[Qemu-devel] [PULL 00/10] target-arm queue
[PULL 00/28] target-arm queue
1
target-arm queue for rc1 -- these are all bug fixes.
1
Hi; this is the latest target-arm queue; most of this is a refactoring
2
patchset from RTH for the arm page-table-walk emulation.
2
3
3
thanks
4
thanks
4
-- PMM
5
-- PMM
5
6
6
The following changes since commit b9404bf592e7ba74180e1a54ed7a266ec6ee67f2:
7
The following changes since commit f1d33f55c47dfdaf8daacd618588ad3ae4c452d1:
7
8
8
Merge remote-tracking branch 'remotes/dgilbert/tags/pull-hmp-20190715' into staging (2019-07-15 12:22:07 +0100)
9
Merge tag 'pull-testing-gdbstub-plugins-gitdm-061022-3' of https://github.com/stsquad/qemu into staging (2022-10-06 07:11:56 -0400)
9
10
10
are available in the Git repository at:
11
are available in the Git repository at:
11
12
12
https://git.linaro.org/people/pmaydell/qemu-arm.git tags/pull-target-arm-20190715
13
https://git.linaro.org/people/pmaydell/qemu-arm.git tags/pull-target-arm-20221010
13
14
14
for you to fetch changes up to 51c9122e92b776a3f16af0b9282f1dc5012e2a19:
15
for you to fetch changes up to 915f62844cf62e428c7c178149b5ff1cbe129b07:
15
16
16
target/arm: NS BusFault on vector table fetch escalates to NS HardFault (2019-07-15 14:17:04 +0100)
17
docs/system/arm/emulation.rst: Report FEAT_GTG support (2022-10-10 14:52:25 +0100)
17
18
18
----------------------------------------------------------------
19
----------------------------------------------------------------
19
target-arm queue:
20
target-arm queue:
20
* report ARMv8-A FP support for AArch32 -cpu max
21
* Retry KVM_CREATE_VM call if it fails EINTR
21
* hw/ssi/xilinx_spips: Avoid AXI writes to the LQSPI linear memory
22
* allow setting SCR_EL3.EnTP2 when FEAT_SME is implemented
22
* hw/ssi/xilinx_spips: Avoid out-of-bound access to lqspi_buf[]
23
* docs/nuvoton: Update URL for images
23
* hw/ssi/mss-spi: Avoid crash when reading empty RX FIFO
24
* refactoring of page table walk code
24
* hw/display/xlnx_dp: Avoid crash when reading empty RX FIFO
25
* hw/arm/boot: set CPTR_EL3.ESM and SCR_EL3.EnTP2 when booting Linux with EL3
25
* hw/arm/virt: Fix non-secure flash mode
26
* Don't allow guest to use unimplemented granule sizes
26
* pl031: Correctly migrate state when using -rtc clock=host
27
* Report FEAT_GTG support
27
* fix regression that meant arm926 and arm1026 lost VFP
28
double-precision support
29
* v8M: NS BusFault on vector table fetch escalates to NS HardFault
30
28
31
----------------------------------------------------------------
29
----------------------------------------------------------------
32
Alex Bennée (1):
30
Jerome Forissier (2):
33
target/arm: report ARMv8-A FP support for AArch32 -cpu max
31
target/arm: allow setting SCR_EL3.EnTP2 when FEAT_SME is implemented
32
hw/arm/boot: set CPTR_EL3.ESM and SCR_EL3.EnTP2 when booting Linux with EL3
34
33
35
David Engraf (1):
34
Joel Stanley (1):
36
hw/arm/virt: Fix non-secure flash mode
35
docs/nuvoton: Update URL for images
37
36
38
Peter Maydell (3):
37
Peter Maydell (4):
39
pl031: Correctly migrate state when using -rtc clock=host
38
target/arm/kvm: Retry KVM_CREATE_VM call if it fails EINTR
40
target/arm: Set VFP-related MVFR0 fields for arm926 and arm1026
39
target/arm: Don't allow guest to use unimplemented granule sizes
41
target/arm: NS BusFault on vector table fetch escalates to NS HardFault
40
target/arm: Use ARMGranuleSize in ARMVAParameters
41
docs/system/arm/emulation.rst: Report FEAT_GTG support
42
42
43
Philippe Mathieu-Daudé (5):
43
Richard Henderson (21):
44
hw/ssi/xilinx_spips: Convert lqspi_read() to read_with_attrs
44
target/arm: Split s2walk_secure from ipa_secure in get_phys_addr
45
hw/ssi/xilinx_spips: Avoid AXI writes to the LQSPI linear memory
45
target/arm: Make the final stage1+2 write to secure be unconditional
46
hw/ssi/xilinx_spips: Avoid out-of-bound access to lqspi_buf[]
46
target/arm: Add is_secure parameter to get_phys_addr_lpae
47
hw/ssi/mss-spi: Avoid crash when reading empty RX FIFO
47
target/arm: Fix S2 disabled check in S1_ptw_translate
48
hw/display/xlnx_dp: Avoid crash when reading empty RX FIFO
48
target/arm: Add is_secure parameter to regime_translation_disabled
49
target/arm: Split out get_phys_addr_with_secure
50
target/arm: Add is_secure parameter to v7m_read_half_insn
51
target/arm: Add TBFLAG_M32.SECURE
52
target/arm: Merge regime_is_secure into get_phys_addr
53
target/arm: Add is_secure parameter to do_ats_write
54
target/arm: Fold secure and non-secure a-profile mmu indexes
55
target/arm: Reorg regime_translation_disabled
56
target/arm: Drop secure check for HCR.TGE vs SCTLR_EL1.M
57
target/arm: Introduce arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate
58
target/arm: Hoist read of *is_secure in S1_ptw_translate
59
target/arm: Remove env argument from combined_attrs_fwb
60
target/arm: Pass HCR to attribute subroutines.
61
target/arm: Fix ATS12NSO* from S PL1
62
target/arm: Split out get_phys_addr_disabled
63
target/arm: Fix cacheattr in get_phys_addr_disabled
64
target/arm: Use tlb_set_page_full
49
65
50
include/hw/timer/pl031.h | 2 ++
66
docs/system/arm/emulation.rst | 1 +
51
hw/arm/virt.c | 2 +-
67
docs/system/arm/nuvoton.rst | 4 +-
52
hw/core/machine.c | 1 +
68
target/arm/cpu-param.h | 2 +-
53
hw/display/xlnx_dp.c | 15 +++++---
69
target/arm/cpu.h | 181 ++++++++------
54
hw/ssi/mss-spi.c | 8 ++++-
70
target/arm/internals.h | 150 ++++++-----
55
hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c | 43 +++++++++++++++-------
71
hw/arm/boot.c | 4 +
56
hw/timer/pl031.c | 92 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
72
target/arm/helper.c | 332 ++++++++++++++----------
57
target/arm/cpu.c | 16 +++++++++
73
target/arm/kvm.c | 4 +-
58
target/arm/m_helper.c | 21 ++++++++---
74
target/arm/m_helper.c | 29 ++-
59
9 files changed, 174 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-)
75
target/arm/ptw.c | 570 ++++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
60
76
target/arm/tlb_helper.c | 9 +-
77
target/arm/translate-a64.c | 8 -
78
target/arm/translate.c | 9 +-
79
13 files changed, 717 insertions(+), 586 deletions(-)
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 01/28] target/arm/kvm: Retry KVM_CREATE_VM call if it fails EINTR
1
Occasionally the KVM_CREATE_VM ioctl can return EINTR, even though
2
there is no pending signal to be taken. In commit 94ccff13382055
3
we added a retry-on-EINTR loop to the KVM_CREATE_VM call in the
4
generic KVM code. Adopt the same approach for the use of the
5
ioctl in the Arm-specific KVM code (where we use it to create a
6
scratch VM for probing for various things).
1
7
8
For more information, see the mailing list thread:
9
https://lore.kernel.org/qemu-devel/8735e0s1zw.wl-maz@kernel.org/
10
11
Reported-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
12
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
13
Reviewed-by: Vitaly Chikunov <vt@altlinux.org>
14
Reviewed-by: Eric Auger <eric.auger@redhat.com>
15
Acked-by: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
16
Message-id: 20220930113824.1933293-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
17
---
18
target/arm/kvm.c | 4 +++-
19
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
20
21
diff --git a/target/arm/kvm.c b/target/arm/kvm.c
22
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
23
--- a/target/arm/kvm.c
24
+++ b/target/arm/kvm.c
25
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool kvm_arm_create_scratch_host_vcpu(const uint32_t *cpus_to_try,
26
if (max_vm_pa_size < 0) {
27
max_vm_pa_size = 0;
28
}
29
- vmfd = ioctl(kvmfd, KVM_CREATE_VM, max_vm_pa_size);
30
+ do {
31
+ vmfd = ioctl(kvmfd, KVM_CREATE_VM, max_vm_pa_size);
32
+ } while (vmfd == -1 && errno == EINTR);
33
if (vmfd < 0) {
34
goto err;
35
}
36
--
37
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 02/28] target/arm: allow setting SCR_EL3.EnTP2 when FEAT_SME is implemented
1
From: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org>
1
2
3
Updates write_scr() to allow setting SCR_EL3.EnTP2 when FEAT_SME is
4
implemented. SCR_EL3 being a 64-bit register, valid_mask is changed
5
to uint64_t and the SCR_* constants in target/arm/cpu.h are extended
6
to 64-bit so that masking and bitwise not (~) behave as expected.
7
8
This enables booting Linux with Trusted Firmware-A at EL3 with
9
"-M virt,secure=on -cpu max".
10
11
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
12
Fixes: 78cb9776662a ("target/arm: Enable SME for -cpu max")
13
Signed-off-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org>
14
Reviewed-by: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
15
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
16
Message-id: 20221004072354.27037-1-jerome.forissier@linaro.org
17
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
18
---
19
target/arm/cpu.h | 54 ++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
20
target/arm/helper.c | 5 ++++-
21
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 28 deletions(-)
22
23
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h
24
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
25
--- a/target/arm/cpu.h
26
+++ b/target/arm/cpu.h
27
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static inline void xpsr_write(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t val, uint32_t mask)
28
29
#define HPFAR_NS (1ULL << 63)
30
31
-#define SCR_NS (1U << 0)
32
-#define SCR_IRQ (1U << 1)
33
-#define SCR_FIQ (1U << 2)
34
-#define SCR_EA (1U << 3)
35
-#define SCR_FW (1U << 4)
36
-#define SCR_AW (1U << 5)
37
-#define SCR_NET (1U << 6)
38
-#define SCR_SMD (1U << 7)
39
-#define SCR_HCE (1U << 8)
40
-#define SCR_SIF (1U << 9)
41
-#define SCR_RW (1U << 10)
42
-#define SCR_ST (1U << 11)
43
-#define SCR_TWI (1U << 12)
44
-#define SCR_TWE (1U << 13)
45
-#define SCR_TLOR (1U << 14)
46
-#define SCR_TERR (1U << 15)
47
-#define SCR_APK (1U << 16)
48
-#define SCR_API (1U << 17)
49
-#define SCR_EEL2 (1U << 18)
50
-#define SCR_EASE (1U << 19)
51
-#define SCR_NMEA (1U << 20)
52
-#define SCR_FIEN (1U << 21)
53
-#define SCR_ENSCXT (1U << 25)
54
-#define SCR_ATA (1U << 26)
55
-#define SCR_FGTEN (1U << 27)
56
-#define SCR_ECVEN (1U << 28)
57
-#define SCR_TWEDEN (1U << 29)
58
+#define SCR_NS (1ULL << 0)
59
+#define SCR_IRQ (1ULL << 1)
60
+#define SCR_FIQ (1ULL << 2)
61
+#define SCR_EA (1ULL << 3)
62
+#define SCR_FW (1ULL << 4)
63
+#define SCR_AW (1ULL << 5)
64
+#define SCR_NET (1ULL << 6)
65
+#define SCR_SMD (1ULL << 7)
66
+#define SCR_HCE (1ULL << 8)
67
+#define SCR_SIF (1ULL << 9)
68
+#define SCR_RW (1ULL << 10)
69
+#define SCR_ST (1ULL << 11)
70
+#define SCR_TWI (1ULL << 12)
71
+#define SCR_TWE (1ULL << 13)
72
+#define SCR_TLOR (1ULL << 14)
73
+#define SCR_TERR (1ULL << 15)
74
+#define SCR_APK (1ULL << 16)
75
+#define SCR_API (1ULL << 17)
76
+#define SCR_EEL2 (1ULL << 18)
77
+#define SCR_EASE (1ULL << 19)
78
+#define SCR_NMEA (1ULL << 20)
79
+#define SCR_FIEN (1ULL << 21)
80
+#define SCR_ENSCXT (1ULL << 25)
81
+#define SCR_ATA (1ULL << 26)
82
+#define SCR_FGTEN (1ULL << 27)
83
+#define SCR_ECVEN (1ULL << 28)
84
+#define SCR_TWEDEN (1ULL << 29)
85
#define SCR_TWEDEL MAKE_64BIT_MASK(30, 4)
86
#define SCR_TME (1ULL << 34)
87
#define SCR_AMVOFFEN (1ULL << 35)
88
diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c
89
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
90
--- a/target/arm/helper.c
91
+++ b/target/arm/helper.c
92
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void vbar_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
93
static void scr_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value)
94
{
95
/* Begin with base v8.0 state. */
96
- uint32_t valid_mask = 0x3fff;
97
+ uint64_t valid_mask = 0x3fff;
98
ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
99
100
/*
101
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void scr_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value)
102
if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_doublefault, cpu)) {
103
valid_mask |= SCR_EASE | SCR_NMEA;
104
}
105
+ if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_sme, cpu)) {
106
+ valid_mask |= SCR_ENTP2;
107
+ }
108
} else {
109
valid_mask &= ~(SCR_RW | SCR_ST);
110
if (cpu_isar_feature(aa32_ras, cpu)) {
111
--
112
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
[Qemu-devel] [PULL 04/10] hw/ssi/xilinx_spips: Avoid out-of-bound access to lqspi_buf[]
[PULL 03/28] docs/nuvoton: Update URL for images
1
From: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
1
From: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
2
2
3
Both lqspi_read() and lqspi_load_cache() expect a 32-bit
3
openpower.xyz was retired some time ago. The OpenBMC Jenkins is where
4
aligned address.
4
images can be found these days.
5
5
6
>From UG1085 datasheet [*] chapter on 'Quad-SPI Controller':
6
Signed-off-by: Joel Stanley <joel@jms.id.au>
7
7
Reviewed-by: Hao Wu <wuhaotsh@google.com>
8
Transfer Size Limitations
8
Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
9
9
Tested-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <f4bug@amsat.org>
10
Because of the 32-bit wide TX, RX, and generic FIFO, all
10
Message-id: 20221004050042.22681-1-joel@jms.id.au
11
APB/AXI transfers must be an integer multiple of 4-bytes.
12
Shorter transfers are not possible.
13
14
Set MemoryRegionOps.impl values to force 32-bit accesses,
15
this way we are sure we do not access the lqspi_buf[] array
16
out of bound.
17
18
[*] https://www.xilinx.com/support/documentation/user_guides/ug1085-zynq-ultrascale-trm.pdf
19
20
Reviewed-by: Francisco Iglesias <frasse.iglesias@gmail.com>
21
Tested-by: Francisco Iglesias <frasse.iglesias@gmail.com>
22
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
23
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
11
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
24
---
12
---
25
hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c | 4 ++++
13
docs/system/arm/nuvoton.rst | 4 ++--
26
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
14
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
27
15
28
diff --git a/hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c b/hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c
16
diff --git a/docs/system/arm/nuvoton.rst b/docs/system/arm/nuvoton.rst
29
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
17
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
30
--- a/hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c
18
--- a/docs/system/arm/nuvoton.rst
31
+++ b/hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c
19
+++ b/docs/system/arm/nuvoton.rst
32
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static const MemoryRegionOps lqspi_ops = {
20
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ Boot options
33
.read_with_attrs = lqspi_read,
21
34
.write_with_attrs = lqspi_write,
22
The Nuvoton machines can boot from an OpenBMC firmware image, or directly into
35
.endianness = DEVICE_NATIVE_ENDIAN,
23
a kernel using the ``-kernel`` option. OpenBMC images for ``quanta-gsj`` and
36
+ .impl = {
24
-possibly others can be downloaded from the OpenPOWER jenkins :
37
+ .min_access_size = 4,
25
+possibly others can be downloaded from the OpenBMC jenkins :
38
+ .max_access_size = 4,
26
39
+ },
27
- https://openpower.xyz/
40
.valid = {
28
+ https://jenkins.openbmc.org/
41
.min_access_size = 1,
29
42
.max_access_size = 4
30
The firmware image should be attached as an MTD drive. Example :
31
43
--
32
--
44
2.20.1
33
2.25.1
45
34
46
35
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 04/28] target/arm: Split s2walk_secure from ipa_secure in get_phys_addr
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
The starting security state comes with the translation regime,
4
not the current state of arm_is_secure_below_el3().
5
6
Create a new local variable, s2walk_secure, which does not need
7
to be written back to result->attrs.secure -- we compute that
8
value later, after the S2 walk is complete.
9
10
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
11
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
12
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-2-richard.henderson@linaro.org
13
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
14
---
15
target/arm/ptw.c | 18 +++++++++---------
16
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
17
18
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
19
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
20
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
21
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
22
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
23
hwaddr ipa;
24
int s1_prot;
25
int ret;
26
- bool ipa_secure;
27
+ bool ipa_secure, s2walk_secure;
28
ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs1;
29
ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx;
30
bool is_el0;
31
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
32
33
ipa = result->phys;
34
ipa_secure = result->attrs.secure;
35
- if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) {
36
- if (ipa_secure) {
37
- result->attrs.secure = !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & VSTCR_SW);
38
- } else {
39
- result->attrs.secure = !(env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & VTCR_NSW);
40
- }
41
+ if (is_secure) {
42
+ /* Select TCR based on the NS bit from the S1 walk. */
43
+ s2walk_secure = !(ipa_secure
44
+ ? env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & VSTCR_SW
45
+ : env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & VTCR_NSW);
46
} else {
47
assert(!ipa_secure);
48
+ s2walk_secure = false;
49
}
50
51
- s2_mmu_idx = (result->attrs.secure
52
+ s2_mmu_idx = (s2walk_secure
53
? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2);
54
is_el0 = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E10_0 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0;
55
56
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
57
result->cacheattrs);
58
59
/* Check if IPA translates to secure or non-secure PA space. */
60
- if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) {
61
+ if (is_secure) {
62
if (ipa_secure) {
63
result->attrs.secure =
64
!(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & (VSTCR_SA | VSTCR_SW));
65
--
66
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 05/28] target/arm: Make the final stage1+2 write to secure be unconditional
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
While the stage2 call to get_phys_addr_lpae should never set
4
attrs.secure when given a non-secure input, it's just as easy
5
to make the final update to attrs.secure be unconditional and
6
false in the case of non-secure input.
7
8
Suggested-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
9
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
10
Message-id: 20221007152159.1414065-1-richard.henderson@linaro.org
11
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
12
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
13
---
14
target/arm/ptw.c | 21 ++++++++++-----------
15
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
16
17
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
18
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
19
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
20
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
21
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
22
result->cacheattrs = combine_cacheattrs(env, cacheattrs1,
23
result->cacheattrs);
24
25
- /* Check if IPA translates to secure or non-secure PA space. */
26
- if (is_secure) {
27
- if (ipa_secure) {
28
- result->attrs.secure =
29
- !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & (VSTCR_SA | VSTCR_SW));
30
- } else {
31
- result->attrs.secure =
32
- !((env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & (VTCR_NSA | VTCR_NSW))
33
- || (env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & (VSTCR_SA | VSTCR_SW)));
34
- }
35
- }
36
+ /*
37
+ * Check if IPA translates to secure or non-secure PA space.
38
+ * Note that VSTCR overrides VTCR and {N}SW overrides {N}SA.
39
+ */
40
+ result->attrs.secure =
41
+ (is_secure
42
+ && !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & (VSTCR_SA | VSTCR_SW))
43
+ && (ipa_secure
44
+ || !(env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & (VTCR_NSA | VTCR_NSW))));
45
+
46
return 0;
47
} else {
48
/*
49
--
50
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
[Qemu-devel] [PULL 07/10] hw/arm/virt: Fix non-secure flash mode
[PULL 06/28] target/arm: Add is_secure parameter to get_phys_addr_lpae
1
From: David Engraf <david.engraf@sysgo.com>
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2
2
3
Using the whole 128 MiB flash in non-secure mode is not working because
3
Remove the use of regime_is_secure from get_phys_addr_lpae,
4
virt_flash_fdt() expects the same address for secure_sysmem and sysmem.
4
using the new parameter instead.
5
This is not correctly handled by caller because it forwards NULL for
6
secure_sysmem in non-secure flash mode.
7
5
8
Fixed by using sysmem when secure_sysmem is NULL.
