[PATCH v2] x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled

Juergen Gross posted 1 patch 3 years, 2 months ago
Failed in applying to current master (apply log)
arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h |  1 +
arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c     | 14 +++++++++++++-
arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S          |  1 +
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
[PATCH v2] x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled
Posted by Juergen Gross 3 years, 2 months ago
When booting a kernel which has been built with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
enabled as a Xen pv guest a warning is issued for each processor:

[    5.964347] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[    5.968314] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 1 at /home/gross/linux/head/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c:660 get_trap_addr+0x59/0x90
[    5.972321] Modules linked in:
[    5.976313] CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Tainted: G        W         5.11.0-rc5-default #75
[    5.980313] Hardware name: Dell Inc. OptiPlex 9020/0PC5F7, BIOS A05 12/05/2013
[    5.984313] RIP: e030:get_trap_addr+0x59/0x90
[    5.988313] Code: 42 10 83 f0 01 85 f6 74 04 84 c0 75 1d b8 01 00 00 00 c3 48 3d 00 80 83 82 72 08 48 3d 20 81 83 82 72 0c b8 01 00 00 00 eb db <0f> 0b 31 c0 c3 48 2d 00 80 83 82 48 ba 72 1c c7 71 1c c7 71 1c 48
[    5.992313] RSP: e02b:ffffc90040033d38 EFLAGS: 00010202
[    5.996313] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffffffff82a141d0 RCX: ffffffff8222ec38
[    6.000312] RDX: ffffffff8222ec38 RSI: 0000000000000005 RDI: ffffc90040033d40
[    6.004313] RBP: ffff8881003984a0 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: ffff888100398000
[    6.008312] R10: 0000000000000007 R11: ffffc90040246000 R12: ffff8884082182a8
[    6.012313] R13: 0000000000000100 R14: 000000000000001d R15: ffff8881003982d0
[    6.016316] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888408200000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[    6.020313] CS:  e030 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[    6.024313] CR2: ffffc900020ef000 CR3: 000000000220a000 CR4: 0000000000050660
[    6.028314] Call Trace:
[    6.032313]  cvt_gate_to_trap.part.7+0x3f/0x90
[    6.036313]  ? asm_exc_double_fault+0x30/0x30
[    6.040313]  xen_convert_trap_info+0x87/0xd0
[    6.044313]  xen_pv_cpu_up+0x17a/0x450
[    6.048313]  bringup_cpu+0x2b/0xc0
[    6.052313]  ? cpus_read_trylock+0x50/0x50
[    6.056313]  cpuhp_invoke_callback+0x80/0x4c0
[    6.060313]  _cpu_up+0xa7/0x140
[    6.064313]  cpu_up+0x98/0xd0
[    6.068313]  bringup_nonboot_cpus+0x4f/0x60
[    6.072313]  smp_init+0x26/0x79
[    6.076313]  kernel_init_freeable+0x103/0x258
[    6.080313]  ? rest_init+0xd0/0xd0
[    6.084313]  kernel_init+0xa/0x110
[    6.088313]  ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[    6.092313] ---[ end trace be9ecf17dceeb4f3 ]---

Reason is that there is no Xen pv trap entry for X86_TRAP_VC.

Fix that by adding a generic trap handler for unknown traps and wire all
unknown bare metal handlers to this generic handler, which will just
panic the system in case such a trap will ever happen.

Fixes: 0786138c78e793 ("x86/sev-es: Add a Runtime #VC Exception Handler")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v5.10
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
V2:
- use generic handler for unknown traps (Andrew Cooper)
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h |  1 +
 arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c     | 14 +++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S          |  1 +
 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
index 247a60a47331..f656aabd1545 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h
@@ -613,6 +613,7 @@ DECLARE_IDTENTRY_VC(X86_TRAP_VC,	exc_vmm_communication);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_XEN_PV
 DECLARE_IDTENTRY_XENCB(X86_TRAP_OTHER,	exc_xen_hypervisor_callback);
+DECLARE_IDTENTRY_RAW(X86_TRAP_OTHER,	exc_xen_unknown_trap);
 #endif
 
 /* Device interrupts common/spurious */
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
index 4409306364dc..ca5ac10fcbf7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
@@ -583,6 +583,12 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(xenpv_exc_debug)
 		exc_debug(regs);
 }
 
+DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_xen_unknown_trap)
+{
+	/* This should never happen and there is no way to handle it. */
+	panic("Unknown trap in Xen PV mode.");
+}
+
 struct trap_array_entry {
 	void (*orig)(void);
 	void (*xen)(void);
@@ -631,6 +637,7 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist)
 {
 	unsigned int nr;
 	bool ist_okay = false;
+	bool found = false;
 
 	/*
 	 * Replace trap handler addresses by Xen specific ones.
@@ -645,6 +652,7 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist)
 		if (*addr == entry->orig) {
 			*addr = entry->xen;
 			ist_okay = entry->ist_okay;
+			found = true;
 			break;
 		}
 	}
@@ -655,9 +663,13 @@ static bool __ref get_trap_addr(void **addr, unsigned int ist)
 		nr = (*addr - (void *)early_idt_handler_array[0]) /
 		     EARLY_IDT_HANDLER_SIZE;
 		*addr = (void *)xen_early_idt_handler_array[nr];
+		found = true;
 	}
 
-	if (WARN_ON(ist != 0 && !ist_okay))
+	if (!found)
+		*addr = (void *)xen_asm_exc_xen_unknown_trap;
+
+	if (WARN_ON(found && ist != 0 && !ist_okay))
 		return false;
 
 	return true;
diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
index 1cb0e84b9161..53cf8aa35032 100644
--- a/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
+++ b/arch/x86/xen/xen-asm.S
@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ xen_pv_trap asm_exc_simd_coprocessor_error
 #ifdef CONFIG_IA32_EMULATION
 xen_pv_trap entry_INT80_compat
 #endif
+xen_pv_trap asm_exc_xen_unknown_trap
 xen_pv_trap asm_exc_xen_hypervisor_callback
 
 	__INIT
-- 
2.26.2


Re: [PATCH v2] x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled
Posted by Andrew Cooper 3 years, 2 months ago
On 27/01/2021 09:38, Juergen Gross wrote:
> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
> index 4409306364dc..ca5ac10fcbf7 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
> @@ -583,6 +583,12 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(xenpv_exc_debug)
>  		exc_debug(regs);
>  }
>  
> +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_xen_unknown_trap)
> +{
> +	/* This should never happen and there is no way to handle it. */
> +	panic("Unknown trap in Xen PV mode.");

Looks much better.  How about including regs->entry_vector here, just to
short circuit the inevitable swearing which will accompany encountering
this panic() ?

~Andrew

Re: [PATCH v2] x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled
Posted by Jürgen Groß 3 years, 2 months ago
On 27.01.21 10:43, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 27/01/2021 09:38, Juergen Gross wrote:
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>> index 4409306364dc..ca5ac10fcbf7 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>> @@ -583,6 +583,12 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(xenpv_exc_debug)
>>   		exc_debug(regs);
>>   }
>>   
>> +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_xen_unknown_trap)
>> +{
>> +	/* This should never happen and there is no way to handle it. */
>> +	panic("Unknown trap in Xen PV mode.");
> 
> Looks much better.  How about including regs->entry_vector here, just to
> short circuit the inevitable swearing which will accompany encountering
> this panic() ?

You are aware the regs parameter is struct pt_regs *, not the Xen
struct cpu_user_regs *?

So I have no idea how I should get this information without creating
a per-vector handler.


Juergen
Re: [PATCH v2] x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled
Posted by Andrew Cooper 3 years, 2 months ago
On 27/01/2021 10:26, Jürgen Groß wrote:
> On 27.01.21 10:43, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 27/01/2021 09:38, Juergen Gross wrote:
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>> index 4409306364dc..ca5ac10fcbf7 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>> @@ -583,6 +583,12 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(xenpv_exc_debug)
>>>           exc_debug(regs);
>>>   }
>>>   +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_xen_unknown_trap)
>>> +{
>>> +    /* This should never happen and there is no way to handle it. */
>>> +    panic("Unknown trap in Xen PV mode.");
>>
>> Looks much better.  How about including regs->entry_vector here, just to
>> short circuit the inevitable swearing which will accompany encountering
>> this panic() ?
>
> You are aware the regs parameter is struct pt_regs *, not the Xen
> struct cpu_user_regs *?

Yes, but I was assuming that they both contained the same information.

