From: Alexey Baturo <baturo.alexey@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexey Baturo <baturo.alexey@gmail.com>
---
target/riscv/cpu.h | 4 +++
target/riscv/cpu_helper.c | 58 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 62 insertions(+)
diff --git a/target/riscv/cpu.h b/target/riscv/cpu.h
index c9bed5c9fc..1c8979c1c8 100644
--- a/target/riscv/cpu.h
+++ b/target/riscv/cpu.h
@@ -671,6 +671,10 @@ static inline uint32_t vext_get_vlmax(RISCVCPU *cpu, target_ulong vtype)
void cpu_get_tb_cpu_state(CPURISCVState *env, vaddr *pc,
uint64_t *cs_base, uint32_t *pflags);
+bool riscv_cpu_virt_mem_enabled(CPURISCVState *env);
+RISCVPmPmm riscv_pm_get_pmm(CPURISCVState *env);
+int riscv_pm_get_pmlen(RISCVPmPmm pmm);
+
RISCVException riscv_csrrw(CPURISCVState *env, int csrno,
target_ulong *ret_value,
target_ulong new_value, target_ulong write_mask);
diff --git a/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c b/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
index a3d477d226..9640e4c2c5 100644
--- a/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
+++ b/target/riscv/cpu_helper.c
@@ -139,6 +139,64 @@ void cpu_get_tb_cpu_state(CPURISCVState *env, vaddr *pc,
*pflags = flags;
}
+RISCVPmPmm riscv_pm_get_pmm(CPURISCVState *env)
+{
+ int pmm = 0;
+#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
+ int priv_mode = cpu_address_mode(env);
+ /* Get current PMM field */
+ switch (priv_mode) {
+ case PRV_M:
+ pmm = riscv_cpu_cfg(env)->ext_smmpm ?
+ get_field(env->mseccfg, MSECCFG_PMM) : PMM_FIELD_DISABLED;
+ break;
+ case PRV_S:
+ pmm = riscv_cpu_cfg(env)->ext_smnpm ?
+ get_field(env->menvcfg, MENVCFG_PMM) : PMM_FIELD_DISABLED;
+ break;
+ case PRV_U:
+ pmm = riscv_cpu_cfg(env)->ext_ssnpm ?
+ get_field(env->senvcfg, SENVCFG_PMM) : PMM_FIELD_DISABLED;
+ break;
+ default:
+ g_assert_not_reached();
+ }
+#endif
+ return pmm;
+}
+
+bool riscv_cpu_virt_mem_enabled(CPURISCVState *env)
+{
+ bool virt_mem_en = false;
+#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
+ int satp_mode = 0;
+ int priv_mode = cpu_address_mode(env);
+ /* Get current PMM field */
+ if (riscv_cpu_mxl(env) == MXL_RV32) {
+ satp_mode = get_field(env->satp, SATP32_MODE);
+ } else {
+ satp_mode = get_field(env->satp, SATP64_MODE);
+ }
+ virt_mem_en = ((satp_mode != VM_1_10_MBARE) && (priv_mode != PRV_M));
+#endif
+ return virt_mem_en;
+}
+
+int riscv_pm_get_pmlen(RISCVPmPmm pmm)
+{
+ switch (pmm) {
+ case PMM_FIELD_DISABLED:
+ return 0;
+ case PMM_FIELD_PMLEN7:
+ return 7;
+ case PMM_FIELD_PMLEN16:
+ return 16;
+ default:
+ g_assert_not_reached();
+ }
+ return -1;
+}
+
#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
/*
--
2.34.1On Tue, Jan 9, 2024 at 2:31 AM Alexey Baturo <baturo.alexey@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> From: Alexey Baturo <baturo.alexey@gmail.com>
>
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Baturo <baturo.alexey@gmail.com>
> ---
> +
> +bool riscv_cpu_virt_mem_enabled(CPURISCVState *env)
> +{
> + bool virt_mem_en = false;
> +#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
> + int satp_mode = 0;
> + int priv_mode = cpu_address_mode(env);
> + /* Get current PMM field */
> + if (riscv_cpu_mxl(env) == MXL_RV32) {
> + satp_mode = get_field(env->satp, SATP32_MODE);
> + } else {
> + satp_mode = get_field(env->satp, SATP64_MODE);
> + }
> + virt_mem_en = ((satp_mode != VM_1_10_MBARE) && (priv_mode != PRV_M));
> +#endif
> + return virt_mem_en;
Obsessing a little bit on how to test PM enabled binaries with qemu-user.
If we return false above then we're not allowed to test binaries with
pointer masking enabled with qemu-user.
That use case is not required?
