hw/9pfs/9p-util.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++---------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
The released fix for this CVE:
f6b0de53fb8 ("9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)")
caused a regression with security_model=passthrough. When handling a
'Tmknod' request there was a side effect that 'Tmknod' request could fail
as 9p server was trying to adjust permissions:
#6 close_if_special_file (fd=30) at ../hw/9pfs/9p-util.h:140
#7 openat_file (mode=<optimized out>, flags=2228224,
name=<optimized out>, dirfd=<optimized out>) at
../hw/9pfs/9p-util.h:181
#8 fchmodat_nofollow (dirfd=dirfd@entry=31,
name=name@entry=0x5555577ea6e0 "mysocket", mode=493) at
../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:360
#9 local_set_cred_passthrough (credp=0x7ffbbc4ace10, name=0x5555577ea6e0
"mysocket", dirfd=31, fs_ctx=0x55555811f528) at
../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:457
#10 local_mknod (fs_ctx=0x55555811f528, dir_path=<optimized out>,
name=0x5555577ea6e0 "mysocket", credp=0x7ffbbc4ace10) at
../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:702
#11 v9fs_co_mknod (pdu=pdu@entry=0x555558121140,
fidp=fidp@entry=0x5555574c46c0, name=name@entry=0x7ffbbc4aced0,
uid=1000, gid=1000, dev=<optimized out>, mode=49645,
stbuf=0x7ffbbc4acef0) at ../hw/9pfs/cofs.c:205
#12 v9fs_mknod (opaque=0x555558121140) at ../hw/9pfs/9p.c:3711
That's because server was opening the special file to adjust permissions,
however it was using O_PATH and it would have not returned the file
descriptor to guest. So the call to close_if_special_file() on that branch
was incorrect.
Let's lift the restriction introduced by f6b0de53fb8 such that it would
allow to open special files on host if O_PATH flag is supplied, not only
for 9p server's own operations as described above, but also for any client
'Topen' request.
It is safe to allow opening special files with O_PATH on host, because
O_PATH only allows path based operations on the resulting file descriptor
and prevents I/O such as read() and write() on that file descriptor.
Fixes: f6b0de53fb8 ("9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)")
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2337
Reported-by: Dirk Herrendorfer <d.herrendoerfer@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
---
hw/9pfs/9p-util.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
index 51c94b0116..95ee4da9bd 100644
--- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
+++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
@@ -177,20 +177,27 @@ again:
return -1;
}
- if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
- return -1;
- }
-
- serrno = errno;
- /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
- * do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()
- * ignored it anyway.
- */
+ /* Only if O_PATH is not set ... */
if (!(flags & O_PATH_9P_UTIL)) {
+ /*
+ * Prevent I/O on special files (device files, etc.) on host side,
+ * however it is safe and required to allow opening them with O_PATH,
+ * as this is limited to (required) path based operations only.
+ */
+ if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ serrno = errno;
+ /*
+ * O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
+ * do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and
+ * openat() ignored it anyway.
+ */
ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
assert(!ret);
+ errno = serrno;
}
- errno = serrno;
return fd;
}
--
2.39.5
On Friday, December 6, 2024 12:20:29 PM CET Christian Schoenebeck wrote:
> The released fix for this CVE:
>
> f6b0de53fb8 ("9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)")
>
> caused a regression with security_model=passthrough. When handling a
> 'Tmknod' request there was a side effect that 'Tmknod' request could fail
> as 9p server was trying to adjust permissions:
>
> #6 close_if_special_file (fd=30) at ../hw/9pfs/9p-util.h:140
> #7 openat_file (mode=<optimized out>, flags=2228224,
> name=<optimized out>, dirfd=<optimized out>) at
> ../hw/9pfs/9p-util.h:181
> #8 fchmodat_nofollow (dirfd=dirfd@entry=31,
> name=name@entry=0x5555577ea6e0 "mysocket", mode=493) at
> ../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:360
> #9 local_set_cred_passthrough (credp=0x7ffbbc4ace10, name=0x5555577ea6e0
> "mysocket", dirfd=31, fs_ctx=0x55555811f528) at
> ../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:457
> #10 local_mknod (fs_ctx=0x55555811f528, dir_path=<optimized out>,
> name=0x5555577ea6e0 "mysocket", credp=0x7ffbbc4ace10) at
> ../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:702
> #11 v9fs_co_mknod (pdu=pdu@entry=0x555558121140,
> fidp=fidp@entry=0x5555574c46c0, name=name@entry=0x7ffbbc4aced0,
> uid=1000, gid=1000, dev=<optimized out>, mode=49645,
> stbuf=0x7ffbbc4acef0) at ../hw/9pfs/cofs.c:205
> #12 v9fs_mknod (opaque=0x555558121140) at ../hw/9pfs/9p.c:3711
>
> That's because server was opening the special file to adjust permissions,
> however it was using O_PATH and it would have not returned the file
> descriptor to guest. So the call to close_if_special_file() on that branch
> was incorrect.
