Dom0 normally informs Xen of PCI device removal via
PHYSDEVOP_pci_device_remove, e.g. in response to SR-IOV disable or
hot-unplug. We might find ourselves with stale pdevs if a buggy dom0
fails to report removal via PHYSDEVOP_pci_device_remove. In this case,
attempts to access the config space of the stale pdevs would be invalid
and return all 1s.
Some possible conditions leading to this are:
1. Dom0 disables SR-IOV without reporting VF removal to Xen.
The Linux SR-IOV subsystem normally reports VF removal when a PF driver
disables SR-IOV. In case of a buggy dom0 SR-IOV subsystem, SR-IOV could
become disabled with stale dangling VF pdevs in both dom0 Linux and Xen.
2. Dom0 reporting PF removal without reporting VF removal.
During SR-IOV PF removal (hot-unplug), a buggy PF driver may fail to
disable SR-IOV, thus failing to remove the VFs, leaving stale dangling
VFs behind in both Xen and Linux. At least Linux warns in this case:
[ 100.000000] 0000:01:00.0: driver left SR-IOV enabled after remove
In either case, Xen is left with stale VF pdevs, risking invalid PCI
config space accesses.
When Xen is built with CONFIG_DEBUG=y, the following Xen crashes were
observed when dom0 attempted to access the config space of a stale VF:
(XEN) Assertion 'pos' failed at arch/x86/msi.c:1274
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.20-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]----
...
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d040346834>] R pci_msi_conf_write_intercept+0xa2/0x1de
(XEN) [<ffff82d04035d6b4>] F pci_conf_write_intercept+0x68/0x78
(XEN) [<ffff82d0403264e5>] F arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c#pci_cfg_ok+0xa0/0x114
(XEN) [<ffff82d04032660e>] F arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c#guest_io_write+0xb5/0x1c8
(XEN) [<ffff82d0403267bb>] F arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c#write_io+0x9a/0xe0
(XEN) [<ffff82d04037c77a>] F x86_emulate+0x100e5/0x25f1e
(XEN) [<ffff82d0403941a8>] F x86_emulate_wrapper+0x29/0x64
(XEN) [<ffff82d04032802b>] F pv_emulate_privileged_op+0x12e/0x217
(XEN) [<ffff82d040369f12>] F do_general_protection+0xc2/0x1b8
(XEN) [<ffff82d040201aa7>] F x86_64/entry.S#handle_exception_saved+0x2b/0x8c
(XEN) Assertion 'pos' failed at arch/x86/msi.c:1246
(XEN) ----[ Xen-4.20-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]----
...
(XEN) Xen call trace:
(XEN) [<ffff82d040346b0a>] R pci_reset_msix_state+0x47/0x50
(XEN) [<ffff82d040287eec>] F pdev_msix_assign+0x19/0x35
(XEN) [<ffff82d040286184>] F drivers/passthrough/pci.c#assign_device+0x181/0x471
(XEN) [<ffff82d040287c36>] F iommu_do_pci_domctl+0x248/0x2ec
(XEN) [<ffff82d040284e1f>] F iommu_do_domctl+0x26/0x44
(XEN) [<ffff82d0402483b8>] F do_domctl+0x8c1/0x1660
(XEN) [<ffff82d04032977e>] F pv_hypercall+0x5ce/0x6af
(XEN) [<ffff82d0402012d3>] F lstar_enter+0x143/0x150
These ASSERTs triggered because the MSI-X capability position can't be
found for a stale pdev.
Latch the capability positions of MSI and MSI-X during device init, and
replace instances of pci_find_cap_offset(..., PCI_CAP_ID_MSI{,X}) with
the stored value. Introduce one additional ASSERT, while the two
existing ASSERTs in question continue to work as intended, even with a
stale pdev.
