This enables guests to lock their CR0 and CR4 registers with a subset of
X86_CR0_WP, X86_CR4_SMEP, X86_CR4_SMAP, X86_CR4_UMIP, X86_CR4_FSGSBASE
and X86_CR4_CET flags.
The new KVM_HC_LOCK_CR_UPDATE hypercall takes two arguments. The first
is to identify the control register, and the second is a bit mask to
pin (i.e. mark as read-only).
These register flags should already be pinned by Linux guests, but once
compromised, this self-protection mechanism could be disabled, which is
not the case with this dedicated hypercall.
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505152046.6575-6-mic@digikod.net
---
Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/hypercalls.rst | 15 +++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 10 ++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 16 +++++
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 3 +
include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h | 1 +
7 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/hypercalls.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/hypercalls.rst
index 0ec79cc77f53..8aa5d28986e3 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/hypercalls.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/hypercalls.rst
@@ -207,3 +207,18 @@ identified with set of physical page ranges (GFNs). The HEKI_ATTR_MEM_NOWRITE
memory page range attribute forbids related modification to the guest.
Returns 0 on success or a KVM error code otherwise.
+
+10. KVM_HC_LOCK_CR_UPDATE
+-------------------------
+
+:Architecture: x86
+:Status: active
+:Purpose: Request some control registers to be restricted.
+
+- a0: identify a control register
+- a1: bit mask to make some flags read-only
+
+The hypercall lets a guest request control register flags to be pinned for
+itself.
+
+Returns 0 on success or a KVM error code otherwise.
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
index f3cc7699e1e1..dd89379fe5ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
@@ -413,7 +413,7 @@ static __always_inline void setup_umip(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
}
/* These bits should not change their value after CPU init is finished. */
-static const unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask =
+const unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask =
X86_CR4_SMEP | X86_CR4_SMAP | X86_CR4_UMIP |
X86_CR4_FSGSBASE | X86_CR4_CET;
static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE_RO(cr_pinning);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 9870db887a62..931688edc8eb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -3162,6 +3162,11 @@ void vmx_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0)
struct vcpu_vmx *vmx = to_vmx(vcpu);
unsigned long hw_cr0, old_cr0_pg;
u32 tmp;
+ int res;
+
+ res = heki_check_cr(vcpu->kvm, 0, cr0);
+ if (res)
+ return;
old_cr0_pg = kvm_read_cr0_bits(vcpu, X86_CR0_PG);
@@ -3323,6 +3328,11 @@ void vmx_set_cr4(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr4)
* this bit, even if host CR4.MCE == 0.
*/
unsigned long hw_cr4;
+ int res;
+
+ res = heki_check_cr(vcpu->kvm, 4, cr4);
+ if (res)
+ return;
hw_cr4 = (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE) | (cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE);
if (is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index ffab64d08de3..a529455359ac 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -7927,11 +7927,77 @@ static unsigned long emulator_get_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr)
return value;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_HEKI
+
+extern unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask;
+
+static int heki_lock_cr(struct kvm *const kvm, const unsigned long cr,
+ unsigned long pin)
+{
+ if (!pin)
+ return -KVM_EINVAL;
+
+ switch (cr) {
+ case 0:
+ /* Cf. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c */
+ if (!(pin & X86_CR0_WP))
+ return -KVM_EINVAL;
+
+ if ((read_cr0() & pin) != pin)
+ return -KVM_EINVAL;
+
+ atomic_long_or(pin, &kvm->heki_pinned_cr0);
+ return 0;
+ case 4:
+ /* Checks for irrelevant bits. */
+ if ((pin & cr4_pinned_mask) != pin)
+ return -KVM_EINVAL;
+
+ /* Ignores bits not present in host. */
+ pin &= __read_cr4();
+ atomic_long_or(pin, &kvm->heki_pinned_cr4);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return -KVM_EINVAL;
+}
+
+int heki_check_cr(const struct kvm *const kvm, const unsigned long cr,
+ const unsigned long val)
+{
+ unsigned long pinned;
+
+ switch (cr) {
+ case 0:
+ pinned = atomic_long_read(&kvm->heki_pinned_cr0);
+ if ((val & pinned) != pinned) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited(
+ "heki-kvm: Blocked CR0 update: 0x%lx\n", val);
+ return -KVM_EPERM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ case 4:
+ pinned = atomic_long_read(&kvm->heki_pinned_cr4);
+ if ((val & pinned) != pinned) {
+ pr_warn_ratelimited(
+ "heki-kvm: Blocked CR4 update: 0x%lx\n", val);
+ return -KVM_EPERM;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_HEKI */
+
static int emulator_set_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr, ulong val)
