Commit eb7eeb8 ("memory: split address_space_read and
address_space_write", 2015-12-17) made address_space_rw
dispatch to one of address_space_read or address_space_write,
rather than vice versa.
For callers of address_space_read and address_space_write this
causes false positive defects when Coverity sees a length-8 write in
address_space_read and a length-4 (e.g. int*) buffer to read into.
As long as the size of the buffer is okay, this is a false positive.
Reflect the code change into the model.
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
scripts/coverity-model.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/scripts/coverity-model.c b/scripts/coverity-model.c
index ee5bf9d..c702804 100644
--- a/scripts/coverity-model.c
+++ b/scripts/coverity-model.c
@@ -67,18 +67,27 @@ static void __bufread(uint8_t *buf, ssize_t len)
int last = buf[len-1];
}
-MemTxResult address_space_rw(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr, MemTxAttrs attrs,
- uint8_t *buf, int len, bool is_write)
+MemTxResult address_space_read(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr,
+ MemTxAttrs attrs,
+ uint8_t *buf, int len)
{
MemTxResult result;
-
// TODO: investigate impact of treating reads as producing
// tainted data, with __coverity_tainted_data_argument__(buf).
- if (is_write) __bufread(buf, len); else __bufwrite(buf, len);
+ __bufwrite(buf, len);
+ return result;
+}
+MemTxResult address_space_write(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr,
+ MemTxAttrs attrs,
+ const uint8_t *buf, int len)
+{
+ MemTxResult result;
+ __bufread(buf, len);
return result;
}
+
/* Tainting */
typedef struct {} name2keysym_t;
--
2.9.3
On 03/15/2017 03:16 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> Commit eb7eeb8 ("memory: split address_space_read and
> address_space_write", 2015-12-17) made address_space_rw
> dispatch to one of address_space_read or address_space_write,
> rather than vice versa.
>
> For callers of address_space_read and address_space_write this
> causes false positive defects when Coverity sees a length-8 write in
> address_space_read and a length-4 (e.g. int*) buffer to read into.
> As long as the size of the buffer is okay, this is a false positive.
>
> Reflect the code change into the model.
>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
> scripts/coverity-model.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> -MemTxResult address_space_rw(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr, MemTxAttrs attrs,
> - uint8_t *buf, int len, bool is_write)
> +MemTxResult address_space_read(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr,
> + MemTxAttrs attrs,
> + uint8_t *buf, int len)
> {
> MemTxResult result;
> -
> // TODO: investigate impact of treating reads as producing
> // tainted data, with __coverity_tainted_data_argument__(buf).
> - if (is_write) __bufread(buf, len); else __bufwrite(buf, len);
Old code did __bufread for reads,
> + __bufwrite(buf, len);
but the new does __bufwrite.
> + return result;
> +}
>
> +MemTxResult address_space_write(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr,
> + MemTxAttrs attrs,
> + const uint8_t *buf, int len)
> +{
> + MemTxResult result;
> + __bufread(buf, len);
And __bufread for writes. Did you get this backwards?
> return result;
> }
>
> +
> /* Tainting */
>
> typedef struct {} name2keysym_t;
>
--
Eric Blake eblake redhat com +1-919-301-3266
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org
On 15 March 2017 at 11:55, Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> wrote:
> On 03/15/2017 03:16 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> -MemTxResult address_space_rw(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr, MemTxAttrs attrs,
>> - uint8_t *buf, int len, bool is_write)
>> +MemTxResult address_space_read(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr,
>> + MemTxAttrs attrs,
>> + uint8_t *buf, int len)
>> {
>> MemTxResult result;
>> -
>> // TODO: investigate impact of treating reads as producing
>> // tainted data, with __coverity_tainted_data_argument__(buf).
>> - if (is_write) __bufread(buf, len); else __bufwrite(buf, len);
>
> Old code did __bufread for reads,
Eh? for a read is_write is false, and we use the else clause,
which is __bufwrite...
thanks
-- PMM
On 03/15/2017 06:58 AM, Peter Maydell wrote:
> On 15 March 2017 at 11:55, Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com> wrote:
>> On 03/15/2017 03:16 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>>> -MemTxResult address_space_rw(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr, MemTxAttrs attrs,
>>> - uint8_t *buf, int len, bool is_write)
>>> +MemTxResult address_space_read(AddressSpace *as, hwaddr addr,
>>> + MemTxAttrs attrs,
>>> + uint8_t *buf, int len)
>>> {
>>> MemTxResult result;
>>> -
>>> // TODO: investigate impact of treating reads as producing
>>> // tainted data, with __coverity_tainted_data_argument__(buf).
>>> - if (is_write) __bufread(buf, len); else __bufwrite(buf, len);
>>
>> Old code did __bufread for reads,
>
> Eh? for a read is_write is false, and we use the else clause,
> which is __bufwrite...
Maybe I shouldn't send emails when I've just woken up? It threw me that
we have a function named 'read' relying on coverity's 'write' - but
you're correct that it has always been that way, and thinking about it
more, what is really happening is:
our function named 'read' is emulating getting data from hardware (the
'read' portion) and copying it into the buffer (the 'write' portion);
the Coverity model needs to know about the effects to the buffer, but
could care less about the hardware emulation side.
Okay, you've straightened me out, so I can give:
Reviewed-by: Eric Blake <eblake@redhat.com>
--
Eric Blake eblake redhat com +1-919-301-3266
Libvirt virtualization library http://libvirt.org
© 2016 - 2026 Red Hat, Inc.