Hello Dov,
On Thu, Aug 05, 2021 at 09:34:42AM +0300, Dov Murik wrote:
>
>
> On 04/08/2021 14:53, Ashish Kalra wrote:
> > From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
> > ---
> > docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
> > 1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt b/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt
> > index 12ca25180e..0d9184532a 100644
> > --- a/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt
> > +++ b/docs/amd-memory-encryption.txt
> > @@ -126,7 +126,51 @@ TODO
> >
> > Live Migration
> > ----------------
> > -TODO
> > +AMD SEV encrypts the memory of VMs and because a different key is used
> > +in each VM, the hypervisor will be unable to simply copy the
> > +ciphertext from one VM to another to migrate the VM. Instead the AMD SEV Key
> > +Management API provides sets of function which the hypervisor can use
> > +to package a guest page for migration, while maintaining the confidentiality
> > +provided by AMD SEV.
> > +
> > +SEV guest VMs have the concept of private and shared memory. The private
> > +memory is encrypted with the guest-specific key, while shared memory may
> > +be encrypted with the hypervisor key. The migration APIs provided by the
> > +SEV API spec should be used for migrating the private pages.
> > +
> > +The KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE hypercall is used by the SEV guest to notify a
> > +change in the page encryption status to the hypervisor. The hypercall
> > +is invoked when the encryption attribute is changed from encrypted -> decrypted
> > +and vice versa. By default all guest pages are considered encrypted.
> > +
> > +This hypercall exits to qemu via KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL to manage the guest
> > +shared regions and integrate with the qemu's migration code. The shared
> > +region list can be used to check if the given guest page is private or shared.
> > +
> > +Before initiating the migration, we need to know the targets machine's public
>
> s/targets/target/
>
> > +Diffie-Hellman key (PDH) and certificate chain. It can be retrieved
> > +with the 'query-sev-capabilities' QMP command or using the sev-tool. The
> > +migrate-set-parameter can be used to pass the target machine's PDH and
> > +certificate chain.
>
> It's better to clarify that you use query-sev-capabilities QMP command
> on the *target* VM (to get its PDF and cert) when it's ready, and then
> use migrate-set-parameter QMP command on the *source* so it can prepare
> the migration for that specific target.
>
>
Ok.
> > +
> > +During the migration flow, the SEND_START is called on the source hypervisor
> > +to create an outgoing encryption context. The SEV guest policy dictates whether
> > +the certificate passed through the migrate-sev-set-info command will be
>
> Here you say migrate-sev-set-info but above you said
> migrate-set-parameter. Which one is it?
>
>
Actually earlier it used to be migrate-sev-set-info, so this is a typo,
it should be migrate-set-parameter.
Thanks,
Ashish
>
> > +validated. SEND_UPDATE_DATA is called to encrypt the guest private pages.
> > +After migration is completed, SEND_FINISH is called to destroy the encryption
> > +context and make the VM non-runnable to protect it against cloning.
> > +
> > +On the target machine, RECEIVE_START is called first to create an
> > +incoming encryption context. The RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA is called to copy
> > +the received encrypted page into guest memory. After migration has
> > +completed, RECEIVE_FINISH is called to make the VM runnable.
> > +
> > +For more information about the migration see SEV API Appendix A
> > +Usage flow (Live migration section).
> > +
> > +NOTE:
> > +To protect against the memory clone SEV APIs are designed to make the VM
> > +unrunnable in case of the migration failure.
> >
> > References
> > -----------------
> >