{
struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu = emul_to_vcpu(ctxt);
int res = 0;
+ res = heki_check_cr(vcpu->kvm, cr, val);
+ if (res)
+ return res;
+
switch (cr) {
case 0:
res = kvm_set_cr0(vcpu, mk_cr_64(kvm_read_cr0(vcpu), val));
@@ -9858,6 +9924,12 @@ int kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
else
ret = heki_lock_mem_page_ranges(vcpu->kvm, a0, a1);
break;
+ case KVM_HC_LOCK_CR_UPDATE:
+ if (a0 > U32_MAX)
+ ret = -KVM_EINVAL;
+ else
+ ret = heki_lock_cr(vcpu->kvm, a0, a1);
+ break;
#endif /* CONFIG_HEKI */
default:
ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
index 9de72586f406..3e80a60ecbd8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h
@@ -276,6 +276,22 @@ static inline bool kvm_check_has_quirk(struct kvm *kvm, u64 quirk)
return !(kvm->arch.disabled_quirks & quirk);
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_HEKI
+
+int heki_check_cr(const struct kvm *kvm, unsigned long cr, unsigned long val);
+
+bool kvm_heki_is_exec_allowed(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t gpa);
+
+#else /* CONFIG_HEKI */
+
+static inline int heki_check_cr(const struct kvm *const kvm,
+ const unsigned long cr, const unsigned long val)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_HEKI */
+
void kvm_inject_realmode_interrupt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int irq, int inc_eip);
u64 get_kvmclock_ns(struct kvm *kvm);
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index 39a1bdc2ba42..ab9dc723bc89 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -812,6 +812,9 @@ struct kvm {
#define HEKI_GFN_MAX 16
atomic_t heki_gfn_no_write_num;
struct heki_gfn_range heki_gfn_no_write[HEKI_GFN_MAX];
+
+ atomic_long_t heki_pinned_cr0;
+ atomic_long_t heki_pinned_cr4;
#endif /* CONFIG_HEKI */
#ifdef CONFIG_HAVE_KVM_PM_NOTIFIER
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
index d7512a10880e..9f68d4ba646b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#define KVM_HC_SCHED_YIELD 11
#define KVM_HC_MAP_GPA_RANGE 12
#define KVM_HC_LOCK_MEM_PAGE_RANGES 13
+#define KVM_HC_LOCK_CR_UPDATE 14
/*
* hypercalls use architecture specific
--
2.40.1
On Fri, May 05, 2023 at 05:20:42PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
> This enables guests to lock their CR0 and CR4 registers with a subset of
> X86_CR0_WP, X86_CR4_SMEP, X86_CR4_SMAP, X86_CR4_UMIP, X86_CR4_FSGSBASE
> and X86_CR4_CET flags.
>
> The new KVM_HC_LOCK_CR_UPDATE hypercall takes two arguments. The first
> is to identify the control register, and the second is a bit mask to
> pin (i.e. mark as read-only).
>
> These register flags should already be pinned by Linux guests, but once
> compromised, this self-protection mechanism could be disabled, which is
> not the case with this dedicated hypercall.
>
> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505152046.6575-6-mic@digikod.net
[...]
> hw_cr4 = (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE) | (cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE);
> if (is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu))
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> index ffab64d08de3..a529455359ac 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
> @@ -7927,11 +7927,77 @@ static unsigned long emulator_get_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr)
> return value;
> }
>
> +#ifdef CONFIG_HEKI
> +
> +extern unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask;
> +
Can this be moved to a header file?
> +static int heki_lock_cr(struct kvm *const kvm, const unsigned long cr,
> + unsigned long pin)
> +{
> + if (!pin)
> + return -KVM_EINVAL;
> +
> + switch (cr) {
> + case 0:
> + /* Cf. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c */
> + if (!(pin & X86_CR0_WP))
> + return -KVM_EINVAL;
> +
> + if ((read_cr0() & pin) != pin)
> + return -KVM_EINVAL;
> +
> + atomic_long_or(pin, &kvm->heki_pinned_cr0);
> + return 0;
> + case 4:
> + /* Checks for irrelevant bits. */
> + if ((pin & cr4_pinned_mask) != pin)
> + return -KVM_EINVAL;
> +
It is enforcing the host mask on the guest, right? If the guest's set is a
super set of the host's then it will get rejected.
> + /* Ignores bits not present in host. */
> + pin &= __read_cr4();
> + atomic_long_or(pin, &kvm->heki_pinned_cr4);
> + return 0;
> + }
> + return -KVM_EINVAL;
> +}
> +
> +int heki_check_cr(const struct kvm *const kvm, const unsigned long cr,
> + const unsigned long val)
> +{
> + unsigned long pinned;
> +
> + switch (cr) {
> + case 0:
> + pinned = atomic_long_read(&kvm->heki_pinned_cr0);
> + if ((val & pinned) != pinned) {
> + pr_warn_ratelimited(
> + "heki-kvm: Blocked CR0 update: 0x%lx\n", val);
I think if the message contains the VM and VCPU identifier it will
become more useful.
Thanks,
Wei.
On 08/05/2023 23:11, Wei Liu wrote:
> On Fri, May 05, 2023 at 05:20:42PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> This enables guests to lock their CR0 and CR4 registers with a subset of
>> X86_CR0_WP, X86_CR4_SMEP, X86_CR4_SMAP, X86_CR4_UMIP, X86_CR4_FSGSBASE
>> and X86_CR4_CET flags.
