hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c | 13 +++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
Validate guest-controlled cpu_num before using it to index the cpu[] array
or pass to async_run_on_cpu(). Without this check, a malicious guest can
trigger a NULL pointer dereference in async_run_on_cpu() and an
out-of-bounds array access in qemu_set_irq(), causing host crash.
Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3616
Fixes: 0d148eaf5a3e ("hw/loongarch: Implement dintc set irq")
Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Song Gao <gaosong@loongson.cn>
---
hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c | 13 +++++++++++++
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
diff --git a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
index c877a8003b..e40292887c 100644
--- a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
+++ b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
#include "target/loongarch/cpu.h"
#include "qemu/error-report.h"
#include "system/hw_accel.h"
+#include "qemu/log.h"
/* msg addr field */
FIELD(MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM, 4, 8)
@@ -52,7 +53,19 @@ static void loongarch_dintc_mem_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
CPUState *cs;
cpu_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, CPU_NUM);
+
+ /* Validate cpu_num against the configured number of CPUs */
+ if (cpu_num >= s->num_cpu) {
+ qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
+ "loongarch-dintc: invalid cpu number%d\n", cpu_num);
+ return;
+ }
cs = cpu_by_arch_id(cpu_num);
+ if (!cs) {
+ qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
+ "loongarch-dintc: no CPU for arch_id %d\n", cpu_num);
+ return;
+ }
irq_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM);
async_run_on_cpu(cs, do_set_vcpu_dintc_irq,
--
2.47.3
On 2026/7/1 下午2:54, Song Gao wrote:
> Validate guest-controlled cpu_num before using it to index the cpu[] array
> or pass to async_run_on_cpu(). Without this check, a malicious guest can
> trigger a NULL pointer dereference in async_run_on_cpu() and an
> out-of-bounds array access in qemu_set_irq(), causing host crash.
>
> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3616
> Fixes: 0d148eaf5a3e ("hw/loongarch: Implement dintc set irq")
> Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Song Gao <gaosong@loongson.cn>
> ---
> hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
> index c877a8003b..e40292887c 100644
> --- a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
> +++ b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
> #include "target/loongarch/cpu.h"
> #include "qemu/error-report.h"
> #include "system/hw_accel.h"
> +#include "qemu/log.h"
>
> /* msg addr field */
> FIELD(MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM, 4, 8)
> @@ -52,7 +53,19 @@ static void loongarch_dintc_mem_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
> CPUState *cs;
>
> cpu_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, CPU_NUM);
> +
> + /* Validate cpu_num against the configured number of CPUs */
> + if (cpu_num >= s->num_cpu) {
> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> + "loongarch-dintc: invalid cpu number%d\n", cpu_num);
> + return;
> + }
Here cpu_num decoded from MSG_ADDR is physical CPU ID, I think that it
is not meaningful to compare it with s->num_cpu.
> cs = cpu_by_arch_id(cpu_num);
This is ok to use cpu_by_arch_id now, in later when CPU hotplug is
support with dintc, there should be self CPU search logic like ipi irqchip.
Regards
Bibo Mao
> + if (!cs) {
> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> + "loongarch-dintc: no CPU for arch_id %d\n", cpu_num);
> + return;
> + }
> irq_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM);
>
> async_run_on_cpu(cs, do_set_vcpu_dintc_irq,
>
On 09/07/2026 11.08, Bibo Mao wrote:
>
>
> On 2026/7/1 下午2:54, Song Gao wrote:
>> Validate guest-controlled cpu_num before using it to index the cpu[] array
>> or pass to async_run_on_cpu(). Without this check, a malicious guest can
>> trigger a NULL pointer dereference in async_run_on_cpu() and an
>> out-of-bounds array access in qemu_set_irq(), causing host crash.
