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[edk2-devel] [PATCH 06/16] OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys: clean up global variable name prefixes

Laszlo Ersek posted 16 patches 6 years, 9 months ago
[edk2-devel] [PATCH 06/16] OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys: clean up global variable name prefixes
Posted by Laszlo Ersek 6 years, 9 months ago 
In edk2, we should start the names of module-global variables with "m".
Rename the "RedHatPkKek1", "MicrosoftKEK", "MicrosoftPCA",
"MicrosoftUefiCA" variables accordingly, with the following command:

  sed --regexp-extended --in-place \
    --expression='s,\<(RedHatPkKek1|Microsoft(KEK|PCA|UefiCA))\>,m\1,g' \
    OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c

Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1747
Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
---
 OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c | 18 +++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)

diff --git a/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c b/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c
index aa827ac6aa81..fb30f4906df7 100644
--- a/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c
+++ b/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c
@@ -17,17 +17,17 @@
 
 //
 // We'll use the certificate below as both Platform Key and as first Key
 // Exchange Key.
 //
 // "Red Hat Secure Boot (PK/KEK key 1)/emailAddress=secalert@redhat.com"
 // SHA1: fd:fc:7f:3c:7e:f3:e0:57:76:ad:d7:98:78:21:6c:9b:e0:e1:95:97
 //
-STATIC CONST UINT8 RedHatPkKek1[] = {
+STATIC CONST UINT8 mRedHatPkKek1[] = {
   0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xa0, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x88, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
   0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xf5, 0x88, 0xe8, 0xf3, 0x96, 0xc0, 0xf1, 0x30, 0x0d,
   0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00,
   0x30, 0x51, 0x31, 0x2b, 0x30, 0x29, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, 0x22,
   0x52, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x48, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x53, 0x65, 0x63, 0x75, 0x72,
   0x65, 0x20, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x20, 0x28, 0x50, 0x4b, 0x2f, 0x4b, 0x45,
   0x4b, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x20, 0x31, 0x29, 0x31, 0x22, 0x30, 0x20, 0x06,
   0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x13, 0x73,
@@ -98,17 +98,17 @@ STATIC CONST UINT8 RedHatPkKek1[] = {
 };
 
 //
 // Second KEK: "Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011".
 // SHA1: 31:59:0b:fd:89:c9:d7:4e:d0:87:df:ac:66:33:4b:39:31:25:4b:30
 //
 // "dbx" updates in "dbxtool" are signed with a key derived from this KEK.
 //
-STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftKEK[] = {
+STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftKEK[] = {
   0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xd0, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
   0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x0a, 0xd1, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x30,
   0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,
   0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x91, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06,
   0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08,
   0x13, 0x0a, 0x57, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x31,
   0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x13, 0x07, 0x52, 0x65, 0x64,
   0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x31, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x1c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a,
@@ -225,17 +225,17 @@ STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftKEK[] = {
 
 //
 // First DB entry: "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011"
 // SHA1: 58:0a:6f:4c:c4:e4:b6:69:b9:eb:dc:1b:2b:3e:08:7b:80:d0:67:8d
 //
 // Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 R2 boot loaders are signed with a chain
 // rooted in this certificate.
 //
-STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftPCA[] = {
+STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftPCA[] = {
   0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xd7, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xbf, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
   0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x07, 0x76, 0x56, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x30,
   0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,
   0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x88, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06,
   0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08,
   0x13, 0x0a, 0x57, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x31,
   0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x13, 0x07, 0x52, 0x65, 0x64,
   0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x31, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x1c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a,
@@ -350,17 +350,17 @@ STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftPCA[] = {
 };
 
 //
 // Second DB entry: "Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011"
 // SHA1: 46:de:f6:3b:5c:e6:1c:f8:ba:0d:e2:e6:63:9c:10:19:d0:ed:14:f3
 //
 // To verify the "shim" binary and PCI expansion ROMs with.
 //
-STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftUefiCA[] = {
+STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftUefiCA[] = {
   0x30, 0x82, 0x06, 0x10, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
   0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30,
   0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,
   0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x91, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06,
   0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08,
   0x13, 0x0a, 0x57, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x31,
   0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x13, 0x07, 0x52, 0x65, 0x64,
   0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x31, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x1c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a,
@@ -938,18 +938,18 @@ ShellAppMain (
       return 1;
     }
   }
 
   Status = EnrollListOfCerts (
              EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
              &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
              &gEfiCertX509Guid,
-             MicrosoftPCA,    sizeof MicrosoftPCA,    &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
-             MicrosoftUefiCA, sizeof MicrosoftUefiCA, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
+             mMicrosoftPCA,    sizeof mMicrosoftPCA,    &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
+             mMicrosoftUefiCA, sizeof mMicrosoftUefiCA, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
              NULL);
   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
     return 1;
   }
 