> +}
> +
> +int riscv_pm_get_pmlen(RISCVPmPmm pmm)
> +{
> + switch (pmm) {
> + case PMM_FIELD_DISABLED:
> + return 0;
> + case PMM_FIELD_PMLEN7:
> + return 7;
> + case PMM_FIELD_PMLEN16:
> + return 16;
> + default:
> + g_assert_not_reached();
> + }
> + return -1;
> +}
> +
> #ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
>
> /*
> --
> 2.34.1
>
>
On 1/19/24 04:21, Deepak Gupta wrote:
> On Tue, Jan 9, 2024 at 2:31 AM Alexey Baturo <baturo.alexey@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>> From: Alexey Baturo <baturo.alexey@gmail.com>
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Alexey Baturo <baturo.alexey@gmail.com>
>> ---
>
>> +
>> +bool riscv_cpu_virt_mem_enabled(CPURISCVState *env)
>> +{
>> + bool virt_mem_en = false;
>> +#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
>> + int satp_mode = 0;
>> + int priv_mode = cpu_address_mode(env);
>> + /* Get current PMM field */
>> + if (riscv_cpu_mxl(env) == MXL_RV32) {
>> + satp_mode = get_field(env->satp, SATP32_MODE);
>> + } else {
>> + satp_mode = get_field(env->satp, SATP64_MODE);
>> + }
>> + virt_mem_en = ((satp_mode != VM_1_10_MBARE) && (priv_mode != PRV_M));
>> +#endif
>> + return virt_mem_en;
>
> Obsessing a little bit on how to test PM enabled binaries with qemu-user.
> If we return false above then we're not allowed to test binaries with
> pointer masking enabled with qemu-user.
> That use case is not required?
In a previous round I suggested that the ifdefs are not necessary.
But for now it will always be off for qemu-user.
At some point pointer masking will be in hardware, and the kernel will gain support for
it, and there will likely be a prctl() added for it. At the point the kernel finalizes
the API, you will be able to enable pointer masking for qemu-user.
r~
On Thu, Jan 18, 2024 at 12:50 PM Richard Henderson
<richard.henderson@linaro.org> wrote:
>
> On 1/19/24 04:21, Deepak Gupta wrote:
> > On Tue, Jan 9, 2024 at 2:31 AM Alexey Baturo <baturo.alexey@gmail.com> wrote:
> >>
> >> From: Alexey Baturo <baturo.alexey@gmail.com>
> >>
> >> Signed-off-by: Alexey Baturo <baturo.alexey@gmail.com>
> >> ---
> >
> >> +
> >> +bool riscv_cpu_virt_mem_enabled(CPURISCVState *env)
> >> +{
> >> + bool virt_mem_en = false;
> >> +#ifndef CONFIG_USER_ONLY
> >> + int satp_mode = 0;
> >> + int priv_mode = cpu_address_mode(env);
> >> + /* Get current PMM field */
> >> + if (riscv_cpu_mxl(env) == MXL_RV32) {
> >> + satp_mode = get_field(env->satp, SATP32_MODE);
> >> + } else {
> >> + satp_mode = get_field(env->satp, SATP64_MODE);
> >> + }
> >> + virt_mem_en = ((satp_mode != VM_1_10_MBARE) && (priv_mode != PRV_M));
> >> +#endif
> >> + return virt_mem_en;
> >
> > Obsessing a little bit on how to test PM enabled binaries with qemu-user.
> > If we return false above then we're not allowed to test binaries with
> > pointer masking enabled with qemu-user.
> > That use case is not required?
>
> In a previous round I suggested that the ifdefs are not necessary.
> But for now it will always be off for qemu-user.
>
> At some point pointer masking will be in hardware, and the kernel will gain support for
> it, and there will likely be a prctl() added for it. At the point the kernel finalizes
> the API, you will be able to enable pointer masking for qemu-user.
I am sure I am missing some important detail here, BUT...
How is it different from aarch64 "top byte ignore".
I think commit: 16c8497 enables top byte ignore for user pointers and
by default for qemu-user for aarch64 target.
IIRC, user <--> kernel abi is only needed for pointers that are passed
to the kernel.
And in the case of qemu-user, we are talking about the host kernel.
Since arm64 had TBI enabled for qemu-user for a while and I imagine it
works on x86 host kernel
(assuming qemu-user is sanitizing pointers)
Same should work for risc-v qemu-user, right?
>
>
> r~
On 1/19/24 09:40, Deepak Gupta wrote:
> On Thu, Jan 18, 2024 at 12:50 PM Richard Henderson
> <richard.henderson@linaro.org> wrote:
>> At some point pointer masking will be in hardware, and the kernel will gain support for
>> it, and there will likely be a prctl() added for it. At the point the kernel finalizes
>> the API, you will be able to enable pointer masking for qemu-user.
>
> I am sure I am missing some important detail here, BUT...
