From nobody Sat May 18 23:44:07 2024 Received: from mgamail.intel.com (mgamail.intel.com [198.175.65.16]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 076361CD1A; Mon, 26 Feb 2024 08:27:32 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=198.175.65.16 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708936056; cv=none; b=VYXTkuIg154he0zzWa2OG71mHNWSWEQoAtpdkvL4EpcCh71sR4T7TmPzlChVM69Ax+TZOBMuq83WOko+lOdB9BbkyxiZeUjO0trbadmjObOLotmLjGX8jzb34U5TKbb2AP4uJdSYJhrB7ApY/2F4OLYny/elBCGpVfTfUvTJksc= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1708936056; c=relaxed/simple; bh=JnAye2mxcRd7JRJCRvasniecaQXra3ayFlsdJL5PD+s=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:MIME-Version; b=a9s0DTI3Diat9uUZ6MmPJmMsxhXSeRAUvEVwh0Qsfov/ICZAGW+Ix6SonwYvyH/S7aLV1XC8sbV35YDcuSy44cq27/z5zsGWkzwePHL7kDsFdl3hNmOCp8qMilAa6r24w3rmm06vgHN5ITFwhShoP1WMHsVQpYNdbFbgIx7DilY= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=intel.com; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=intel.com header.i=@intel.com header.b=A5erxH39; arc=none smtp.client-ip=198.175.65.16 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=intel.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=intel.com header.i=@intel.com header.b="A5erxH39" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1708936053; x=1740472053; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:mime-version: content-transfer-encoding; bh=JnAye2mxcRd7JRJCRvasniecaQXra3ayFlsdJL5PD+s=; b=A5erxH39Tq5RfPGnlz+5PXmfhpKERODM7GpHEB2AX+q5wgpbLvzvyls7 Efe9YkBvLqexEOjKTsG57gsKUN/1oF1tluYDrnP1zbMFcUFyJcGvMxO8k GRS5voUhvFp5BAsaVmSLGb3xTY2LOjAkUkfdnbInRKrW6vAe4FF4buk0P OlUI0zRSiGLW6RFnbREQhi1Jla8z3FkgYk95F6nepwVrS8uqBBiVznetR 8SJKQZCxDfwsWFjBOzRC0woYdeOhPWmyJB79jVNRxDvc2wRJfq6eCqR4L Oo7uNricxlyLA7j0OwJjH5xYpXrj0iM8esWxULr0QEzDQFkq5paHG0byW A==; X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6600,9927,10995"; a="3340692" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.06,185,1705392000"; d="scan'208";a="3340692" Received: from orviesa006.jf.intel.com ([10.64.159.146]) by orvoesa108.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Feb 2024 00:27:33 -0800 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.06,185,1705392000"; d="scan'208";a="7020020" Received: from ls.sc.intel.com (HELO localhost) ([172.25.112.31]) by orviesa006-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Feb 2024 00:27:32 -0800 From: isaku.yamahata@intel.com To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: isaku.yamahata@intel.com, isaku.yamahata@gmail.com, Paolo Bonzini , erdemaktas@google.com, Sean Christopherson , Sagi Shahar , Kai Huang , chen.bo@intel.com, hang.yuan@intel.com, tina.zhang@intel.com Subject: [PATCH v19 000/130] KVM TDX basic feature support Date: Mon, 26 Feb 2024 00:25:02 -0800 Message-Id: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" From: Isaku Yamahata KVM TDX basic feature support Hello. This is v19 the patch series of KVM TDX support. This is based on v6.8-rc5. Major changes and uAPI ---------------------- The major change is uAPI change to use KVM_MEMORY_MAPPING as KVM common implementation and dropped CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE. uAPI change requires pa= tches to qemu or tdx kselftest as follows. For unified KVM uAPI, I'll post independent patches and TDX support would be on top of this patch series. Trees ----- The tree can be found at https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream The corresponding qemu branch is found at https://github.com/yamahata/qemu/tree/tdx/qemu-upm How to run/test: It's describe at https://github.com/intel/tdx/wiki/TDX-KVM Existing VM type and SNP ------------------------ The following matrix shows helper functions returns and how the code distin= guish the existing VM types (default, sw protected, and SNP) from TDX so that this patch series doesn't break the existing code. default or SEV-SNP TDX: S =3D (47 or 51) - 12 gfn_shared_mask 0 S bit kvm_is_private_gpa() always false true if GFN has S bit set kvm_gfn_to_shared() nop set S bit kvm_gfn_to_private() nop clear S bit fault.is_private means that host page should be gotten from guest_memfd is_private_gpa() means that KVM MMU should invoke private MMU hooks. Future work ----------- This patch series supports only basic functionalities, TDX guest creation, execution and