Expose ITS_NO by default, as users using Sierra Forest and higher
CPU models would not be able to live migrate to lower CPU hosts due to
missing features. In that case, they would not be vulnerable to ITS.

its-no was originally added on [1], but needs to be exposed on the
individual CPU models for the guests to see by default.

Note: For SRF, version 2 already exposed BHI_CTRL, which would already
mark the CPU as invulnerable to ITS (at least in Linux); however,
expose ITS_NO for completeness.

[1] 74978391b2da ("target/i386: Make ITS_NO available to guests")

Cc: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Jon Kohler <jon@nutanix.com>
---
 target/i386/cpu.c | 9 +++++++++
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+)

diff --git a/target/i386/cpu.c b/target/i386/cpu.c
index afbfe11733..a522805233 100644
--- a/target/i386/cpu.c
+++ b/target/i386/cpu.c
@@ -5445,6 +5445,15 @@ static const X86CPUDefinition builtin_x86_defs[] = {
                     { /* end of list */ },
                 }
             },
+            {
+                .version = 4,
+                .note = "with ITS_NO",
+                .cache_info = &xeon_srf_cache_info,
+                .props = (PropValue[]) {
+                    { "its-no", "on" },
+                    { /* end of list */ },
+                }
+            },
             { /* end of list */ },
         },
     },
-- 
2.43.0