.c
@@ -282,6 +282,7 @@ static void hvm_set_callback_irq_level(struct vcpu *v)
             __hvm_pci_intx_assert(d, pdev, pintx);
         else
             __hvm_pci_intx_deassert(d, pdev, pintx);
+        break;
     default:
         break;
     }
-- 
2.34.1