6
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
9
7
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
10
Signed-off-by: David Engraf <david.engraf@sysgo.com>
8
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-3-richard.henderson@linaro.org
11
Message-id: 20190712075002.14326-1-david.engraf@sysgo.com
12
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
13
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
9
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
14
---
10
---
15
hw/arm/virt.c | 2 +-
11
target/arm/ptw.c | 20 ++++++++++----------
16
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
12
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
17
13
18
diff --git a/hw/arm/virt.c b/hw/arm/virt.c
14
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
19
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
15
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
20
--- a/hw/arm/virt.c
16
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
21
+++ b/hw/arm/virt.c
17
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
22
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void machvirt_init(MachineState *machine)
18
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@
23
&machine->device_memory->mr);
19
20
static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address,
21
MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
22
- bool s1_is_el0, GetPhysAddrResult *result,
23
- ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
24
+ bool is_secure, bool s1_is_el0,
25
+ GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
26
__attribute__((nonnull));
27
28
/* This mapping is common between ID_AA64MMFR0.PARANGE and TCR_ELx.{I}PS. */
29
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
30
GetPhysAddrResult s2 = {};
31
int ret;
32
33
- ret = get_phys_addr_lpae(env, addr, MMU_DATA_LOAD, s2_mmu_idx, false,
34
- &s2, fi);
35
+ ret = get_phys_addr_lpae(env, addr, MMU_DATA_LOAD, s2_mmu_idx,
36
+ *is_secure, false, &s2, fi);
37
if (ret) {
38
assert(fi->type != ARMFault_None);
39
fi->s2addr = addr;
40
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool check_s2_mmu_setup(ARMCPU *cpu, bool is_aa64, int level,
41
*/
42
static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address,
43
MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
44
- bool s1_is_el0, GetPhysAddrResult *result,
45
- ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
46
+ bool is_secure, bool s1_is_el0,
47
+ GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
48
{
49
ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
50
/* Read an LPAE long-descriptor translation table. */
51
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address,
52
* remain non-secure. We implement this by just ORing in the NSTable/NS
53
* bits at each step.
54
*/
55
- tableattrs = regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx) ? 0 : (1 << 4);
56
+ tableattrs = is_secure ? 0 : (1 << 4);
57
for (;;) {
58
uint64_t descriptor;
59
bool nstable;
60
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
61
memset(result, 0, sizeof(*result));
62
63
ret = get_phys_addr_lpae(env, ipa, access_type, s2_mmu_idx,
64
- is_el0, result, fi);
65
+ s2walk_secure, is_el0, result, fi);
66
fi->s2addr = ipa;
67
68
/* Combine the S1 and S2 perms. */
69
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
24
}
70
}
25
71
26
- virt_flash_fdt(vms, sysmem, secure_sysmem);
72
if (regime_using_lpae_format(env, mmu_idx)) {
27
+ virt_flash_fdt(vms, sysmem, secure_sysmem ?: sysmem);
73
- return get_phys_addr_lpae(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, false,
28
74
- result, fi);
29
create_gic(vms, pic);
75
+ return get_phys_addr_lpae(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
30
76
+ is_secure, false, result, fi);
77
} else if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_XP) {
78
return get_phys_addr_v6(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
79
is_secure, result, fi);
31
--
80
--
32
2.20.1
81
2.25.1
33
82
34
83
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 07/28] target/arm: Fix S2 disabled check in S1_ptw_translate
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
Pass the correct stage2 mmu_idx to regime_translation_disabled,
4
which we computed afterward.
5
6
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
7
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
8
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-4-richard.henderson@linaro.org
9
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
10
---
11
target/arm/ptw.c | 6 +++---
12
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
13
14
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
15
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
16
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
17
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
18
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
19
hwaddr addr, bool *is_secure,
20
ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
21
{
22
+ ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx = *is_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2;
23
+
24
if (arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2(mmu_idx) &&
25
- !regime_translation_disabled(env, ARMMMUIdx_Stage2)) {
26
- ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx = *is_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S
27
- : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2;
28
+ !regime_translation_disabled(env, s2_mmu_idx)) {
29
GetPhysAddrResult s2 = {};
30
int ret;
31
32
--
33
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
[Qemu-devel] [PULL 05/10] hw/ssi/mss-spi: Avoid crash when reading empty RX FIFO
[PULL 08/28] target/arm: Add is_secure parameter to regime_translation_disabled
1
From: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2
2
3
Reading the RX_DATA register when the RX_FIFO is empty triggers
3
Remove the use of regime_is_secure from regime_translation_disabled,
4
an abort. This can be easily reproduced:
4
using the new parameter instead.
5
5
6
$ qemu-system-arm -M emcraft-sf2 -monitor stdio -S
6
This fixes a bug in S1_ptw_translate and get_phys_addr where we had
7
QEMU 4.0.50 monitor - type 'help' for more information
7
passed ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 and not ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S to determine if
8
(qemu) x 0x40001010
8
Stage2 is disabled, affecting FEAT_SEL2.
9
Aborted (core dumped)
10
9
11
(gdb) bt
10
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
12
#1 0x00007f035874f895 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6
11
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
13
#2 0x00005628686591ff in fifo8_pop (fifo=0x56286a9a4c68) at util/fifo8.c:66
12
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
14
#3 0x00005628683e0b8e in fifo32_pop (fifo=0x56286a9a4c68) at include/qemu/fifo32.h:137
13
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-5-richard.henderson@linaro.org
15
#4 0x00005628683e0efb in spi_read (opaque=0x56286a9a4850, addr=4, size=4) at hw/ssi/mss-spi.c:168
16
#5 0x0000562867f96801 in memory_region_read_accessor (mr=0x56286a9a4b60, addr=16, value=0x7ffeecb0c5c8, size=4, shift=0, mask=4294967295, attrs=...) at memory.c:439
17
#6 0x0000562867f96cdb in access_with_adjusted_size (addr=16, value=0x7ffeecb0c5c8, size=4, access_size_min=1, access_size_max=4, access_fn=0x562867f967c3 <memory_region_read_accessor>, mr=0x56286a9a4b60, attrs=...) at memory.c:569
18
#7 0x0000562867f99940 in memory_region_dispatch_read1 (mr=0x56286a9a4b60, addr=16, pval=0x7ffeecb0c5c8, size=4, attrs=...) at memory.c:1420
19
#8 0x0000562867f99a08 in memory_region_dispatch_read (mr=0x56286a9a4b60, addr=16, pval=0x7ffeecb0c5c8, size=4, attrs=...) at memory.c:1447
20
#9 0x0000562867f38721 in flatview_read_continue (fv=0x56286aec6360, addr=1073745936, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffeecb0c7c0 "\340ǰ\354\376\177", len=4, addr1=16, l=4, mr=0x56286a9a4b60) at exec.c:3385
21
#10 0x0000562867f38874 in flatview_read (fv=0x56286aec6360, addr=1073745936, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffeecb0c7c0 "\340ǰ\354\376\177", len=4) at exec.c:3423
22
#11 0x0000562867f388ea in address_space_read_full (as=0x56286aa3e890, addr=1073745936, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffeecb0c7c0 "\340ǰ\354\376\177", len=4) at exec.c:3436
23
#12 0x0000562867f389c5 in address_space_rw (as=0x56286aa3e890, addr=1073745936, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffeecb0c7c0 "\340ǰ\354\376\177", len=4, is_write=false) at exec.c:3466
24
#13 0x0000562867f3bdd7 in cpu_memory_rw_debug (cpu=0x56286aa19d00, addr=1073745936, buf=0x7ffeecb0c7c0 "\340ǰ\354\376\177", len=4, is_write=0) at exec.c:3976
25
#14 0x000056286811ed51 in memory_dump (mon=0x56286a8c32d0, count=1, format=120, wsize=4, addr=1073745936, is_physical=0) at monitor/misc.c:730
26
#15 0x000056286811eff1 in hmp_memory_dump (mon=0x56286a8c32d0, qdict=0x56286b15c400) at monitor/misc.c:785
27
#16 0x00005628684740ee in handle_hmp_command (mon=0x56286a8c32d0, cmdline=0x56286a8caeb2 "0x40001010") at monitor/hmp.c:1082
28
29
From the datasheet "Actel SmartFusion Microcontroller Subsystem
30
User's Guide" Rev.1, Table 13-3 "SPI Register Summary", this
31
register has a reset value of 0.
32
33
Check the FIFO is not empty before accessing it, else log an
34
error message.
35
36
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
37
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
38
Message-id: 20190709113715.7761-3-philmd@redhat.com
39
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
14
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
40
---
15
---
41
hw/ssi/mss-spi.c | 8 +++++++-
16
target/arm/ptw.c | 20 +++++++++++---------
42
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
17
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
43
18
44
diff --git a/hw/ssi/mss-spi.c b/hw/ssi/mss-spi.c
19
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
45
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
20
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
46
--- a/hw/ssi/mss-spi.c
21
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
47
+++ b/hw/ssi/mss-spi.c
22
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
48
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ spi_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size)
23
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static uint64_t regime_ttbr(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, int ttbrn)
49
case R_SPI_RX:
24
}
50
s->regs[R_SPI_STATUS] &= ~S_RXFIFOFUL;
25
51
s->regs[R_SPI_STATUS] &= ~S_RXCHOVRF;
26
/* Return true if the specified stage of address translation is disabled */
52
- ret = fifo32_pop(&s->rx_fifo);
27
-static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
53
+ if (fifo32_is_empty(&s->rx_fifo)) {
28
+static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
54
+ qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
29
+ bool is_secure)
55
+ "%s: Reading empty RX_FIFO\n",
30
{
56
+ __func__);
31
uint64_t hcr_el2;
57
+ } else {
32
58
+ ret = fifo32_pop(&s->rx_fifo);
33
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
59
+ }
34
- switch (env->v7m.mpu_ctrl[regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx)] &
60
if (fifo32_is_empty(&s->rx_fifo)) {
35
+ switch (env->v7m.mpu_ctrl[is_secure] &
61
s->regs[R_SPI_STATUS] |= S_RXFIFOEMP;
36
(R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_ENABLE_MASK | R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_HFNMIENA_MASK)) {
37
case R_V7M_MPU_CTRL_ENABLE_MASK:
38
/* Enabled, but not for HardFault and NMI */
39
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
40
41
if (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE) {
42
/* TGE means that NS EL0/1 act as if SCTLR_EL1.M is zero */
43
- if (!regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx) && regime_el(env, mmu_idx) == 1) {
44
+ if (!is_secure && regime_el(env, mmu_idx) == 1) {
45
return true;
62
}
46
}
47
}
48
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
49
ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx = *is_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2;
50
51
if (arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2(mmu_idx) &&
52
- !regime_translation_disabled(env, s2_mmu_idx)) {
53
+ !regime_translation_disabled(env, s2_mmu_idx, *is_secure)) {
54
GetPhysAddrResult s2 = {};
55
int ret;
56
57
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
58
uint32_t base;
59
bool is_user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx);
60
61
- if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx)) {
62
+ if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, is_secure)) {
63
/* MPU disabled. */
64
result->phys = address;
65
result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
66
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
67
result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
68
result->prot = 0;
69
70
- if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx) ||
71
+ if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, secure) ||
72
m_is_ppb_region(env, address)) {
73
/*
74
* MPU disabled or M profile PPB access: use default memory map.
75
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
76
* are done in arm_v7m_load_vector(), which always does a direct
77
* read using address_space_ldl(), rather than going via this function.
78
*/
79
- if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx)) { /* MPU disabled */
80
+ if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, secure)) { /* MPU disabled */
81
hit = true;
82
} else if (m_is_ppb_region(env, address)) {
83
hit = true;
84
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
85
result, fi);
86
87
/* If S1 fails or S2 is disabled, return early. */
88
- if (ret || regime_translation_disabled(env, ARMMMUIdx_Stage2)) {
89
+ if (ret || regime_translation_disabled(env, ARMMMUIdx_Stage2,
90
+ is_secure)) {
91
return ret;
92
}
93
94
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
95
96
/* Definitely a real MMU, not an MPU */
97
98
- if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx)) {
99
+ if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, is_secure)) {
100
uint64_t hcr;
101
uint8_t memattr;
102
63
--
103
--
64
2.20.1
104
2.25.1
65
105
66
106
diff view generated by jsdifflib
[Qemu-devel] [PULL 06/10] hw/display/xlnx_dp: Avoid crash when reading empty RX FIFO
[PULL 09/28] target/arm: Split out get_phys_addr_with_secure
1
From: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2
2
3
In the previous commit we fixed a crash when the guest read a
3
Retain the existing get_phys_addr interface using the security
4
register that pop from an empty FIFO.
4
state derived from mmu_idx. Move the kerneldoc comments to the
5
By auditing the repository, we found another similar use with
5
header file where they belong.
6
an easy way to reproduce:
7
6
8
$ qemu-system-aarch64 -M xlnx-zcu102 -monitor stdio -S
7
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
9
QEMU 4.0.50 monitor - type 'help' for more information
8
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
10
(qemu) xp/b 0xfd4a0134
9
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-6-richard.henderson@linaro.org
11
Aborted (core dumped)
12
13
(gdb) bt
14
#0 0x00007f6936dea57f in raise () at /lib64/libc.so.6
15
#1 0x00007f6936dd4895 in abort () at /lib64/libc.so.6
16
#2 0x0000561ad32975ec in xlnx_dp_aux_pop_rx_fifo (s=0x7f692babee70) at hw/display/xlnx_dp.c:431
17
#3 0x0000561ad3297dc0 in xlnx_dp_read (opaque=0x7f692babee70, offset=77, size=4) at hw/display/xlnx_dp.c:667
18
#4 0x0000561ad321b896 in memory_region_read_accessor (mr=0x7f692babf620, addr=308, value=0x7ffe05c1db88, size=4, shift=0, mask=4294967295, attrs=...) at memory.c:439
19
#5 0x0000561ad321bd70 in access_with_adjusted_size (addr=308, value=0x7ffe05c1db88, size=1, access_size_min=4, access_size_max=4, access_fn=0x561ad321b858 <memory_region_read_accessor>, mr=0x7f692babf620, attrs=...) at memory.c:569
20
#6 0x0000561ad321e9d5 in memory_region_dispatch_read1 (mr=0x7f692babf620, addr=308, pval=0x7ffe05c1db88, size=1, attrs=...) at memory.c:1420
21
#7 0x0000561ad321ea9d in memory_region_dispatch_read (mr=0x7f692babf620, addr=308, pval=0x7ffe05c1db88, size=1, attrs=...) at memory.c:1447
22
#8 0x0000561ad31bd742 in flatview_read_continue (fv=0x561ad69c04f0, addr=4249485620, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffe05c1dcf0 "\020\335\301\005\376\177", len=1, addr1=308, l=1, mr=0x7f692babf620) at exec.c:3385
23
#9 0x0000561ad31bd895 in flatview_read (fv=0x561ad69c04f0, addr=4249485620, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffe05c1dcf0 "\020\335\301\005\376\177", len=1) at exec.c:3423
24
#10 0x0000561ad31bd90b in address_space_read_full (as=0x561ad5bb3020, addr=4249485620, attrs=..., buf=0x7ffe05c1dcf0 "\020\335\301\005\376\177", len=1) at exec.c:3436
25
#11 0x0000561ad33b1c42 in address_space_read (len=1, buf=0x7ffe05c1dcf0 "\020\335\301\005\376\177", attrs=..., addr=4249485620, as=0x561ad5bb3020) at include/exec/memory.h:2131
26
#12 0x0000561ad33b1c42 in memory_dump (mon=0x561ad59c4530, count=1, format=120, wsize=1, addr=4249485620, is_physical=1) at monitor/misc.c:723
27
#13 0x0000561ad33b1fc1 in hmp_physical_memory_dump (mon=0x561ad59c4530, qdict=0x561ad6c6fd00) at monitor/misc.c:795
28
#14 0x0000561ad37b4a9f in handle_hmp_command (mon=0x561ad59c4530, cmdline=0x561ad59d0f22 "/b 0x00000000fd4a0134") at monitor/hmp.c:1082
29
30
Fix by checking the FIFO is not empty before popping from it.
31
32
The datasheet is not clear about the reset value of this register,
33
we choose to return '0'.
34
35
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
36
Reviewed-by: Alistair Francis <alistair.francis@wdc.com>
37
Message-id: 20190709113715.7761-4-philmd@redhat.com
38
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
10
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
39
---
11
---
40
hw/display/xlnx_dp.c | 15 +++++++++++----
12
target/arm/internals.h | 40 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
41
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
13
target/arm/ptw.c | 44 ++++++++++++++----------------------------
14
2 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
42
15
43
diff --git a/hw/display/xlnx_dp.c b/hw/display/xlnx_dp.c
16
diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h
44
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
17
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
45
--- a/hw/display/xlnx_dp.c
18
--- a/target/arm/internals.h
46
+++ b/hw/display/xlnx_dp.c
19
+++ b/target/arm/internals.h
47
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static uint8_t xlnx_dp_aux_pop_rx_fifo(XlnxDPState *s)
20
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ typedef struct GetPhysAddrResult {
48
uint8_t ret;
21
ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs;
49
22
} GetPhysAddrResult;
50
if (fifo8_is_empty(&s->rx_fifo)) {
23
51
- DPRINTF("rx_fifo underflow..\n");
24
+/**
52
- abort();
25
+ * get_phys_addr_with_secure: get the physical address for a virtual address
53
+ qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR,
26
+ * @env: CPUARMState
54
+ "%s: Reading empty RX_FIFO\n",
27
+ * @address: virtual address to get physical address for
55
+ __func__);
28
+ * @access_type: 0 for read, 1 for write, 2 for execute
56
+ /*
29
+ * @mmu_idx: MMU index indicating required translation regime
57
+ * The datasheet is not clear about the reset value, it seems
30
+ * @is_secure: security state for the access
58
+ * to be unspecified. We choose to return '0'.
31
+ * @result: set on translation success.
59
+ */
32
+ * @fi: set to fault info if the translation fails
60
+ ret = 0;
33
+ *
61
+ } else {
34
+ * Find the physical address corresponding to the given virtual address,
62
+ ret = fifo8_pop(&s->rx_fifo);
35
+ * by doing a translation table walk on MMU based systems or using the
63
+ DPRINTF("pop 0x%" PRIX8 " from rx_fifo.\n", ret);
36
+ * MPU state on MPU based systems.
64
}
37
+ *
65
- ret = fifo8_pop(&s->rx_fifo);
38
+ * Returns false if the translation was successful. Otherwise, phys_ptr, attrs,
66
- DPRINTF("pop 0x%" PRIX8 " from rx_fifo.\n", ret);
39
+ * prot and page_size may not be filled in, and the populated fsr value provides
40
+ * information on why the translation aborted, in the format of a
41
+ * DFSR/IFSR fault register, with the following caveats:
42
+ * * we honour the short vs long DFSR format differences.
43
+ * * the WnR bit is never set (the caller must do this).
44
+ * * for PSMAv5 based systems we don't bother to return a full FSR format
45
+ * value.
46
+ */
47
+bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
48
+ MMUAccessType access_type,
49
+ ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool is_secure,
50
+ GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
51
+ __attribute__((nonnull));
52
+
53
+/**
54
+ * get_phys_addr: get the physical address for a virtual address
55
+ * @env: CPUARMState
56
+ * @address: virtual address to get physical address for
57
+ * @access_type: 0 for read, 1 for write, 2 for execute
58
+ * @mmu_idx: MMU index indicating required translation regime
59
+ * @result: set on translation success.
60
+ * @fi: set to fault info if the translation fails
61
+ *
62
+ * Similarly, but use the security regime of @mmu_idx.
63
+ */
64
bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
65
MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
66
GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
67
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
68
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
69
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
70
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
71
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static ARMCacheAttrs combine_cacheattrs(CPUARMState *env,
67
return ret;
72
return ret;
68
}
73
}
69
74
75
-/**
76
- * get_phys_addr - get the physical address for this virtual address
77
- *
78
- * Find the physical address corresponding to the given virtual address,
79
- * by doing a translation table walk on MMU based systems or using the
80
- * MPU state on MPU based systems.
81
- *
82
- * Returns false if the translation was successful. Otherwise, phys_ptr, attrs,
83
- * prot and page_size may not be filled in, and the populated fsr value provides
84
- * information on why the translation aborted, in the format of a
85
- * DFSR/IFSR fault register, with the following caveats:
86
- * * we honour the short vs long DFSR format differences.
87
- * * the WnR bit is never set (the caller must do this).
88
- * * for PSMAv5 based systems we don't bother to return a full FSR format
89
- * value.
90
- *
91
- * @env: CPUARMState
92
- * @address: virtual address to get physical address for
93
- * @access_type: 0 for read, 1 for write, 2 for execute
94
- * @mmu_idx: MMU index indicating required translation regime
95
- * @result: set on translation success.