Fixes: 484d7c852e4f ("x86/MSI-X: track host and guest mask-all requests separately")
Fixes: 575e18d54d19 ("pci: clear {host/guest}_maskall field on assign")
Signed-off-by: Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@amd.com>
---
v5->v6;
* latch MSI/MSI-X capability position during device init
v4->v5:
* new patch, independent of the rest of the series
* new approach to fixing the issue: don't rely on dom0 to report any
sort of device removal; rather, fix the condition directly
---
Instructions to reproduce
Requires Xen with CONFIG_DEBUG=y
Tested with Linux 6.11
1. Dom0 disables SR-IOV without reporting VF removal to Xen.
* Hack the Linux SR-IOV subsystem to remove the call to
pci_stop_and_remove_bus_device() in
drivers/pci/iov.c:pci_iov_remove_virtfn().
* Enable SR-IOV, then disable SR-IOV
echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:01\:00.0/sriov_numvfs
echo 0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:01\:00.0/sriov_numvfs
* Now we have a stale VF. We can trigger the ASSERT either by unbinding
the VF driver and issuing a reset...
echo 0000\:01\:10.0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:01\:10.0/driver/unbind
echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:01\:10.0/reset
... or by doing xl pci-assignable-add
xl pci-assignable-add 01:10.0
2. Dom0 reporting PF removal without reporting VF removal.
* Hack your PF driver to leave SR-IOV enabled when removing the device
* Enable SR-IOV
echo 1 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:01\:00.0/sriov_numvfs
* Unplug the PCI device
(qemu) device_del mydev
* Now we have a stale VF. We can trigger the ASSERT either by re-adding
the PF device with SR-IOV disabled...
echo 0000\:01\:10.0 > /sys/bus/pci/devices/0000\:01\:10.0/driver/unbind
(qemu) device_add igb,id=mydev,bus=pcie.1,netdev=net1
... or by reset / xl pci-assignable-add as above.
---
xen/arch/x86/msi.c | 19 +++++++++----------
xen/drivers/passthrough/msi.c | 3 +++
xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c | 2 +-
xen/drivers/vpci/msix.c | 2 +-
xen/include/xen/pci.h | 3 +++
5 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
index ff2e3d86878d..5e24df7be0c0 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
@@ -278,23 +278,21 @@ void __msi_set_enable(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 slot, u8 func, int pos, int enable)
static void msi_set_enable(struct pci_dev *dev, int enable)
{
- int pos;
+ int pos = dev->msi_pos;
u16 seg = dev->seg;
u8 bus = dev->bus;
u8 slot = PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn);
u8 func = PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn);
- pos = pci_find_cap_offset(dev->sbdf, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI);
if ( pos )
__msi_set_enable(seg, bus, slot, func, pos, enable);
}
static void msix_set_enable(struct pci_dev *dev, int enable)
{
- int pos;
+ int pos = dev->msix_pos;
uint16_t control;
- pos = pci_find_cap_offset(dev->sbdf, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
if ( pos )
{
control = pci_conf_read16(dev->sbdf, msix_control_reg(pos));
@@ -601,7 +599,7 @@ static int msi_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
uint16_t control;
ASSERT_PDEV_LIST_IS_READ_LOCKED(dev->domain);
- pos = pci_find_cap_offset(dev->sbdf, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI);
+ pos = dev->msi_pos;
if ( !pos )
return -ENODEV;
control = pci_conf_read16(dev->sbdf, msi_control_reg(pos));
@@ -764,7 +762,7 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
u8 slot = PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn);
u8 func = PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn);
bool maskall = msix->host_maskall, zap_on_error = false;
- unsigned int pos = pci_find_cap_offset(dev->sbdf, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+ unsigned int pos = dev->msix_pos;
if ( !pos )
return -ENODEV;
@@ -1133,11 +1131,13 @@ static void _pci_cleanup_msix(struct arch_msix *msix)
static void __pci_disable_msix(struct msi_desc *entry)
{
struct pci_dev *dev = entry->dev;