>
> How is it different from aarch64 "top byte ignore".
It is very similar, yes.
> I think commit: 16c8497 enables top byte ignore for user pointers and
> by default for qemu-user for aarch64 target.
Not quite, no.
commit 0e0c030c681730f3ec55ba3b223b608a8f3e8282
Author: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
Date: Fri Feb 12 10:48:51 2021 -0800
linux-user/aarch64: Implement PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE
is more relevant.
> IIRC, user <--> kernel abi is only needed for pointers that are passed
> to the kernel.
It is also needed to *enable* pointer masking at all.
For aarch64, TBI has been enabled for user-space since the beginning, but that is not true
for riscv. Therefore there will be a need for a syscall to opt in and enable pointer masking.
> And in the case of qemu-user, we are talking about the host kernel.
No, we are not. We are always emulating the guest kernel.
r~
Hi, Having the feature to run binaries with pointer masking on qemu-user is really nice, but I see this patch series as an initial support. Obviously there'll be more patches and fixes for pointer masking as soon as arch tests are ready. I suggest supporting qemu-user in the next patches, but make sure we do this before claiming 100% support for pointer masking. @Deepak Gupta <debug@rivosinc.com> what do you think? Thanks сб, 20 янв. 2024 г. в 10:37, Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org >: > On 1/19/24 09:40, Deepak Gupta wrote: > > On Thu, Jan 18, 2024 at 12:50 PM Richard Henderson > > <richard.henderson@linaro.org> wrote: > >> At some point pointer masking will be in hardware, and the kernel will > gain support for > >> it, and there will likely be a prctl() added for it. At the point the > kernel finalizes > >> the API, you will be able to enable pointer masking for qemu-user. > > > > I am sure I am missing some important detail here, BUT... > > > > How is it different from aarch64 "top byte ignore". > > It is very similar, yes. > > > I think commit: 16c8497 enables top byte ignore for user pointers and > > by default for qemu-user for aarch64 target. > > Not quite, no. > > commit 0e0c030c681730f3ec55ba3b223b608a8f3e8282 > Author: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> > Date: Fri Feb 12 10:48:51 2021 -0800 > > linux-user/aarch64: Implement PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE > > is more relevant. > > > IIRC, user <--> kernel abi is only needed for pointers that are passed > > to the kernel. > > It is also needed to *enable* pointer masking at all. > > For aarch64, TBI has been enabled for user-space since the beginning, but > that is not true > for riscv. Therefore there will be a need for a syscall to opt in and > enable pointer masking. > > > And in the case of qemu-user, we are talking about the host kernel. > > No, we are not. We are always emulating the guest kernel. > > > r~ >
On Sat, Jan 20, 2024 at 11:14 PM Alexey Baturo <baturo.alexey@gmail.com> wrote: > > Hi, > > Having the feature to run binaries with pointer masking on qemu-user is really nice, but I see this patch series as an initial support. > Obviously there'll be more patches and fixes for pointer masking as soon as arch tests are ready. > I suggest supporting qemu-user in the next patches, but make sure we do this before claiming 100% support for pointer masking. > @Deepak Gupta what do you think? I think that makes sense. Thanks. > > Thanks > > сб, 20 янв. 2024 г. в 10:37, Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>: >> >> On 1/19/24 09:40, Deepak Gupta wrote: >> > On Thu, Jan 18, 2024 at 12:50 PM Richard Henderson >> > <richard.henderson@linaro.org> wrote: >> >> At some point pointer masking will be in hardware, and the kernel will gain support for >> >> it, and there will likely be a prctl() added for it. At the point the kernel finalizes >> >> the API, you will be able to enable pointer masking for qemu-user. >> > >> > I am sure I am missing some important detail here, BUT... >> > >> > How is it different from aarch64 "top byte ignore". >> >> It is very similar, yes. >> >> > I think commit: 16c8497 enables top byte ignore for user pointers and >> > by default for qemu-user for aarch64 target. >> >> Not quite, no. >> >> commit 0e0c030c681730f3ec55ba3b223b608a8f3e8282 >> Author: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org> >> Date: Fri Feb 12 10:48:51 2021 -0800 >> >> linux-user/aarch64: Implement PR_TAGGED_ADDR_ENABLE >> >> is more relevant. >> >> > IIRC, user <--> kernel abi is only needed for pointers that are passed >> > to the kernel. >> >> It is also needed to *enable* pointer masking at all. >> >> For aarch64, TBI has been enabled for user-space since the beginning, but that is not true >> for riscv. Therefore there will be a need for a syscall to opt in and enable pointer masking. >> >> > And in the case of qemu-user, we are talking about the host kernel. >> >> No, we are not. We are always emulating the guest kernel. >> >> >> r~
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