96
- * @fi: set to fault info if the translation fails
97
- */
98
-bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
99
- MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
100
- GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
101
+bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
102
+ MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
103
+ bool is_secure, GetPhysAddrResult *result,
104
+ ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
105
{
106
ARMMMUIdx s1_mmu_idx = stage_1_mmu_idx(mmu_idx);
107
- bool is_secure = regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx);
108
109
if (mmu_idx != s1_mmu_idx) {
110
/*
111
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
112
ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx;
113
bool is_el0;
114
115
- ret = get_phys_addr(env, address, access_type, s1_mmu_idx,
116
- result, fi);
117
+ ret = get_phys_addr_with_secure(env, address, access_type,
118
+ s1_mmu_idx, is_secure, result, fi);
119
120
/* If S1 fails or S2 is disabled, return early. */
121
if (ret || regime_translation_disabled(env, ARMMMUIdx_Stage2,
122
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
123
}
124
}
125
126
+bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
127
+ MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
128
+ GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
129
+{
130
+ return get_phys_addr_with_secure(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
131
+ regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx),
132
+ result, fi);
133
+}
134
+
135
hwaddr arm_cpu_get_phys_page_attrs_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr,
136
MemTxAttrs *attrs)
137
{
70
--
138
--
71
2.20.1
139
2.25.1
72
73
diff view generated by jsdifflib
[Qemu-devel] [PULL 10/10] target/arm: NS BusFault on vector table fetch escalates to NS HardFault
[PULL 10/28] target/arm: Add is_secure parameter to v7m_read_half_insn
1
In the M-profile architecture, when we do a vector table fetch and it
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2
fails, we need to report a HardFault. Whether this is a Secure HF or
3
a NonSecure HF depends on several things. If AIRCR.BFHFNMINS is 0
4
then HF is always Secure, because there is no NonSecure HardFault.
5
Otherwise, the answer depends on whether the 'underlying exception'
6
(MemManage, BusFault, SecureFault) targets Secure or NonSecure. (In
7
the pseudocode, this is handled in the Vector() function: the final
8
exc.isSecure is calculated by looking at the exc.isSecure from the
9
exception returned from the memory access, not the isSecure input
10
argument.)
11
2
12
We weren't doing this correctly, because we were looking at
3
Remove the use of regime_is_secure from v7m_read_half_insn, using
13
the target security domain of the exception we were trying to
4
the new parameter instead.
14
load the vector table entry for. This produces errors of two kinds:
15
* a load from the NS vector table which hits the "NS access
16
to S memory" SecureFault should end up as a Secure HardFault,
17
but we were raising an NS HardFault
18
* a load from the S vector table which causes a BusFault
19
should raise an NS HardFault if BFHFNMINS == 1 (because
20
in that case all BusFaults are NonSecure), but we were raising
21
a Secure HardFault
22
5
23
Correct the logic.
6
As it happens, both callers pass true, propagated from the argument
7
to arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate which created the mmu_idx argument,
8
but that is a detail of v7m_handle_execute_nsc we need not expose
9
to the callee.
24
10
25
We also fix a comment error where we claimed that we might
11
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
26
be escalating MemManage to HardFault, and forgot about SecureFault.
12
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
27
(Vector loads can never hit MPU access faults, because they're
13
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
28
always aligned and always use the default address map.)
14
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-7-richard.henderson@linaro.org
29
30
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
15
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
31
Message-id: 20190705094823.28905-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
32
---
16
---
33
target/arm/m_helper.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++----
17
target/arm/m_helper.c | 9 ++++-----
34
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
18
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
35
19
36
diff --git a/target/arm/m_helper.c b/target/arm/m_helper.c
20
diff --git a/target/arm/m_helper.c b/target/arm/m_helper.c
37
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
21
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
38
--- a/target/arm/m_helper.c
22
--- a/target/arm/m_helper.c
39
+++ b/target/arm/m_helper.c
23
+++ b/target/arm/m_helper.c
40
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool arm_v7m_load_vector(ARMCPU *cpu, int exc, bool targets_secure,
24
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool do_v7m_function_return(ARMCPU *cpu)
41
if (sattrs.ns) {
25
return true;
42
attrs.secure = false;
26
}
43
} else if (!targets_secure) {
27
44
- /* NS access to S memory */
28
-static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
45
+ /*
29
+static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool secure,
46
+ * NS access to S memory: the underlying exception which we escalate
30
uint32_t addr, uint16_t *insn)
47
+ * to HardFault is SecureFault, which always targets Secure.
31
{
48
+ */
32
/*
49
+ exc_secure = true;
33
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
50
goto load_fail;
34
ARMMMUFaultInfo fi = {};
51
}
35
MemTxResult txres;
36
37
- v8m_security_lookup(env, addr, MMU_INST_FETCH, mmu_idx,
38
- regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx), &sattrs);
39
+ v8m_security_lookup(env, addr, MMU_INST_FETCH, mmu_idx, secure, &sattrs);
40
if (!sattrs.nsc || sattrs.ns) {
41
/*
42
* This must be the second half of the insn, and it straddles a
43
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu)
44
/* We want to do the MPU lookup as secure; work out what mmu_idx that is */
45
mmu_idx = arm_v7m_mmu_idx_for_secstate(env, true);
46
47
- if (!v7m_read_half_insn(cpu, mmu_idx, env->regs[15], &insn)) {
48
+ if (!v7m_read_half_insn(cpu, mmu_idx, true, env->regs[15], &insn)) {
49
return false;
52
}
50
}
53
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool arm_v7m_load_vector(ARMCPU *cpu, int exc, bool targets_secure,
51
54
vector_entry = address_space_ldl(arm_addressspace(cs, attrs), addr,
52
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool v7m_handle_execute_nsc(ARMCPU *cpu)
55
attrs, &result);
53
goto gen_invep;
56
if (result != MEMTX_OK) {
57
+ /*
58
+ * Underlying exception is BusFault: its target security state
59
+ * depends on BFHFNMINS.
60
+ */
61
+ exc_secure = !(cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK);
62
goto load_fail;
63
}
54
}
64
*pvec = vector_entry;
55
65
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ load_fail:
56
- if (!v7m_read_half_insn(cpu, mmu_idx, env->regs[15] + 2, &insn)) {
66
/*
57
+ if (!v7m_read_half_insn(cpu, mmu_idx, true, env->regs[15] + 2, &insn)) {
67
* All vector table fetch fails are reported as HardFault, with
58
return false;
68
* HFSR.VECTTBL and .FORCED set. (FORCED is set because
59
}
69
- * technically the underlying exception is a MemManage or BusFault
60
70
+ * technically the underlying exception is a SecureFault or BusFault
71
* that is escalated to HardFault.) This is a terminal exception,
72
* so we will either take the HardFault immediately or else enter
73
* lockup (the latter case is handled in armv7m_nvic_set_pending_derived()).
74
+ * The HardFault is Secure if BFHFNMINS is 0 (meaning that all HFs are
75
+ * secure); otherwise it targets the same security state as the
76
+ * underlying exception.
77
*/
78
- exc_secure = targets_secure ||
79
- !(cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK);
80
+ if (!(cpu->env.v7m.aircr & R_V7M_AIRCR_BFHFNMINS_MASK)) {
81
+ exc_secure = true;
82
+ }
83
env->v7m.hfsr |= R_V7M_HFSR_VECTTBL_MASK | R_V7M_HFSR_FORCED_MASK;
84
armv7m_nvic_set_pending_derived(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_HARD, exc_secure);
85
return false;
86
--
61
--
87
2.20.1
62
2.25.1
88
63
89
64
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 11/28] target/arm: Add TBFLAG_M32.SECURE
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
Remove the use of regime_is_secure from arm_tr_init_disas_context.
4
Instead, provide the value of v8m_secure directly from tb_flags.
5
Rather than use regime_is_secure, use the env->v7m.secure directly,
6
as per arm_mmu_idx_el.
7
8
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
9
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
10
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-8-richard.henderson@linaro.org
11
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
12
---
13
target/arm/cpu.h | 2 ++
14
target/arm/helper.c | 4 ++++
15
target/arm/translate.c | 3 +--
16
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
17
18
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h
19
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
20
--- a/target/arm/cpu.h
21
+++ b/target/arm/cpu.h
22
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ FIELD(TBFLAG_M32, NEW_FP_CTXT_NEEDED, 3, 1) /* Not cached. */
23
FIELD(TBFLAG_M32, FPCCR_S_WRONG, 4, 1) /* Not cached. */
24
/* Set if MVE insns are definitely not predicated by VPR or LTPSIZE */
25
FIELD(TBFLAG_M32, MVE_NO_PRED, 5, 1) /* Not cached. */
26
+/* Set if in secure mode */
27
+FIELD(TBFLAG_M32, SECURE, 6, 1)
28
29
/*
30
* Bit usage when in AArch64 state
31
diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c
32
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
33
--- a/target/arm/helper.c
34
+++ b/target/arm/helper.c
35
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static CPUARMTBFlags rebuild_hflags_m32(CPUARMState *env, int fp_el,
36
DP_TBFLAG_M32(flags, STACKCHECK, 1);
37
}
38
39
+ if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) && env->v7m.secure) {
40
+ DP_TBFLAG_M32(flags, SECURE, 1);
41
+ }
42
+
43
return rebuild_hflags_common_32(env, fp_el, mmu_idx, flags);
44
}
45
46
diff --git a/target/arm/translate.c b/target/arm/translate.c
47
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
48
--- a/target/arm/translate.c
49
+++ b/target/arm/translate.c
50
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void arm_tr_init_disas_context(DisasContextBase *dcbase, CPUState *cs)
51
dc->vfp_enabled = 1;
52
dc->be_data = MO_TE;
53
dc->v7m_handler_mode = EX_TBFLAG_M32(tb_flags, HANDLER);
54
- dc->v8m_secure = arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M_SECURITY) &&
55
- regime_is_secure(env, dc->mmu_idx);
56
+ dc->v8m_secure = EX_TBFLAG_M32(tb_flags, SECURE);
57
dc->v8m_stackcheck = EX_TBFLAG_M32(tb_flags, STACKCHECK);
58
dc->v8m_fpccr_s_wrong = EX_TBFLAG_M32(tb_flags, FPCCR_S_WRONG);
59
dc->v7m_new_fp_ctxt_needed =
60
--
61
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
[Qemu-devel] [PULL 02/10] hw/ssi/xilinx_spips: Convert lqspi_read() to read_with_attrs
[PULL 12/28] target/arm: Merge regime_is_secure into get_phys_addr
1
From: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2
2
3
In the next commit we will implement the write_with_attrs()
3
This is the last use of regime_is_secure; remove it
4
handler. To avoid using different APIs, convert the read()
4
entirely before changing the layout of ARMMMUIdx.
5
handler first.
6
5
7
Reviewed-by: Francisco Iglesias <frasse.iglesias@gmail.com>
6
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
8
Tested-by: Francisco Iglesias <frasse.iglesias@gmail.com>
7
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
9
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
8
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-9-richard.henderson@linaro.org
10
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
9
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
11
---
10
---
12
hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c | 23 +++++++++++------------
11
target/arm/internals.h | 42 ----------------------------------------
13
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
12
target/arm/ptw.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
13
2 files changed, 42 insertions(+), 44 deletions(-)
14
14
15
diff --git a/hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c b/hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c
15
diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h
16
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
16
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
17
--- a/hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c
17
--- a/target/arm/internals.h
18
+++ b/hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c
18
+++ b/target/arm/internals.h
19
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void lqspi_load_cache(void *opaque, hwaddr addr)
19
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static inline bool regime_has_2_ranges(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
20
}
20
}
21
}
21
}
22
22
23
-static uint64_t
23
-/* Return true if this address translation regime is secure */
24
-lqspi_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, unsigned int size)
24
-static inline bool regime_is_secure(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
25
+static MemTxResult lqspi_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t *value,
25
-{
26
+ unsigned size, MemTxAttrs attrs)
26
- switch (mmu_idx) {
27
- case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
28
- case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
29
- case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
30
- case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0:
31
- case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2:
32
- case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN:
33
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0:
34
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1:
35
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN:
36
- case ARMMMUIdx_E2:
37
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2:
38
- case ARMMMUIdx_MPrivNegPri:
39
- case ARMMMUIdx_MUserNegPri:
40
- case ARMMMUIdx_MPriv:
41
- case ARMMMUIdx_MUser:
42
- return false;
43
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE3:
44
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0:
45
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1:
46
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN:
47
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0:
48
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2:
49
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN:
50
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0:
51
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1:
52
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN:
53
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE2:
54
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S:
55
- case ARMMMUIdx_MSPrivNegPri:
56
- case ARMMMUIdx_MSUserNegPri:
57
- case ARMMMUIdx_MSPriv:
58
- case ARMMMUIdx_MSUser:
59
- return true;
60
- default:
61
- g_assert_not_reached();
62
- }
63
-}
64
-
65
static inline bool regime_is_pan(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
27
{
66
{
28
- XilinxQSPIPS *q = opaque;
67
switch (mmu_idx) {
29
- uint32_t ret;
68
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
30
+ XilinxQSPIPS *q = XILINX_QSPIPS(opaque);
69
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
31
70
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
32
if (addr >= q->lqspi_cached_addr &&
71
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
33
addr <= q->lqspi_cached_addr + LQSPI_CACHE_SIZE - 4) {
72
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
34
uint8_t *retp = &q->lqspi_buf[addr - q->lqspi_cached_addr];
73
MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
35
- ret = cpu_to_le32(*(uint32_t *)retp);
74
GetPhysAddrResult *result, ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
36
- DB_PRINT_L(1, "addr: %08x, data: %08x\n", (unsigned)addr,
75
{
37
- (unsigned)ret);
76
+ bool is_secure;
38
- return ret;
39
- } else {
40
- lqspi_load_cache(opaque, addr);
41
- return lqspi_read(opaque, addr, size);
42
+ *value = cpu_to_le32(*(uint32_t *)retp);
43
+ DB_PRINT_L(1, "addr: %08" HWADDR_PRIx ", data: %08" PRIx64 "\n",
44
+ addr, *value);
45
+ return MEMTX_OK;
46
}
47
+
77
+
48
+ lqspi_load_cache(opaque, addr);
78
+ switch (mmu_idx) {
49
+ return lqspi_read(opaque, addr, value, size, attrs);
79
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
80
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
81
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
82
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0:
83
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2:
84
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN:
85
+ case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0:
86
+ case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1:
87
+ case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN:
88
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E2:
89
+ case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2:
90
+ case ARMMMUIdx_MPrivNegPri:
91
+ case ARMMMUIdx_MUserNegPri:
92
+ case ARMMMUIdx_MPriv:
93
+ case ARMMMUIdx_MUser:
94
+ is_secure = false;
95
+ break;
96
+ case ARMMMUIdx_SE3:
97
+ case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0:
98
+ case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1:
99
+ case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN:
100
+ case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0:
101
+ case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2:
102
+ case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN:
103
+ case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0:
104
+ case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1:
105
+ case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN:
106
+ case ARMMMUIdx_SE2:
107
+ case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S:
108
+ case ARMMMUIdx_MSPrivNegPri:
109
+ case ARMMMUIdx_MSUserNegPri:
110
+ case ARMMMUIdx_MSPriv:
111
+ case ARMMMUIdx_MSUser:
112
+ is_secure = true;
113
+ break;
114
+ default:
115
+ g_assert_not_reached();
116
+ }
117
return get_phys_addr_with_secure(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
118
- regime_is_secure(env, mmu_idx),
119
- result, fi);
120
+ is_secure, result, fi);
50
}
121
}
51
122
52
static const MemoryRegionOps lqspi_ops = {
123
hwaddr arm_cpu_get_phys_page_attrs_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr,
53
- .read = lqspi_read,
54
+ .read_with_attrs = lqspi_read,
55
.endianness = DEVICE_NATIVE_ENDIAN,
56
.valid = {
57
.min_access_size = 1,
58
--
124
--
59
2.20.1
125
2.25.1
60
61
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 13/28] target/arm: Add is_secure parameter to do_ats_write
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
Use get_phys_addr_with_secure directly. For a-profile, this is the
4
one place where the value of is_secure may not equal arm_is_secure(env).
5
6
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
7
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
8
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-10-richard.henderson@linaro.org
9
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
10
---
11
target/arm/helper.c | 19 ++++++++++++++-----
12
1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
13
14
diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c
15
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
16
--- a/target/arm/helper.c
17
+++ b/target/arm/helper.c
18
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static CPAccessResult ats_access(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
19
20
#ifdef CONFIG_TCG
21
static uint64_t do_ats_write(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t value,
22
- MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
23
+ MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
24
+ bool is_secure)
25
{
26
bool ret;
27
uint64_t par64;
28
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static uint64_t do_ats_write(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t value,
29
ARMMMUFaultInfo fi = {};
30
GetPhysAddrResult res = {};
31
32
- ret = get_phys_addr(env, value, access_type, mmu_idx, &res, &fi);
33
+ ret = get_phys_addr_with_secure(env, value, access_type, mmu_idx,
34
+ is_secure, &res, &fi);
35
36
/*
37
* ATS operations only do S1 or S1+S2 translations, so we never
38
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value)
39
switch (el) {
40
case 3:
41
mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_SE3;
42
+ secure = true;
43
break;
44
case 2:
45
g_assert(!secure); /* ARMv8.4-SecEL2 is 64-bit only */
46
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value)
47
switch (el) {
48
case 3:
49
mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0;
50
+ secure = true;
51
break;
52
case 2:
53
g_assert(!secure); /* ARMv8.4-SecEL2 is 64-bit only */
54
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value)
55
case 4:
56
/* stage 1+2 NonSecure PL1: ATS12NSOPR, ATS12NSOPW */
57
mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_1;
58
+ secure = false;
59
break;
60
case 6:
61
/* stage 1+2 NonSecure PL0: ATS12NSOUR, ATS12NSOUW */
62
mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_0;
63
+ secure = false;
64
break;
65
default:
66
g_assert_not_reached();
67
}
68
69
- par64 = do_ats_write(env, value, access_type, mmu_idx);
70
+ par64 = do_ats_write(env, value, access_type, mmu_idx, secure);
71
72
A32_BANKED_CURRENT_REG_SET(env, par, par64);
73
#else
74
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void ats1h_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
75
MMUAccessType access_type = ri->opc2 & 1 ? MMU_DATA_STORE : MMU_DATA_LOAD;
76
uint64_t par64;
77
78
- par64 = do_ats_write(env, value, access_type, ARMMMUIdx_E2);
79
+ /* There is no SecureEL2 for AArch32. */
80
+ par64 = do_ats_write(env, value, access_type, ARMMMUIdx_E2, false);
81
82
A32_BANKED_CURRENT_REG_SET(env, par, par64);
83
#else
84
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void ats_write64(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
85
break;
86
case 6: /* AT S1E3R, AT S1E3W */
87
mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_SE3;
88
+ secure = true;
89
break;
90
default:
91
g_assert_not_reached();
92
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void ats_write64(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
93
g_assert_not_reached();
94
}
95
96
- env->cp15.par_el[1] = do_ats_write(env, value, access_type, mmu_idx);
97
+ env->cp15.par_el[1] = do_ats_write(env, value, access_type,
98
+ mmu_idx, secure);
99
#else
100
/* Handled by hardware accelerator. */
101
g_assert_not_reached();
102
--
103
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 14/28] target/arm: Fold secure and non-secure a-profile mmu indexes
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
For a-profile aarch64, which does not bank system registers, it takes
4
quite a lot of code to switch between security states. In the process,
5
registers such as TCR_EL{1,2} must be swapped, which in itself requires
6
the flushing of softmmu tlbs. Therefore it doesn't buy us anything to
7
separate tlbs by security state.
8
9
Retain the distinction between Stage2 and Stage2_S.
10
11
This will be important as we implement FEAT_RME, and do not wish to
12
add a third set of mmu indexes for Realm state.
13
14
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
15
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
16
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-11-richard.henderson@linaro.org
17
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
18
---
19
target/arm/cpu-param.h | 2 +-
20
target/arm/cpu.h | 72 +++++++------------
21
target/arm/internals.h | 31 +-------
22
target/arm/helper.c | 144 +++++++++++++------------------------
23
target/arm/ptw.c | 25 ++-----
24
target/arm/translate-a64.c | 8 ---
25
target/arm/translate.c | 6 +-
26
7 files changed, 85 insertions(+), 203 deletions(-)
27
28
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu-param.h b/target/arm/cpu-param.h
29
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
30
--- a/target/arm/cpu-param.h
31
+++ b/target/arm/cpu-param.h
32
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@
33
# define TARGET_PAGE_BITS_MIN 10
34
#endif
35
36
-#define NB_MMU_MODES 15
37
+#define NB_MMU_MODES 8
38
39
#endif
40
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h
41
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
42
--- a/target/arm/cpu.h
43
+++ b/target/arm/cpu.h
44
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool write_cpustate_to_list(ARMCPU *cpu, bool kvm_sync);
45
* table over and over.
46
* 6. we need separate EL1/EL2 mmu_idx for handling the Privileged Access
47
* Never (PAN) bit within PSTATE.
48
+ * 7. we fold together the secure and non-secure regimes for A-profile,
49
+ * because there are no banked system registers for aarch64, so the
50
+ * process of switching between secure and non-secure is
51
+ * already heavyweight.
