[PATCH v3 35/36] docs: Document security implications of debugging

Alex Bennée posted 36 patches 2 years, 3 months ago
Maintainers: "Alex Bennée" <alex.bennee@linaro.org>, "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <philmd@linaro.org>, Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>, Wainer dos Santos Moschetta <wainersm@redhat.com>, Beraldo Leal <bleal@redhat.com>, Bin Meng <bmeng.cn@gmail.com>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>, Riku Voipio <riku.voipio@iki.fi>, Alexandre Iooss <erdnaxe@crans.org>, Mahmoud Mandour <ma.mandourr@gmail.com>, "Daniel P. Berrangé" <berrange@redhat.com>, Eduardo Habkost <eduardo@habkost.net>, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>, Yanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com>, Juan Quintela <quintela@redhat.com>, Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>, Leonardo Bras <leobras@redhat.com>, Laurent Vivier <laurent@vivier.eu>, Alexander Bulekov <alxndr@bu.edu>, Bandan Das <bsd@redhat.com>, Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>, Darren Kenny <darren.kenny@oracle.com>, Qiuhao Li <Qiuhao.Li@outlook.com>, Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>, Radoslaw Biernacki <rad@semihalf.com>, Leif Lindholm <quic_llindhol@quicinc.com>, Marcin Juszkiewicz <marcin.juszkiewicz@linaro.org>, Cleber Rosa <crosa@redhat.com>
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[PATCH v3 35/36] docs: Document security implications of debugging
Posted by Alex Bennée 2 years, 3 months ago
From: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>

Now that the GDB stub explicitly implements reading host files (note
that it was already possible by changing the emulated code to open and
read those files), concerns may arise that it undermines security.

Document the status quo, which is that the users are already
responsible for securing the GDB connection themselves.

Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
Message-Id: <20230621203627.1808446-8-iii@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
---
 docs/system/gdb.rst | 15 +++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

diff --git a/docs/system/gdb.rst b/docs/system/gdb.rst
index 7d3718deef..9906991b84 100644
--- a/docs/system/gdb.rst
+++ b/docs/system/gdb.rst
@@ -214,3 +214,18 @@ The memory mode can be checked by sending the following command:
 
 ``maintenance packet Qqemu.PhyMemMode:0``
     This will change it back to normal memory mode.
+
+Security considerations
+=======================
+
+Connecting to the GDB socket allows running arbitrary code inside the guest;
+in case of the TCG emulation, which is not considered a security boundary, this
+also means running arbitrary code on the host. Additionally, when debugging
+qemu-user, it allows directly downloading any file readable by QEMU from the
+host.
+
+The GDB socket is not protected by authentication, authorization or encryption.
+It is therefore a responsibility of the user to make sure that only authorized
+clients can connect to it, e.g., by using a unix socket with proper
+permissions, or by opening a TCP socket only on interfaces that are not
+reachable by potential attackers.
-- 
2.39.2


Re: [PATCH v3 35/36] docs: Document security implications of debugging
Posted by Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 2 years, 3 months ago
On 27/6/23 18:09, Alex Bennée wrote:
> From: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
> 
> Now that the GDB stub explicitly implements reading host files (note
> that it was already possible by changing the emulated code to open and
> read those files), concerns may arise that it undermines security.
> 
> Document the status quo, which is that the users are already
> responsible for securing the GDB connection themselves.
> 
> Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
> Signed-off-by: Ilya Leoshkevich <iii@linux.ibm.com>
> Message-Id: <20230621203627.1808446-8-iii@linux.ibm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
> ---
>   docs/system/gdb.rst | 15 +++++++++++++++
>   1 file changed, 15 insertions(+)

Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@linaro.org>