>
> Let's lift the restriction introduced by f6b0de53fb8 such that it would
> allow to open special files on host if O_PATH flag is supplied, not only
> for 9p server's own operations as described above, but also for any client
> 'Topen' request.
>
> It is safe to allow opening special files with O_PATH on host, because
> O_PATH only allows path based operations on the resulting file descriptor
> and prevents I/O such as read() and write() on that file descriptor.
>
> Fixes: f6b0de53fb8 ("9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)")
> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2337
> Reported-by: Dirk Herrendorfer <d.herrendoerfer@de.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
> ---
> hw/9pfs/9p-util.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++----------
> 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
Queued on 9p.next:
https://github.com/cschoenebeck/qemu/commits/9p.next
Let's see if we can still land this in 9.2.
/Christian
On Tue, 10 Dec 2024 at 09:57, Christian Schoenebeck
<qemu_oss@crudebyte.com> wrote:
>
> On Friday, December 6, 2024 12:20:29 PM CET Christian Schoenebeck wrote:
> > The released fix for this CVE:
> >
> > f6b0de53fb8 ("9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)")
> >
> > caused a regression with security_model=passthrough. When handling a
> > 'Tmknod' request there was a side effect that 'Tmknod' request could fail
> > as 9p server was trying to adjust permissions:
> >
> > #6 close_if_special_file (fd=30) at ../hw/9pfs/9p-util.h:140
> > #7 openat_file (mode=<optimized out>, flags=2228224,
> > name=<optimized out>, dirfd=<optimized out>) at
> > ../hw/9pfs/9p-util.h:181
> > #8 fchmodat_nofollow (dirfd=dirfd@entry=31,
> > name=name@entry=0x5555577ea6e0 "mysocket", mode=493) at
> > ../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:360
> > #9 local_set_cred_passthrough (credp=0x7ffbbc4ace10, name=0x5555577ea6e0
> > "mysocket", dirfd=31, fs_ctx=0x55555811f528) at
> > ../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:457
> > #10 local_mknod (fs_ctx=0x55555811f528, dir_path=<optimized out>,
> > name=0x5555577ea6e0 "mysocket", credp=0x7ffbbc4ace10) at
> > ../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:702
> > #11 v9fs_co_mknod (pdu=pdu@entry=0x555558121140,
> > fidp=fidp@entry=0x5555574c46c0, name=name@entry=0x7ffbbc4aced0,
> > uid=1000, gid=1000, dev=<optimized out>, mode=49645,
> > stbuf=0x7ffbbc4acef0) at ../hw/9pfs/cofs.c:205
> > #12 v9fs_mknod (opaque=0x555558121140) at ../hw/9pfs/9p.c:3711
> >
> > That's because server was opening the special file to adjust permissions,
> > however it was using O_PATH and it would have not returned the file
> > descriptor to guest. So the call to close_if_special_file() on that branch
> > was incorrect.
> >
> > Let's lift the restriction introduced by f6b0de53fb8 such that it would
> > allow to open special files on host if O_PATH flag is supplied, not only
> > for 9p server's own operations as described above, but also for any client
> > 'Topen' request.
> >
> > It is safe to allow opening special files with O_PATH on host, because
> > O_PATH only allows path based operations on the resulting file descriptor
> > and prevents I/O such as read() and write() on that file descriptor.