52
*
53
* This gives us the following list of cases:
54
*
55
- * NS EL0 EL1&0 stage 1+2 (aka NS PL0)
56
- * NS EL1 EL1&0 stage 1+2 (aka NS PL1)
57
- * NS EL1 EL1&0 stage 1+2 +PAN
58
- * NS EL0 EL2&0
59
- * NS EL2 EL2&0
60
- * NS EL2 EL2&0 +PAN
61
- * NS EL2 (aka NS PL2)
62
- * S EL0 EL1&0 (aka S PL0)
63
- * S EL1 EL1&0 (not used if EL3 is 32 bit)
64
- * S EL1 EL1&0 +PAN
65
- * S EL3 (aka S PL1)
66
+ * EL0 EL1&0 stage 1+2 (aka NS PL0)
67
+ * EL1 EL1&0 stage 1+2 (aka NS PL1)
68
+ * EL1 EL1&0 stage 1+2 +PAN
69
+ * EL0 EL2&0
70
+ * EL2 EL2&0
71
+ * EL2 EL2&0 +PAN
72
+ * EL2 (aka NS PL2)
73
+ * EL3 (aka S PL1)
74
*
75
- * for a total of 11 different mmu_idx.
76
+ * for a total of 8 different mmu_idx.
77
*
78
* R profile CPUs have an MPU, but can use the same set of MMU indexes
79
- * as A profile. They only need to distinguish NS EL0 and NS EL1 (and
80
- * NS EL2 if we ever model a Cortex-R52).
81
+ * as A profile. They only need to distinguish EL0 and EL1 (and
82
+ * EL2 if we ever model a Cortex-R52).
83
*
84
* M profile CPUs are rather different as they do not have a true MMU.
85
* They have the following different MMU indexes:
86
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool write_cpustate_to_list(ARMCPU *cpu, bool kvm_sync);
87
#define ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB 0x20 /* does not have a TLB */
88
#define ARM_MMU_IDX_M 0x40 /* M profile */
89
90
-/* Meanings of the bits for A profile mmu idx values */
91
-#define ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS 0x8
92
-
93
/* Meanings of the bits for M profile mmu idx values */
94
#define ARM_MMU_IDX_M_PRIV 0x1
95
#define ARM_MMU_IDX_M_NEGPRI 0x2
96
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ typedef enum ARMMMUIdx {
97
/*
98
* A-profile.
99
*/
100
- ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0 = 0 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
101
- ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0 = 1 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
102
- ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1 = 2 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
103
- ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2 = 3 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
104
- ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN = 4 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
105
- ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN = 5 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
106
- ARMMMUIdx_SE2 = 6 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
107
- ARMMMUIdx_SE3 = 7 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
108
-
109
- ARMMMUIdx_E10_0 = ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS,
110
- ARMMMUIdx_E20_0 = ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS,
111
- ARMMMUIdx_E10_1 = ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS,
112
- ARMMMUIdx_E20_2 = ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS,
113
- ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN = ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS,
114
- ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN = ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS,
115
- ARMMMUIdx_E2 = ARMMMUIdx_SE2 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS,
116
+ ARMMMUIdx_E10_0 = 0 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
117
+ ARMMMUIdx_E20_0 = 1 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
118
+ ARMMMUIdx_E10_1 = 2 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
119
+ ARMMMUIdx_E20_2 = 3 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
120
+ ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN = 4 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
121
+ ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN = 5 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
122
+ ARMMMUIdx_E2 = 6 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
123
+ ARMMMUIdx_E3 = 7 | ARM_MMU_IDX_A,
124
125
/*
126
* These are not allocated TLBs and are used only for AT system
127
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ typedef enum ARMMMUIdx {
128
ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0 = 0 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB,
129
ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1 = 1 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB,
130
ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN = 2 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB,
131
- ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0 = 3 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB,
132
- ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1 = 4 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB,
133
- ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN = 5 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB,
134
/*
135
* Not allocated a TLB: used only for second stage of an S12 page
136
* table walk, or for descriptor loads during first stage of an S1
137
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ typedef enum ARMMMUIdx {
138
* then various TLB flush insns which currently are no-ops or flush
139
* only stage 1 MMU indexes will need to change to flush stage 2.
140
*/
141
- ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 = 6 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB,
142
- ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S = 7 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB,
143
+ ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 = 3 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB,
144
+ ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S = 4 | ARM_MMU_IDX_NOTLB,
145
146
/*
147
* M-profile.
148
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ typedef enum ARMMMUIdxBit {
149
TO_CORE_BIT(E2),
150
TO_CORE_BIT(E20_2),
151
TO_CORE_BIT(E20_2_PAN),
152
- TO_CORE_BIT(SE10_0),
153
- TO_CORE_BIT(SE20_0),
154
- TO_CORE_BIT(SE10_1),
155
- TO_CORE_BIT(SE20_2),
156
- TO_CORE_BIT(SE10_1_PAN),
157
- TO_CORE_BIT(SE20_2_PAN),
158
- TO_CORE_BIT(SE2),
159
- TO_CORE_BIT(SE3),
160
+ TO_CORE_BIT(E3),
161
162
TO_CORE_BIT(MUser),
163
TO_CORE_BIT(MPriv),
164
diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h
165
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
166
--- a/target/arm/internals.h
167
+++ b/target/arm/internals.h
168
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static inline bool regime_has_2_ranges(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
169
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0:
170
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1:
171
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN:
172
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0:
173
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1:
174
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN:
175
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
176
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
177
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
178
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0:
179
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2:
180
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN:
181
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0:
182
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1:
183
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN:
184
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0:
185
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2:
186
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN:
187
return true;
188
default:
189
return false;
190
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static inline bool regime_is_pan(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
191
{
192
switch (mmu_idx) {
193
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN:
194
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN:
195
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
196
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN:
197
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN:
198
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN:
199
return true;
200
default:
201
return false;
202
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static inline bool regime_is_pan(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
203
static inline uint32_t regime_el(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
204
{
205
switch (mmu_idx) {
206
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0:
207
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2:
208
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN:
209
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0:
210
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2:
211
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN:
212
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2:
213
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S:
214
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE2:
215
case ARMMMUIdx_E2:
216
return 2;
217
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE3:
218
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E3:
219
return 3;
220
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0:
221
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0:
222
- return arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3) ? 1 : 3;
223
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1:
224
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN:
225
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
226
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0:
227
+ return arm_el_is_aa64(env, 3) || !arm_is_secure_below_el3(env) ? 1 : 3;
228
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1:
229
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN:
230
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1:
231
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN:
232
- case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
233
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
234
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
235
case ARMMMUIdx_MPrivNegPri:
236
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static inline bool arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
237
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0:
238
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1:
239
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN:
240
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0:
241
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1:
242
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN:
243
return true;
244
default:
245
return false;
246
diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c
247
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
248
--- a/target/arm/helper.c
249
+++ b/target/arm/helper.c
250
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void scr_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value)
251
/* Begin with base v8.0 state. */
252
uint64_t valid_mask = 0x3fff;
253
ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
254
+ uint64_t changed;
255
256
/*
257
* Because SCR_EL3 is the "real" cpreg and SCR is the alias, reset always
258
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void scr_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value)
259
260
/* Clear all-context RES0 bits. */
261
value &= valid_mask;
262
- raw_write(env, ri, value);
263
+ changed = env->cp15.scr_el3 ^ value;
264
+ env->cp15.scr_el3 = value;
265
+
266
+ /*
267
+ * If SCR_EL3.NS changes, i.e. arm_is_secure_below_el3, then
268
+ * we must invalidate all TLBs below EL3.
269
+ */
270
+ if (changed & SCR_NS) {
271
+ tlb_flush_by_mmuidx(env_cpu(env), (ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_0 |
272
+ ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_0 |
273
+ ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1 |
274
+ ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2 |
275
+ ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1_PAN |
276
+ ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2_PAN |
277
+ ARMMMUIdxBit_E2));
278
+ }
279
}
280
281
static void scr_reset(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri)
282
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static int gt_phys_redir_timeridx(CPUARMState *env)
283
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0:
284
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2:
285
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN:
286
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0:
287
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2:
288
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN:
289
return GTIMER_HYP;
290
default:
291
return GTIMER_PHYS;
292
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static int gt_virt_redir_timeridx(CPUARMState *env)
293
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0:
294
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2:
295
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN:
296
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0:
297
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2:
298
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN:
299
return GTIMER_HYPVIRT;
300
default:
301
return GTIMER_VIRT;
302
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value)
303
/* stage 1 current state PL1: ATS1CPR, ATS1CPW, ATS1CPRP, ATS1CPWP */
304
switch (el) {
305
case 3:
306
- mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_SE3;
307
+ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E3;
308
secure = true;
309
break;
310
case 2:
311
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value)
312
/* fall through */
313
case 1:
314
if (ri->crm == 9 && (env->uncached_cpsr & CPSR_PAN)) {
315
- mmu_idx = (secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN
316
- : ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN);
317
+ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN;
318
} else {
319
- mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1 : ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1;
320
+ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1;
321
}
322
break;
323
default:
324
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value)
325
/* stage 1 current state PL0: ATS1CUR, ATS1CUW */
326
switch (el) {
327
case 3:
328
- mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0;
329
+ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_0;
330
secure = true;
331
break;
332
case 2:
333
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void ats_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri, uint64_t value)
334
mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0;
335
break;
336
case 1:
337
- mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0 : ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0;
338
+ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0;
339
break;
340
default:
341
g_assert_not_reached();
342
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void ats_write64(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
343
switch (ri->opc1) {
344
case 0: /* AT S1E1R, AT S1E1W, AT S1E1RP, AT S1E1WP */
345
if (ri->crm == 9 && (env->pstate & PSTATE_PAN)) {
346
- mmu_idx = (secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN
347
- : ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN);
348
+ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN;
349
} else {
350
- mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1 : ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1;
351
+ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1;
352
}
353
break;
354
case 4: /* AT S1E2R, AT S1E2W */
355
- mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_SE2 : ARMMMUIdx_E2;
356
+ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E2;
357
break;
358
case 6: /* AT S1E3R, AT S1E3W */
359
- mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_SE3;
360
+ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E3;
361
secure = true;
362
break;
363
default:
364
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void ats_write64(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
365
}
366
break;
367
case 2: /* AT S1E0R, AT S1E0W */
368
- mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0 : ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0;
369
+ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0;
370
break;
371
case 4: /* AT S12E1R, AT S12E1W */
372
- mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1 : ARMMMUIdx_E10_1;
373
+ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_1;
374
break;
375
case 6: /* AT S12E0R, AT S12E0W */
376
- mmu_idx = secure ? ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0 : ARMMMUIdx_E10_0;
377
+ mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_0;
378
break;
379
default:
380
g_assert_not_reached();
381
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void vmsa_tcr_ttbr_el2_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
382
uint16_t mask = ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2 |
383
ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2_PAN |
384
ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_0;
385
-
386
- if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) {
387
- mask >>= ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS;
388
- }
389
-
390
tlb_flush_by_mmuidx(env_cpu(env), mask);
391
}
392
raw_write(env, ri, value);
393
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void vttbr_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
394
uint16_t mask = ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1 |
395
ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1_PAN |
396
ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_0;
397
-
398
- if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) {
399
- mask >>= ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS;
400
- }
401
-
402
tlb_flush_by_mmuidx(cs, mask);
403
raw_write(env, ri, value);
404
}
405
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static int vae1_tlbmask(CPUARMState *env)
406
ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1_PAN |
407
ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_0;
408
}
409
-
410
- if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) {
411
- mask >>= ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS;
412
- }
413
-
414
return mask;
415
}
416
417
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static int vae1_tlbbits(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t addr)
418
mmu_idx = ARMMMUIdx_E10_0;
419
}
420
421
- if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) {
422
- mmu_idx &= ~ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS;
423
- }
424
-
425
return tlbbits_for_regime(env, mmu_idx, addr);
426
}
427
428
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static int alle1_tlbmask(CPUARMState *env)
429
* stage 2 translations, whereas most other scopes only invalidate
430
* stage 1 translations.
431
*/
432
- if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) {
433
- return ARMMMUIdxBit_SE10_1 |
434
- ARMMMUIdxBit_SE10_1_PAN |
435
- ARMMMUIdxBit_SE10_0;
436
- } else {
437
- return ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1 |
438
- ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1_PAN |
439
- ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_0;
440
- }
441
+ return (ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1 |
442
+ ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_1_PAN |
443
+ ARMMMUIdxBit_E10_0);
444
}
445
446
static int e2_tlbmask(CPUARMState *env)
447
{
448
- if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) {
449
- return ARMMMUIdxBit_SE20_0 |
450
- ARMMMUIdxBit_SE20_2 |
451
- ARMMMUIdxBit_SE20_2_PAN |
452
- ARMMMUIdxBit_SE2;
453
- } else {
454
- return ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_0 |
455
- ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2 |
456
- ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2_PAN |
457
- ARMMMUIdxBit_E2;
458
- }
459
+ return (ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_0 |
460
+ ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2 |
461
+ ARMMMUIdxBit_E20_2_PAN |
462
+ ARMMMUIdxBit_E2);
463
}
464
465
static void tlbi_aa64_alle1_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
466
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void tlbi_aa64_alle3_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
467
ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
468
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
469
470
- tlb_flush_by_mmuidx(cs, ARMMMUIdxBit_SE3);
471
+ tlb_flush_by_mmuidx(cs, ARMMMUIdxBit_E3);
472
}
473
474
static void tlbi_aa64_alle1is_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
475
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void tlbi_aa64_alle3is_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
476
{
477
CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env);
478
479
- tlb_flush_by_mmuidx_all_cpus_synced(cs, ARMMMUIdxBit_SE3);
480
+ tlb_flush_by_mmuidx_all_cpus_synced(cs, ARMMMUIdxBit_E3);
481
}
482
483
static void tlbi_aa64_vae2_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
484
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void tlbi_aa64_vae3_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
485
CPUState *cs = CPU(cpu);
486
uint64_t pageaddr = sextract64(value << 12, 0, 56);
487
488
- tlb_flush_page_by_mmuidx(cs, pageaddr, ARMMMUIdxBit_SE3);
489
+ tlb_flush_page_by_mmuidx(cs, pageaddr, ARMMMUIdxBit_E3);
490
}
491
492
static void tlbi_aa64_vae1is_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
493
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void tlbi_aa64_vae2is_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
494
{
495
CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env);
496
uint64_t pageaddr = sextract64(value << 12, 0, 56);
497
- bool secure = arm_is_secure_below_el3(env);
498
- int mask = secure ? ARMMMUIdxBit_SE2 : ARMMMUIdxBit_E2;
499
- int bits = tlbbits_for_regime(env, secure ? ARMMMUIdx_SE2 : ARMMMUIdx_E2,
500
- pageaddr);
501
+ int bits = tlbbits_for_regime(env, ARMMMUIdx_E2, pageaddr);
502
503
- tlb_flush_page_bits_by_mmuidx_all_cpus_synced(cs, pageaddr, mask, bits);
504
+ tlb_flush_page_bits_by_mmuidx_all_cpus_synced(cs, pageaddr,
505
+ ARMMMUIdxBit_E2, bits);
506
}
507
508
static void tlbi_aa64_vae3is_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
509
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void tlbi_aa64_vae3is_write(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
510
{
511
CPUState *cs = env_cpu(env);
512
uint64_t pageaddr = sextract64(value << 12, 0, 56);
513
- int bits = tlbbits_for_regime(env, ARMMMUIdx_SE3, pageaddr);
514
+ int bits = tlbbits_for_regime(env, ARMMMUIdx_E3, pageaddr);
515
516
tlb_flush_page_bits_by_mmuidx_all_cpus_synced(cs, pageaddr,
517
- ARMMMUIdxBit_SE3, bits);
518
+ ARMMMUIdxBit_E3, bits);
519
}
520
521
#ifdef TARGET_AARCH64
522
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void tlbi_aa64_rvae1is_write(CPUARMState *env,
523
524
static int vae2_tlbmask(CPUARMState *env)
525
{
526
- return (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)
527
- ? ARMMMUIdxBit_SE2 : ARMMMUIdxBit_E2);
528
+ return ARMMMUIdxBit_E2;
529
}
530
531
static void tlbi_aa64_rvae2_write(CPUARMState *env,
532
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void tlbi_aa64_rvae3_write(CPUARMState *env,
533
* flush-last-level-only.
534
*/
535
536
- do_rvae_write(env, value, ARMMMUIdxBit_SE3,
537
- tlb_force_broadcast(env));
538
+ do_rvae_write(env, value, ARMMMUIdxBit_E3, tlb_force_broadcast(env));
539
}
540
541
static void tlbi_aa64_rvae3is_write(CPUARMState *env,
542
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void tlbi_aa64_rvae3is_write(CPUARMState *env,
543
* flush-last-level-only or inner/outer specific flushes.
544
*/
545
546
- do_rvae_write(env, value, ARMMMUIdxBit_SE3, true);
547
+ do_rvae_write(env, value, ARMMMUIdxBit_E3, true);
548
}
549
#endif
550
551
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ uint64_t arm_sctlr(CPUARMState *env, int el)
552
/* Only EL0 needs to be adjusted for EL1&0 or EL2&0. */
553
if (el == 0) {
554
ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx = arm_mmu_idx_el(env, 0);
555
- el = (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E20_0 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0)
556
- ? 2 : 1;
557
+ el = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E20_0 ? 2 : 1;
558
}
559
return env->cp15.sctlr_el[el];
560
}
561
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ int arm_mmu_idx_to_el(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
562
switch (mmu_idx) {
563
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
564
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0:
565
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0:
566
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0:
567
return 0;
568
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
569
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
570
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1:
571
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN:
572
return 1;
573
case ARMMMUIdx_E2:
574
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2:
575
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN:
576
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE2:
577
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2:
578
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN:
579
return 2;
580
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE3:
581
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E3:
582
return 3;
583
default:
584
g_assert_not_reached();
585
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ ARMMMUIdx arm_mmu_idx_el(CPUARMState *env, int el)
586
}
587
break;
588
case 3:
589
- return ARMMMUIdx_SE3;
590
+ return ARMMMUIdx_E3;
591
default:
592
g_assert_not_reached();
593
}
594
595
- if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) {
596
- idx &= ~ARM_MMU_IDX_A_NS;
597
- }
598
-
599
return idx;
600
}
601
602
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static CPUARMTBFlags rebuild_hflags_a64(CPUARMState *env, int el, int fp_el,
603
switch (mmu_idx) {
604
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
605
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
606
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1:
607
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN:
608
/* TODO: ARMv8.3-NV */
609
DP_TBFLAG_A64(flags, UNPRIV, 1);
610
break;
611
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2:
612
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN:
613
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2:
614
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN:
615
/*
616
* Note that EL20_2 is gated by HCR_EL2.E2H == 1, but EL20_0 is
617
* gated by HCR_EL2.<E2H,TGE> == '11', and so is LDTR.
618
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
619
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
620
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
621
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
622
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ unsigned int arm_pamax(ARMCPU *cpu)
623
ARMMMUIdx stage_1_mmu_idx(ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
624
{
625
switch (mmu_idx) {
626
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0:
627
- return ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0;
628
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1:
629
- return ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1;
630
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN:
631
- return ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN;
632
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
633
return ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0;
634
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
635
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool regime_translation_big_endian(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
636
static bool regime_is_user(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
637
{
638
switch (mmu_idx) {
639
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0:
640
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0:
641
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0:
642
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0:
643
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0:
644
case ARMMMUIdx_MUser:
645
case ARMMMUIdx_MSUser:
646
case ARMMMUIdx_MUserNegPri:
647
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
648
649
s2_mmu_idx = (s2walk_secure
650
? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2);
651
- is_el0 = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E10_0 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0;
652
+ is_el0 = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_E10_0;
653
654
/*
655
* S1 is done, now do S2 translation.
656
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
657
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1:
658
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN:
659
case ARMMMUIdx_E2:
660
+ is_secure = arm_is_secure_below_el3(env);
661
+ break;
662
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2:
663
case ARMMMUIdx_MPrivNegPri:
664
case ARMMMUIdx_MUserNegPri:
665
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
666
case ARMMMUIdx_MUser:
667
is_secure = false;
668
break;
669
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE3:
670
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0:
671
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1:
672
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN:
673
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0:
674
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2:
675
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN:
676
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE0:
677
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1:
678
- case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_SE1_PAN:
679
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE2:
680
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E3:
681
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S:
682
case ARMMMUIdx_MSPrivNegPri:
683
case ARMMMUIdx_MSUserNegPri:
684
diff --git a/target/arm/translate-a64.c b/target/arm/translate-a64.c
685
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
686
--- a/target/arm/translate-a64.c
687
+++ b/target/arm/translate-a64.c
688
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static int get_a64_user_mem_index(DisasContext *s)
689
case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN:
690
useridx = ARMMMUIdx_E20_0;
691
break;
692
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1:
693
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN:
694
- useridx = ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0;
695
- break;
696
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2:
697
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE20_2_PAN:
698
- useridx = ARMMMUIdx_SE20_0;
699
- break;
700
default:
701
g_assert_not_reached();
702
}
703
diff --git a/target/arm/translate.c b/target/arm/translate.c
704
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
705
--- a/target/arm/translate.c
706
+++ b/target/arm/translate.c
707
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static inline int get_a32_user_mem_index(DisasContext *s)
708
* otherwise, access as if at PL0.