>>
>> The new KVM_HC_LOCK_CR_UPDATE hypercall takes two arguments. The first
>> is to identify the control register, and the second is a bit mask to
>> pin (i.e. mark as read-only).
>>
>> These register flags should already be pinned by Linux guests, but once
>> compromised, this self-protection mechanism could be disabled, which is
>> not the case with this dedicated hypercall.
>>
>> Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
>> Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
>> Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
>> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
>> Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
>> Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com>
>> Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
>> Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
>> Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
>> Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>
>> Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>
>> Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net>
>> Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505152046.6575-6-mic@digikod.net
> [...]
>> hw_cr4 = (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE) | (cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE);
>> if (is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu))
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> index ffab64d08de3..a529455359ac 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
>> @@ -7927,11 +7927,77 @@ static unsigned long emulator_get_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr)
>> return value;
>> }
>>
>> +#ifdef CONFIG_HEKI
>> +
>> +extern unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask;
>> +
>
> Can this be moved to a header file?
Yep, but I'm not sure which one. Any preference Kees?
>
>> +static int heki_lock_cr(struct kvm *const kvm, const unsigned long cr,
>> + unsigned long pin)
>> +{
>> + if (!pin)
>> + return -KVM_EINVAL;
>> +
>> + switch (cr) {
>> + case 0:
>> + /* Cf. arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c */
>> + if (!(pin & X86_CR0_WP))
>> + return -KVM_EINVAL;
>> +
>> + if ((read_cr0() & pin) != pin)
>> + return -KVM_EINVAL;
>> +
>> + atomic_long_or(pin, &kvm->heki_pinned_cr0);
>> + return 0;
>> + case 4:
>> + /* Checks for irrelevant bits. */
>> + if ((pin & cr4_pinned_mask) != pin)
>> + return -KVM_EINVAL;
>> +
>
> It is enforcing the host mask on the guest, right? If the guest's set is a
> super set of the host's then it will get rejected.
>
>
>> + /* Ignores bits not present in host. */
>> + pin &= __read_cr4();
>> + atomic_long_or(pin, &kvm->heki_pinned_cr4);
We assume that the host's mask is a superset of the guest's mask. I
guess we should check the absolute supported bits instead, even if it
would be weird for the host to not support these bits.
>> + return 0;
>> + }
>> + return -KVM_EINVAL;
>> +}
>> +
>> +int heki_check_cr(const struct kvm *const kvm, const unsigned long cr,
>> + const unsigned long val)
>> +{
>> + unsigned long pinned;
>> +
>> + switch (cr) {
>> + case 0:
>> + pinned = atomic_long_read(&kvm->heki_pinned_cr0);
>> + if ((val & pinned) != pinned) {
>> + pr_warn_ratelimited(
>> + "heki-kvm: Blocked CR0 update: 0x%lx\n", val);
>
> I think if the message contains the VM and VCPU identifier it will
> become more useful.
Indeed, and this should be the case for all log messages, but I'd left
that for future work. ;) I'll update the logs for the next series with a
new kvm_warn_ratelimited() helper using VCPU's PID.
On Mon, May 29, 2023 at 06:48:03PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > On 08/05/2023 23:11, Wei Liu wrote: > > On Fri, May 05, 2023 at 05:20:42PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote: > > > This enables guests to lock their CR0 and CR4 registers with a subset of > > > X86_CR0_WP, X86_CR4_SMEP, X86_CR4_SMAP, X86_CR4_UMIP, X86_CR4_FSGSBASE > > > and X86_CR4_CET flags. > > > > > > The new KVM_HC_LOCK_CR_UPDATE hypercall takes two arguments. The first > > > is to identify the control register, and the second is a bit mask to > > > pin (i.e. mark as read-only). > > > > > > These register flags should already be pinned by Linux guests, but once > > > compromised, this self-protection mechanism could be disabled, which is > > > not the case with this dedicated hypercall. > > > > > > Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> > > > Cc: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> > > > Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> > > > Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com> > > > Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> > > > Cc: Madhavan T. Venkataraman <madvenka@linux.microsoft.com> > > > Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> > > > Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> > > > Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > > > Cc: Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com> > > > Cc: Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com> > > > Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün <mic@digikod.net> > > > Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230505152046.6575-6-mic@digikod.net > > [...] > > > hw_cr4 = (cr4_read_shadow() & X86_CR4_MCE) | (cr4 & ~X86_CR4_MCE); > > > if (is_unrestricted_guest(vcpu)) > > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > > > index ffab64d08de3..a529455359ac 100644 > > > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > > > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c > > > @@ -7927,11 +7927,77 @@ static unsigned long emulator_get_cr(struct x86_emulate_ctxt *ctxt, int cr) > > > return value; > > > } > > > +#ifdef CONFIG_HEKI > > > + > > > +extern unsigned long cr4_pinned_mask; > > > + > > > > Can this be moved to a header file? > > Yep, but I'm not sure which one. Any preference Kees? Uh, er, I was never expecting that mask to be non-static. ;) To that end, how about putting it in arch/x86/kvm/x86.h ? -- Kees Cook
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