>
> So I have no idea how I should get this information without creating
> a per-vector handler.

Oh - that's dull.

Fine then.  Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Re: [PATCH v2] x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled
Posted by Jürgen Groß 3 years, 2 months ago
On 27.01.21 12:23, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 27/01/2021 10:26, Jürgen Groß wrote:
>> On 27.01.21 10:43, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>> On 27/01/2021 09:38, Juergen Gross wrote:
>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>>> index 4409306364dc..ca5ac10fcbf7 100644
>>>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>>> @@ -583,6 +583,12 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(xenpv_exc_debug)
>>>>            exc_debug(regs);
>>>>    }
>>>>    +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_xen_unknown_trap)
>>>> +{
>>>> +    /* This should never happen and there is no way to handle it. */
>>>> +    panic("Unknown trap in Xen PV mode.");
>>>
>>> Looks much better.  How about including regs->entry_vector here, just to
>>> short circuit the inevitable swearing which will accompany encountering
>>> this panic() ?
>>
>> You are aware the regs parameter is struct pt_regs *, not the Xen
>> struct cpu_user_regs *?
> 
> Yes, but I was assuming that they both contained the same information.
> 
>>
>> So I have no idea how I should get this information without creating
>> a per-vector handler.
> 
> Oh - that's dull.
> 
> Fine then.  Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
> 

I think I'll switch the panic() to printk(); BUG(); in order to have
more diagnostic data. Can I keep your R-b: with that modification?


Juergen
Re: [PATCH v2] x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled
Posted by Andrew Cooper 3 years, 2 months ago
On 27/01/2021 13:59, Jürgen Groß wrote:
> On 27.01.21 12:23, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 27/01/2021 10:26, Jürgen Groß wrote:
>>> On 27.01.21 10:43, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>>>> On 27/01/2021 09:38, Juergen Gross wrote:
>>>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>>>> b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>>>> index 4409306364dc..ca5ac10fcbf7 100644
>>>>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>>>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>>>> @@ -583,6 +583,12 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(xenpv_exc_debug)
>>>>>            exc_debug(regs);
>>>>>    }
>>>>>    +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_xen_unknown_trap)
>>>>> +{
>>>>> +    /* This should never happen and there is no way to handle it. */
>>>>> +    panic("Unknown trap in Xen PV mode.");
>>>>
>>>> Looks much better.  How about including regs->entry_vector here,
>>>> just to
>>>> short circuit the inevitable swearing which will accompany
>>>> encountering
>>>> this panic() ?
>>>
>>> You are aware the regs parameter is struct pt_regs *, not the Xen
>>> struct cpu_user_regs *?
>>
>> Yes, but I was assuming that they both contained the same information.
>>
>>>
>>> So I have no idea how I should get this information without creating
>>> a per-vector handler.
>>
>> Oh - that's dull.
>>
>> Fine then.  Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
>>
>
> I think I'll switch the panic() to printk(); BUG(); in order to have
> more diagnostic data. Can I keep your R-b: with that modification?

Yeah.  Sounds good.

~Andrew

Re: [PATCH v2] x86/xen: avoid warning in Xen pv guest with CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT enabled
Posted by Jan Beulich 3 years, 2 months ago
On 27.01.2021 11:26, Jürgen Groß wrote:
> On 27.01.21 10:43, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> On 27/01/2021 09:38, Juergen Gross wrote:
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>> index 4409306364dc..ca5ac10fcbf7 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/xen/enlighten_pv.c
>>> @@ -583,6 +583,12 @@ DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(xenpv_exc_debug)
>>>   		exc_debug(regs);
>>>   }
>>>   
>>> +DEFINE_IDTENTRY_RAW(exc_xen_unknown_trap)
>>> +{
>>> +	/* This should never happen and there is no way to handle it. */
>>> +	panic("Unknown trap in Xen PV mode.");
>>
>> Looks much better.  How about including regs->entry_vector here, just to
>> short circuit the inevitable swearing which will accompany encountering
>> this panic() ?
> 
> You are aware the regs parameter is struct pt_regs *, not the Xen
> struct cpu_user_regs *?
> 
> So I have no idea how I should get this information without creating
> a per-vector handler.

Maybe log _RET_IP_ then (ideally decoded to a symbol), to give at
least some hint as to where this was coming from?

Jan