We only need to drop/switch our credentials for the (f)setxattr() call
alone, not for the openat() or fchdir() around it.
(Right now, this may not be that big of a problem, but with inodes being
identified by file handles instead of an O_PATH fd, we will need
open_by_handle_at() calls here, which is really fickle when it comes to
credentials being dropped.)
Signed-off-by: Hanna Reitz <hreitz@redhat.com>
---
tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
index 6511a6acb4..b43afdfbd3 100644
--- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
+++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
@@ -3123,6 +3123,7 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
bool switched_creds = false;
bool cap_fsetid_dropped = false;
struct lo_cred old = {};
+ bool changed_cwd = false;
if (block_xattr(lo, in_name)) {
fuse_reply_err(req, EOPNOTSUPP);
@@ -3158,6 +3159,24 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
", name=%s value=%s size=%zd)\n", ino, name, value, size);
sprintf(procname, "%i", inode->fd);
+ /*
+ * We can only open regular files or directories. If the inode is
+ * something else, we have to enter /proc/self/fd and use
+ * setxattr() on the link's filename there.
+ */
+ if (S_ISREG(inode->filetype) || S_ISDIR(inode->filetype)) {
+ fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, procname, O_RDONLY);
+ if (fd < 0) {
+ saverr = errno;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* fchdir should not fail here */
+ FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
+ /* Set flag so the clean-up path will chdir back */
+ changed_cwd = true;
+ }
+
/*
* If we are setting posix access acl and if SGID needs to be
* cleared, then switch to caller's gid and drop CAP_FSETID
@@ -3178,20 +3197,12 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
}
switched_creds = true;
}
- if (S_ISREG(inode->filetype) || S_ISDIR(inode->filetype)) {
- fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, procname, O_RDONLY);
- if (fd < 0) {
- saverr = errno;
- goto out;
- }
+ if (fd >= 0) {
ret = fsetxattr(fd, name, value, size, flags);
saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
} else {
- /* fchdir should not fail here */
- FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
ret = setxattr(procname, name, value, size, flags);
saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
- FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
}
if (switched_creds) {
if (cap_fsetid_dropped)
@@ -3201,6 +3212,11 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
}
out:
+ if (changed_cwd) {
+ /* Change CWD back, fchdir should not fail here */
+ FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
+ }
+
if (fd >= 0) {
close(fd);
}
--
2.31.1
On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 10:40:35AM +0200, Hanna Reitz wrote:
> We only need to drop/switch our credentials for the (f)setxattr() call
> alone, not for the openat() or fchdir() around it.
>
> (Right now, this may not be that big of a problem, but with inodes being
> identified by file handles instead of an O_PATH fd, we will need
> open_by_handle_at() calls here, which is really fickle when it comes to
> credentials being dropped.)
>
> Signed-off-by: Hanna Reitz <hreitz@redhat.com>
> ---
> tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
> 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> index 6511a6acb4..b43afdfbd3 100644
> --- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
> @@ -3123,6 +3123,7 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
> bool switched_creds = false;
> bool cap_fsetid_dropped = false;
> struct lo_cred old = {};
> + bool changed_cwd = false;
>
> if (block_xattr(lo, in_name)) {
> fuse_reply_err(req, EOPNOTSUPP);
> @@ -3158,6 +3159,24 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
> ", name=%s value=%s size=%zd)\n", ino, name, value, size);
>
> sprintf(procname, "%i", inode->fd);
> + /*
> + * We can only open regular files or directories. If the inode is
> + * something else, we have to enter /proc/self/fd and use
> + * setxattr() on the link's filename there.
> + */
> + if (S_ISREG(inode->filetype) || S_ISDIR(inode->filetype)) {
> + fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, procname, O_RDONLY);
> + if (fd < 0) {
> + saverr = errno;
> + goto out;
> + }
> + } else {
> + /* fchdir should not fail here */
> + FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
> + /* Set flag so the clean-up path will chdir back */
> + changed_cwd = true;
Is there a need to move FCHDIR_NOFAIL() call earlier too? I am assuming
this will not be impacted by file handle stuff. So we probably could
leave it in place. Easier to read.
