[PATCH v5 4/7] x86: introduce x86_seg_sys

Jan Beulich posted 7 patches 2 months, 2 weeks ago
There is a newer version of this series
[PATCH v5 4/7] x86: introduce x86_seg_sys
Posted by Jan Beulich 2 months, 2 weeks ago
To represent the USER-MSR bitmap access, a new segment type needs
introducing, behaving like x86_seg_none in terms of address treatment,
but behaving like a system segment for page walk purposes (implicit
supervisor-mode access).

Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
---
This feels a little fragile: Of course I did look through uses of the
enumerators, and I didn't find further places which would need
adjustment, but I'm not really sure I didn't miss any place.
---
v3: New.

--- a/tools/tests/x86_emulator/test_x86_emulator.c
+++ b/tools/tests/x86_emulator/test_x86_emulator.c
@@ -593,6 +593,7 @@ static int read(
     default:
         if ( !is_x86_user_segment(seg) )
             return X86EMUL_UNHANDLEABLE;
+    case x86_seg_sys:
     case x86_seg_none:
         bytes_read += bytes;
         break;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/emulate.c
@@ -840,7 +840,7 @@ static int hvmemul_virtual_to_linear(
     int okay;
     unsigned long reps = 1;
 
-    if ( seg == x86_seg_none )
+    if ( seg == x86_seg_none || seg == x86_seg_sys )
     {
         *linear = offset;
         return X86EMUL_OKAY;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/hvm.c
@@ -2601,7 +2601,7 @@ bool hvm_vcpu_virtual_to_linear(
      * It is expected that the access rights of reg are suitable for seg (and
      * that this is enforced at the point that seg is loaded).
      */
-    ASSERT(seg < x86_seg_none);
+    ASSERT(seg < x86_seg_sys);
 
     /* However, check that insn fetches only ever specify CS. */
     ASSERT(access_type != hvm_access_insn_fetch || seg == x86_seg_cs);
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -749,6 +749,7 @@ static void cf_check svm_set_segment_reg
         vmcb->ldtr = *reg;
         break;
 
+    case x86_seg_sys:
     case x86_seg_none:
         ASSERT_UNREACHABLE();
         break;
--- a/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/x86_emulate/x86_emulate.h
@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ enum x86_segment {
     x86_seg_ldtr,
     x86_seg_gdtr,
     x86_seg_idtr,
-    /* No Segment: For accesses which are already linear. */
+    /* No Segment: For (system/normal) accesses which are already linear. */
+    x86_seg_sys,
     x86_seg_none
 };
Re: [PATCH v5 4/7] x86: introduce x86_seg_sys
Posted by Andrew Cooper 1 month, 3 weeks ago
On 04/09/2024 1:29 pm, Jan Beulich wrote:
> To represent the USER-MSR bitmap access, a new segment type needs
> introducing, behaving like x86_seg_none in terms of address treatment,
> but behaving like a system segment for page walk purposes (implicit
> supervisor-mode access).
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

Reviewed-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

After discussing this extensively in the maintainers call, and with
others, it's probably the best way forwards given the structure of Xen
right now.

~Andrew
Re: [PATCH v5 4/7] x86: introduce x86_seg_sys
Posted by Andrew Cooper 2 months, 2 weeks ago
On 04/09/2024 1:29 pm, Jan Beulich wrote:
> To represent the USER-MSR bitmap access, a new segment type needs
> introducing, behaving like x86_seg_none in terms of address treatment,
> but behaving like a system segment for page walk purposes (implicit
> supervisor-mode access).
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
> ---
> This feels a little fragile: Of course I did look through uses of the
> enumerators, and I didn't find further places which would need
> adjustment, but I'm not really sure I didn't miss any place.

It does feel a bit fragile, but it may help to consider the other
related cases.

Here, we need a linear access with implicit-supervisor paging
properties.  From what I can tell, it needs to be exactly like other
implicit supervisor accesses.

For CET, we get two new cases.

The legacy bitmap has a pointer out of MSR_[U,S]_CET, but otherwise
obeys CPL rules, so wants to be x86_seg_none.

However, WRUSS is both a CPL0 instruction, and generates implicit-user
accesses.  It's the first instruction of it's like, that I'm aware of. 
If we're going down this x86_seg_sys route, we'd need x86_seg_user too.


Really, this is a consequence of the memory APIs we've got.  It's the
intermediate layers which generate PFEC_* for the pagewalk, and we're
(ab)using segment at the top level to encode "skip segmentation but I
still want certain properties".

But, there's actually a 3rd case we get from CET, and it breaks everything.

Shstk accesses are a new type, architecturally expressed as a new input
(and output) to the pagewalk, but are also regular user-segment relative.

We either do the same trick of expressing fetch() in terms of
read(PFEC_insn) and implement new shstk_{read,write}() accessors which
wrap {read,write}(PFEC_shstk), or we need to plumb the PFEC parameters
higher in the call tree.