- unsigned int pos = pci_find_cap_offset(dev->sbdf, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+ unsigned int pos = dev->msix_pos;
u16 control = pci_conf_read16(dev->sbdf,
msix_control_reg(entry->msi_attrib.pos));
bool maskall = dev->msix->host_maskall;
+ ASSERT(pos);
+
if ( unlikely(!(control & PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_ENABLE)) )
{
dev->msix->host_maskall = 1;
@@ -1241,7 +1241,7 @@ void pci_cleanup_msi(struct pci_dev *pdev)
int pci_reset_msix_state(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
- unsigned int pos = pci_find_cap_offset(pdev->sbdf, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+ unsigned int pos = pdev->msix_pos;
ASSERT(pos);
/*
@@ -1269,8 +1269,7 @@ int pci_msi_conf_write_intercept(struct pci_dev *pdev, unsigned int reg,
if ( pdev->msix )
{
entry = find_msi_entry(pdev, -1, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
- pos = entry ? entry->msi_attrib.pos
- : pci_find_cap_offset(pdev->sbdf, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+ pos = entry ? entry->msi_attrib.pos : pdev->msix_pos;
ASSERT(pos);
if ( reg >= pos && reg < msix_pba_offset_reg(pos) + 4 )
diff --git a/xen/drivers/passthrough/msi.c b/xen/drivers/passthrough/msi.c
index 13d904692ef8..ed2bc7ebe635 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/passthrough/msi.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/passthrough/msi.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ int pdev_msi_init(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
uint16_t ctrl = pci_conf_read16(pdev->sbdf, msi_control_reg(pos));
+ pdev->msi_pos = pos;
pdev->msi_maxvec = multi_msi_capable(ctrl);
}
@@ -41,6 +42,8 @@ int pdev_msi_init(struct pci_dev *pdev)
if ( !msix )
return -ENOMEM;
+ pdev->msix_pos = pos;
+
spin_lock_init(&msix->table_lock);
ctrl = pci_conf_read16(pdev->sbdf, msix_control_reg(pos));
diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c
index dd6620ec5674..66e5a8a116be 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/msi.c
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ static void cf_check mask_write(
static int cf_check init_msi(struct pci_dev *pdev)
{
- unsigned int pos = pci_find_cap_offset(pdev->sbdf, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI);
+ unsigned int pos = pdev->msi_pos;
uint16_t control;
int ret;
diff --git a/xen/drivers/vpci/msix.c b/xen/drivers/vpci/msix.c
index 5bb4444ce21f..6bd8c55bb48e 100644
--- a/xen/drivers/vpci/msix.c
+++ b/xen/drivers/vpci/msix.c
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ static int cf_check init_msix(struct pci_dev *pdev)
struct vpci_msix *msix;
int rc;
- msix_offset = pci_find_cap_offset(pdev->sbdf, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
+ msix_offset = pdev->msix_pos;
if ( !msix_offset )
return 0;
diff --git a/xen/include/xen/pci.h b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
index 63e49f0117e9..ef56e80651d6 100644
--- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
+++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
@@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ struct pci_dev {
pci_sbdf_t sbdf;
};
+ unsigned int msi_pos;
+ unsigned int msix_pos;
+
uint8_t msi_maxvec;
uint8_t phantom_stride;
--
2.47.0On 18.10.2024 22:39, Stewart Hildebrand wrote:
> Dom0 normally informs Xen of PCI device removal via
> PHYSDEVOP_pci_device_remove, e.g. in response to SR-IOV disable or
> hot-unplug. We might find ourselves with stale pdevs if a buggy dom0
> fails to report removal via PHYSDEVOP_pci_device_remove. In this case,
> attempts to access the config space of the stale pdevs would be invalid
> and return all 1s.
>
> Some possible conditions leading to this are:
>
> 1. Dom0 disables SR-IOV without reporting VF removal to Xen.
>
> The Linux SR-IOV subsystem normally reports VF removal when a PF driver
> disables SR-IOV. In case of a buggy dom0 SR-IOV subsystem, SR-IOV could
> become disabled with stale dangling VF pdevs in both dom0 Linux and Xen.
>
> 2. Dom0 reporting PF removal without reporting VF removal.