> >
> > Fixes: f6b0de53fb8 ("9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)")
> > Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2337
> > Reported-by: Dirk Herrendorfer <d.herrendoerfer@de.ibm.com>
> > Signed-off-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
> > ---
> > hw/9pfs/9p-util.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++----------
> > 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> Queued on 9p.next:
> https://github.com/cschoenebeck/qemu/commits/9p.next
>
> Let's see if we can still land this in 9.2.
9.2 is due to be released today, so this would need to be:
* a fix for a critical bug
* the bug must be a regression since 9.1
* with a clear justification attached for why it's important
enough to delay the release
Commit f6b0de53fb8 was in 9.1, which suggests that this isn't
a regression since 9.1 ?
thanks
-- PMM
On Tuesday, December 10, 2024 11:11:47 AM CET Peter Maydell wrote:
> On Tue, 10 Dec 2024 at 09:57, Christian Schoenebeck
> <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com> wrote:
> >
> > On Friday, December 6, 2024 12:20:29 PM CET Christian Schoenebeck wrote:
> > > The released fix for this CVE:
> > >
> > > f6b0de53fb8 ("9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)")
> > >
> > > caused a regression with security_model=passthrough. When handling a
> > > 'Tmknod' request there was a side effect that 'Tmknod' request could fail
> > > as 9p server was trying to adjust permissions:
> > >
> > > #6 close_if_special_file (fd=30) at ../hw/9pfs/9p-util.h:140
> > > #7 openat_file (mode=<optimized out>, flags=2228224,
> > > name=<optimized out>, dirfd=<optimized out>) at
> > > ../hw/9pfs/9p-util.h:181
> > > #8 fchmodat_nofollow (dirfd=dirfd@entry=31,
> > > name=name@entry=0x5555577ea6e0 "mysocket", mode=493) at
> > > ../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:360
> > > #9 local_set_cred_passthrough (credp=0x7ffbbc4ace10, name=0x5555577ea6e0
> > > "mysocket", dirfd=31, fs_ctx=0x55555811f528) at
> > > ../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:457
> > > #10 local_mknod (fs_ctx=0x55555811f528, dir_path=<optimized out>,
> > > name=0x5555577ea6e0 "mysocket", credp=0x7ffbbc4ace10) at
> > > ../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:702
> > > #11 v9fs_co_mknod (pdu=pdu@entry=0x555558121140,
> > > fidp=fidp@entry=0x5555574c46c0, name=name@entry=0x7ffbbc4aced0,
> > > uid=1000, gid=1000, dev=<optimized out>, mode=49645,
> > > stbuf=0x7ffbbc4acef0) at ../hw/9pfs/cofs.c:205
> > > #12 v9fs_mknod (opaque=0x555558121140) at ../hw/9pfs/9p.c:3711
> > >
> > > That's because server was opening the special file to adjust permissions,
> > > however it was using O_PATH and it would have not returned the file
> > > descriptor to guest. So the call to close_if_special_file() on that branch
> > > was incorrect.
> > >
> > > Let's lift the restriction introduced by f6b0de53fb8 such that it would
> > > allow to open special files on host if O_PATH flag is supplied, not only
> > > for 9p server's own operations as described above, but also for any client
> > > 'Topen' request.
> > >
> > > It is safe to allow opening special files with O_PATH on host, because
> > > O_PATH only allows path based operations on the resulting file descriptor
> > > and prevents I/O such as read() and write() on that file descriptor.
> > >
> > > Fixes: f6b0de53fb8 ("9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)")
> > > Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2337
> > > Reported-by: Dirk Herrendorfer <d.herrendoerfer@de.ibm.com>
> > > Signed-off-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
> > > ---
> > > hw/9pfs/9p-util.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++----------
> > > 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
> >
> > Queued on 9p.next:
> > https://github.com/cschoenebeck/qemu/commits/9p.next
> >
> > Let's see if we can still land this in 9.2.
>
> 9.2 is due to be released today, so this would need to be:
> * a fix for a critical bug
> * the bug must be a regression since 9.1
> * with a clear justification attached for why it's important
> enough to delay the release
>
> Commit f6b0de53fb8 was in 9.1, which suggests that this isn't
> a regression since 9.1 ?