>>
>> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3616
>> Fixes: 0d148eaf5a3e ("hw/loongarch: Implement dintc set irq")
>> Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Song Gao <gaosong@loongson.cn>
>> ---
>> hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c | 13 +++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>> index c877a8003b..e40292887c 100644
>> --- a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>> +++ b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
>> #include "target/loongarch/cpu.h"
>> #include "qemu/error-report.h"
>> #include "system/hw_accel.h"
>> +#include "qemu/log.h"
>> /* msg addr field */
>> FIELD(MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM, 4, 8)
>> @@ -52,7 +53,19 @@ static void loongarch_dintc_mem_write(void *opaque,
>> hwaddr addr,
>> CPUState *cs;
>> cpu_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, CPU_NUM);
>> +
>> + /* Validate cpu_num against the configured number of CPUs */
>> + if (cpu_num >= s->num_cpu) {
>> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
>> + "loongarch-dintc: invalid cpu number%d\n", cpu_num);
>> + return;
>> + }
> Here cpu_num decoded from MSG_ADDR is physical CPU ID, I think that it is
> not meaningful to compare it with s->num_cpu.
Later in this function, cpu_num is used to index into the s->cpu[] array:
qemu_set_irq(s->cpu[cpu_num].parent_irq, 1);
and s->cpu is allocated like this in the realize function:
s->num_cpu = id_list->len;
s->cpu = g_new(DINTCCore, s->num_cpu);
So the new check here looks valid for me, at least right now. Or what else
would you suggest here?
Thomas
>> cs = cpu_by_arch_id(cpu_num);
> This is ok to use cpu_by_arch_id now, in later when CPU hotplug is support
> with dintc, there should be self CPU search logic like ipi irqchip.
>
> Regards
> Bibo Mao
>> + if (!cs) {
>> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
>> + "loongarch-dintc: no CPU for arch_id %d\n", cpu_num);
>> + return;
>> + }
>> irq_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM);
>> async_run_on_cpu(cs, do_set_vcpu_dintc_irq,
>>
>
On 2026/7/9 下午5:33, Thomas Huth wrote:
> On 09/07/2026 11.08, Bibo Mao wrote:
>>
>>
>> On 2026/7/1 下午2:54, Song Gao wrote:
>>> Validate guest-controlled cpu_num before using it to index the cpu[]
>>> array
>>> or pass to async_run_on_cpu(). Without this check, a malicious guest can
>>> trigger a NULL pointer dereference in async_run_on_cpu() and an
>>> out-of-bounds array access in qemu_set_irq(), causing host crash.
>>>
>>> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3616
>>> Fixes: 0d148eaf5a3e ("hw/loongarch: Implement dintc set irq")
>>> Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Song Gao <gaosong@loongson.cn>
>>> ---
>>> hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c | 13 +++++++++++++
>>> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>>> index c877a8003b..e40292887c 100644
>>> --- a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>>> +++ b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>>> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
>>> #include "target/loongarch/cpu.h"
>>> #include "qemu/error-report.h"
>>> #include "system/hw_accel.h"
>>> +#include "qemu/log.h"
>>> /* msg addr field */
>>> FIELD(MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM, 4, 8)
>>> @@ -52,7 +53,19 @@ static void loongarch_dintc_mem_write(void
>>> *opaque, hwaddr addr,
>>> CPUState *cs;
>>> cpu_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, CPU_NUM);
>>> +
>>> + /* Validate cpu_num against the configured number of CPUs */
>>> + if (cpu_num >= s->num_cpu) {
>>> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
>>> + "loongarch-dintc: invalid cpu number%d\n",
>>> cpu_num);
>>> + return;
>>> + }
>> Here cpu_num decoded from MSG_ADDR is physical CPU ID, I think that it
>> is not meaningful to compare it with s->num_cpu.
>
> Later in this function, cpu_num is used to index into the s->cpu[] array:
>
> qemu_set_irq(s->cpu[cpu_num].parent_irq, 1);
>
> and s->cpu is allocated like this in the realize function:
>
> s->num_cpu = id_list->len;
> s->cpu = g_new(DINTCCore, s->num_cpu);
>
> So the new check here looks valid for me, at least right now. Or what
> else would you suggest here?
I prefer separate function dintc_cpu_by_arch_id(), this piece of code is
not tested.