709
*/
710
switch (s->mmu_idx) {
711
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E3:
712
case ARMMMUIdx_E2: /* this one is UNPREDICTABLE */
713
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
714
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
715
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
716
return arm_to_core_mmu_idx(ARMMMUIdx_E10_0);
717
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE3:
718
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0:
719
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1:
720
- case ARMMMUIdx_SE10_1_PAN:
721
- return arm_to_core_mmu_idx(ARMMMUIdx_SE10_0);
722
case ARMMMUIdx_MUser:
723
case ARMMMUIdx_MPriv:
724
return arm_to_core_mmu_idx(ARMMMUIdx_MUser);
725
--
726
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 15/28] target/arm: Reorg regime_translation_disabled
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
Use a switch on mmu_idx for the a-profile indexes, instead of
4
three different if's vs regime_el and arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2.
5
6
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
7
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
8
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-12-richard.henderson@linaro.org
9
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
10
---
11
target/arm/ptw.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-------
12
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
13
14
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
15
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
16
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
17
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
18
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
19
20
hcr_el2 = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
21
22
- if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) {
23
+ switch (mmu_idx) {
24
+ case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2:
25
+ case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S:
26
/* HCR.DC means HCR.VM behaves as 1 */
27
return (hcr_el2 & (HCR_DC | HCR_VM)) == 0;
28
- }
29
30
- if (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE) {
31
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
32
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
33
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
34
/* TGE means that NS EL0/1 act as if SCTLR_EL1.M is zero */
35
- if (!is_secure && regime_el(env, mmu_idx) == 1) {
36
+ if (!is_secure && (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE)) {
37
return true;
38
}
39
- }
40
+ break;
41
42
- if ((hcr_el2 & HCR_DC) && arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2(mmu_idx)) {
43
+ case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E0:
44
+ case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1:
45
+ case ARMMMUIdx_Stage1_E1_PAN:
46
/* HCR.DC means SCTLR_EL1.M behaves as 0 */
47
- return true;
48
+ if (hcr_el2 & HCR_DC) {
49
+ return true;
50
+ }
51
+ break;
52
+
53
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E20_0:
54
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2:
55
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E20_2_PAN:
56
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E2:
57
+ case ARMMMUIdx_E3:
58
+ break;
59
+
60
+ default:
61
+ g_assert_not_reached();
62
}
63
64
return (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_M) == 0;
65
--
66
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 16/28] target/arm: Drop secure check for HCR.TGE vs SCTLR_EL1.M
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
The effect of TGE does not only apply to non-secure state,
4
now that Secure EL2 exists.
5
6
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
7
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
8
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-13-richard.henderson@linaro.org
9
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
10
---
11
target/arm/ptw.c | 4 ++--
12
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
13
14
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
15
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
16
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
17
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
18
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
19
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_0:
20
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1:
21
case ARMMMUIdx_E10_1_PAN:
22
- /* TGE means that NS EL0/1 act as if SCTLR_EL1.M is zero */
23
- if (!is_secure && (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE)) {
24
+ /* TGE means that EL0/1 act as if SCTLR_EL1.M is zero */
25
+ if (hcr_el2 & HCR_TGE) {
26
return true;
27
}
28
break;
29
--
30
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
[Qemu-devel] [PULL 08/10] pl031: Correctly migrate state when using -rtc clock=host
[PULL 17/28] target/arm: Introduce arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate
1
The PL031 RTC tracks the difference between the guest RTC
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2
and the host RTC using a tick_offset field. For migration,
3
however, we currently always migrate the offset between
4
the guest and the vm_clock, even if the RTC clock is not
5
the same as the vm_clock; this was an attempt to retain
6
migration backwards compatibility.
7
2
8
Unfortunately this results in the RTC behaving oddly across
3
For page walking, we may require HCR for a security state
9
a VM state save and restore -- since the VM clock stands still
4
that is not "current".
10
across save-then-restore, regardless of how much real world
11
time has elapsed, the guest RTC ends up out of sync with the
12
host RTC in the restored VM.
13
5
14
Fix this by migrating the raw tick_offset. To retain migration
6
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
15
compatibility as far as possible, we have a new property
7
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
16
migrate-tick-offset; by default this is 'true' and we will
8
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-14-richard.henderson@linaro.org
17
migrate the true tick offset in a new subsection; if the
9
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
18
incoming data has no subsection we fall back to the old
10
---
19
vm_clock-based offset information, so old->new migration
11
target/arm/cpu.h | 20 +++++++++++++-------
20
compatibility is preserved. For complete new->old migration
12
target/arm/helper.c | 11 ++++++++---
21
compatibility, the property is set to 'false' for 4.0 and
13
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
22
earlier machine types (this will only affect 'virt-4.0'
23
and below, as none of the other pl031-using machines are
24
versioned).
25
14
26
Reported-by: Russell King <rmk@armlinux.org.uk>
15
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h
27
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
28
Reviewed-by: Dr. David Alan Gilbert <dgilbert@redhat.com>
29
Message-id: 20190709143912.28905-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
30
---
31
include/hw/timer/pl031.h | 2 +
32
hw/core/machine.c | 1 +
33
hw/timer/pl031.c | 92 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
34
3 files changed, 91 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
35
36
diff --git a/include/hw/timer/pl031.h b/include/hw/timer/pl031.h
37
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
16
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
38
--- a/include/hw/timer/pl031.h
17
--- a/target/arm/cpu.h
39
+++ b/include/hw/timer/pl031.h
18
+++ b/target/arm/cpu.h
40
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ typedef struct PL031State {
19
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static inline bool arm_is_secure(CPUARMState *env)
41
*/
20
* Return true if the current security state has AArch64 EL2 or AArch32 Hyp.
42
uint32_t tick_offset_vmstate;
21
* This corresponds to the pseudocode EL2Enabled()
43
uint32_t tick_offset;
22
*/
44
+ bool tick_offset_migrated;
23
+static inline bool arm_is_el2_enabled_secstate(CPUARMState *env, bool secure)
45
+ bool migrate_tick_offset;
46
47
uint32_t mr;
48
uint32_t lr;
49
diff --git a/hw/core/machine.c b/hw/core/machine.c
50
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
51
--- a/hw/core/machine.c
52
+++ b/hw/core/machine.c
53
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ GlobalProperty hw_compat_4_0[] = {
54
{ "virtio-gpu-pci", "edid", "false" },
55
{ "virtio-device", "use-started", "false" },
56
{ "virtio-balloon-device", "qemu-4-0-config-size", "true" },
57
+ { "pl031", "migrate-tick-offset", "false" },
58
};
59
const size_t hw_compat_4_0_len = G_N_ELEMENTS(hw_compat_4_0);
60
61
diff --git a/hw/timer/pl031.c b/hw/timer/pl031.c
62
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
63
--- a/hw/timer/pl031.c
64
+++ b/hw/timer/pl031.c
65
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static int pl031_pre_save(void *opaque)
66
{
67
PL031State *s = opaque;
68
69
- /* tick_offset is base_time - rtc_clock base time. Instead, we want to
70
- * store the base time relative to the QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL for backwards-compatibility. */
71
+ /*
72
+ * The PL031 device model code uses the tick_offset field, which is
73
+ * the offset between what the guest RTC should read and what the
74
+ * QEMU rtc_clock reads:
75
+ * guest_rtc = rtc_clock + tick_offset
76
+ * and so
77
+ * tick_offset = guest_rtc - rtc_clock
78
+ *
79
+ * We want to migrate this offset, which sounds straightforward.
80
+ * Unfortunately older versions of QEMU migrated a conversion of this
81
+ * offset into an offset from the vm_clock. (This was in turn an
82
+ * attempt to be compatible with even older QEMU versions, but it
83
+ * has incorrect behaviour if the rtc_clock is not the same as the
84
+ * vm_clock.) So we put the actual tick_offset into a migration
85
+ * subsection, and the backwards-compatible time-relative-to-vm_clock
86
+ * in the main migration state.
87
+ *
88
+ * Calculate base time relative to QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL:
89
+ */
90
int64_t delta = qemu_clock_get_ns(rtc_clock) - qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL);
91
s->tick_offset_vmstate = s->tick_offset + delta / NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND;
92
93
return 0;
94
}
95
96
+static int pl031_pre_load(void *opaque)
97
+{
24
+{
98
+ PL031State *s = opaque;
25
+ return arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_EL2)
99
+
26
+ && (!secure || (env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_EEL2));
100
+ s->tick_offset_migrated = false;
101
+ return 0;
102
+}
27
+}
103
+
28
+
104
static int pl031_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
29
static inline bool arm_is_el2_enabled(CPUARMState *env)
105
{
30
{
106
PL031State *s = opaque;
31
- if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_EL2)) {
107
32
- if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) {
108
- int64_t delta = qemu_clock_get_ns(rtc_clock) - qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL);
33
- return (env->cp15.scr_el3 & SCR_EEL2) != 0;
109
- s->tick_offset = s->tick_offset_vmstate - delta / NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND;
34
- }
110
+ /*
35
- return true;
111
+ * If we got the tick_offset subsection, then we can just use
36
- }
112
+ * the value in that. Otherwise the source is an older QEMU and
37
- return false;
113
+ * has given us the offset from the vm_clock; convert it back to
38
+ return arm_is_el2_enabled_secstate(env, arm_is_secure_below_el3(env));
114
+ * an offset from the rtc_clock. This will cause time to incorrectly
115
+ * go backwards compared to the host RTC, but this is unavoidable.
116
+ */
117
+
118
+ if (!s->tick_offset_migrated) {
119
+ int64_t delta = qemu_clock_get_ns(rtc_clock) -
120
+ qemu_clock_get_ns(QEMU_CLOCK_VIRTUAL);
121
+ s->tick_offset = s->tick_offset_vmstate -
122
+ delta / NANOSECONDS_PER_SECOND;
123
+ }
124
pl031_set_alarm(s);
125
return 0;
126
}
39
}
127
40
128
+static int pl031_tick_offset_post_load(void *opaque, int version_id)
41
#else
42
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static inline bool arm_is_secure(CPUARMState *env)
43
return false;
44
}
45
46
+static inline bool arm_is_el2_enabled_secstate(CPUARMState *env, bool secure)
129
+{
47
+{
130
+ PL031State *s = opaque;
48
+ return false;
131
+
132
+ s->tick_offset_migrated = true;
133
+ return 0;
134
+}
49
+}
135
+
50
+
136
+static bool pl031_tick_offset_needed(void *opaque)
51
static inline bool arm_is_el2_enabled(CPUARMState *env)
52
{
53
return false;
54
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static inline bool arm_is_el2_enabled(CPUARMState *env)
55
* "for all purposes other than a direct read or write access of HCR_EL2."
56
* Not included here is HCR_RW.
57
*/
58
+uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(CPUARMState *env, bool secure);
59
uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff(CPUARMState *env);
60
uint64_t arm_hcrx_el2_eff(CPUARMState *env);
61
62
diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c
63
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
64
--- a/target/arm/helper.c
65
+++ b/target/arm/helper.c
66
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void hcr_writelow(CPUARMState *env, const ARMCPRegInfo *ri,
67
}
68
69
/*
70
- * Return the effective value of HCR_EL2.
71
+ * Return the effective value of HCR_EL2, at the given security state.
72
* Bits that are not included here:
73
* RW (read from SCR_EL3.RW as needed)
74
*/
75
-uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff(CPUARMState *env)
76
+uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(CPUARMState *env, bool secure)
77
{
78
uint64_t ret = env->cp15.hcr_el2;
79
80
- if (!arm_is_el2_enabled(env)) {
81
+ if (!arm_is_el2_enabled_secstate(env, secure)) {
82
/*
83
* "This register has no effect if EL2 is not enabled in the
84
* current Security state". This is ARMv8.4-SecEL2 speak for
85
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff(CPUARMState *env)
86
return ret;
87
}
88
89
+uint64_t arm_hcr_el2_eff(CPUARMState *env)
137
+{
90
+{
138
+ PL031State *s = opaque;
91
+ return arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, arm_is_secure_below_el3(env));
139
+
140
+ return s->migrate_tick_offset;
141
+}
92
+}
142
+
93
+
143
+static const VMStateDescription vmstate_pl031_tick_offset = {
94
/*
144
+ .name = "pl031/tick-offset",
95
* Corresponds to ARM pseudocode function ELIsInHost().
145
+ .version_id = 1,
96
*/
146
+ .minimum_version_id = 1,
147
+ .needed = pl031_tick_offset_needed,
148
+ .post_load = pl031_tick_offset_post_load,
149
+ .fields = (VMStateField[]) {
150
+ VMSTATE_UINT32(tick_offset, PL031State),
151
+ VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST()
152
+ }
153
+};
154
+
155
static const VMStateDescription vmstate_pl031 = {
156
.name = "pl031",
157
.version_id = 1,
158
.minimum_version_id = 1,
159
.pre_save = pl031_pre_save,
160
+ .pre_load = pl031_pre_load,
161
.post_load = pl031_post_load,
162
.fields = (VMStateField[]) {
163
VMSTATE_UINT32(tick_offset_vmstate, PL031State),
164
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static const VMStateDescription vmstate_pl031 = {
165
VMSTATE_UINT32(im, PL031State),
166
VMSTATE_UINT32(is, PL031State),
167
VMSTATE_END_OF_LIST()
168
+ },
169
+ .subsections = (const VMStateDescription*[]) {
170
+ &vmstate_pl031_tick_offset,
171
+ NULL
172
}
173
};
174
175
+static Property pl031_properties[] = {
176
+ /*
177
+ * True to correctly migrate the tick offset of the RTC. False to
178
+ * obtain backward migration compatibility with older QEMU versions,
179
+ * at the expense of the guest RTC going backwards compared with the
180
+ * host RTC when the VM is saved/restored if using -rtc host.
181
+ * (Even if set to 'true' older QEMU can migrate forward to newer QEMU;
182
+ * 'false' also permits newer QEMU to migrate to older QEMU.)
183
+ */
184
+ DEFINE_PROP_BOOL("migrate-tick-offset",
185
+ PL031State, migrate_tick_offset, true),
186
+ DEFINE_PROP_END_OF_LIST()
187
+};
188
+
189
static void pl031_class_init(ObjectClass *klass, void *data)
190
{
191
DeviceClass *dc = DEVICE_CLASS(klass);
192
193
dc->vmsd = &vmstate_pl031;
194
+ dc->props = pl031_properties;
195
}
196
197
static const TypeInfo pl031_info = {
198
--
97
--
199
2.20.1
98
2.25.1
200
201
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 18/28] target/arm: Hoist read of *is_secure in S1_ptw_translate
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
Rename the argument to is_secure_ptr, and introduce a
4
local variable is_secure with the value. We only write
5
back to the pointer toward the end of the function.
6
7
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
8
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
9
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-15-richard.henderson@linaro.org
10
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
11
---
12
target/arm/ptw.c | 22 ++++++++++++----------
13
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
14
15
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
16
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
17
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
18
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
19
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool ptw_attrs_are_device(CPUARMState *env, ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs)
20
21
/* Translate a S1 pagetable walk through S2 if needed. */
22
static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
23
- hwaddr addr, bool *is_secure,
24
+ hwaddr addr, bool *is_secure_ptr,
25
ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
26
{
27
- ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx = *is_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2;
28
+ bool is_secure = *is_secure_ptr;
29
+ ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx = is_secure ? ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S : ARMMMUIdx_Stage2;
30
31
if (arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2(mmu_idx) &&
32
- !regime_translation_disabled(env, s2_mmu_idx, *is_secure)) {
33
+ !regime_translation_disabled(env, s2_mmu_idx, is_secure)) {
34
GetPhysAddrResult s2 = {};
35
int ret;
36
37
ret = get_phys_addr_lpae(env, addr, MMU_DATA_LOAD, s2_mmu_idx,
38
- *is_secure, false, &s2, fi);
39
+ is_secure, false, &s2, fi);
40
if (ret) {
41
assert(fi->type != ARMFault_None);
42
fi->s2addr = addr;
43
fi->stage2 = true;
44
fi->s1ptw = true;
45
- fi->s1ns = !*is_secure;
46
+ fi->s1ns = !is_secure;
47
return ~0;
48
}
49
if ((arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_PTW) &&
50
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
51
fi->s2addr = addr;
52
fi->stage2 = true;
53
fi->s1ptw = true;
54
- fi->s1ns = !*is_secure;
55
+ fi->s1ns = !is_secure;
56
return ~0;
57
}
58
59
if (arm_is_secure_below_el3(env)) {
60
/* Check if page table walk is to secure or non-secure PA space. */
61
- if (*is_secure) {
62
- *is_secure = !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & VSTCR_SW);
63
+ if (is_secure) {
64
+ is_secure = !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & VSTCR_SW);
65
} else {
66
- *is_secure = !(env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & VTCR_NSW);
67
+ is_secure = !(env->cp15.vtcr_el2 & VTCR_NSW);
68
}
69
+ *is_secure_ptr = is_secure;
70
} else {
71
- assert(!*is_secure);
72
+ assert(!is_secure);
73
}
74
75
addr = s2.phys;
76
--
77
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 19/28] target/arm: Remove env argument from combined_attrs_fwb
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
This value is unused.
4
5
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
6
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
7
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-16-richard.henderson@linaro.org
8
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
9
---
10
target/arm/ptw.c | 5 ++---
11
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
12
13
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
14
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
15
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
16
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
17
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static uint8_t force_cacheattr_nibble_wb(uint8_t attr)
18
* s1 and s2 for the HCR_EL2.FWB == 1 case, returning the
19
* combined attributes in MAIR_EL1 format.
20
*/
21
-static uint8_t combined_attrs_fwb(CPUARMState *env,
22
- ARMCacheAttrs s1, ARMCacheAttrs s2)
23
+static uint8_t combined_attrs_fwb(ARMCacheAttrs s1, ARMCacheAttrs s2)
24
{
25
switch (s2.attrs) {
26
case 7:
27
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static ARMCacheAttrs combine_cacheattrs(CPUARMState *env,
28
29
/* Combine memory type and cacheability attributes */
30
if (arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_FWB) {
31
- ret.attrs = combined_attrs_fwb(env, s1, s2);
32
+ ret.attrs = combined_attrs_fwb(s1, s2);
33
} else {
34
ret.attrs = combined_attrs_nofwb(env, s1, s2);
35
}
36
--
37
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 20/28] target/arm: Pass HCR to attribute subroutines.
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
These subroutines did not need ENV for anything except
4
retrieving the effective value of HCR anyway.
5
6
We have computed the effective value of HCR in the callers,
7
and this will be especially important for interpreting HCR
8
in a non-current security state.
9
10
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
11
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
12
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-17-richard.henderson@linaro.org
13
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
14
---
15
target/arm/ptw.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++-------------
16
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
17
18
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
19
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
20
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
21
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
22
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
23
return (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_M) == 0;
24
}
25
26
-static bool ptw_attrs_are_device(CPUARMState *env, ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs)
27
+static bool ptw_attrs_are_device(uint64_t hcr, ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs)
28
{
29
/*
30
* For an S1 page table walk, the stage 1 attributes are always
31
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool ptw_attrs_are_device(CPUARMState *env, ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs)
32
* when cacheattrs.attrs bit [2] is 0.
33
*/
34
assert(cacheattrs.is_s2_format);
35
- if (arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_FWB) {
36
+ if (hcr & HCR_FWB) {
37
return (cacheattrs.attrs & 0x4) == 0;
38
} else {
39
return (cacheattrs.attrs & 0xc) == 0;
40
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
41
if (arm_mmu_idx_is_stage1_of_2(mmu_idx) &&
42
!regime_translation_disabled(env, s2_mmu_idx, is_secure)) {
43
GetPhysAddrResult s2 = {};
44
+ uint64_t hcr;
45
int ret;
46
47
ret = get_phys_addr_lpae(env, addr, MMU_DATA_LOAD, s2_mmu_idx,
48
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
49
fi->s1ns = !is_secure;
50
return ~0;
51
}
52
- if ((arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_PTW) &&
53
- ptw_attrs_are_device(env, s2.cacheattrs)) {
54
+
55
+ hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
56
+ if ((hcr & HCR_PTW) && ptw_attrs_are_device(hcr, s2.cacheattrs)) {
57
/*
58
* PTW set and S1 walk touched S2 Device memory:
59
* generate Permission fault.
60
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
61
* ref: shared/translation/attrs/S2AttrDecode()
62
* .../S2ConvertAttrsHints()
63
*/
64
-static uint8_t convert_stage2_attrs(CPUARMState *env, uint8_t s2attrs)
65
+static uint8_t convert_stage2_attrs(uint64_t hcr, uint8_t s2attrs)
66
{
67
uint8_t hiattr = extract32(s2attrs, 2, 2);
68
uint8_t loattr = extract32(s2attrs, 0, 2);
69
uint8_t hihint = 0, lohint = 0;
70
71
if (hiattr != 0) { /* normal memory */
72
- if (arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_CD) { /* cache disabled */
73
+ if (hcr & HCR_CD) { /* cache disabled */
74
hiattr = loattr = 1; /* non-cacheable */
75
} else {
76
if (hiattr != 1) { /* Write-through or write-back */
77
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static uint8_t combine_cacheattr_nibble(uint8_t s1, uint8_t s2)
78
* s1 and s2 for the HCR_EL2.FWB == 0 case, returning the
79
* combined attributes in MAIR_EL1 format.
