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[edk2-devel] [patch v3 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION

Dandan Bi posted 5 patches 6 years, 4 months ago
[edk2-devel] [patch v3 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Posted by Dandan Bi 6 years, 4 months ago 
For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
This follows UEFI Spec.

But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.

This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
for the callers in UefiBootManagerLib which don't have the policy to defer
the execution of the image.

Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
---
V3: Enahnce the error handling logic in BmLoadOption.c and BmMisc.c.
 MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c   |  9 +++++++++
 .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c      | 14 ++++++++++++--
 MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c   | 14 ++++++++++++--
 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
index 952033fc82..760d7647b8 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
@@ -1859,10 +1859,19 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot (
     if (FilePath != NULL) {
       FreePool (FilePath);
     }
 
     if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+      //
+      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+      //
+      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+        gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+      }
       //
       // Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that the failure to load boot option
       //
       BmReportLoadFailure (EFI_SW_DXE_BS_EC_BOOT_OPTION_LOAD_ERROR, Status);
       BootOption->Status = Status;
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
index 07592f8ebd..89372b3b97 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /** @file
   Load option library functions which relate with creating and processing load options.
 
-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
 (C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
 SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
 
 **/
 
@@ -1409,11 +1409,21 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption (
                     FileSize,
                     &ImageHandle
                     );
     FreePool (FileBuffer);
 
-    if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+      //
+      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+      //
+      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+        gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+      }
+    } else {
       Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo);
       ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
 
       ImageInfo->LoadOptionsSize = LoadOption->OptionalDataSize;
       ImageInfo->LoadOptions = LoadOption->OptionalData;
diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
index 6b8fb4d924..89595747af 100644
--- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
+++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
@@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
 /** @file
   Misc library functions.
 
-Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
 (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
 SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
 
 **/
 
@@ -491,11 +491,21 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages (
         ImageDevicePath,
         NULL,
         0,
         &ImageHandle
       );
-      if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+      if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+        //
+        // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+        // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+        // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+        // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+        //
+        if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+          gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+        }
+      } else {
         LoadCount++;
         //
         // Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for
         // a 5 Minute period
         //
-- 
2.18.0.windows.1


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Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Posted by Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 6 years, 4 months ago 
On 9/24/19 3:16 PM, Dandan Bi wrote:
> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
> the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> This follows UEFI Spec.
> 
> But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
> the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> 
> This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
> for the callers in UefiBootManagerLib which don't have the policy to defer
> the execution of the image.
> 
> Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
> Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
> Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
> Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> ---
> V3: Enahnce the error handling logic in BmLoadOption.c and BmMisc.c.
>  MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c   |  9 +++++++++
>  .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c      | 14 ++++++++++++--
>  MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c   | 14 ++++++++++++--
>  3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> index 952033fc82..760d7647b8 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> @@ -1859,10 +1859,19 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot (
>      if (FilePath != NULL) {
>        FreePool (FilePath);
>      }
>  
>      if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> +      //
> +      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
> +      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> +      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
> +      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> +      //
> +      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +        gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> +      }
>        //
>        // Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that the failure to load boot option
>        //
>        BmReportLoadFailure (EFI_SW_DXE_BS_EC_BOOT_OPTION_LOAD_ERROR, Status);
>        BootOption->Status = Status;
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> index 07592f8ebd..89372b3b97 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
>  /** @file
>    Load option library functions which relate with creating and processing load options.
>  
> -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
>  (C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
>  SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>  
>  **/
>  
> @@ -1409,11 +1409,21 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption (
>                      FileSize,
>                      &ImageHandle
>                      );
>      FreePool (FileBuffer);
>  
> -    if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> +    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> +      //
> +      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
> +      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> +      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
> +      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> +      //
> +      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +        gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> +      }
> +    } else {

Thanks for changing this Dandan!

>        Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle, &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo);
>        ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
>  
>        ImageInfo->LoadOptionsSize = LoadOption->OptionalDataSize;
>        ImageInfo->LoadOptions = LoadOption->OptionalData;
> diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> index 6b8fb4d924..89595747af 100644
> --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
>  /** @file
>    Misc library functions.
>  
> -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
>  (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
>  SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>  
>  **/
>  
> @@ -491,11 +491,21 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages (
>          ImageDevicePath,
>          NULL,
>          0,
>          &ImageHandle
>        );
> -      if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> +      if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> +        //
> +        // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
> +        // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> +        // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
> +        // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> +        //
> +        if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> +          gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> +        }
> +      } else {

Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>

>          LoadCount++;
>          //
>          // Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for
>          // a 5 Minute period
>          //
> 

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Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
Posted by Gao, Zhichao 6 years, 4 months ago 
Nice catch. Moving the check into the if conditional section would avoid the additional check when the status is EFI_SUCCESS.

Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>

Thanks,
Zhichao

> -----Original Message-----
> From: devel@edk2.groups.io [mailto:devel@edk2.groups.io] On Behalf Of
> Philippe Mathieu-Daudé
> Sent: Tuesday, September 24, 2019 9:22 PM
> To: devel@edk2.groups.io; Bi, Dandan <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> Cc: Wang, Jian J <jian.j.wang@intel.com>; Wu, Hao A <hao.a.wu@intel.com>;
> Ni, Ray <ray.ni@intel.com>; Gao, Zhichao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>; Gao,
> Liming <liming.gao@intel.com>; Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Subject: Re: [edk2-devel] [patch v3 3/5] MdeModulePkg/UefiBootManager:
> Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> 
> On 9/24/19 3:16 PM, Dandan Bi wrote:
> > For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
> > the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> > EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right
> now.
> > This follows UEFI Spec.
> >
> > But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the
> > execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like
> > any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> > EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> >
> > This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
> > explicitly for the callers in UefiBootManagerLib which don't have the
> > policy to defer the execution of the image.
> >
> > Cc: Jian J Wang <jian.j.wang@intel.com>
> > Cc: Hao A Wu <hao.a.wu@intel.com>
> > Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
> > Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
> > Cc: Liming Gao <liming.gao@intel.com>
> > Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> > Cc: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
> > REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> > Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> > ---
> > V3: Enahnce the error handling logic in BmLoadOption.c and BmMisc.c.
> >  MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c   |  9 +++++++++
> >  .../Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c      | 14 ++++++++++++--
> >  MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c   | 14
> ++++++++++++--
> >  3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> > b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> > index 952033fc82..760d7647b8 100644
> > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmBoot.c
> > @@ -1859,10 +1859,19 @@ EfiBootManagerBoot (
> >      if (FilePath != NULL) {
> >        FreePool (FilePath);
> >      }
> >
> >      if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> > +      //
> > +      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> > +      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not
> be started right now.
> > +      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> > +      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource
> leak.
> > +      //
> > +      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> > +        gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> > +      }
> >        //
> >        // Report Status Code with the failure status to indicate that the failure
> to load boot option
> >        //
> >        BmReportLoadFailure
> (EFI_SW_DXE_BS_EC_BOOT_OPTION_LOAD_ERROR, Status);
> >        BootOption->Status = Status;
> > diff --git a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> > b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> > index 07592f8ebd..89372b3b97 100644
> > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmLoadOption.c
> > @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
> >  /** @file
> >    Load option library functions which relate with creating and processing
> load options.
> >
> > -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights
> > reserved.<BR>
> > +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights
> > +reserved.<BR>
> >  (C) Copyright 2015-2018 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
> >  SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> >
> >  **/
> >
> > @@ -1409,11 +1409,21 @@ EfiBootManagerProcessLoadOption (
> >                      FileSize,
> >                      &ImageHandle
> >                      );
> >      FreePool (FileBuffer);
> >
> > -    if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> > +    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> > +      //
> > +      // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> > +      // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not
> be started right now.
> > +      // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> > +      // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource
> leak.
> > +      //
> > +      if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> > +        gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> > +      }
> > +    } else {
> 
> Thanks for changing this Dandan!
> 
> >        Status = gBS->HandleProtocol (ImageHandle,
> &gEfiLoadedImageProtocolGuid, (VOID **)&ImageInfo);
> >        ASSERT_EFI_ERROR (Status);
> >
> >        ImageInfo->LoadOptionsSize = LoadOption->OptionalDataSize;
> >        ImageInfo->LoadOptions = LoadOption->OptionalData; diff --git
> > a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> > b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> > index 6b8fb4d924..89595747af 100644
> > --- a/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> > +++ b/MdeModulePkg/Library/UefiBootManagerLib/BmMisc.c
> > @@ -1,9 +1,9 @@
> >  /** @file
> >    Misc library functions.
> >
> > -Copyright (c) 2011 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights
> > reserved.<BR>
> > +Copyright (c) 2011 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights
> > +reserved.<BR>
> >  (C) Copyright 2016 Hewlett Packard Enterprise Development LP<BR>
> >  SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
> >
> >  **/
> >
> > @@ -491,11 +491,21 @@ EfiBootManagerDispatchDeferredImages (
> >          ImageDevicePath,
> >          NULL,
> >          0,
> >          &ImageHandle
> >        );
> > -      if (!EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> > +      if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> > +        //
> > +        // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and
> an ImageHandle was created
> > +        // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can
> not be started right now.
> > +        // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> > +        // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource
> leak.
> > +        //
> > +        if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> > +          gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> > +        }
> > +      } else {
> 
> Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>
> 
> >          LoadCount++;
> >          //
> >          // Before calling the image, enable the Watchdog Timer for
> >          // a 5 Minute period
> >          //
> >
> 
> 


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