+static int loongarch_dintc_cmp(const void *a, const void *b)
+{
+ DINTCCore *dintc_a = (DINTCCore *)a;
+ DINTCCore *dintc_b = (DINTCCore *)b;
+
+ return dintc_a->arch_id - dintc_a->arch_id;
+}
+
+static int dintc_cpu_by_arch_id(LoongArchDINTCState *s,
+ int64_t arch_id, int *index, CPUState
**pcs)
+{
+ DINTCCore dintc, *found;
+
+ dintc.arch_id = arch_id;
+ found = bsearch(&dintc, s->cpu, s->num_cpu, sizeof(DINTCCore),
+ loongarch_dintc_cmp);
+ if (found && found->cpu) {
+ if (index) {
+ *index = found - s->cpu;
+ }
+
+ if (pcs) {
+ *pcs = found->cpu;
+ }
+
+ return MEMTX_OK;
+ }
+
+ return MEMTX_ERROR;
+}
+
static void loongarch_dintc_mem_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
uint64_t val, unsigned size)
{
- int irq_num, cpu_num = 0;
+ int irq_num, cpu_num, ret;
LoongArchDINTCState *s = LOONGARCH_DINTC(opaque);
uint64_t msg_addr = addr + VIRT_DINTC_BASE;
CPUState *cs;
+ uint32_t cpuid;
- cpu_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, CPU_NUM);
- cs = cpu_by_arch_id(cpu_num);
+ cpuid = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, CPU_NUM);
irq_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM);
+ ret = dintc_cpu_by_arch_id(s, cpuid, &cpu_num, &cs);
+ if (ret != MEMTX_OK || cpu_num >= ipi->num_cpu) {
+ qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
+ "loongarch-dintc: no CPU for arch_id %d\n", cpuid);
+ return;
+ }
async_run_on_cpu(cs, do_set_vcpu_dintc_irq,
RUN_ON_CPU_HOST_INT(irq_num));
Regards
Bibo Mao
>
> Thomas
>
>
>>> cs = cpu_by_arch_id(cpu_num);
>> This is ok to use cpu_by_arch_id now, in later when CPU hotplug is
>> support with dintc, there should be self CPU search logic like ipi
>> irqchip.
>>
>> Regards
>> Bibo Mao
>>> + if (!cs) {
>>> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
>>> + "loongarch-dintc: no CPU for arch_id %d\n",
>>> cpu_num);
>>> + return;
>>> + }
>>> irq_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM);
>>> async_run_on_cpu(cs, do_set_vcpu_dintc_irq,
>>>
>>
>
On 01/07/2026 08.54, Song Gao wrote:
> Validate guest-controlled cpu_num before using it to index the cpu[] array
> or pass to async_run_on_cpu(). Without this check, a malicious guest can
> trigger a NULL pointer dereference in async_run_on_cpu() and an
> out-of-bounds array access in qemu_set_irq(), causing host crash.
>
> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3616
> Fixes: 0d148eaf5a3e ("hw/loongarch: Implement dintc set irq")
> Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
I think that should rather be:
Reported-by: huntr bubble
since I merely made you aware of the bug report at gitlab.
Thomas
Hi,
On 1/7/26 08:54, Song Gao wrote:
> Validate guest-controlled cpu_num before using it to index the cpu[] array
> or pass to async_run_on_cpu(). Without this check, a malicious guest can
> trigger a NULL pointer dereference in async_run_on_cpu() and an
> out-of-bounds array access in qemu_set_irq(), causing host crash.
>
> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3616
> Fixes: 0d148eaf5a3e ("hw/loongarch: Implement dintc set irq")
> Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Song Gao <gaosong@loongson.cn>
> ---
> hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c | 13 +++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
> index c877a8003b..e40292887c 100644
> --- a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
> +++ b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
> #include "target/loongarch/cpu.h"
> #include "qemu/error-report.h"
> #include "system/hw_accel.h"
> +#include "qemu/log.h"
>
> /* msg addr field */
> FIELD(MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM, 4, 8)
> @@ -52,7 +53,19 @@ static void loongarch_dintc_mem_write(void *opaque, hwaddr addr,
> CPUState *cs;
>
> cpu_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, CPU_NUM);
> +
> + /* Validate cpu_num against the configured number of CPUs */
> + if (cpu_num >= s->num_cpu) {
> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> + "loongarch-dintc: invalid cpu number%d\n", cpu_num);
> + return;
Do you know how real hardware behave in this case?
