On Mon, 6 Jul 2026 16:31:24 +0200
Cédric Le Goater <clg@redhat.com> wrote:
> The 3-bit MSI-X BIR fields permit values 0-7, but VFIOPCIDevice::bars[]
> only contains BAR0-BAR5 (6 entries). An invalid BIR value of 6 or 7
> can cause an out-of-bounds array access (CWE-129) in vfio_msix_early_setup().
>
> Add range checks immediately after extracting the BIR values.
A compliant PCI device used for traditional device assignment is not
susceptible to this without a malicious intermediary. The primary
exposure seems to be a vfio-user server, maliciously or inadvertently
exposing bogus BIR values, which appears to introduce a DoS vector
without any reliable further exploit.
> Reported-by: Feifan Qian <bea1e@proton.me>
> Fixes: 65501a745dba ("vfio: vfio-pci device assignment driver")
> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/issues/3878
> Signed-off-by: Cédric Le Goater <clg@redhat.com>
> ---
> hw/vfio/pci.c | 8 ++++++++
> 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/hw/vfio/pci.c b/hw/vfio/pci.c
> index 67d9d9e846446577e8de7a8c588165c6f38c3bee..324e3f5d98206ccb64963ee232f69d3ada422ef5 100644
> --- a/hw/vfio/pci.c
> +++ b/hw/vfio/pci.c
> @@ -1762,6 +1762,14 @@ static bool vfio_msix_early_setup(VFIOPCIDevice *vdev, Error **errp)
> msix->pba_offset = pba & ~PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_BIRMASK;
> msix->entries = (ctrl & PCI_MSIX_FLAGS_QSIZE) + 1;
>
> + if (msix->table_bar >= PCI_NUM_REGIONS - 1 ||
> + msix->pba_bar >= PCI_NUM_REGIONS - 1) {
> + error_setg(errp, "invalid MSI-X BIR, table_bar=%d pba_bar=%d",
> + msix->table_bar, msix->pba_bar);
> + g_free(msix);
> + return false;
> + }
> +
> ret = vfio_device_get_irq_info(&vdev->vbasedev, VFIO_PCI_MSIX_IRQ_INDEX,
> &irq_info);
> if (ret < 0) {
Note that the vulnerability is an out-of-bounds index on vdev->bars, so
we could test >= ARRAY_SIZE(vdev->bars), which is sized as
(PCI_NUM_REGIONS - 1). Either way...
Reviewed-by: Alex Williamson <alex@shazbot.org>