Hi Peter,
I just saw there was still one open milestone ticket for 9.2 and assumed the
release to be delayed by one week anyway.
I am not trying to convince you of a delay. So unless somebody objects, just
disregard the PR for now.
Thanks!
/Christian
On Fri, 6 Dec 2024 12:20:29 +0100
Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com> wrote:
> The released fix for this CVE:
>
> f6b0de53fb8 ("9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)")
>
> caused a regression with security_model=passthrough. When handling a
> 'Tmknod' request there was a side effect that 'Tmknod' request could fail
> as 9p server was trying to adjust permissions:
>
> #6 close_if_special_file (fd=30) at ../hw/9pfs/9p-util.h:140
> #7 openat_file (mode=<optimized out>, flags=2228224,
> name=<optimized out>, dirfd=<optimized out>) at
> ../hw/9pfs/9p-util.h:181
> #8 fchmodat_nofollow (dirfd=dirfd@entry=31,
> name=name@entry=0x5555577ea6e0 "mysocket", mode=493) at
> ../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:360
> #9 local_set_cred_passthrough (credp=0x7ffbbc4ace10, name=0x5555577ea6e0
> "mysocket", dirfd=31, fs_ctx=0x55555811f528) at
> ../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:457
> #10 local_mknod (fs_ctx=0x55555811f528, dir_path=<optimized out>,
> name=0x5555577ea6e0 "mysocket", credp=0x7ffbbc4ace10) at
> ../hw/9pfs/9p-local.c:702
> #11 v9fs_co_mknod (pdu=pdu@entry=0x555558121140,
> fidp=fidp@entry=0x5555574c46c0, name=name@entry=0x7ffbbc4aced0,
> uid=1000, gid=1000, dev=<optimized out>, mode=49645,
> stbuf=0x7ffbbc4acef0) at ../hw/9pfs/cofs.c:205
> #12 v9fs_mknod (opaque=0x555558121140) at ../hw/9pfs/9p.c:3711
>
> That's because server was opening the special file to adjust permissions,
> however it was using O_PATH and it would have not returned the file
> descriptor to guest. So the call to close_if_special_file() on that branch
> was incorrect.
>
> Let's lift the restriction introduced by f6b0de53fb8 such that it would
> allow to open special files on host if O_PATH flag is supplied, not only
> for 9p server's own operations as described above, but also for any client
> 'Topen' request.
>
> It is safe to allow opening special files with O_PATH on host, because
> O_PATH only allows path based operations on the resulting file descriptor
> and prevents I/O such as read() and write() on that file descriptor.
>
> Fixes: f6b0de53fb8 ("9pfs: prevent opening special files (CVE-2023-2861)")
> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/2337
> Reported-by: Dirk Herrendorfer <d.herrendoerfer@de.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>
> ---
Reviewed-by: Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>
> hw/9pfs/9p-util.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++----------
> 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
> index 51c94b0116..95ee4da9bd 100644
> --- a/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
> +++ b/hw/9pfs/9p-util.h
> @@ -177,20 +177,27 @@ again:
> return -1;
> }
>
> - if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
> - return -1;
> - }
> -
> - serrno = errno;
> - /* O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
> - * do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and openat()
> - * ignored it anyway.
> - */
> + /* Only if O_PATH is not set ... */
> if (!(flags & O_PATH_9P_UTIL)) {
> + /*
> + * Prevent I/O on special files (device files, etc.) on host side,
> + * however it is safe and required to allow opening them with O_PATH,
> + * as this is limited to (required) path based operations only.
> + */
> + if (close_if_special_file(fd) < 0) {
> + return -1;
> + }
> +
> + serrno = errno;
> + /*
> + * O_NONBLOCK was only needed to open the file. Let's drop it. We don't
> + * do that with O_PATH since fcntl(F_SETFL) isn't supported, and
> + * openat() ignored it anyway.
> + */
> ret = fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, flags);
> assert(!ret);
> + errno = serrno;
> }
> - errno = serrno;
> return fd;
> }
>
--
Greg
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