>
> During SR-IOV PF removal (hot-unplug), a buggy PF driver may fail to
> disable SR-IOV, thus failing to remove the VFs, leaving stale dangling
> VFs behind in both Xen and Linux. At least Linux warns in this case:
>
> [ 100.000000] 0000:01:00.0: driver left SR-IOV enabled after remove
>
> In either case, Xen is left with stale VF pdevs, risking invalid PCI
> config space accesses.
>
> When Xen is built with CONFIG_DEBUG=y, the following Xen crashes were
> observed when dom0 attempted to access the config space of a stale VF:
>
> (XEN) Assertion 'pos' failed at arch/x86/msi.c:1274
> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.20-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]----
> ...
> (XEN) Xen call trace:
> (XEN) [<ffff82d040346834>] R pci_msi_conf_write_intercept+0xa2/0x1de
> (XEN) [<ffff82d04035d6b4>] F pci_conf_write_intercept+0x68/0x78
> (XEN) [<ffff82d0403264e5>] F arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c#pci_cfg_ok+0xa0/0x114
> (XEN) [<ffff82d04032660e>] F arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c#guest_io_write+0xb5/0x1c8
> (XEN) [<ffff82d0403267bb>] F arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c#write_io+0x9a/0xe0
> (XEN) [<ffff82d04037c77a>] F x86_emulate+0x100e5/0x25f1e
> (XEN) [<ffff82d0403941a8>] F x86_emulate_wrapper+0x29/0x64
> (XEN) [<ffff82d04032802b>] F pv_emulate_privileged_op+0x12e/0x217
> (XEN) [<ffff82d040369f12>] F do_general_protection+0xc2/0x1b8
> (XEN) [<ffff82d040201aa7>] F x86_64/entry.S#handle_exception_saved+0x2b/0x8c
>
> (XEN) Assertion 'pos' failed at arch/x86/msi.c:1246
> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.20-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]----
> ...
> (XEN) Xen call trace:
> (XEN) [<ffff82d040346b0a>] R pci_reset_msix_state+0x47/0x50
> (XEN) [<ffff82d040287eec>] F pdev_msix_assign+0x19/0x35
> (XEN) [<ffff82d040286184>] F drivers/passthrough/pci.c#assign_device+0x181/0x471
> (XEN) [<ffff82d040287c36>] F iommu_do_pci_domctl+0x248/0x2ec
> (XEN) [<ffff82d040284e1f>] F iommu_do_domctl+0x26/0x44
> (XEN) [<ffff82d0402483b8>] F do_domctl+0x8c1/0x1660
> (XEN) [<ffff82d04032977e>] F pv_hypercall+0x5ce/0x6af
> (XEN) [<ffff82d0402012d3>] F lstar_enter+0x143/0x150
>
> These ASSERTs triggered because the MSI-X capability position can't be
> found for a stale pdev.
>
> Latch the capability positions of MSI and MSI-X during device init, and
> replace instances of pci_find_cap_offset(..., PCI_CAP_ID_MSI{,X}) with
> the stored value. Introduce one additional ASSERT, while the two
> existing ASSERTs in question continue to work as intended, even with a
> stale pdev.
>
> Fixes: 484d7c852e4f ("x86/MSI-X: track host and guest mask-all requests separately")
> Fixes: 575e18d54d19 ("pci: clear {host/guest}_maskall field on assign")
> Signed-off-by: Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@amd.com>
Looks largely okay to me now, just two type selection aspects:
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
> @@ -278,23 +278,21 @@ void __msi_set_enable(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 slot, u8 func, int pos, int enable)
>
> static void msi_set_enable(struct pci_dev *dev, int enable)
> {
> - int pos;
> + int pos = dev->msi_pos;
This and ...
> u16 seg = dev->seg;
> u8 bus = dev->bus;
> u8 slot = PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn);
> u8 func = PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn);
>
> - pos = pci_find_cap_offset(dev->sbdf, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI);
> if ( pos )
> __msi_set_enable(seg, bus, slot, func, pos, enable);
> }
>
> static void msix_set_enable(struct pci_dev *dev, int enable)
> {
> - int pos;
> + int pos = dev->msix_pos;
... this want to become unsigned int at this occasion, imo. Like we have ...