   Status = EnrollListOfCerts (
              EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,
              &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
@@ -959,28 +959,28 @@ ShellAppMain (
   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
     return 1;
   }
 
   Status = EnrollListOfCerts (
              EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
              &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
              &gEfiCertX509Guid,
-             RedHatPkKek1, sizeof RedHatPkKek1, &gEfiCallerIdGuid,
-             MicrosoftKEK, sizeof MicrosoftKEK, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
+             mRedHatPkKek1, sizeof mRedHatPkKek1, &gEfiCallerIdGuid,
+             mMicrosoftKEK, sizeof mMicrosoftKEK, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
              NULL);
   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
     return 1;
   }
 
   Status = EnrollListOfCerts (
              EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
              &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
              &gEfiCertX509Guid,
-             RedHatPkKek1, sizeof RedHatPkKek1, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
+             mRedHatPkKek1, sizeof mRedHatPkKek1, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
              NULL);
   if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
     return 1;
   }
 
   Settings.CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
   Status = gRT->SetVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
                   EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
-- 
2.19.1.3.g30247aa5d201



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Re: [edk2-devel] [PATCH 06/16] OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys: clean up global variable name prefixes
Posted by Philippe Mathieu-Daudé 6 years, 9 months ago 
On 4/27/19 2:53 AM, Laszlo Ersek wrote:
> In edk2, we should start the names of module-global variables with "m".
> Rename the "RedHatPkKek1", "MicrosoftKEK", "MicrosoftPCA",
> "MicrosoftUefiCA" variables accordingly, with the following command:
> 
>   sed --regexp-extended --in-place \
>     --expression='s,\<(RedHatPkKek1|Microsoft(KEK|PCA|UefiCA))\>,m\1,g' \
>     OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c
> 
> Cc: Anthony Perard <anthony.perard@citrix.com>
> Cc: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
> Cc: Jordan Justen <jordan.l.justen@intel.com>
> Cc: Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
> Bugzilla: https://bugzilla.tianocore.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1747
> Signed-off-by: Laszlo Ersek <lersek@redhat.com>
> ---
>  OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c | 18 +++++++++---------
>  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c b/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c
> index aa827ac6aa81..fb30f4906df7 100644
> --- a/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c
> +++ b/OvmfPkg/EnrollDefaultKeys/EnrollDefaultKeys.c
> @@ -17,17 +17,17 @@
>  
>  //
>  // We'll use the certificate below as both Platform Key and as first Key
>  // Exchange Key.
>  //
>  // "Red Hat Secure Boot (PK/KEK key 1)/emailAddress=secalert@redhat.com"
>  // SHA1: fd:fc:7f:3c:7e:f3:e0:57:76:ad:d7:98:78:21:6c:9b:e0:e1:95:97
>  //
> -STATIC CONST UINT8 RedHatPkKek1[] = {
> +STATIC CONST UINT8 mRedHatPkKek1[] = {
>    0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xa0, 0x30, 0x82, 0x02, 0x88, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
>    0x02, 0x09, 0x00, 0xfe, 0xf5, 0x88, 0xe8, 0xf3, 0x96, 0xc0, 0xf1, 0x30, 0x0d,
>    0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05, 0x00,
>    0x30, 0x51, 0x31, 0x2b, 0x30, 0x29, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x03, 0x13, 0x22,
>    0x52, 0x65, 0x64, 0x20, 0x48, 0x61, 0x74, 0x20, 0x53, 0x65, 0x63, 0x75, 0x72,
>    0x65, 0x20, 0x42, 0x6f, 0x6f, 0x74, 0x20, 0x28, 0x50, 0x4b, 0x2f, 0x4b, 0x45,
>    0x4b, 0x20, 0x6b, 0x65, 0x79, 0x20, 0x31, 0x29, 0x31, 0x22, 0x30, 0x20, 0x06,
>    0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x09, 0x01, 0x16, 0x13, 0x73,
> @@ -98,17 +98,17 @@ STATIC CONST UINT8 RedHatPkKek1[] = {
>  };
>  
>  //
>  // Second KEK: "Microsoft Corporation KEK CA 2011".
>  // SHA1: 31:59:0b:fd:89:c9:d7:4e:d0:87:df:ac:66:33:4b:39:31:25:4b:30
>  //
>  // "dbx" updates in "dbxtool" are signed with a key derived from this KEK.
>  //
> -STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftKEK[] = {
> +STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftKEK[] = {
>    0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xe8, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xd0, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
>    0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x0a, 0xd1, 0x88, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x30,
>    0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,
>    0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x91, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06,
>    0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08,
>    0x13, 0x0a, 0x57, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x31,
>    0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x13, 0x07, 0x52, 0x65, 0x64,