80
*/
81
-static uint8_t combined_attrs_nofwb(CPUARMState *env,
82
+static uint8_t combined_attrs_nofwb(uint64_t hcr,
83
ARMCacheAttrs s1, ARMCacheAttrs s2)
84
{
85
uint8_t s1lo, s2lo, s1hi, s2hi, s2_mair_attrs, ret_attrs;
86
87
- s2_mair_attrs = convert_stage2_attrs(env, s2.attrs);
88
+ s2_mair_attrs = convert_stage2_attrs(hcr, s2.attrs);
89
90
s1lo = extract32(s1.attrs, 0, 4);
91
s2lo = extract32(s2_mair_attrs, 0, 4);
92
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static uint8_t combined_attrs_fwb(ARMCacheAttrs s1, ARMCacheAttrs s2)
93
* @s1: Attributes from stage 1 walk
94
* @s2: Attributes from stage 2 walk
95
*/
96
-static ARMCacheAttrs combine_cacheattrs(CPUARMState *env,
97
+static ARMCacheAttrs combine_cacheattrs(uint64_t hcr,
98
ARMCacheAttrs s1, ARMCacheAttrs s2)
99
{
100
ARMCacheAttrs ret;
101
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static ARMCacheAttrs combine_cacheattrs(CPUARMState *env,
102
}
103
104
/* Combine memory type and cacheability attributes */
105
- if (arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_FWB) {
106
+ if (hcr & HCR_FWB) {
107
ret.attrs = combined_attrs_fwb(s1, s2);
108
} else {
109
- ret.attrs = combined_attrs_nofwb(env, s1, s2);
110
+ ret.attrs = combined_attrs_nofwb(hcr, s1, s2);
111
}
112
113
/*
114
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
115
ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs1;
116
ARMMMUIdx s2_mmu_idx;
117
bool is_el0;
118
+ uint64_t hcr;
119
120
ret = get_phys_addr_with_secure(env, address, access_type,
121
s1_mmu_idx, is_secure, result, fi);
122
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
123
}
124
125
/* Combine the S1 and S2 cache attributes. */
126
- if (arm_hcr_el2_eff(env) & HCR_DC) {
127
+ hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
128
+ if (hcr & HCR_DC) {
129
/*
130
* HCR.DC forces the first stage attributes to
131
* Normal Non-Shareable,
132
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
133
}
134
cacheattrs1.shareability = 0;
135
}
136
- result->cacheattrs = combine_cacheattrs(env, cacheattrs1,
137
+ result->cacheattrs = combine_cacheattrs(hcr, cacheattrs1,
138
result->cacheattrs);
139
140
/*
141
--
142
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 21/28] target/arm: Fix ATS12NSO* from S PL1
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
Use arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate instead of arm_hcr_el2_eff, so
4
that we use is_secure instead of the current security state.
5
These AT* operations have been broken since arm_hcr_el2_eff
6
gained a check for "el2 enabled" for Secure EL2.
7
8
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
9
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
10
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-18-richard.henderson@linaro.org
11
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
12
---
13
target/arm/ptw.c | 8 ++++----
14
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
15
16
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
17
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
18
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
19
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
20
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool regime_translation_disabled(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
21
}
22
}
23
24
- hcr_el2 = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
25
+ hcr_el2 = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
26
27
switch (mmu_idx) {
28
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2:
29
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
30
return ~0;
31
}
32
33
- hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
34
+ hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
35
if ((hcr & HCR_PTW) && ptw_attrs_are_device(hcr, s2.cacheattrs)) {
36
/*
37
* PTW set and S1 walk touched S2 Device memory:
38
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
39
}
40
41
/* Combine the S1 and S2 cache attributes. */
42
- hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
43
+ hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
44
if (hcr & HCR_DC) {
45
/*
46
* HCR.DC forces the first stage attributes to
47
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
48
result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
49
50
/* Fill in cacheattr a-la AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off. */
51
- hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff(env);
52
+ hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
53
result->cacheattrs.shareability = 0;
54
result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false;
55
if (hcr & HCR_DC) {
56
--
57
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
[Qemu-devel] [PULL 03/10] hw/ssi/xilinx_spips: Avoid AXI writes to the LQSPI linear memory
[PULL 22/28] target/arm: Split out get_phys_addr_disabled
1
From: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
2
2
3
Lei Sun found while auditing the code that a CPU write would
3
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
4
trigger a NULL pointer dereference.
4
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
5
5
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-19-richard.henderson@linaro.org
6
>From UG1085 datasheet [*] AXI writes in this region are ignored
7
and generates an AXI Slave Error (SLVERR).
8
9
Fix by implementing the write_with_attrs() handler.
10
Return MEMTX_ERROR when the region is accessed (this error maps
11
to an AXI slave error).
12
13
[*] https://www.xilinx.com/support/documentation/user_guides/ug1085-zynq-ultrascale-trm.pdf
14
15
Reported-by: Lei Sun <slei.casper@gmail.com>
16
Reviewed-by: Francisco Iglesias <frasse.iglesias@gmail.com>
17
Tested-by: Francisco Iglesias <frasse.iglesias@gmail.com>
18
Signed-off-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daudé <philmd@redhat.com>
19
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
6
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
20
---
7
---
21
hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
8
target/arm/ptw.c | 138 +++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
22
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+)
9
1 file changed, 74 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
23
10
24
diff --git a/hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c b/hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c
11
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
25
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
12
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
26
--- a/hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c
13
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
27
+++ b/hw/ssi/xilinx_spips.c
14
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
28
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static MemTxResult lqspi_read(void *opaque, hwaddr addr, uint64_t *value,
15
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static ARMCacheAttrs combine_cacheattrs(uint64_t hcr,
29
return lqspi_read(opaque, addr, value, size, attrs);
16
return ret;
30
}
17
}
31
18
32
+static MemTxResult lqspi_write(void *opaque, hwaddr offset, uint64_t value,
19
+/*
33
+ unsigned size, MemTxAttrs attrs)
20
+ * MMU disabled. S1 addresses within aa64 translation regimes are
21
+ * still checked for bounds -- see AArch64.S1DisabledOutput().
22
+ */
23
+static bool get_phys_addr_disabled(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
24
+ MMUAccessType access_type,
25
+ ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool is_secure,
26
+ GetPhysAddrResult *result,
27
+ ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
34
+{
28
+{
35
+ /*
29
+ uint64_t hcr;
36
+ * From UG1085, Chapter 24 (Quad-SPI controllers):
30
+ uint8_t memattr;
37
+ * - Writes are ignored
38
+ * - AXI writes generate an external AXI slave error (SLVERR)
39
+ */
40
+ qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "%s Unexpected %u-bit access to 0x%" PRIx64
41
+ " (value: 0x%" PRIx64 "\n",
42
+ __func__, size << 3, offset, value);
43
+
31
+
44
+ return MEMTX_ERROR;
32
+ if (mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 && mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) {
33
+ int r_el = regime_el(env, mmu_idx);
34
+ if (arm_el_is_aa64(env, r_el)) {
35
+ int pamax = arm_pamax(env_archcpu(env));
36
+ uint64_t tcr = env->cp15.tcr_el[r_el];
37
+ int addrtop, tbi;
38
+
39
+ tbi = aa64_va_parameter_tbi(tcr, mmu_idx);
40
+ if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) {
41
+ tbi &= ~aa64_va_parameter_tbid(tcr, mmu_idx);
42
+ }
43
+ tbi = (tbi >> extract64(address, 55, 1)) & 1;
44
+ addrtop = (tbi ? 55 : 63);
45
+
46
+ if (extract64(address, pamax, addrtop - pamax + 1) != 0) {
47
+ fi->type = ARMFault_AddressSize;
48
+ fi->level = 0;
49
+ fi->stage2 = false;
50
+ return 1;
51
+ }
52
+
53
+ /*
54
+ * When TBI is disabled, we've just validated that all of the
55
+ * bits above PAMax are zero, so logically we only need to
56
+ * clear the top byte for TBI. But it's clearer to follow
57
+ * the pseudocode set of addrdesc.paddress.
58
+ */
59
+ address = extract64(address, 0, 52);
60
+ }
61
+ }
62
+
63
+ result->phys = address;
64
+ result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
65
+ result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
66
+
67
+ /* Fill in cacheattr a-la AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off. */
68
+ hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
69
+ result->cacheattrs.shareability = 0;
70
+ result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false;
71
+ if (hcr & HCR_DC) {
72
+ if (hcr & HCR_DCT) {
73
+ memattr = 0xf0; /* Tagged, Normal, WB, RWA */
74
+ } else {
75
+ memattr = 0xff; /* Normal, WB, RWA */
76
+ }
77
+ } else if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) {
78
+ if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_I) {
79
+ memattr = 0xee; /* Normal, WT, RA, NT */
80
+ } else {
81
+ memattr = 0x44; /* Normal, NC, No */
82
+ }
83
+ result->cacheattrs.shareability = 2; /* outer sharable */
84
+ } else {
85
+ memattr = 0x00; /* Device, nGnRnE */
86
+ }
87
+ result->cacheattrs.attrs = memattr;
88
+ return 0;
45
+}
89
+}
46
+
90
+
47
static const MemoryRegionOps lqspi_ops = {
91
bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
48
.read_with_attrs = lqspi_read,
92
MMUAccessType access_type, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
49
+ .write_with_attrs = lqspi_write,
93
bool is_secure, GetPhysAddrResult *result,
50
.endianness = DEVICE_NATIVE_ENDIAN,
94
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
51
.valid = {
95
/* Definitely a real MMU, not an MPU */
52
.min_access_size = 1,
96
97
if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, is_secure)) {
98
- uint64_t hcr;
99
- uint8_t memattr;
100
-
101
- /*
102
- * MMU disabled. S1 addresses within aa64 translation regimes are
103
- * still checked for bounds -- see AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off.
104
- */
105
- if (mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 && mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) {
106
- int r_el = regime_el(env, mmu_idx);
107
- if (arm_el_is_aa64(env, r_el)) {
108
- int pamax = arm_pamax(env_archcpu(env));
109
- uint64_t tcr = env->cp15.tcr_el[r_el];
110
- int addrtop, tbi;
111
-
112
- tbi = aa64_va_parameter_tbi(tcr, mmu_idx);
113
- if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) {
114
- tbi &= ~aa64_va_parameter_tbid(tcr, mmu_idx);
115
- }
116
- tbi = (tbi >> extract64(address, 55, 1)) & 1;
117
- addrtop = (tbi ? 55 : 63);
118
-
119
- if (extract64(address, pamax, addrtop - pamax + 1) != 0) {
120
- fi->type = ARMFault_AddressSize;
121
- fi->level = 0;
122
- fi->stage2 = false;
123
- return 1;
124
- }
125
-
126
- /*
127
- * When TBI is disabled, we've just validated that all of the
128
- * bits above PAMax are zero, so logically we only need to
129
- * clear the top byte for TBI. But it's clearer to follow
130
- * the pseudocode set of addrdesc.paddress.
131
- */
132
- address = extract64(address, 0, 52);
133
- }
134
- }
135
- result->phys = address;
136
- result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
137
- result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
138
-
139
- /* Fill in cacheattr a-la AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off. */
140
- hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
141
- result->cacheattrs.shareability = 0;
142
- result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false;
143
- if (hcr & HCR_DC) {
144
- if (hcr & HCR_DCT) {
145
- memattr = 0xf0; /* Tagged, Normal, WB, RWA */
146
- } else {
147
- memattr = 0xff; /* Normal, WB, RWA */
148
- }
149
- } else if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) {
150
- if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_I) {
151
- memattr = 0xee; /* Normal, WT, RA, NT */
152
- } else {
153
- memattr = 0x44; /* Normal, NC, No */
154
- }
155
- result->cacheattrs.shareability = 2; /* outer sharable */
156
- } else {
157
- memattr = 0x00; /* Device, nGnRnE */
158
- }
159
- result->cacheattrs.attrs = memattr;
160
- return 0;
161
+ return get_phys_addr_disabled(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
162
+ is_secure, result, fi);
163
}
164
-
165
if (regime_using_lpae_format(env, mmu_idx)) {
166
return get_phys_addr_lpae(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx,
167
is_secure, false, result, fi);
53
--
168
--
54
2.20.1
169
2.25.1
55
56
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 23/28] target/arm: Fix cacheattr in get_phys_addr_disabled
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
Do not apply memattr or shareability for Stage2 translations.
4
Make sure to apply HCR_{DC,DCT} only to Regime_EL10, per the
5
pseudocode in AArch64.S1DisabledOutput.
6
7
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
8
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
9
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-20-richard.henderson@linaro.org
10
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
11
---
12
target/arm/ptw.c | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------------
13
1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
14
15
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
16
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
17
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
18
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
19
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_disabled(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
20
GetPhysAddrResult *result,
21
ARMMMUFaultInfo *fi)
22
{
23
- uint64_t hcr;
24
- uint8_t memattr;
25
+ uint8_t memattr = 0x00; /* Device nGnRnE */
26
+ uint8_t shareability = 0; /* non-sharable */
27
28
if (mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 && mmu_idx != ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) {
29
int r_el = regime_el(env, mmu_idx);
30
+
31
if (arm_el_is_aa64(env, r_el)) {
32
int pamax = arm_pamax(env_archcpu(env));
33
uint64_t tcr = env->cp15.tcr_el[r_el];
34
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_disabled(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
35
*/
36
address = extract64(address, 0, 52);
37
}
38
+
39
+ /* Fill in cacheattr a-la AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off. */
40
+ if (r_el == 1) {
41
+ uint64_t hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
42
+ if (hcr & HCR_DC) {
43
+ if (hcr & HCR_DCT) {
44
+ memattr = 0xf0; /* Tagged, Normal, WB, RWA */
45
+ } else {
46
+ memattr = 0xff; /* Normal, WB, RWA */
47
+ }
48
+ }
49
+ }
50
+ if (memattr == 0 && access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) {
51
+ if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_I) {
52
+ memattr = 0xee; /* Normal, WT, RA, NT */
53
+ } else {
54
+ memattr = 0x44; /* Normal, NC, No */
55
+ }
56
+ shareability = 2; /* outer sharable */
57
+ }
58
+ result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false;
59
}
60
61
result->phys = address;
62
result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
63
result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
64
-
65
- /* Fill in cacheattr a-la AArch64.TranslateAddressS1Off. */
66
- hcr = arm_hcr_el2_eff_secstate(env, is_secure);
67
- result->cacheattrs.shareability = 0;
68
- result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false;
69
- if (hcr & HCR_DC) {
70
- if (hcr & HCR_DCT) {
71
- memattr = 0xf0; /* Tagged, Normal, WB, RWA */
72
- } else {
73
- memattr = 0xff; /* Normal, WB, RWA */
74
- }
75
- } else if (access_type == MMU_INST_FETCH) {
76
- if (regime_sctlr(env, mmu_idx) & SCTLR_I) {
77
- memattr = 0xee; /* Normal, WT, RA, NT */
78
- } else {
79
- memattr = 0x44; /* Normal, NC, No */
80
- }
81
- result->cacheattrs.shareability = 2; /* outer sharable */
82
- } else {
83
- memattr = 0x00; /* Device, nGnRnE */
84
- }
85
+ result->cacheattrs.shareability = shareability;
86
result->cacheattrs.attrs = memattr;
87
return 0;
88
}
89
--
90
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 24/28] target/arm: Use tlb_set_page_full
1
From: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
1
2
3
Adjust GetPhysAddrResult to fill in CPUTLBEntryFull,
4
so that it may be passed directly to tlb_set_page_full.
5
6
The change is large, but mostly mechanical. The major
7
non-mechanical change is page_size -> lg_page_size.
8
Most of the time this is obvious, and is related to
9
TARGET_PAGE_BITS.
10
11
Signed-off-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
12
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
13
Message-id: 20221001162318.153420-21-richard.henderson@linaro.org
14
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
15
---
16
target/arm/internals.h | 5 +-
17
target/arm/helper.c | 12 +--
18
target/arm/m_helper.c | 20 ++---
19
target/arm/ptw.c | 179 ++++++++++++++++++++--------------------
20
target/arm/tlb_helper.c | 9 +-
21
5 files changed, 111 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-)
22
23
diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h
24
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
25
--- a/target/arm/internals.h
26
+++ b/target/arm/internals.h
27
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ typedef struct ARMCacheAttrs {
28
29
/* Fields that are valid upon success. */
30
typedef struct GetPhysAddrResult {
31
- hwaddr phys;
32
- target_ulong page_size;
33
- int prot;
34
- MemTxAttrs attrs;
35
+ CPUTLBEntryFull f;
36
ARMCacheAttrs cacheattrs;
37
} GetPhysAddrResult;
38
39
diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c
40
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
41
--- a/target/arm/helper.c
42
+++ b/target/arm/helper.c
43
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static uint64_t do_ats_write(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t value,
44
/* Create a 64-bit PAR */
45
par64 = (1 << 11); /* LPAE bit always set */
46
if (!ret) {
47
- par64 |= res.phys & ~0xfffULL;
48
- if (!res.attrs.secure) {
49
+ par64 |= res.f.phys_addr & ~0xfffULL;
50
+ if (!res.f.attrs.secure) {
51
par64 |= (1 << 9); /* NS */
52
}
53
par64 |= (uint64_t)res.cacheattrs.attrs << 56; /* ATTR */
54
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static uint64_t do_ats_write(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t value,
55
*/
56
if (!ret) {
57
/* We do not set any attribute bits in the PAR */
58
- if (res.page_size == (1 << 24)
59
+ if (res.f.lg_page_size == 24
60
&& arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V7)) {
61
- par64 = (res.phys & 0xff000000) | (1 << 1);
62
+ par64 = (res.f.phys_addr & 0xff000000) | (1 << 1);
63
} else {
64
- par64 = res.phys & 0xfffff000;
65
+ par64 = res.f.phys_addr & 0xfffff000;
66
}
67
- if (!res.attrs.secure) {
68
+ if (!res.f.attrs.secure) {
69
par64 |= (1 << 9); /* NS */
70
}
71
} else {
72
diff --git a/target/arm/m_helper.c b/target/arm/m_helper.c
73
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
74
--- a/target/arm/m_helper.c
75
+++ b/target/arm/m_helper.c
76
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool v7m_stack_write(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t addr, uint32_t value,
77
}
78
goto pend_fault;
79
}
80
- address_space_stl_le(arm_addressspace(cs, res.attrs), res.phys, value,
81
- res.attrs, &txres);
82
+ address_space_stl_le(arm_addressspace(cs, res.f.attrs), res.f.phys_addr,
83
+ value, res.f.attrs, &txres);
84
if (txres != MEMTX_OK) {
85
/* BusFault trying to write the data */
86
if (mode == STACK_LAZYFP) {
87
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool v7m_stack_read(ARMCPU *cpu, uint32_t *dest, uint32_t addr,
88
goto pend_fault;
89
}
90
91
- value = address_space_ldl(arm_addressspace(cs, res.attrs), res.phys,
92
- res.attrs, &txres);
93
+ value = address_space_ldl(arm_addressspace(cs, res.f.attrs),
94
+ res.f.phys_addr, res.f.attrs, &txres);
95
if (txres != MEMTX_OK) {
96
/* BusFault trying to read the data */
97
qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...BusFault with BFSR.UNSTKERR\n");
98
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool v7m_read_half_insn(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool secure,
99
qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT, "...really MemManage with CFSR.IACCVIOL\n");
100
return false;
101
}
102
- *insn = address_space_lduw_le(arm_addressspace(cs, res.attrs), res.phys,
103
- res.attrs, &txres);
104
+ *insn = address_space_lduw_le(arm_addressspace(cs, res.f.attrs),
105
+ res.f.phys_addr, res.f.attrs, &txres);
106
if (txres != MEMTX_OK) {
107
env->v7m.cfsr[M_REG_NS] |= R_V7M_CFSR_IBUSERR_MASK;
108
armv7m_nvic_set_pending(env->nvic, ARMV7M_EXCP_BUS, false);
109
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool v7m_read_sg_stack_word(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
110
}
111
return false;
112
}
113
- value = address_space_ldl(arm_addressspace(cs, res.attrs), res.phys,
114
- res.attrs, &txres);
115
+ value = address_space_ldl(arm_addressspace(cs, res.f.attrs),
116
+ res.f.phys_addr, res.f.attrs, &txres);
117
if (txres != MEMTX_OK) {
118
/* BusFault trying to read the data */
119
qemu_log_mask(CPU_LOG_INT,
120
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ uint32_t HELPER(v7m_tt)(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t addr, uint32_t op)
121
} else {
122
mrvalid = true;
123
}
124
- r = res.prot & PAGE_READ;
125
- rw = res.prot & PAGE_WRITE;
126
+ r = res.f.prot & PAGE_READ;
127
+ rw = res.f.prot & PAGE_WRITE;
128
} else {
129
r = false;
130
rw = false;
131
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
132
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
133
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
134
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
135
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static hwaddr S1_ptw_translate(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
136
assert(!is_secure);
137
}
138
139
- addr = s2.phys;
140
+ addr = s2.f.phys_addr;
141
}
142
return addr;
143
}
144
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
145
/* 1Mb section. */
146
phys_addr = (desc & 0xfff00000) | (address & 0x000fffff);
147
ap = (desc >> 10) & 3;
148
- result->page_size = 1024 * 1024;
149
+ result->f.lg_page_size = 20; /* 1MB */
150
} else {
151
/* Lookup l2 entry. */
152
if (type == 1) {
153
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
154
case 1: /* 64k page. */
155
phys_addr = (desc & 0xffff0000) | (address & 0xffff);
156
ap = (desc >> (4 + ((address >> 13) & 6))) & 3;
157
- result->page_size = 0x10000;
158
+ result->f.lg_page_size = 16;
159
break;
160
case 2: /* 4k page. */
161
phys_addr = (desc & 0xfffff000) | (address & 0xfff);
162
ap = (desc >> (4 + ((address >> 9) & 6))) & 3;
163
- result->page_size = 0x1000;
164
+ result->f.lg_page_size = 12;
165
break;
166
case 3: /* 1k page, or ARMv6/XScale "extended small (4k) page" */
167
if (type == 1) {
168
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
169
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_XSCALE)
170
|| arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V6)) {
171
phys_addr = (desc & 0xfffff000) | (address & 0xfff);
172
- result->page_size = 0x1000;
173
+ result->f.lg_page_size = 12;
174
} else {
175
/*
176
* UNPREDICTABLE in ARMv5; we choose to take a
177
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
178
}
179
} else {
180
phys_addr = (desc & 0xfffffc00) | (address & 0x3ff);
181
- result->page_size = 0x400;
182
+ result->f.lg_page_size = 10;
183
}
184
ap = (desc >> 4) & 3;
185
break;
186
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
187
g_assert_not_reached();
188
}
189
}
190
- result->prot = ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap, domain_prot);
191
- result->prot |= result->prot ? PAGE_EXEC : 0;
192
- if (!(result->prot & (1 << access_type))) {
193
+ result->f.prot = ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap, domain_prot);
194
+ result->f.prot |= result->f.prot ? PAGE_EXEC : 0;
195
+ if (!(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type))) {
196
/* Access permission fault. */
197
fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
198
goto do_fault;
199
}
200
- result->phys = phys_addr;
201
+ result->f.phys_addr = phys_addr;
202
return false;
203
do_fault:
204
fi->domain = domain;
205
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v6(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
206
phys_addr = (desc & 0xff000000) | (address & 0x00ffffff);
207
phys_addr |= (uint64_t)extract32(desc, 20, 4) << 32;
208
phys_addr |= (uint64_t)extract32(desc, 5, 4) << 36;
209
- result->page_size = 0x1000000;
210
+ result->f.lg_page_size = 24; /* 16MB */
211
} else {
212
/* Section. */
213
phys_addr = (desc & 0xfff00000) | (address & 0x000fffff);
214
- result->page_size = 0x100000;
215
+ result->f.lg_page_size = 20; /* 1MB */
216
}
217
ap = ((desc >> 10) & 3) | ((desc >> 13) & 4);
218
xn = desc & (1 << 4);
219
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v6(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
220
case 1: /* 64k page. */
221
phys_addr = (desc & 0xffff0000) | (address & 0xffff);
222
xn = desc & (1 << 15);
223
- result->page_size = 0x10000;
224
+ result->f.lg_page_size = 16;
225
break;
226
case 2: case 3: /* 4k page. */
227
phys_addr = (desc & 0xfffff000) | (address & 0xfff);
228
xn = desc & 1;
229
- result->page_size = 0x1000;
230
+ result->f.lg_page_size = 12;
231
break;
232
default:
233
/* Never happens, but compiler isn't smart enough to tell. */
234
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v6(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
235
}
236
}
237
if (domain_prot == 3) {
238
- result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
239
+ result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
240
} else {
241
if (pxn && !regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx)) {
242
xn = 1;
243
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v6(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
244
fi->type = ARMFault_AccessFlag;
245
goto do_fault;
246
}
247
- result->prot = simple_ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap >> 1);
248
+ result->f.prot = simple_ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap >> 1);
249
} else {
250
- result->prot = ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap, domain_prot);
251
+ result->f.prot = ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap, domain_prot);
252
}
253
- if (result->prot && !xn) {
254
- result->prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
255
+ if (result->f.prot && !xn) {
256
+ result->f.prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
257
}
258
- if (!(result->prot & (1 << access_type))) {
259
+ if (!(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type))) {
260
/* Access permission fault. */
261
fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
262
goto do_fault;
263
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_v6(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
264
* the CPU doesn't support TZ or this is a non-secure translation
265
* regime, because the attribute will already be non-secure.