> @@ -764,7 +762,7 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
> u8 slot = PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn);
> u8 func = PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn);
> bool maskall = msix->host_maskall, zap_on_error = false;
> - unsigned int pos = pci_find_cap_offset(dev->sbdf, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
> + unsigned int pos = dev->msix_pos;
... e.g. here already.
> --- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
> +++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
> @@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ struct pci_dev {
> pci_sbdf_t sbdf;
> };
>
> + unsigned int msi_pos;
> + unsigned int msix_pos;
> +
> uint8_t msi_maxvec;
> uint8_t phantom_stride;
As can be seen from the subsequent members, we're trying to be space
conserving here. Both fields won't require more than 8 bits, so uint8_t
or unsigned char would be the better type to use. Again imo. Preferably
with those adjustments (which could likely be done while committing)
Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
Jan
On Mon, Oct 28, 2024 at 05:58:28PM +0100, Jan Beulich wrote:
> On 18.10.2024 22:39, Stewart Hildebrand wrote:
> > Dom0 normally informs Xen of PCI device removal via
> > PHYSDEVOP_pci_device_remove, e.g. in response to SR-IOV disable or
> > hot-unplug. We might find ourselves with stale pdevs if a buggy dom0
> > fails to report removal via PHYSDEVOP_pci_device_remove. In this case,
> > attempts to access the config space of the stale pdevs would be invalid
> > and return all 1s.
> >
> > Some possible conditions leading to this are:
> >
> > 1. Dom0 disables SR-IOV without reporting VF removal to Xen.
> >
> > The Linux SR-IOV subsystem normally reports VF removal when a PF driver
> > disables SR-IOV. In case of a buggy dom0 SR-IOV subsystem, SR-IOV could
> > become disabled with stale dangling VF pdevs in both dom0 Linux and Xen.
> >
> > 2. Dom0 reporting PF removal without reporting VF removal.
> >
> > During SR-IOV PF removal (hot-unplug), a buggy PF driver may fail to
> > disable SR-IOV, thus failing to remove the VFs, leaving stale dangling
> > VFs behind in both Xen and Linux. At least Linux warns in this case:
> >
> > [ 100.000000] 0000:01:00.0: driver left SR-IOV enabled after remove
> >
> > In either case, Xen is left with stale VF pdevs, risking invalid PCI
> > config space accesses.
> >
> > When Xen is built with CONFIG_DEBUG=y, the following Xen crashes were
> > observed when dom0 attempted to access the config space of a stale VF:
> >
> > (XEN) Assertion 'pos' failed at arch/x86/msi.c:1274
> > (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.20-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]----
> > ...
> > (XEN) Xen call trace:
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d040346834>] R pci_msi_conf_write_intercept+0xa2/0x1de
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d04035d6b4>] F pci_conf_write_intercept+0x68/0x78
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d0403264e5>] F arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c#pci_cfg_ok+0xa0/0x114
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d04032660e>] F arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c#guest_io_write+0xb5/0x1c8
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d0403267bb>] F arch/x86/pv/emul-priv-op.c#write_io+0x9a/0xe0
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d04037c77a>] F x86_emulate+0x100e5/0x25f1e
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d0403941a8>] F x86_emulate_wrapper+0x29/0x64
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d04032802b>] F pv_emulate_privileged_op+0x12e/0x217
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d040369f12>] F do_general_protection+0xc2/0x1b8
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d040201aa7>] F x86_64/entry.S#handle_exception_saved+0x2b/0x8c
> >
> > (XEN) Assertion 'pos' failed at arch/x86/msi.c:1246
> > (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.20-unstable x86_64 debug=y Tainted: C ]----
> > ...
