Patches 1-3 fix actual or latent bugs causing uninitialised stack to leak into
the trace buffers.  Xentrace is a developer/debugging activity restricted to
fully privileged entities, so the leaking of uninitialised stack contents is
not a security concern here.

Patches 4-6 are various pieces of cleanup.  This entire subsystem is a mess,
but the practical gains in patch 4 speak for themselves.

Andrew Cooper (6):
  xen/trace: Don't over-read trace objects
  xen/memory: Remove tail padding from TRC_MEM_* records
  xen/credit2: Remove tail padding from TRC_CSCHED2_* records
  x86/trace: Reduce stack usage from HVMTRACE_ND()
  xen/credit2: Clean up trace handling
  xen/trace: Minor code cleanup

 tools/xentrace/formats          |   4 +
 tools/xentrace/xenalyze.c       |  12 +-
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c      |   8 +-
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/vmx/vmx.c      |   9 +-
 xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m-pod.c       |  17 +-
 xen/common/memory.c             |   4 +-
 xen/common/sched/credit2.c      | 343 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
 xen/common/trace.c              |  58 +++----
 xen/include/asm-x86/hvm/trace.h |  30 ++--
 9 files changed, 235 insertions(+), 250 deletions(-)

-- 
2.11.0