Vivek
> + }
> +
> /*
> * If we are setting posix access acl and if SGID needs to be
> * cleared, then switch to caller's gid and drop CAP_FSETID
> @@ -3178,20 +3197,12 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
> }
> switched_creds = true;
> }
> - if (S_ISREG(inode->filetype) || S_ISDIR(inode->filetype)) {
> - fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, procname, O_RDONLY);
> - if (fd < 0) {
> - saverr = errno;
> - goto out;
> - }
> + if (fd >= 0) {
> ret = fsetxattr(fd, name, value, size, flags);
> saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
> } else {
> - /* fchdir should not fail here */
> - FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
> ret = setxattr(procname, name, value, size, flags);
> saverr = ret == -1 ? errno : 0;
> - FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
> }
> if (switched_creds) {
> if (cap_fsetid_dropped)
> @@ -3201,6 +3212,11 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
> }
>
> out:
> + if (changed_cwd) {
> + /* Change CWD back, fchdir should not fail here */
> + FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->root.fd);
> + }
> +
> if (fd >= 0) {
> close(fd);
> }
> --
> 2.31.1
>
On 18.10.21 19:20, Vivek Goyal wrote:
> On Thu, Sep 16, 2021 at 10:40:35AM +0200, Hanna Reitz wrote:
>> We only need to drop/switch our credentials for the (f)setxattr() call
>> alone, not for the openat() or fchdir() around it.
>>
>> (Right now, this may not be that big of a problem, but with inodes being
>> identified by file handles instead of an O_PATH fd, we will need
>> open_by_handle_at() calls here, which is really fickle when it comes to
>> credentials being dropped.)
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Hanna Reitz <hreitz@redhat.com>
>> ---
>> tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
>> 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
>>
>> diff --git a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
>> index 6511a6acb4..b43afdfbd3 100644
>> --- a/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
>> +++ b/tools/virtiofsd/passthrough_ll.c
>> @@ -3123,6 +3123,7 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
>> bool switched_creds = false;
>> bool cap_fsetid_dropped = false;
>> struct lo_cred old = {};
>> + bool changed_cwd = false;
>>
>> if (block_xattr(lo, in_name)) {
>> fuse_reply_err(req, EOPNOTSUPP);
>> @@ -3158,6 +3159,24 @@ static void lo_setxattr(fuse_req_t req, fuse_ino_t ino, const char *in_name,
>> ", name=%s value=%s size=%zd)\n", ino, name, value, size);
>>
>> sprintf(procname, "%i", inode->fd);
>> + /*
>> + * We can only open regular files or directories. If the inode is
>> + * something else, we have to enter /proc/self/fd and use
>> + * setxattr() on the link's filename there.
>> + */
>> + if (S_ISREG(inode->filetype) || S_ISDIR(inode->filetype)) {
>> + fd = openat(lo->proc_self_fd, procname, O_RDONLY);
>> + if (fd < 0) {
>> + saverr = errno;
>> + goto out;
>> + }
>> + } else {
>> + /* fchdir should not fail here */
>> + FCHDIR_NOFAIL(lo->proc_self_fd);
>> + /* Set flag so the clean-up path will chdir back */
>> + changed_cwd = true;
> Is there a need to move FCHDIR_NOFAIL() call earlier too? I am assuming
> this will not be impacted by file handle stuff. So we probably could
> leave it in place. Easier to read.
I wanted to limit the region where the creds are dropped to an absolute
minimum, i.e. just around (f)setxattr(). I prefer this in general, not
just because it breaks opening file handles, and so I wanted to pull out
not just the openat(), but the fchdir() as well.
Hanna
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