> > (XEN) Xen call trace:
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d040346b0a>] R pci_reset_msix_state+0x47/0x50
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d040287eec>] F pdev_msix_assign+0x19/0x35
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d040286184>] F drivers/passthrough/pci.c#assign_device+0x181/0x471
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d040287c36>] F iommu_do_pci_domctl+0x248/0x2ec
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d040284e1f>] F iommu_do_domctl+0x26/0x44
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d0402483b8>] F do_domctl+0x8c1/0x1660
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d04032977e>] F pv_hypercall+0x5ce/0x6af
> > (XEN) [<ffff82d0402012d3>] F lstar_enter+0x143/0x150
> >
> > These ASSERTs triggered because the MSI-X capability position can't be
> > found for a stale pdev.
> >
> > Latch the capability positions of MSI and MSI-X during device init, and
> > replace instances of pci_find_cap_offset(..., PCI_CAP_ID_MSI{,X}) with
> > the stored value. Introduce one additional ASSERT, while the two
> > existing ASSERTs in question continue to work as intended, even with a
> > stale pdev.
> >
> > Fixes: 484d7c852e4f ("x86/MSI-X: track host and guest mask-all requests separately")
> > Fixes: 575e18d54d19 ("pci: clear {host/guest}_maskall field on assign")
> > Signed-off-by: Stewart Hildebrand <stewart.hildebrand@amd.com>
>
> Looks largely okay to me now, just two type selection aspects:
>
> > --- a/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
> > +++ b/xen/arch/x86/msi.c
> > @@ -278,23 +278,21 @@ void __msi_set_enable(u16 seg, u8 bus, u8 slot, u8 func, int pos, int enable)
> >
> > static void msi_set_enable(struct pci_dev *dev, int enable)
> > {
> > - int pos;
> > + int pos = dev->msi_pos;
>
> This and ...
>
> > u16 seg = dev->seg;
> > u8 bus = dev->bus;
> > u8 slot = PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn);
> > u8 func = PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn);
> >
> > - pos = pci_find_cap_offset(dev->sbdf, PCI_CAP_ID_MSI);
> > if ( pos )
> > __msi_set_enable(seg, bus, slot, func, pos, enable);
> > }
> >
> > static void msix_set_enable(struct pci_dev *dev, int enable)
> > {
> > - int pos;
> > + int pos = dev->msix_pos;
>
> ... this want to become unsigned int at this occasion, imo. Like we have ...
>
> > @@ -764,7 +762,7 @@ static int msix_capability_init(struct pci_dev *dev,
> > u8 slot = PCI_SLOT(dev->devfn);
> > u8 func = PCI_FUNC(dev->devfn);
> > bool maskall = msix->host_maskall, zap_on_error = false;
> > - unsigned int pos = pci_find_cap_offset(dev->sbdf, PCI_CAP_ID_MSIX);
> > + unsigned int pos = dev->msix_pos;
>
> ... e.g. here already.
>
> > --- a/xen/include/xen/pci.h
> > +++ b/xen/include/xen/pci.h
> > @@ -113,6 +113,9 @@ struct pci_dev {
> > pci_sbdf_t sbdf;
> > };
> >
> > + unsigned int msi_pos;
> > + unsigned int msix_pos;
> > +
> > uint8_t msi_maxvec;
> > uint8_t phantom_stride;
>
> As can be seen from the subsequent members, we're trying to be space
> conserving here. Both fields won't require more than 8 bits, so uint8_t
> or unsigned char would be the better type to use. Again imo. Preferably
> with those adjustments (which could likely be done while committing)
> Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
uint8_t would seem preferable here, as it's fixed-size width clearly
related to the offset into the PCI configuration space for a device.
It might also be worth noting in the commit message that having the
position cached should be a small perf improvement, by not having to
walk the capability list each time.
Anyway, no strong opinion about the commit message adjustment, so with
the type changed:
Reviewed-by: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Thanks, Roger.
On 28.10.2024 18:53, Roger Pau Monné wrote: > Anyway, no strong opinion about the commit message adjustment, so with > the type changed: Btw, while preparing this patch for committing I ended up confused by this: I can't find any request to adjust the commit message. The only other thing I had asked for where plain int -> unsigned int adjustments. Jan
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