> + }
> cs = cpu_by_arch_id(cpu_num);
> + if (!cs) {
> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
> + "loongarch-dintc: no CPU for arch_id %d\n", cpu_num);
> + return;
> + }
> irq_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM);
>
> async_run_on_cpu(cs, do_set_vcpu_dintc_irq,
在 2026/7/1 下午3:43, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 写道:
> Hi,
>
> On 1/7/26 08:54, Song Gao wrote:
>> Validate guest-controlled cpu_num before using it to index the cpu[]
>> array
>> or pass to async_run_on_cpu(). Without this check, a malicious guest can
>> trigger a NULL pointer dereference in async_run_on_cpu() and an
>> out-of-bounds array access in qemu_set_irq(), causing host crash.
>>
>> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3616
>> Fixes: 0d148eaf5a3e ("hw/loongarch: Implement dintc set irq")
>> Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Song Gao <gaosong@loongson.cn>
>> ---
>> hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c | 13 +++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>> index c877a8003b..e40292887c 100644
>> --- a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>> +++ b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
>> #include "target/loongarch/cpu.h"
>> #include "qemu/error-report.h"
>> #include "system/hw_accel.h"
>> +#include "qemu/log.h"
>> /* msg addr field */
>> FIELD(MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM, 4, 8)
>> @@ -52,7 +53,19 @@ static void loongarch_dintc_mem_write(void
>> *opaque, hwaddr addr,
>> CPUState *cs;
>> cpu_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, CPU_NUM);
>> +
>> + /* Validate cpu_num against the configured number of CPUs */
>> + if (cpu_num >= s->num_cpu) {
>> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
>> + "loongarch-dintc: invalid cpu number%d\n",
>> cpu_num);
>> + return;
>
> Do you know how real hardware behave in this case?
>
I haven't been able to verify the exact physical hardware behavior for
writes targeting a non-existent CPU.
However, I don't think this situation will actually happen,
but QEMU ASAN has reported a code risk, and I'm not sure if we need to
address it. Could you offer some advice?
Thanks.
Song Gao
>> + }
>> cs = cpu_by_arch_id(cpu_num);
>> + if (!cs) {
>> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
>> + "loongarch-dintc: no CPU for arch_id %d\n",
>> cpu_num);
>> + return;
>> + }
>> irq_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM);
>> async_run_on_cpu(cs, do_set_vcpu_dintc_irq,
On 02/07/2026 03.50, gaosong wrote:
> 在 2026/7/1 下午3:43, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 写道:
>> Hi,
>>
>> On 1/7/26 08:54, Song Gao wrote:
>>> Validate guest-controlled cpu_num before using it to index the cpu[] array
>>> or pass to async_run_on_cpu(). Without this check, a malicious guest can
>>> trigger a NULL pointer dereference in async_run_on_cpu() and an
>>> out-of-bounds array access in qemu_set_irq(), causing host crash.
>>>
>>> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3616
>>> Fixes: 0d148eaf5a3e ("hw/loongarch: Implement dintc set irq")
>>> Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
>>> Signed-off-by: Song Gao <gaosong@loongson.cn>
>>> ---
>>> hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c | 13 +++++++++++++
>>> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>>> index c877a8003b..e40292887c 100644
>>> --- a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>>> +++ b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>>> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
>>> #include "target/loongarch/cpu.h"
>>> #include "qemu/error-report.h"
>>> #include "system/hw_accel.h"
>>> +#include "qemu/log.h"
>>> /* msg addr field */
>>> FIELD(MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM, 4, 8)
>>> @@ -52,7 +53,19 @@ static void loongarch_dintc_mem_write(void *opaque,
>>> hwaddr addr,
>>> CPUState *cs;
>>> cpu_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, CPU_NUM);
>>> +
>>> + /* Validate cpu_num against the configured number of CPUs */
>>> + if (cpu_num >= s->num_cpu) {
>>> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
>>> + "loongarch-dintc: invalid cpu number%d\n", cpu_num);
>>> + return;
>>
>> Do you know how real hardware behave in this case?
