[PULL 54/91] intel-iommu: block output address in interrupt address range

Michael S. Tsirkin posted 91 patches 3 years, 7 months ago
Maintainers: "Marc-André Lureau" <marcandre.lureau@redhat.com>, Gerd Hoffmann <kraxel@redhat.com>, "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>, "Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>, Greg Kurz <groug@kaod.org>, Christian Schoenebeck <qemu_oss@crudebyte.com>, Igor Mammedov <imammedo@redhat.com>, Ani Sinha <ani@anisinha.ca>, Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>, Raphael Norwitz <raphael.norwitz@nutanix.com>, Kevin Wolf <kwolf@redhat.com>, Hanna Reitz <hreitz@redhat.com>, Stefan Hajnoczi <stefanha@redhat.com>, Laurent Vivier <lvivier@redhat.com>, Amit Shah <amit@kernel.org>, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, Eduardo Habkost <eduardo@habkost.net>, Marcel Apfelbaum <marcel.apfelbaum@gmail.com>, "Philippe Mathieu-Daudé" <f4bug@amsat.org>, Yanan Wang <wangyanan55@huawei.com>, Ben Widawsky <ben.widawsky@intel.com>, Jonathan Cameron <jonathan.cameron@huawei.com>, Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>, Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>, Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>, Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Fam Zheng <fam@euphon.net>, Mathieu Poirier <mathieu.poirier@linaro.org>, David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>, "Gonglei (Arei)" <arei.gonglei@huawei.com>, Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>, Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>, Markus Armbruster <armbru@redhat.com>, Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>, Marcelo Tosatti <mtosatti@redhat.com>, Thomas Huth <thuth@redhat.com>
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[PULL 54/91] intel-iommu: block output address in interrupt address range
Posted by Michael S. Tsirkin 3 years, 7 months ago
From: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>

According to vtd spec v3.3 3.14:

"""
Software must not program paging-structure entries to remap any
address to the interrupt address range. Untranslated requests and
translation requests that result in an address in the interrupt range
will be blocked with condition code LGN.4 or SGN.8.
"""

This patch blocks the request that result in interrupt address range.

Signed-off-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Message-Id: <20220210092815.45174-2-jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
---
 hw/i386/intel_iommu_internal.h |  4 ++++
 hw/i386/intel_iommu.c          | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/hw/i386/intel_iommu_internal.h b/hw/i386/intel_iommu_internal.h
index b6a2da8e83..930ce61feb 100644
--- a/hw/i386/intel_iommu_internal.h
+++ b/hw/i386/intel_iommu_internal.h
@@ -289,6 +289,8 @@ typedef enum VTDFaultReason {
      * context-entry.
      */
     VTD_FR_CONTEXT_ENTRY_TT,
+    /* Output address in the interrupt address range */
+    VTD_FR_INTERRUPT_ADDR = 0xE,
 
     /* Interrupt remapping transition faults */
     VTD_FR_IR_REQ_RSVD = 0x20, /* One or more IR request reserved
@@ -304,6 +306,8 @@ typedef enum VTDFaultReason {
 
     VTD_FR_PASID_TABLE_INV = 0x58,  /*Invalid PASID table entry */
 
+    /* Output address in the interrupt address range for scalable mode */
+    VTD_FR_SM_INTERRUPT_ADDR = 0x87,
     VTD_FR_MAX,                 /* Guard */
 } VTDFaultReason;
 
diff --git a/hw/i386/intel_iommu.c b/hw/i386/intel_iommu.c
index 8af2e39151..695dd51dc3 100644
--- a/hw/i386/intel_iommu.c
+++ b/hw/i386/intel_iommu.c
@@ -1020,6 +1020,7 @@ static int vtd_iova_to_slpte(IntelIOMMUState *s, VTDContextEntry *ce,
     uint32_t offset;
     uint64_t slpte;
     uint64_t access_right_check;
+    uint64_t xlat, size;
 
     if (!vtd_iova_range_check(s, iova, ce, aw_bits)) {
         error_report_once("%s: detected IOVA overflow (iova=0x%" PRIx64 ")",
@@ -1064,11 +1065,33 @@ static int vtd_iova_to_slpte(IntelIOMMUState *s, VTDContextEntry *ce,
         if (vtd_is_last_slpte(slpte, level)) {
             *slptep = slpte;
             *slpte_level = level;
-            return 0;
+            break;
         }
         addr = vtd_get_slpte_addr(slpte, aw_bits);
         level--;
     }
+
+    xlat = vtd_get_slpte_addr(*slptep, aw_bits);
+    size = ~vtd_slpt_level_page_mask(level) + 1;
+
+    /*
+     * From VT-d spec 3.14: Untranslated requests and translation
+     * requests that result in an address in the interrupt range will be
+     * blocked with condition code LGN.4 or SGN.8.
+     */
+    if ((xlat > VTD_INTERRUPT_ADDR_LAST ||
+         xlat + size - 1 < VTD_INTERRUPT_ADDR_FIRST)) {
+        return 0;
+    } else {
+        error_report_once("%s: xlat address is in interrupt range "
+                          "(iova=0x%" PRIx64 ", level=0x%" PRIx32 ", "
+                          "slpte=0x%" PRIx64 ", write=%d, "
+                          "xlat=0x%" PRIx64 ", size=0x%" PRIx64 ")",
+                          __func__, iova, level, slpte, is_write,
+                          xlat, size);
+        return s->scalable_mode ? -VTD_FR_SM_INTERRUPT_ADDR :
+                                  -VTD_FR_INTERRUPT_ADDR;
+    }
 }
 
 typedef int (*vtd_page_walk_hook)(IOMMUTLBEvent *event, void *private);
@@ -1628,10 +1651,12 @@ static const bool vtd_qualified_faults[] = {
     [VTD_FR_PAGING_ENTRY_INV] = true,
     [VTD_FR_ROOT_TABLE_INV] = false,
     [VTD_FR_CONTEXT_TABLE_INV] = false,
+    [VTD_FR_INTERRUPT_ADDR] = true,
     [VTD_FR_ROOT_ENTRY_RSVD] = false,
     [VTD_FR_PAGING_ENTRY_RSVD] = true,
     [VTD_FR_CONTEXT_ENTRY_TT] = true,
     [VTD_FR_PASID_TABLE_INV] = false,
+    [VTD_FR_SM_INTERRUPT_ADDR] = true,
     [VTD_FR_MAX] = false,
 };
 
-- 
MST