Introduce support for confidential guest reset (x86)

[PATCH v3 20/33] i386/sev: free existing launch update data and kernel hashes data on init

Ani Sinha posted 33 patches 1 week, 6 days ago

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Maintainers: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Eduardo Habkost <eduardo@habkost.net>, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>, "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@linaro.org>, Yanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com>, Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>, "Maciej S. Szmigiero" <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>, Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>, Bernhard Beschow <shentey@gmail.com>, Alex Williamson <alex@shazbot.org>, "Cédric Le Goater" <clg@redhat.com>, Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>, Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>, Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>, Song Gao <gaosong@loongson.cn>, Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>, Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>, Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>, Aleksandar Rikalo <arikalo@gmail.com>, Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>, Harsh Prateek Bora <harshpb@linux.ibm.com>, Chinmay Rath <rathc@linux.ibm.com>, Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>, Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>, Weiwei Li <liwei1518@gmail.com>, Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>, Liu Zhiwei <zhiwei_liu@linux.alibaba.com>, Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>, Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>, Eric Farman <farman@linux.ibm.com>, Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com>, Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>, David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>, Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>, Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>

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[PATCH v3 20/33] i386/sev: free existing launch update data and kernel hashes data on init

Posted by Ani Sinha 1 week, 6 days ago

If there is existing launch update data and kernel hashes data, they need to be
freed when initialization code is executed. This is important for resettable
confidential guests where the initialization happens once every reset.

Signed-off-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/sev.c | 12 ++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)

diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index a65a924fb3..d1dc0f3c1d 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -1772,6 +1772,7 @@ static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
     uint32_t ebx;
     uint32_t host_cbitpos;
     struct sev_user_data_status status = {};
+    SevLaunchUpdateData *data, *next_elm;
     SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(cgs);
     SevCommonStateClass *klass = SEV_COMMON_GET_CLASS(cgs);
     X86ConfidentialGuestClass *x86_klass =
@@ -1779,6 +1780,11 @@ static int sev_common_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
 
     sev_common->state = SEV_STATE_UNINIT;
 
+    /* free existing launch update data if any */
+    QTAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(data, &launch_update, next, next_elm) {
+        g_free(data);
+    }
+
     host_cpuid(0x8000001F, 0, NULL, &ebx, NULL, NULL);
     host_cbitpos = ebx & 0x3f;
 
@@ -1968,6 +1974,8 @@ static int sev_snp_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
 {
     MachineState *ms = MACHINE(qdev_get_machine());
     X86MachineState *x86ms = X86_MACHINE(ms);
+    SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(cgs);
+    SevSnpGuestState *sev_snp_guest = SEV_SNP_GUEST(sev_common);
 
     if (x86ms->smm == ON_OFF_AUTO_AUTO) {
         x86ms->smm = ON_OFF_AUTO_OFF;
@@ -1976,6 +1984,10 @@ static int sev_snp_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
         return -1;
     }
 
+    /* free existing kernel hashes data if any */
+    g_free(sev_snp_guest->kernel_hashes_data);
+    sev_snp_guest->kernel_hashes_data = NULL;
+
     return 0;
 }
 
-- 
2.42.0