[PATCH v1 18/28] i386/sev: add support for confidential guest reset

Ani Sinha posted 28 patches 1 day, 15 hours ago
Maintainers: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, "Maciej S. Szmigiero" <maciej.szmigiero@oracle.com>, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>, Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>, Eduardo Habkost <eduardo@habkost.net>, David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>, Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>, Bernhard Beschow <shentey@gmail.com>, Alex Williamson <alex@shazbot.org>, "Cédric Le Goater" <clg@redhat.com>, "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@linaro.org>, Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>, David Hildenbrand <david@kernel.org>, Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>, Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>, Zhao Liu <zhao1.liu@intel.com>, Song Gao <gaosong@loongson.cn>, Huacai Chen <chenhuacai@kernel.org>, Aurelien Jarno <aurelien@aurel32.net>, Jiaxun Yang <jiaxun.yang@flygoat.com>, Aleksandar Rikalo <arikalo@gmail.com>, Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>, Harsh Prateek Bora <harshpb@linux.ibm.com>, Chinmay Rath <rathc@linux.ibm.com>, Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>, Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>, Weiwei Li <liwei1518@gmail.com>, Daniel Henrique Barboza <dbarboza@ventanamicro.com>, Liu Zhiwei <zhiwei_liu@linux.alibaba.com>, Halil Pasic <pasic@linux.ibm.com>, Christian Borntraeger <borntraeger@linux.ibm.com>, Eric Farman <farman@linux.ibm.com>, Matthew Rosato <mjrosato@linux.ibm.com>, Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>, Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
[PATCH v1 18/28] i386/sev: add support for confidential guest reset
Posted by Ani Sinha 1 day, 15 hours ago
When the KVM VM file descriptor changes as a part of the confidential guest
reset mechanism, it necessary to create a new confidential guest context and
re-encrypt the VM memeory. This happens for SEV-ES and SEV-SNP virtual machines
as a part of SEV_LAUNCH_FINISH, SEV_SNP_LAUNCH_FINISH operations.

A new resettable interface for SEV module has been added. A new reset callback
for the reset 'exit' state has been implemented to perform the above operations
when the VM file descriptor has changed during VM reset.

Signed-off-by: Ani Sinha <anisinha@redhat.com>
---
 target/i386/sev.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 51 insertions(+)

diff --git a/target/i386/sev.c b/target/i386/sev.c
index 83b9bfb2ae..246a58c752 100644
--- a/target/i386/sev.c
+++ b/target/i386/sev.c
@@ -30,8 +30,10 @@
 #include "system/kvm.h"
 #include "kvm/kvm_i386.h"
 #include "sev.h"
+#include "system/cpus.h"
 #include "system/system.h"
 #include "system/runstate.h"
+#include "system/reset.h"
 #include "trace.h"
 #include "migration/blocker.h"
 #include "qom/object.h"
@@ -84,6 +86,10 @@ typedef struct QEMU_PACKED PaddedSevHashTable {
     uint8_t padding[ROUND_UP(sizeof(SevHashTable), 16) - sizeof(SevHashTable)];
 } PaddedSevHashTable;
 
+static void sev_handle_reset(Object *obj, ResetType type);
+
+SevKernelLoaderContext sev_load_ctx = {};
+
 QEMU_BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(PaddedSevHashTable) % 16 != 0);
 
 #define SEV_INFO_BLOCK_GUID     "00f771de-1a7e-4fcb-890e-68c77e2fb44e"
@@ -127,6 +133,7 @@ struct SevCommonState {
     uint8_t build_id;
     int sev_fd;
     SevState state;
+    ResettableState reset_state;
 
     QTAILQ_HEAD(, SevLaunchVmsa) launch_vmsa;
 };
@@ -2012,6 +2019,37 @@ static int sev_snp_kvm_init(ConfidentialGuestSupport *cgs, Error **errp)
     return 0;
 }
 
+/*
+ * handle sev vm reset
+ */
+static void sev_handle_reset(Object *obj, ResetType type)
+{
+    SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(MACHINE(qdev_get_machine())->cgs);
+    SevCommonStateClass *klass = SEV_COMMON_GET_CLASS(sev_common);
+
+    if (!sev_common) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    if (!runstate_is_running()) {
+        return;
+    }
+
+    sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(&sev_load_ctx, &error_fatal);
+    if (!sev_check_state(sev_common, SEV_STATE_RUNNING)) {
+        /* this calls sev_snp_launch_finish() etc */
+        klass->launch_finish(sev_common);
+    }
+
+    return;
+}
+
+static ResettableState *sev_reset_state(Object *obj)
+{
+    SevCommonState *sev_common = SEV_COMMON(obj);
+    return &sev_common->reset_state;
+}
+
 int
 sev_encrypt_flash(hwaddr gpa, uint8_t *ptr, uint64_t len, Error **errp)
 {
@@ -2490,6 +2528,8 @@ bool sev_add_kernel_loader_hashes(SevKernelLoaderContext *ctx, Error **errp)
         return false;
     }
 
+    /* save the context here so that it can be re-used when vm is reset */
+    memcpy(&sev_load_ctx, ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
     return klass->build_kernel_loader_hashes(sev_common, area, ctx, errp);
 }
 
@@ -2750,8 +2790,16 @@ static void
 sev_common_class_init(ObjectClass *oc, const void *data)
 {
     ConfidentialGuestSupportClass *klass = CONFIDENTIAL_GUEST_SUPPORT_CLASS(oc);
+    ResettableClass *rc = RESETTABLE_CLASS(oc);
 
     klass->kvm_init = sev_common_kvm_init;
+    /*
+     * the exit phase makes sure sev handles reset after all legacy resets
+     * have taken place (in the hold phase) and IGVM has also properly
+     * set up the boot state.
+     */
+    rc->phases.exit = sev_handle_reset;
+    rc->get_state = sev_reset_state;
 
     object_class_property_add_str(oc, "sev-device",
                                   sev_common_get_sev_device,
@@ -2786,6 +2834,8 @@ sev_common_instance_init(Object *obj)
     cgs->get_mem_map_entry = cgs_get_mem_map_entry;
     cgs->set_guest_policy = cgs_set_guest_policy;
 
+    qemu_register_resettable(OBJECT(sev_common));
+
     QTAILQ_INIT(&sev_common->launch_vmsa);
 }
 
@@ -2800,6 +2850,7 @@ static const TypeInfo sev_common_info = {
     .abstract = true,
     .interfaces = (const InterfaceInfo[]) {
         { TYPE_USER_CREATABLE },
+        { TYPE_RESETTABLE_INTERFACE },
         { }
     }
 };
-- 
2.42.0