266
*/
267
- result->attrs.secure = false;
268
+ result->f.attrs.secure = false;
269
}
270
- result->phys = phys_addr;
271
+ result->f.phys_addr = phys_addr;
272
return false;
273
do_fault:
274
fi->domain = domain;
275
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address,
276
if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) {
277
ns = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2;
278
xn = extract32(attrs, 11, 2);
279
- result->prot = get_S2prot(env, ap, xn, s1_is_el0);
280
+ result->f.prot = get_S2prot(env, ap, xn, s1_is_el0);
281
} else {
282
ns = extract32(attrs, 3, 1);
283
xn = extract32(attrs, 12, 1);
284
pxn = extract32(attrs, 11, 1);
285
- result->prot = get_S1prot(env, mmu_idx, aarch64, ap, ns, xn, pxn);
286
+ result->f.prot = get_S1prot(env, mmu_idx, aarch64, ap, ns, xn, pxn);
287
}
288
289
fault_type = ARMFault_Permission;
290
- if (!(result->prot & (1 << access_type))) {
291
+ if (!(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type))) {
292
goto do_fault;
293
}
294
295
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address,
296
* the CPU doesn't support TZ or this is a non-secure translation
297
* regime, because the attribute will already be non-secure.
298
*/
299
- result->attrs.secure = false;
300
+ result->f.attrs.secure = false;
301
}
302
/* When in aarch64 mode, and BTI is enabled, remember GP in the IOTLB. */
303
if (aarch64 && guarded && cpu_isar_feature(aa64_bti, cpu)) {
304
- arm_tlb_bti_gp(&result->attrs) = true;
305
+ arm_tlb_bti_gp(&result->f.attrs) = true;
306
}
307
308
if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) {
309
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address,
310
result->cacheattrs.shareability = extract32(attrs, 6, 2);
311
}
312
313
- result->phys = descaddr;
314
- result->page_size = page_size;
315
+ result->f.phys_addr = descaddr;
316
+ result->f.lg_page_size = ctz64(page_size);
317
return false;
318
319
do_fault:
320
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
321
322
if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, is_secure)) {
323
/* MPU disabled. */
324
- result->phys = address;
325
- result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
326
+ result->f.phys_addr = address;
327
+ result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
328
return false;
329
}
330
331
- result->phys = address;
332
+ result->f.phys_addr = address;
333
for (n = 7; n >= 0; n--) {
334
base = env->cp15.c6_region[n];
335
if ((base & 1) == 0) {
336
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
337
fi->level = 1;
338
return true;
339
}
340
- result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
341
+ result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
342
break;
343
case 2:
344
- result->prot = PAGE_READ;
345
+ result->f.prot = PAGE_READ;
346
if (!is_user) {
347
- result->prot |= PAGE_WRITE;
348
+ result->f.prot |= PAGE_WRITE;
349
}
350
break;
351
case 3:
352
- result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
353
+ result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
354
break;
355
case 5:
356
if (is_user) {
357
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
358
fi->level = 1;
359
return true;
360
}
361
- result->prot = PAGE_READ;
362
+ result->f.prot = PAGE_READ;
363
break;
364
case 6:
365
- result->prot = PAGE_READ;
366
+ result->f.prot = PAGE_READ;
367
break;
368
default:
369
/* Bad permission. */
370
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav5(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
371
fi->level = 1;
372
return true;
373
}
374
- result->prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
375
+ result->f.prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
376
return false;
377
}
378
379
static void get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx,
380
- int32_t address, int *prot)
381
+ int32_t address, uint8_t *prot)
382
{
383
if (!arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
384
*prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE;
385
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
386
int n;
387
bool is_user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx);
388
389
- result->phys = address;
390
- result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
391
- result->prot = 0;
392
+ result->f.phys_addr = address;
393
+ result->f.lg_page_size = TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
394
+ result->f.prot = 0;
395
396
if (regime_translation_disabled(env, mmu_idx, secure) ||
397
m_is_ppb_region(env, address)) {
398
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
399
* which always does a direct read using address_space_ldl(), rather
400
* than going via this function, so we don't need to check that here.
401
*/
402
- get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address, &result->prot);
403
+ get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address, &result->f.prot);
404
} else { /* MPU enabled */
405
for (n = (int)cpu->pmsav7_dregion - 1; n >= 0; n--) {
406
/* region search */
407
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
408
if (ranges_overlap(base, rmask,
409
address & TARGET_PAGE_MASK,
410
TARGET_PAGE_SIZE)) {
411
- result->page_size = 1;
412
+ result->f.lg_page_size = 0;
413
}
414
continue;
415
}
416
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
417
continue;
418
}
419
if (rsize < TARGET_PAGE_BITS) {
420
- result->page_size = 1 << rsize;
421
+ result->f.lg_page_size = rsize;
422
}
423
break;
424
}
425
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
426
fi->type = ARMFault_Background;
427
return true;
428
}
429
- get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address, &result->prot);
430
+ get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address,
431
+ &result->f.prot);
432
} else { /* a MPU hit! */
433
uint32_t ap = extract32(env->pmsav7.dracr[n], 8, 3);
434
uint32_t xn = extract32(env->pmsav7.dracr[n], 12, 1);
435
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
436
case 5:
437
break; /* no access */
438
case 3:
439
- result->prot |= PAGE_WRITE;
440
+ result->f.prot |= PAGE_WRITE;
441
/* fall through */
442
case 2:
443
case 6:
444
- result->prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC;
445
+ result->f.prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC;
446
break;
447
case 7:
448
/* for v7M, same as 6; for R profile a reserved value */
449
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
450
- result->prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC;
451
+ result->f.prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC;
452
break;
453
}
454
/* fall through */
455
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
456
case 1:
457
case 2:
458
case 3:
459
- result->prot |= PAGE_WRITE;
460
+ result->f.prot |= PAGE_WRITE;
461
/* fall through */
462
case 5:
463
case 6:
464
- result->prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC;
465
+ result->f.prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC;
466
break;
467
case 7:
468
/* for v7M, same as 6; for R profile a reserved value */
469
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_M)) {
470
- result->prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC;
471
+ result->f.prot |= PAGE_READ | PAGE_EXEC;
472
break;
473
}
474
/* fall through */
475
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav7(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
476
477
/* execute never */
478
if (xn) {
479
- result->prot &= ~PAGE_EXEC;
480
+ result->f.prot &= ~PAGE_EXEC;
481
}
482
}
483
}
484
485
fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
486
fi->level = 1;
487
- return !(result->prot & (1 << access_type));
488
+ return !(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type));
489
}
490
491
bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
492
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
493
uint32_t addr_page_base = address & TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
494
uint32_t addr_page_limit = addr_page_base + (TARGET_PAGE_SIZE - 1);
495
496
- result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
497
- result->phys = address;
498
- result->prot = 0;
499
+ result->f.lg_page_size = TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
500
+ result->f.phys_addr = address;
501
+ result->f.prot = 0;
502
if (mregion) {
503
*mregion = -1;
504
}
505
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
506
ranges_overlap(base, limit - base + 1,
507
addr_page_base,
508
TARGET_PAGE_SIZE)) {
509
- result->page_size = 1;
510
+ result->f.lg_page_size = 0;
511
}
512
continue;
513
}
514
515
if (base > addr_page_base || limit < addr_page_limit) {
516
- result->page_size = 1;
517
+ result->f.lg_page_size = 0;
518
}
519
520
if (matchregion != -1) {
521
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
522
523
if (matchregion == -1) {
524
/* hit using the background region */
525
- get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address, &result->prot);
526
+ get_phys_addr_pmsav7_default(env, mmu_idx, address, &result->f.prot);
527
} else {
528
uint32_t ap = extract32(env->pmsav8.rbar[secure][matchregion], 1, 2);
529
uint32_t xn = extract32(env->pmsav8.rbar[secure][matchregion], 0, 1);
530
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
531
xn = 1;
532
}
533
534
- result->prot = simple_ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap);
535
- if (result->prot && !xn && !(pxn && !is_user)) {
536
- result->prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
537
+ result->f.prot = simple_ap_to_rw_prot(env, mmu_idx, ap);
538
+ if (result->f.prot && !xn && !(pxn && !is_user)) {
539
+ result->f.prot |= PAGE_EXEC;
540
}
541
/*
542
* We don't need to look the attribute up in the MAIR0/MAIR1
543
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool pmsav8_mpu_lookup(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
544
545
fi->type = ARMFault_Permission;
546
fi->level = 1;
547
- return !(result->prot & (1 << access_type));
548
+ return !(result->f.prot & (1 << access_type));
549
}
550
551
static bool v8m_is_sau_exempt(CPUARMState *env,
552
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
553
} else {
554
fi->type = ARMFault_QEMU_SFault;
555
}
556
- result->page_size = sattrs.subpage ? 1 : TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
557
- result->phys = address;
558
- result->prot = 0;
559
+ result->f.lg_page_size = sattrs.subpage ? 0 : TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
560
+ result->f.phys_addr = address;
561
+ result->f.prot = 0;
562
return true;
563
}
564
} else {
565
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
566
* might downgrade a secure access to nonsecure.
567
*/
568
if (sattrs.ns) {
569
- result->attrs.secure = false;
570
+ result->f.attrs.secure = false;
571
} else if (!secure) {
572
/*
573
* NS access to S memory must fault.
574
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
575
* for M_FAKE_FSR_SFAULT in arm_v7m_cpu_do_interrupt().
576
*/
577
fi->type = ARMFault_QEMU_SFault;
578
- result->page_size = sattrs.subpage ? 1 : TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
579
- result->phys = address;
580
- result->prot = 0;
581
+ result->f.lg_page_size = sattrs.subpage ? 0 : TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
582
+ result->f.phys_addr = address;
583
+ result->f.prot = 0;
584
return true;
585
}
586
}
587
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_pmsav8(CPUARMState *env, uint32_t address,
588
ret = pmsav8_mpu_lookup(env, address, access_type, mmu_idx, secure,
589
result, fi, NULL);
590
if (sattrs.subpage) {
591
- result->page_size = 1;
592
+ result->f.lg_page_size = 0;
593
}
594
return ret;
595
}
596
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_disabled(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
597
result->cacheattrs.is_s2_format = false;
598
}
599
600
- result->phys = address;
601
- result->prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
602
- result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
603
+ result->f.phys_addr = address;
604
+ result->f.prot = PAGE_READ | PAGE_WRITE | PAGE_EXEC;
605
+ result->f.lg_page_size = TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
606
result->cacheattrs.shareability = shareability;
607
result->cacheattrs.attrs = memattr;
608
return 0;
609
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
610
return ret;
611
}
612
613
- ipa = result->phys;
614
- ipa_secure = result->attrs.secure;
615
+ ipa = result->f.phys_addr;
616
+ ipa_secure = result->f.attrs.secure;
617
if (is_secure) {
618
/* Select TCR based on the NS bit from the S1 walk. */
619
s2walk_secure = !(ipa_secure
620
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
621
* Save the stage1 results so that we may merge
622
* prot and cacheattrs later.
623
*/
624
- s1_prot = result->prot;
625
+ s1_prot = result->f.prot;
626
cacheattrs1 = result->cacheattrs;
627
memset(result, 0, sizeof(*result));
628
629
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
630
fi->s2addr = ipa;
631
632
/* Combine the S1 and S2 perms. */
633
- result->prot &= s1_prot;
634
+ result->f.prot &= s1_prot;
635
636
/* If S2 fails, return early. */
637
if (ret) {
638
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
639
* Check if IPA translates to secure or non-secure PA space.
640
* Note that VSTCR overrides VTCR and {N}SW overrides {N}SA.
641
*/
642
- result->attrs.secure =
643
+ result->f.attrs.secure =
644
(is_secure
645
&& !(env->cp15.vstcr_el2 & (VSTCR_SA | VSTCR_SW))
646
&& (ipa_secure
647
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
648
* cannot upgrade an non-secure translation regime's attributes
649
* to secure.
650
*/
651
- result->attrs.secure = is_secure;
652
- result->attrs.user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx);
653
+ result->f.attrs.secure = is_secure;
654
+ result->f.attrs.user = regime_is_user(env, mmu_idx);
655
656
/*
657
* Fast Context Switch Extension. This doesn't exist at all in v8.
658
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
659
660
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_PMSA)) {
661
bool ret;
662
- result->page_size = TARGET_PAGE_SIZE;
663
+ result->f.lg_page_size = TARGET_PAGE_BITS;
664
665
if (arm_feature(env, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) {
666
/* PMSAv8 */
667
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool get_phys_addr_with_secure(CPUARMState *env, target_ulong address,
668
(access_type == MMU_DATA_STORE ? "writing" : "execute"),
669
(uint32_t)address, mmu_idx,
670
ret ? "Miss" : "Hit",
671
- result->prot & PAGE_READ ? 'r' : '-',
672
- result->prot & PAGE_WRITE ? 'w' : '-',
673
- result->prot & PAGE_EXEC ? 'x' : '-');
674
+ result->f.prot & PAGE_READ ? 'r' : '-',
675
+ result->f.prot & PAGE_WRITE ? 'w' : '-',
676
+ result->f.prot & PAGE_EXEC ? 'x' : '-');
677
678
return ret;
679
}
680
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ hwaddr arm_cpu_get_phys_page_attrs_debug(CPUState *cs, vaddr addr,
681
bool ret;
682
683
ret = get_phys_addr(env, addr, MMU_DATA_LOAD, mmu_idx, &res, &fi);
684
- *attrs = res.attrs;
685
+ *attrs = res.f.attrs;
686
687
if (ret) {
688
return -1;
689
}
690
- return res.phys;
691
+ return res.f.phys_addr;
692
}
693
diff --git a/target/arm/tlb_helper.c b/target/arm/tlb_helper.c
694
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
695
--- a/target/arm/tlb_helper.c
696
+++ b/target/arm/tlb_helper.c
697
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ bool arm_cpu_tlb_fill(CPUState *cs, vaddr address, int size,
698
* target page size are handled specially, so for those we
699
* pass in the exact addresses.
700
*/
701
- if (res.page_size >= TARGET_PAGE_SIZE) {
702
- res.phys &= TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
703
+ if (res.f.lg_page_size >= TARGET_PAGE_BITS) {
704
+ res.f.phys_addr &= TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
705
address &= TARGET_PAGE_MASK;
706
}
707
/* Notice and record tagged memory. */
708
if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_mte, cpu) && res.cacheattrs.attrs == 0xf0) {
709
- arm_tlb_mte_tagged(&res.attrs) = true;
710
+ arm_tlb_mte_tagged(&res.f.attrs) = true;
711
}
712
713
- tlb_set_page_with_attrs(cs, address, res.phys, res.attrs,
714
- res.prot, mmu_idx, res.page_size);
715
+ tlb_set_page_full(cs, mmu_idx, address, &res.f);
716
return true;
717
} else if (probe) {
718
return false;
719
--
720
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
[Qemu-devel] [PULL 01/10] target/arm: report ARMv8-A FP support for AArch32 -cpu max
[PULL 25/28] hw/arm/boot: set CPTR_EL3.ESM and SCR_EL3.EnTP2 when booting Linux with EL3
1
From: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
1
From: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org>
2
2
3
When we converted to using feature bits in 602f6e42cfbf we missed out
3
According to the Linux kernel booting.rst [1], CPTR_EL3.ESM and
4
the fact (dp && arm_dc_feature(s, ARM_FEATURE_V8)) was supported for
4
SCR_EL3.EnTP2 must be initialized to 1 when EL3 is present and FEAT_SME
5
-cpu max configurations. This caused a regression in the GCC test
5
is advertised. This has to be taken care of when QEMU boots directly
6
suite. Fix this by setting the appropriate bits in mvfr1.FPHP to
6
into the kernel (i.e., "-M virt,secure=on -cpu max -kernel Image").
7
report ARMv8-A with FP support (but not ARMv8.2-FP16).