>    0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x31, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x1c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a,
> @@ -225,17 +225,17 @@ STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftKEK[] = {
>  
>  //
>  // First DB entry: "Microsoft Windows Production PCA 2011"
>  // SHA1: 58:0a:6f:4c:c4:e4:b6:69:b9:eb:dc:1b:2b:3e:08:7b:80:d0:67:8d
>  //
>  // Windows 8 and Windows Server 2012 R2 boot loaders are signed with a chain
>  // rooted in this certificate.
>  //
> -STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftPCA[] = {
> +STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftPCA[] = {
>    0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xd7, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xbf, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
>    0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x07, 0x76, 0x56, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x30,
>    0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,
>    0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x88, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06,
>    0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08,
>    0x13, 0x0a, 0x57, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x31,
>    0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x13, 0x07, 0x52, 0x65, 0x64,
>    0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x31, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x1c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a,
> @@ -350,17 +350,17 @@ STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftPCA[] = {
>  };
>  
>  //
>  // Second DB entry: "Microsoft Corporation UEFI CA 2011"
>  // SHA1: 46:de:f6:3b:5c:e6:1c:f8:ba:0d:e2:e6:63:9c:10:19:d0:ed:14:f3
>  //
>  // To verify the "shim" binary and PCI expansion ROMs with.
>  //
> -STATIC CONST UINT8 MicrosoftUefiCA[] = {
> +STATIC CONST UINT8 mMicrosoftUefiCA[] = {
>    0x30, 0x82, 0x06, 0x10, 0x30, 0x82, 0x03, 0xf8, 0xa0, 0x03, 0x02, 0x01, 0x02,
>    0x02, 0x0a, 0x61, 0x08, 0xd3, 0xc4, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x30,
>    0x0d, 0x06, 0x09, 0x2a, 0x86, 0x48, 0x86, 0xf7, 0x0d, 0x01, 0x01, 0x0b, 0x05,
>    0x00, 0x30, 0x81, 0x91, 0x31, 0x0b, 0x30, 0x09, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x06,
>    0x13, 0x02, 0x55, 0x53, 0x31, 0x13, 0x30, 0x11, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x08,
>    0x13, 0x0a, 0x57, 0x61, 0x73, 0x68, 0x69, 0x6e, 0x67, 0x74, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x31,
>    0x10, 0x30, 0x0e, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x07, 0x13, 0x07, 0x52, 0x65, 0x64,
>    0x6d, 0x6f, 0x6e, 0x64, 0x31, 0x1e, 0x30, 0x1c, 0x06, 0x03, 0x55, 0x04, 0x0a,
> @@ -938,18 +938,18 @@ ShellAppMain (
>        return 1;
>      }
>    }
>  
>    Status = EnrollListOfCerts (
>               EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE,
>               &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
>               &gEfiCertX509Guid,
> -             MicrosoftPCA,    sizeof MicrosoftPCA,    &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
> -             MicrosoftUefiCA, sizeof MicrosoftUefiCA, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
> +             mMicrosoftPCA,    sizeof mMicrosoftPCA,    &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
> +             mMicrosoftUefiCA, sizeof mMicrosoftUefiCA, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
>               NULL);
>    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
>      return 1;
>    }
>  
>    Status = EnrollListOfCerts (
>               EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE1,
>               &gEfiImageSecurityDatabaseGuid,
> @@ -959,28 +959,28 @@ ShellAppMain (
>    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
>      return 1;
>    }
>  
>    Status = EnrollListOfCerts (
>               EFI_KEY_EXCHANGE_KEY_NAME,
>               &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
>               &gEfiCertX509Guid,
> -             RedHatPkKek1, sizeof RedHatPkKek1, &gEfiCallerIdGuid,
> -             MicrosoftKEK, sizeof MicrosoftKEK, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
> +             mRedHatPkKek1, sizeof mRedHatPkKek1, &gEfiCallerIdGuid,
> +             mMicrosoftKEK, sizeof mMicrosoftKEK, &mMicrosoftOwnerGuid,
>               NULL);
>    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
>      return 1;
>    }
>  
>    Status = EnrollListOfCerts (
>               EFI_PLATFORM_KEY_NAME,
>               &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
>               &gEfiCertX509Guid,
> -             RedHatPkKek1, sizeof RedHatPkKek1, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
> +             mRedHatPkKek1, sizeof mRedHatPkKek1, &gEfiGlobalVariableGuid,
>               NULL);
>    if (EFI_ERROR (Status)) {
>      return 1;
>    }
>  
>    Settings.CustomMode = STANDARD_SECURE_BOOT_MODE;
>    Status = gRT->SetVariable (EFI_CUSTOM_MODE_NAME, &gEfiCustomModeEnableGuid,
>                    EFI_VARIABLE_NON_VOLATILE | EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS,
> 

Reviewed-by: Philippe Mathieu-Daude <philmd@redhat.com>

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