Mostly i386 patches for QEMU 11.0 soft freeze

[PULL 093/102] target/i386: introduce SierraForest-v5 to expose ITS_NO

Paolo Bonzini posted 102 patches 1 month, 1 week ago

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Maintainers: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Alexander Graf <graf@amazon.com>, Pedro Barbuda <pbarbuda@microsoft.com>, Mohamed Mediouni <mohamed@unpredictable.fr>, Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>, "Marc-André Lureau" <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>, Pierrick Bouvier <pierrick.bouvier@linaro.org>, Dorjoy Chowdhury <dorjoychy111@gmail.com>, Eduardo Habkost <eduardo@habkost.net>, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>, "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@linaro.org>, Yanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com>, Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>, "Maciej S. Szmigiero" <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>, Bernhard Beschow <shentey@gmail.com>, Alex Williamson <alex@shazbot.org>, "Cédric Le Goater" <clg@redhat.com>, Cornelia Huck <cohuck@redhat.com>, Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>, "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>, John Snow <jsnow@redhat.com>, Cleber Rosa <crosa@redhat.com>, Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>, Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>, Manos Pitsidianakis <manos.pitsidianakis@linaro.org>, "Alex Bennée" <alex.bennee@linaro.org>, Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>, Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>, Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>, Cameron Esfahani <dirty@apple.com>, Roman Bolshakov <rbolshakov@ddn.com>, Phil Dennis-Jordan <phil@philjordan.eu>, Wei Liu <wei.liu@kernel.org>, Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>, Magnus Kulke <magnus.kulke@linux.microsoft.com>, Fabiano Rosas <farosas@suse.de>, Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>

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[PULL 093/102] target/i386: introduce SierraForest-v5 to expose ITS_NO

Posted by Paolo Bonzini 1 month, 1 week ago

From: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>

Expose ITS_NO by default, as users using Sierra Forest and higher
CPU models would not be able to live migrate to lower CPU hosts due to
missing features. In that case, they would not be vulnerable to ITS.

its-no was originally added on [1], but needs to be exposed on the
individual CPU models for the guests to see by default.

Note: For SRF, version 2 already exposed BHI_CTRL, which would already
mark the CPU as invulnerable to ITS (at least in Linux); however,
expose ITS_NO for completeness.

[1] 74978391b2da ("target/i386: Make ITS_NO available to guests")

Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251106174626.49930-5-jon@nutanix.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/cpu.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c
index 987f64c5af3..2a869f5b739 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.c
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.c
@@ -5809,6 +5809,15 @@ static const X86CPUDefinition builtin_x86_defs[] = {
                     { /* end of list */ },
                 }
             },
+            {
+                .version = 5,
+                .note = "with ITS_NO",
+                .cache_info = &xeon_srf_cache_info,
+                .props = (PropValue[]) {
+                    { "its-no", "on" },
+                    { /* end of list */ },
+                }
+            },
             { /* end of list */ },
         },
     },
-- 
2.53.0