8
7
9
Fixes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1836078
8
Cc: qemu-stable@nongnu.org
10
Signed-off-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
9
Fixes: 78cb9776662a ("target/arm: Enable SME for -cpu max")
11
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
10
Link: [1] https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/Documentation/arm64/booting.rst?h=v6.0#n321
12
Message-id: 20190711103737.10017-1-alex.bennee@linaro.org
11
Signed-off-by: Jerome Forissier <jerome.forissier@linaro.org>
12
Message-id: 20221003145641.1921467-1-jerome.forissier@linaro.org
13
Reviewed-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
13
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
14
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
14
---
15
---
15
target/arm/cpu.c | 4 ++++
16
hw/arm/boot.c | 4 ++++
16
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
17
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
17
18
18
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.c b/target/arm/cpu.c
19
diff --git a/hw/arm/boot.c b/hw/arm/boot.c
19
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
20
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
20
--- a/target/arm/cpu.c
21
--- a/hw/arm/boot.c
21
+++ b/target/arm/cpu.c
22
+++ b/hw/arm/boot.c
22
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void arm_max_initfn(Object *obj)
23
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void do_cpu_reset(void *opaque)
23
t = FIELD_DP32(t, ID_ISAR6, SPECRES, 1);
24
if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_sve, cpu)) {
24
cpu->isar.id_isar6 = t;
25
env->cp15.cptr_el[3] |= R_CPTR_EL3_EZ_MASK;
25
26
}
26
+ t = cpu->isar.mvfr1;
27
+ if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_sme, cpu)) {
27
+ t = FIELD_DP32(t, MVFR1, FPHP, 2); /* v8.0 FP support */
28
+ env->cp15.cptr_el[3] |= R_CPTR_EL3_ESM_MASK;
28
+ cpu->isar.mvfr1 = t;
29
+ env->cp15.scr_el3 |= SCR_ENTP2;
29
+
30
+ }
30
t = cpu->isar.mvfr2;
31
/* AArch64 kernels never boot in secure mode */
31
t = FIELD_DP32(t, MVFR2, SIMDMISC, 3); /* SIMD MaxNum */
32
assert(!info->secure_boot);
32
t = FIELD_DP32(t, MVFR2, FPMISC, 4); /* FP MaxNum */
33
/* This hook is only supported for AArch32 currently:
33
--
34
--
34
2.20.1
35
2.25.1
35
36
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 26/28] target/arm: Don't allow guest to use unimplemented granule sizes
1
1
Arm CPUs support some subset of the granule (page) sizes 4K, 16K and
2
64K. The guest selects the one it wants using bits in the TCR_ELx
3
registers. If it tries to program these registers with a value that
4
is either reserved or which requests a size that the CPU does not
5
implement, the architecture requires that the CPU behaves as if the
6
field was programmed to some size that has been implemented.
7
Currently we don't implement this, and instead let the guest use any
8
granule size, even if the CPU ID register fields say it isn't
9
present.
10
11
Make aa64_va_parameters() check against the supported granule size
12
and force use of a different one if it is not implemented.
13
14
(A subsequent commit will make ARMVAParameters use the new enum
15
rather than the current pair of using16k/using64k bools.)
16
17
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
18
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
19
Message-id: 20221003162315.2833797-2-peter.maydell@linaro.org
20
---
21
target/arm/cpu.h | 33 +++++++++++++
22
target/arm/internals.h | 9 ++++
23
target/arm/helper.c | 102 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
24
3 files changed, 136 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
25
26
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.h b/target/arm/cpu.h
27
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
28
--- a/target/arm/cpu.h
29
+++ b/target/arm/cpu.h
30
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran16_2_lpa2(const ARMISARegisters *id)
31
return t >= 3 || (t == 0 && isar_feature_aa64_tgran16_lpa2(id));
32
}
33
34
+static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran4(const ARMISARegisters *id)
35
+{
36
+ return FIELD_SEX64(id->id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, TGRAN4) >= 0;
37
+}
38
+
39
+static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran16(const ARMISARegisters *id)
40
+{
41
+ return FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, TGRAN16) >= 1;
42
+}
43
+
44
+static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran64(const ARMISARegisters *id)
45
+{
46
+ return FIELD_SEX64(id->id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, TGRAN64) >= 0;
47
+}
48
+
49
+static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran4_2(const ARMISARegisters *id)
50
+{
51
+ unsigned t = FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, TGRAN4_2);
52
+ return t >= 2 || (t == 0 && isar_feature_aa64_tgran4(id));
53
+}
54
+
55
+static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran16_2(const ARMISARegisters *id)
56
+{
57
+ unsigned t = FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, TGRAN16_2);
58
+ return t >= 2 || (t == 0 && isar_feature_aa64_tgran16(id));
59
+}
60
+
61
+static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_tgran64_2(const ARMISARegisters *id)
62
+{
63
+ unsigned t = FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr0, ID_AA64MMFR0, TGRAN64_2);
64
+ return t >= 2 || (t == 0 && isar_feature_aa64_tgran64(id));
65
+}
66
+
67
static inline bool isar_feature_aa64_ccidx(const ARMISARegisters *id)
68
{
69
return FIELD_EX64(id->id_aa64mmfr2, ID_AA64MMFR2, CCIDX) != 0;
70
diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h
71
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
72
--- a/target/arm/internals.h
73
+++ b/target/arm/internals.h
74
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static inline uint32_t aarch64_pstate_valid_mask(const ARMISARegisters *id)
75
return valid;
76
}
77
78
+/* Granule size (i.e. page size) */
79
+typedef enum ARMGranuleSize {
80
+ /* Same order as TG0 encoding */
81
+ Gran4K,
82
+ Gran64K,
83
+ Gran16K,
84
+ GranInvalid,
85
+} ARMGranuleSize;
86
+
87
/*
88
* Parameters of a given virtual address, as extracted from the
89
* translation control register (TCR) for a given regime.
90
diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c
91
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
92
--- a/target/arm/helper.c
93
+++ b/target/arm/helper.c
94
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static int aa64_va_parameter_tcma(uint64_t tcr, ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx)
95
}
96
}
97
98
+static ARMGranuleSize tg0_to_gran_size(int tg)
99
+{
100
+ switch (tg) {
101
+ case 0:
102
+ return Gran4K;
103
+ case 1:
104
+ return Gran64K;
105
+ case 2:
106
+ return Gran16K;
107
+ default:
108
+ return GranInvalid;
109
+ }
110
+}
111
+
112
+static ARMGranuleSize tg1_to_gran_size(int tg)
113
+{
114
+ switch (tg) {
115
+ case 1:
116
+ return Gran16K;
117
+ case 2:
118
+ return Gran4K;
119
+ case 3:
120
+ return Gran64K;
121
+ default:
122
+ return GranInvalid;
123
+ }
124
+}
125
+
126
+static inline bool have4k(ARMCPU *cpu, bool stage2)
127
+{
128
+ return stage2 ? cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran4_2, cpu)
129
+ : cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran4, cpu);
130
+}
131
+
132
+static inline bool have16k(ARMCPU *cpu, bool stage2)
133
+{
134
+ return stage2 ? cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran16_2, cpu)
135
+ : cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran16, cpu);
136
+}
137
+
138
+static inline bool have64k(ARMCPU *cpu, bool stage2)
139
+{
140
+ return stage2 ? cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran64_2, cpu)
141
+ : cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran64, cpu);
142
+}
143
+
144
+static ARMGranuleSize sanitize_gran_size(ARMCPU *cpu, ARMGranuleSize gran,
145
+ bool stage2)
146
+{
147
+ switch (gran) {
148
+ case Gran4K:
149
+ if (have4k(cpu, stage2)) {
150
+ return gran;
151
+ }
152
+ break;
153
+ case Gran16K:
154
+ if (have16k(cpu, stage2)) {
155
+ return gran;
156
+ }
157
+ break;
158
+ case Gran64K:
159
+ if (have64k(cpu, stage2)) {
160
+ return gran;
161
+ }
162
+ break;
163
+ case GranInvalid:
164
+ break;
165
+ }
166
+ /*
167
+ * If the guest selects a granule size that isn't implemented,
168
+ * the architecture requires that we behave as if it selected one
169
+ * that is (with an IMPDEF choice of which one to pick). We choose
170
+ * to implement the smallest supported granule size.
171
+ */
172
+ if (have4k(cpu, stage2)) {
173
+ return Gran4K;
174
+ }
175
+ if (have16k(cpu, stage2)) {
176
+ return Gran16K;
177
+ }
178
+ assert(have64k(cpu, stage2));
179
+ return Gran64K;
180
+}
181
+
182
ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va,
183
ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool data)
184
{
185
uint64_t tcr = regime_tcr(env, mmu_idx);
186
bool epd, hpd, using16k, using64k, tsz_oob, ds;
187
int select, tsz, tbi, max_tsz, min_tsz, ps, sh;
188
+ ARMGranuleSize gran;
189
ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
190
+ bool stage2 = mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S;
191
192
if (!regime_has_2_ranges(mmu_idx)) {
193
select = 0;
194
tsz = extract32(tcr, 0, 6);
195
- using64k = extract32(tcr, 14, 1);
196
- using16k = extract32(tcr, 15, 1);
197
- if (mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2 || mmu_idx == ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S) {
198
+ gran = tg0_to_gran_size(extract32(tcr, 14, 2));
199
+ if (stage2) {
200
/* VTCR_EL2 */
201
hpd = false;
202
} else {
203
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va,
204
select = extract64(va, 55, 1);
205
if (!select) {
206
tsz = extract32(tcr, 0, 6);
207
+ gran = tg0_to_gran_size(extract32(tcr, 14, 2));
208
epd = extract32(tcr, 7, 1);
209
sh = extract32(tcr, 12, 2);
210
- using64k = extract32(tcr, 14, 1);
211
- using16k = extract32(tcr, 15, 1);
212
hpd = extract64(tcr, 41, 1);
213
} else {
214
- int tg = extract32(tcr, 30, 2);
215
- using16k = tg == 1;
216
- using64k = tg == 3;
217
tsz = extract32(tcr, 16, 6);
218
+ gran = tg1_to_gran_size(extract32(tcr, 30, 2));
219
epd = extract32(tcr, 23, 1);
220
sh = extract32(tcr, 28, 2);
221
hpd = extract64(tcr, 42, 1);
222
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va,
223
ds = extract64(tcr, 59, 1);
224
}
225
226
+ gran = sanitize_gran_size(cpu, gran, stage2);
227
+ using64k = gran == Gran64K;
228
+ using16k = gran == Gran16K;
229
+
230
if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_st, cpu)) {
231
max_tsz = 48 - using64k;
232
} else {
233
--
234
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib
[Qemu-devel] [PULL 09/10] target/arm: Set VFP-related MVFR0 fields for arm926 and arm1026
[PULL 27/28] target/arm: Use ARMGranuleSize in ARMVAParameters
1
The ARMv5 architecture didn't specify detailed per-feature ID
1
Now we have an enum for the granule size, use it in the
2
registers. Now that we're using the MVFR0 register fields to
2
ARMVAParameters struct instead of the using16k/using64k bools.
3
gate the existence of VFP instructions, we need to set up
4
the correct values in the cpu->isar structure so that we still
5
provide an FPU to the guest.
6
3
7
This fixes a regression in the arm926 and arm1026 CPUs, which
8
are the only ones that both have VFP and are ARMv5 or earlier.
9
This regression was introduced by the VFP refactoring, and more
10
specifically by commits 1120827fa182f0e76 and 266bd25c485597c,
11
which accidentally disabled VFP short-vector support and
12
double-precision support on these CPUs.
13
14
Fixes: 1120827fa182f0e
15
Fixes: 266bd25c485597c
16
Fixes: https://bugs.launchpad.net/qemu/+bug/1836192
17
Reported-by: Christophe Lyon <christophe.lyon@linaro.org>
18
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
4
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
19
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
5
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
20
Reviewed-by: Alex Bennée <alex.bennee@linaro.org>
6
Message-id: 20221003162315.2833797-3-peter.maydell@linaro.org
21
Tested-by: Christophe Lyon <christophe.lyon@linaro.org>
22
Message-id: 20190711131241.22231-1-peter.maydell@linaro.org
23
---
7
---
24
target/arm/cpu.c | 12 ++++++++++++
8
target/arm/internals.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
25
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+)
9
target/arm/helper.c | 39 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------
10
target/arm/ptw.c | 8 +-------
11
3 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
26
12
27
diff --git a/target/arm/cpu.c b/target/arm/cpu.c
13
diff --git a/target/arm/internals.h b/target/arm/internals.h
28
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
14
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
29
--- a/target/arm/cpu.c
15
--- a/target/arm/internals.h
30
+++ b/target/arm/cpu.c
16
+++ b/target/arm/internals.h
31
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void arm926_initfn(Object *obj)
17
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ typedef enum ARMGranuleSize {
32
* set the field to indicate Jazelle support within QEMU.
18
GranInvalid,
19
} ARMGranuleSize;
20
21
+/**
22
+ * arm_granule_bits: Return address size of the granule in bits
23
+ *
24
+ * Return the address size of the granule in bits. This corresponds
25
+ * to the pseudocode TGxGranuleBits().
26
+ */
27
+static inline int arm_granule_bits(ARMGranuleSize gran)
28
+{
29
+ switch (gran) {
30
+ case Gran64K:
31
+ return 16;
32
+ case Gran16K:
33
+ return 14;
34
+ case Gran4K:
35
+ return 12;
36
+ default:
37
+ g_assert_not_reached();
38
+ }
39
+}
40
+
41
/*
42
* Parameters of a given virtual address, as extracted from the
43
* translation control register (TCR) for a given regime.
44
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ typedef struct ARMVAParameters {
45
bool tbi : 1;
46
bool epd : 1;
47
bool hpd : 1;
48
- bool using16k : 1;
49
- bool using64k : 1;
50
bool tsz_oob : 1; /* tsz has been clamped to legal range */
51
bool ds : 1;
52
+ ARMGranuleSize gran : 2;
53
} ARMVAParameters;
54
55
ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va,
56
diff --git a/target/arm/helper.c b/target/arm/helper.c
57
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
58
--- a/target/arm/helper.c
59
+++ b/target/arm/helper.c
60
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ typedef struct {
61
uint64_t length;
62
} TLBIRange;
63
64
+static ARMGranuleSize tlbi_range_tg_to_gran_size(int tg)
65
+{
66
+ /*
67
+ * Note that the TLBI range TG field encoding differs from both
68
+ * TG0 and TG1 encodings.
69
+ */
70
+ switch (tg) {
71
+ case 1:
72
+ return Gran4K;
73
+ case 2:
74
+ return Gran16K;
75
+ case 3:
76
+ return Gran64K;
77
+ default:
78
+ return GranInvalid;
79
+ }
80
+}
81
+
82
static TLBIRange tlbi_aa64_get_range(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmuidx,
83
uint64_t value)
84
{
85
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static TLBIRange tlbi_aa64_get_range(CPUARMState *env, ARMMMUIdx mmuidx,
86
uint64_t select = sextract64(value, 36, 1);
87
ARMVAParameters param = aa64_va_parameters(env, select, mmuidx, true);
88
TLBIRange ret = { };
89
+ ARMGranuleSize gran;
90
91
page_size_granule = extract64(value, 46, 2);
92
+ gran = tlbi_range_tg_to_gran_size(page_size_granule);
93
94
/* The granule encoded in value must match the granule in use. */
95
- if (page_size_granule != (param.using64k ? 3 : param.using16k ? 2 : 1)) {
96
+ if (gran != param.gran) {
97
qemu_log_mask(LOG_GUEST_ERROR, "Invalid tlbi page size granule %d\n",
98
page_size_granule);
99
return ret;
100
}
101
102
- page_shift = (page_size_granule - 1) * 2 + 12;
103
+ page_shift = arm_granule_bits(gran);
104
num = extract64(value, 39, 5);
105
scale = extract64(value, 44, 2);
106
exponent = (5 * scale) + 1;
107
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va,
108
ARMMMUIdx mmu_idx, bool data)
109
{
110
uint64_t tcr = regime_tcr(env, mmu_idx);
111
- bool epd, hpd, using16k, using64k, tsz_oob, ds;
112
+ bool epd, hpd, tsz_oob, ds;
113
int select, tsz, tbi, max_tsz, min_tsz, ps, sh;
114
ARMGranuleSize gran;
115
ARMCPU *cpu = env_archcpu(env);
116
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va,
117
}
118
119
gran = sanitize_gran_size(cpu, gran, stage2);
120
- using64k = gran == Gran64K;
121
- using16k = gran == Gran16K;
122
123
if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_st, cpu)) {
124
- max_tsz = 48 - using64k;
125
+ max_tsz = 48 - (gran == Gran64K);
126
} else {
127
max_tsz = 39;
128
}
129
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va,
130
* adjust the effective value of DS, as documented.
33
*/
131
*/
34
cpu->isar.id_isar1 = FIELD_DP32(cpu->isar.id_isar1, ID_ISAR1, JAZELLE, 1);
132
min_tsz = 16;
35
+ /*
133
- if (using64k) {
36
+ * Similarly, we need to set MVFR0 fields to enable double precision
134
+ if (gran == Gran64K) {
37
+ * and short vector support even though ARMv5 doesn't have this register.
135
if (cpu_isar_feature(aa64_lva, cpu)) {
38
+ */
136
min_tsz = 12;
39
+ cpu->isar.mvfr0 = FIELD_DP32(cpu->isar.mvfr0, MVFR0, FPSHVEC, 1);
137
}
40
+ cpu->isar.mvfr0 = FIELD_DP32(cpu->isar.mvfr0, MVFR0, FPDP, 1);
138
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va,
139
switch (mmu_idx) {
140
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2:
141
case ARMMMUIdx_Stage2_S:
142
- if (using16k) {
143
+ if (gran == Gran16K) {
144
ds = cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran16_2_lpa2, cpu);
145
} else {
146
ds = cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran4_2_lpa2, cpu);
147
}
148
break;
149
default:
150
- if (using16k) {
151
+ if (gran == Gran16K) {
152
ds = cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran16_lpa2, cpu);
153
} else {
154
ds = cpu_isar_feature(aa64_tgran4_lpa2, cpu);
155
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ ARMVAParameters aa64_va_parameters(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t va,
156
.tbi = tbi,
157
.epd = epd,
158
.hpd = hpd,
159
- .using16k = using16k,
160
- .using64k = using64k,
161
.tsz_oob = tsz_oob,
162
.ds = ds,
163
+ .gran = gran,
164
};
41
}
165
}
42
166
43
static void arm946_initfn(Object *obj)
167
diff --git a/target/arm/ptw.c b/target/arm/ptw.c
44
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static void arm1026_initfn(Object *obj)
168
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
45
* set the field to indicate Jazelle support within QEMU.
169
--- a/target/arm/ptw.c
46
*/
170
+++ b/target/arm/ptw.c
47
cpu->isar.id_isar1 = FIELD_DP32(cpu->isar.id_isar1, ID_ISAR1, JAZELLE, 1);
171
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ static bool get_phys_addr_lpae(CPUARMState *env, uint64_t address,
48
+ /*
172
}
49
+ * Similarly, we need to set MVFR0 fields to enable double precision
173
}
50
+ * and short vector support even though ARMv5 doesn't have this register.
174
51
+ */
175
- if (param.using64k) {
52
+ cpu->isar.mvfr0 = FIELD_DP32(cpu->isar.mvfr0, MVFR0, FPSHVEC, 1);
176
- stride = 13;
53
+ cpu->isar.mvfr0 = FIELD_DP32(cpu->isar.mvfr0, MVFR0, FPDP, 1);
177
- } else if (param.using16k) {
54
178
- stride = 11;
55
{
179
- } else {
56
/* The 1026 had an IFAR at c6,c0,0,1 rather than the ARMv6 c6,c0,0,2 */
180
- stride = 9;
181
- }
182
+ stride = arm_granule_bits(param.gran) - 3;
183
184
/*
185
* Note that QEMU ignores shareability and cacheability attributes,
57
--
186
--
58
2.20.1
187
2.25.1
59
60
diff view generated by jsdifflib
New patch
[PULL 28/28] docs/system/arm/emulation.rst: Report FEAT_GTG support
1
FEAT_GTG is a change tho the ID register ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1 so that it
2
can report a different set of supported granule (page) sizes for
3
stage 1 and stage 2 translation tables. As of commit c20281b2a5048
4
we already report the granule sizes that way for '-cpu max', and now
5
we also correctly make attempts to use unimplemented granule sizes
6
fail, so we can report the support of the feature in the
7
documentation.
1
8
9
Reviewed-by: Richard Henderson <richard.henderson@linaro.org>
10
Signed-off-by: Peter Maydell <peter.maydell@linaro.org>
11
Message-id: 20221003162315.2833797-4-peter.maydell@linaro.org
12
---
13
docs/system/arm/emulation.rst | 1 +
14
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
15
16
diff --git a/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst b/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst
17
index XXXXXXX..XXXXXXX 100644
18
--- a/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst
19
+++ b/docs/system/arm/emulation.rst
20
@@ -XXX,XX +XXX,XX @@ the following architecture extensions:
21
- FEAT_FRINTTS (Floating-point to integer instructions)
22
- FEAT_FlagM (Flag manipulation instructions v2)
23
- FEAT_FlagM2 (Enhancements to flag manipulation instructions)
24
+- FEAT_GTG (Guest translation granule size)
25
- FEAT_HCX (Support for the HCRX_EL2 register)
26
- FEAT_HPDS (Hierarchical permission disables)
27
- FEAT_I8MM (AArch64 Int8 matrix multiplication instructions)
28
--
29
2.25.1
diff view generated by jsdifflib

Patchew 2.1-devel-b67e4c2

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