For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval,
the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
This follows UEFI Spec.
But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer
the execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
like any other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly
for the callers in ShellPkg which don't have the policy to defer the
execution of the image.
Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
---
ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c | 9 +++++++++
.../Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c | 11 ++++++++++-
ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c | 11 ++++++++++-
3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
index 6909f29441..e5f97bbb11 100644
--- a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
+++ b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
@@ -643,10 +643,19 @@ ProcessManFile(
goto Done;
}
DevPath = ShellInfoObject.NewEfiShellProtocol->GetDevicePathFromFilePath(CmdFilePathName);
Status = gBS->LoadImage(FALSE, gImageHandle, DevPath, NULL, 0, &CmdFileImgHandle);
if(EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ //
+ // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+ // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+ // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+ // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid the resource leak.
+ //
+ if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+ gBS->UnloadImage (CmdFileImgHandle);
+ }
*HelpText = NULL;
goto Done;
}
Status = gBS->OpenProtocol(
CmdFileImgHandle,
diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
index 1b169d0d3c..f91e3eb6e7 100644
--- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
+++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
/** @file
Main file for LoadPciRom shell Debug1 function.
(C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
- Copyright (c) 2005 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+ Copyright (c) 2005 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
#include "UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib.h"
@@ -332,10 +332,19 @@ LoadEfiDriversFromRomImage (
ImageBuffer,
ImageLength,
&ImageHandle
);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
+ //
+ // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+ // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+ // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+ // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+ //
+ if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+ gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
+ }
ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_FAIL), gShellDebug1HiiHandle, L"loadpcirom", FileName, ImageIndex);
// PrintToken (STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_IMAGE_ERROR), HiiHandle, ImageIndex, Status);
} else {
Status = gBS->StartImage (ImageHandle, NULL, NULL);
if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
index 6a94b48c86..a13e1bda2d 100644
--- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
+++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
/** @file
Main file for attrib shell level 2 function.
(C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
- Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
+ Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
**/
#include "UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib.h"
@@ -110,10 +110,19 @@ LoadDriver(
NULL,
0,
&LoadedDriverHandle);
if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
+ //
+ // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created
+ // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
+ // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image, we should
+ // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
+ //
+ if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
+ gBS->UnloadImage (LoadedDriverHandle);
+ }
ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOAD_NOT_IMAGE), gShellLevel2HiiHandle, FileName, Status);
} else {
//
// Make sure it is a driver image
//
--
2.18.0.windows.1
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Reviewed-by: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: Bi, Dandan
> Sent: Wednesday, September 4, 2019 4:26 PM
> To: devel@edk2.groups.io
> Cc: Ni, Ray <ray.ni@intel.com>; Gao, Zhichao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>;
> Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> Subject: [patch 3/3] ShellPkg: Unload image on EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
>
> For the LoadImage() boot service, with EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the
> Image was loaded and an ImageHandle was created with a valid
> EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be started right now.
> This follows UEFI Spec.
>
> But if the caller of LoadImage() doesn't have the option to defer the
> execution of an image, we can not treat EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION like any
> other LoadImage() error, we should unload image for the
> EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
>
> This patch is to do error handling for EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION explicitly for
> the callers in ShellPkg which don't have the policy to defer the execution of
> the image.
>
> Cc: Ray Ni <ray.ni@intel.com>
> Cc: Zhichao Gao <zhichao.gao@intel.com>
> Cc: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> REF: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1992
> Signed-off-by: Dandan Bi <dandan.bi@intel.com>
> ---
> ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c | 9 +++++++++
> .../Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c | 11 ++++++++++-
> 3 files changed, 29 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
> b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
> index 6909f29441..e5f97bbb11 100644
> --- a/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
> +++ b/ShellPkg/Application/Shell/ShellManParser.c
> @@ -643,10 +643,19 @@ ProcessManFile(
> goto Done;
> }
> DevPath = ShellInfoObject.NewEfiShellProtocol-
> >GetDevicePathFromFilePath(CmdFilePathName);
> Status = gBS->LoadImage(FALSE, gImageHandle, DevPath, NULL, 0,
> &CmdFileImgHandle);
> if(EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not
> be started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid the resource
> leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (CmdFileImgHandle);
> + }
> *HelpText = NULL;
> goto Done;
> }
> Status = gBS->OpenProtocol(
> CmdFileImgHandle,
> diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
> b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
> index 1b169d0d3c..f91e3eb6e7 100644
> --- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
> +++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib/LoadPciRom.c
> @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
> /** @file
> Main file for LoadPciRom shell Debug1 function.
>
> (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
> - Copyright (c) 2005 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> + Copyright (c) 2005 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights
> + reserved.<BR>
> SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>
> **/
>
> #include "UefiShellDebug1CommandsLib.h"
> @@ -332,10 +332,19 @@ LoadEfiDriversFromRomImage (
> ImageBuffer,
> ImageLength,
> &ImageHandle
> );
> if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and
> an ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can
> not be started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an
> image, we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource
> leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (ImageHandle);
> + }
> ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN
> (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_FAIL), gShellDebug1HiiHandle, L"loadpcirom",
> FileName, ImageIndex);
> // PrintToken (STRING_TOKEN
> (STR_LOADPCIROM_LOAD_IMAGE_ERROR), HiiHandle, ImageIndex, Status);
> } else {
> Status = gBS->StartImage (ImageHandle, NULL, NULL);
> if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
> diff --git a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
> b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
> index 6a94b48c86..a13e1bda2d 100644
> --- a/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
> +++ b/ShellPkg/Library/UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib/Load.c
> @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
> /** @file
> Main file for attrib shell level 2 function.
>
> (C) Copyright 2015 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.<BR>
> - Copyright (c) 2009 - 2018, Intel Corporation. All rights reserved.<BR>
> + Copyright (c) 2009 - 2019, Intel Corporation. All rights
> + reserved.<BR>
> SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-2-Clause-Patent
>
> **/
>
> #include "UefiShellLevel2CommandsLib.h"
> @@ -110,10 +110,19 @@ LoadDriver(
> NULL,
> 0,
> &LoadedDriverHandle);
>
> if (EFI_ERROR(Status)) {
> + //
> + // With EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION retval, the Image was loaded and an
> ImageHandle was created
> + // with a valid EFI_LOADED_IMAGE_PROTOCOL, but the image can not be
> started right now.
> + // If the caller doesn't have the option to defer the execution of an image,
> we should
> + // unload image for the EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION to avoid resource leak.
> + //
> + if (Status == EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION) {
> + gBS->UnloadImage (LoadedDriverHandle);
> + }
> ShellPrintHiiEx(-1, -1, NULL, STRING_TOKEN (STR_LOAD_NOT_IMAGE),
> gShellLevel2HiiHandle, FileName, Status);
> } else {
> //
> // Make sure it is a driver image
> //
> --
> 2.18.0.windows.1
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