It's worth noting that alignment restrictions make things even more
complicated.  Generally, shstk accesses should be 8 or 4 byte aligned
(based on osize), and the pseudocode for WR{U}SS calls this out; after
all they're converting from arbitrary memory operands.

However, there's a fun corner case where a 64bit code segment can use
INCSSPD to misalign SSP, then CALL to generate a misaligned store.  This
combines with an erratum in Zen3 and possibly Zen4 where there's a
missing #GP check on LRET and you can forge a return address formed of
two misaligned addresses.

So misaligned stores are definitely possible (I checked this on both
vendors at the time), so it wouldn't be appropriate to have in a general
shstk_*() helper.  In turn, this means that the implementation of
WR{U}SS would need a way to linearise it's operand manually to insert
the additional check before then making a regular memory access.

And I can't see a way of doing this without exposing PFEC inputs at the
top level.

Thoughts?

~Andrew

Re: [PATCH v5 4/7] x86: introduce x86_seg_sys
Posted by Jan Beulich 2 months, 2 weeks ago
On 04.09.2024 18:54, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> On 04/09/2024 1:29 pm, Jan Beulich wrote:
>> To represent the USER-MSR bitmap access, a new segment type needs
>> introducing, behaving like x86_seg_none in terms of address treatment,
>> but behaving like a system segment for page walk purposes (implicit
>> supervisor-mode access).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
>> ---
>> This feels a little fragile: Of course I did look through uses of the
>> enumerators, and I didn't find further places which would need
>> adjustment, but I'm not really sure I didn't miss any place.
> 
> It does feel a bit fragile, but it may help to consider the other
> related cases.
> 
> Here, we need a linear access with implicit-supervisor paging
> properties.  From what I can tell, it needs to be exactly like other
> implicit supervisor accesses.

Well, not exactly. There's no segment (and hence no segment base)
involved here. Hence, as said in the description, it's a mix of two
things we've got so far.

> For CET, we get two new cases.
> 
> The legacy bitmap has a pointer out of MSR_[U,S]_CET, but otherwise
> obeys CPL rules, so wants to be x86_seg_none.
> 
> However, WRUSS is both a CPL0 instruction, and generates implicit-user
> accesses.  It's the first instruction of it's like, that I'm aware of. 

With MOVU having got ripped back out of the 386, yes. (Whether to call
such "implicit" user is a separate question.)

> If we're going down this x86_seg_sys route, we'd need x86_seg_user too.

That won't work, as we need to express the real x86_seg_[cdefgs]s
associated with the insn's memory operand. Whereas x86_seg_sys doesn't
need combining with anything.

> Really, this is a consequence of the memory APIs we've got.  It's the
> intermediate layers which generate PFEC_* for the pagewalk, and we're
> (ab)using segment at the top level to encode "skip segmentation but I
> still want certain properties".

Right, for USER-MSR. For WRUSS it's "do segmentation and I want two extra
properties" (just one for WRSS).

> But, there's actually a 3rd case we get from CET, and it breaks everything.
> 
> Shstk accesses are a new type, architecturally expressed as a new input
> (and output) to the pagewalk, but are also regular user-segment relative.

WR{,U}SS are part of that, aren't they?

> We either do the same trick of expressing fetch() in terms of
> read(PFEC_insn) and implement new shstk_{read,write}() accessors which
> wrap {read,write}(PFEC_shstk), or we need to plumb the PFEC parameters
> higher in the call tree.
> 
> It's worth noting that alignment restrictions make things even more
> complicated.  Generally, shstk accesses should be 8 or 4 byte aligned
> (based on osize), and the pseudocode for WR{U}SS calls this out; after
> all they're converting from arbitrary memory operands.
> 
> However, there's a fun corner case where a 64bit code segment can use
> INCSSPD to misalign SSP, then CALL to generate a misaligned store.  This
> combines with an erratum in Zen3 and possibly Zen4 where there's a
> missing #GP check on LRET and you can forge a return address formed of
> two misaligned addresses.

Well, we certainly don't need to emulate errata, I'd say.

> So misaligned stores are definitely possible (I checked this on both
> vendors at the time), so it wouldn't be appropriate to have in a general
> shstk_*() helper.  In turn, this means that the implementation of
> WR{U}SS would need a way to linearise it's operand manually to insert
> the additional check before then making a regular memory access.

We do such for SSE alignment checking already; see the emulator's
is_aligned(). I don't see why we couldn't re-use that for WR{,U}SS.

> And I can't see a way of doing this without exposing PFEC inputs at the
> top level.

Certainly we'll need a qualifier alongside x86_seg_[cdefgs]s, which of
course could then also be allowed to be combined with x86_seg_none.
Moving PFEC inputs to the top level, while certainly possible, would
involve a lot of churn. Plus I'm also hesitant to further grow the
hooks' numbers of parameters. IOW introducing new shstk_{read,write}()
hooks would look somewhat preferable to me, at least for the moment,
if we don't want to have a x86_seg_{shstk,user} flags that can be OR-ed
into the other x86_seg_*.

Jan