CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl | 2 +- SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c | 11 ++++++++++- 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
commit c035e37335ae43229d7e68de74a65f2c01ebc0af
Author: Zhang Lubo <lubo.zhang@intel.com>
Date: Thu Jan 5 14:58:05 2017 +0800
SecurityPkg: enhance secure boot Config Dxe & Time Based AuthVariable.
Added a check for sha256 being the ownly allowed signature hash.
Unfortuantely this commit assumed the form of the signature data was a
raw SignedData sequence. Most tools actually generate a ContentInfo
sequence instead which contains a header identifying the content as
pkcs7-SignedData. Fix this check to allow either format to work.
This fix is needed at least for efitools because we generate signed
variable updates with the ContentInfo header.
Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>
---
CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl | 2 +-
SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c | 11 ++++++++++-
2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl
index b2758a2292..d4e4bd2a81 160000
--- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl
+++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl
@@ -1 +1 @@
-Subproject commit b2758a2292aceda93e9f44c219b94fe21bb9a650
+Subproject commit d4e4bd2a8163f355fa8a3884077eaec7adc75ff7
diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
index 213a524f27..855ea3350a 100644
--- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
+++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c
@@ -1908,10 +1908,19 @@ VerifyTimeBasedPayload (
// in VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor.
// This field has the fixed offset (+13) and be calculated based on two bytes of length encoding.
//
+ // However the data may also begin
+ // ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ // contentType ContentType,
+ // content
+ // [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL }
+ //
+ // In which case the fixed offset is +32
+ //
if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) {
if (SigDataSize >= (13 + sizeof (mSha256OidValue))) {
if (((*(SigData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) ||
- (CompareMem (SigData + 13, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof (mSha256OidValue)) != 0)) {
+ (CompareMem (SigData + 13, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof (mSha256OidValue)) != 0 &&
+ CompareMem (SigData + 32, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof (mSha256OidValue)) != 0)) {
return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
}
}
--
2.13.6
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On 05/10/18 00:09, James Bottomley wrote: > commit c035e37335ae43229d7e68de74a65f2c01ebc0af > Author: Zhang Lubo <lubo.zhang@intel.com> > Date: Thu Jan 5 14:58:05 2017 +0800 > > SecurityPkg: enhance secure boot Config Dxe & Time Based AuthVariable. > > Added a check for sha256 being the ownly allowed signature hash. > Unfortuantely this commit assumed the form of the signature data was a > raw SignedData sequence. Most tools actually generate a ContentInfo > sequence instead which contains a header identifying the content as > pkcs7-SignedData. Fix this check to allow either format to work. > > This fix is needed at least for efitools because we generate signed > variable updates with the ContentInfo header. > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> > --- > CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl | 2 +- > SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c | 11 ++++++++++- > 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl > index b2758a2292..d4e4bd2a81 160000 > --- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl > +++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl > @@ -1 +1 @@ > -Subproject commit b2758a2292aceda93e9f44c219b94fe21bb9a650 > +Subproject commit d4e4bd2a8163f355fa8a3884077eaec7adc75ff7 This hunk should not be necessary; please see edk2 commit b85b20fba42e ("CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: Update OpenSSL version to 1.1.0h", 2018-04-15). (I'll let the SecurityPkg maintainers review the rest.) Thanks, Laszlo > diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c > index 213a524f27..855ea3350a 100644 > --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c > +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c > @@ -1908,10 +1908,19 @@ VerifyTimeBasedPayload ( > // in VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. > // This field has the fixed offset (+13) and be calculated based on two bytes of length encoding. > // > + // However the data may also begin > + // ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { > + // contentType ContentType, > + // content > + // [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL } > + // > + // In which case the fixed offset is +32 > + // > if ((Attributes & EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) { > if (SigDataSize >= (13 + sizeof (mSha256OidValue))) { > if (((*(SigData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) || > - (CompareMem (SigData + 13, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof (mSha256OidValue)) != 0)) { > + (CompareMem (SigData + 13, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof (mSha256OidValue)) != 0 && > + CompareMem (SigData + 32, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof (mSha256OidValue)) != 0)) { > return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; > } > } > _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
> -----Original Message----- > From: edk2-devel [mailto:edk2-devel-bounces@lists.01.org] On Behalf Of > Laszlo Ersek > Sent: Thursday, May 10, 2018 8:36 PM > To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com>; edk2- > devel@lists.01.org > Cc: Zhang Lubo <lubo.zhang@intel.com> > Subject: Re: [edk2] [PATCH] SecurityPkg: fix sha256 signature check > > On 05/10/18 00:09, James Bottomley wrote: > > commit c035e37335ae43229d7e68de74a65f2c01ebc0af > > Author: Zhang Lubo <lubo.zhang@intel.com> > > Date: Thu Jan 5 14:58:05 2017 +0800 > > > > SecurityPkg: enhance secure boot Config Dxe & Time Based AuthVariable. > > > > Added a check for sha256 being the ownly allowed signature hash. > > Unfortuantely this commit assumed the form of the signature data was a > > raw SignedData sequence. Most tools actually generate a ContentInfo > > sequence instead which contains a header identifying the content as > > pkcs7-SignedData. Fix this check to allow either format to work. > > > > This fix is needed at least for efitools because we generate signed > > variable updates with the ContentInfo header. > > > > Signed-off-by: James Bottomley > <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> > > --- > > CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl | 2 +- > > SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c | 11 ++++++++++- > > 2 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl > > b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl > > index b2758a2292..d4e4bd2a81 160000 > > --- a/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl > > +++ b/CryptoPkg/Library/OpensslLib/openssl > > @@ -1 +1 @@ > > -Subproject commit b2758a2292aceda93e9f44c219b94fe21bb9a650 > > +Subproject commit d4e4bd2a8163f355fa8a3884077eaec7adc75ff7 > > This hunk should not be necessary; please see edk2 commit b85b20fba42e > ("CryptoPkg/OpensslLib: Update OpenSSL version to 1.1.0h", 2018-04-15). > > (I'll let the SecurityPkg maintainers review the rest.) > > Thanks, > Laszlo [Long, Qin] I think so. OpenSSL submodule was already upgraded to 1.1.0h (d4e4bd2a8...) > > > diff --git a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c > > b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c > > index 213a524f27..855ea3350a 100644 > > --- a/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c > > +++ b/SecurityPkg/Library/AuthVariableLib/AuthService.c > > @@ -1908,10 +1908,19 @@ VerifyTimeBasedPayload ( > > // in VARIABLE_AUTHENTICATION_2 descriptor. > > // This field has the fixed offset (+13) and be calculated based on two > bytes of length encoding. > > // > > + // However the data may also begin > > + // ContentInfo ::= SEQUENCE { > > + // contentType ContentType, > > + // content > > + // [0] EXPLICIT ANY DEFINED BY contentType OPTIONAL } > > + // > > + // In which case the fixed offset is +32 // > > if ((Attributes & > EFI_VARIABLE_TIME_BASED_AUTHENTICATED_WRITE_ACCESS) != 0) { > > if (SigDataSize >= (13 + sizeof (mSha256OidValue))) { > > if (((*(SigData + 1) & TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) != TWO_BYTE_ENCODE) || > > - (CompareMem (SigData + 13, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof > (mSha256OidValue)) != 0)) { > > + (CompareMem (SigData + 13, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof > (mSha256OidValue)) != 0 && > > + CompareMem (SigData + 32, &mSha256OidValue, sizeof > > +(mSha256OidValue)) != 0)) { > > return EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION; > > } > > } > > [Long, Qin] This part looks good to me. I prefer to add this to make both formats (with or without contentType) to work. > > _______________________________________________ > edk2-devel mailing list > edk2-devel@lists.01.org > https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel _______________________________________________ edk2-devel mailing list edk2-devel@lists.01.org https://lists.01.org/mailman/listinfo/edk2-devel
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