>>
> I haven't been able to verify the exact physical hardware behavior for
> writes targeting a non-existent CPU.
> However, I don't think this situation will actually happen,
>
> but QEMU ASAN has reported a code risk, and I'm not sure if we need to
> address it. Could you offer some advice?
I don't know, but I guess real hardware would ignore the write, too - if
there is no CPU with the right ID listening to the write, it's unlikely that
something happens.
So I think your patch is doing the right thing:
Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
>>> + }
>>> cs = cpu_by_arch_id(cpu_num);
>>> + if (!cs) {
>>> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
>>> + "loongarch-dintc: no CPU for arch_id %d\n", cpu_num);
>>> + return;
>>> + }
>>> irq_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM);
>>> async_run_on_cpu(cs, do_set_vcpu_dintc_irq,
>
On 2/7/26 08:14, Thomas Huth wrote:
> On 02/07/2026 03.50, gaosong wrote:
>> 在 2026/7/1 下午3:43, Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 写道:
>>> Hi,
>>>
>>> On 1/7/26 08:54, Song Gao wrote:
>>>> Validate guest-controlled cpu_num before using it to index the cpu[]
>>>> array
>>>> or pass to async_run_on_cpu(). Without this check, a malicious guest
>>>> can
>>>> trigger a NULL pointer dereference in async_run_on_cpu() and an
>>>> out-of-bounds array access in qemu_set_irq(), causing host crash.
>>>>
>>>> Resolves: https://gitlab.com/qemu-project/qemu/-/work_items/3616
>>>> Fixes: 0d148eaf5a3e ("hw/loongarch: Implement dintc set irq")
>>>> Reported-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
>>>> Signed-off-by: Song Gao <gaosong@loongson.cn>
>>>> ---
>>>> hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c | 13 +++++++++++++
>>>> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+)
>>>>
>>>> diff --git a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>>>> index c877a8003b..e40292887c 100644
>>>> --- a/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>>>> +++ b/hw/intc/loongarch_dintc.c
>>>> @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@
>>>> #include "target/loongarch/cpu.h"
>>>> #include "qemu/error-report.h"
>>>> #include "system/hw_accel.h"
>>>> +#include "qemu/log.h"
>>>> /* msg addr field */
>>>> FIELD(MSG_ADDR, IRQ_NUM, 4, 8)
>>>> @@ -52,7 +53,19 @@ static void loongarch_dintc_mem_write(void
>>>> *opaque, hwaddr addr,
>>>> CPUState *cs;
>>>> cpu_num = FIELD_EX64(msg_addr, MSG_ADDR, CPU_NUM);
>>>> +
>>>> + /* Validate cpu_num against the configured number of CPUs */
>>>> + if (cpu_num >= s->num_cpu) {
>>>> + qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
>>>> + "loongarch-dintc: invalid cpu number%d\n",
>>>> cpu_num);
>>>> + return;
>>>
>>> Do you know how real hardware behave in this case?
>>>
>> I haven't been able to verify the exact physical hardware behavior for
>> writes targeting a non-existent CPU.
>> However, I don't think this situation will actually happen,
>>
>> but QEMU ASAN has reported a code risk, and I'm not sure if we need to
>> address it. Could you offer some advice?
I was just checking, better to not diverge and be faithful when we can.
>
> I don't know, but I guess real hardware would ignore the write, too - if
> there is no CPU with the right ID listening to the write, it's unlikely
> that something happens.
>
> So I think your patch is doing the right thing:
>
> Reviewed-by: Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
Maybe not "the right" but "a plausible" one ;)
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@oss.qualcomm.com>
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