destruction. The following features are planned as follow up. - vPMU - Off-TD debug. qemu gdb stub support - live migration - etc Required changes to qemu and tdx kselftest ------------------------------------------ Required changes to QEMU: Please don't forget to sync linux-headers. diff --git a/target/i386/kvm/tdx.c b/target/i386/kvm/tdx.c index 0041be589c21..60c70b6bed79 100644 --- a/target/i386/kvm/tdx.c +++ b/target/i386/kvm/tdx.c @@ -714,11 +714,7 @@ static void tdx_finalize_vm(Notifier *notifier, void *= unused) tdx_post_init_vcpus(); =20 for_each_tdx_fw_entry(tdvf, entry) { - struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region mem_region =3D { - .source_addr =3D (__u64)entry->mem_ptr, - .gpa =3D entry->address, - .nr_pages =3D entry->size / 4096, - }; + struct kvm_memory_mapping mapping; =20 r =3D kvm_set_memory_attributes_private(entry->address, entry->siz= e); if (r < 0) { @@ -726,14 +722,31 @@ static void tdx_finalize_vm(Notifier *notifier, void = *unused) exit(1); } =20 - __u32 flags =3D entry->attributes & TDVF_SECTION_ATTRIBUTES_MR_EXT= END ? - KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION : 0; - - trace_kvm_tdx_init_mem_region(entry->type, entry->attributes, mem_= region.source_addr, mem_region.gpa, mem_region.nr_pages); - r =3D tdx_vm_ioctl(KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION, flags, &mem_region); + mapping =3D (struct kvm_memory_mapping) { + .base_gfn =3D entry->address / 4096, + .nr_pages =3D entry->size / 4096, + .source =3D (__u64)entry->mem_ptr, + }; + do { + r =3D kvm_vcpu_ioctl(first_cpu, KVM_MEMORY_MAPPING, &mapping); + } while (r =3D=3D -EAGAIN); if (r < 0) { - error_report("KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION failed %s", strerror(-r= )); - exit(1); + error_report("KVM_MEMORY_MAPPING failed %s", strerror(-r)); + exit(1); + } + + if (entry->attributes & TDVF_SECTION_ATTRIBUTES_MR_EXTEND) { + mapping =3D (struct kvm_memory_mapping) { + .base_gfn =3D entry->address / 4096, + .nr_pages =3D entry->size / 4096, + }; + do { + r =3D tdx_vm_ioctl(KVM_TDX_EXTEND_MEMORY, 0, &mapping); + } while (r =3D=3D -EAGAIN); + if (r < 0) { + error_report("KVM_TDX_EXTEND_MEMORY failed %s", strerror(-= r)); + exit(1); + } } =20 if (entry->type =3D=3D TDVF_SECTION_TYPE_TD_HOB || -- Required changes to tdx kselftest. diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/tdx/tdx_util.c b/tools/= testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/tdx/tdx_util.c index edc1b227a014..a2f4921c416f 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/tdx/tdx_util.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/kvm/lib/x86_64/tdx/tdx_util.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ static char *tdx_cmd_str[] =3D { "KVM_TDX_CAPABILITIES", "KVM_TDX_INIT_VM", "KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU", - "KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION", + "KVM_TDX_EXTEND_MEMORY", "KVM_TDX_FINALIZE_VM", "KVM_TDX_RELEASE_VM" }; @@ -179,19 +179,29 @@ static void tdx_td_vcpu_init(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu) static void tdx_init_mem_region(struct kvm_vm *vm, void *source_pages, uint64_t gpa, uint64_t size) { - struct kvm_tdx_init_mem_region mem_region =3D { - .source_addr =3D (uint64_t)source_pages, - .gpa =3D gpa, + struct kvm_vcpu * vcpu =3D list_first_entry(&vm->vcpus, + struct kvm_vcpu, list); + struct kvm_memory_mapping mapping =3D { + .base_gfn =3D gpa / PAGE_SIZE, .nr_pages =3D size / PAGE_SIZE, + .source =3D (uint64_t)source_pages, }; - uint32_t metadata =3D KVM_TDX_MEASURE_MEMORY_REGION; + int r; =20 - TEST_ASSERT((mem_region.nr_pages > 0) && - ((mem_region.nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE) =3D=3D size), + TEST_ASSERT((mapping.nr_pages > 0) && + ((mapping.nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE) =3D=3D size), "Cannot add partial pages to the guest memory.\n"); TEST_ASSERT(((uint64_t)source_pages & (PAGE_SIZE - 1)) =3D=3D 0, "Source memory buffer is not page aligned\n"); - tdx_ioctl(vm->fd, KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION, metadata, &mem_region); + r =3D ioctl(vcpu->fd, KVM_MEMORY_MAPPING, &mapping); + TEST_ASSERT(r =3D=3D 0, "KVM_MEMORY_MAPPING failed: %d %d", + r, errno); + + mapping =3D (struct kvm_memory_mapping) { + .base_gfn =3D gpa / PAGE_SIZE, + .nr_pages =3D size / PAGE_SIZE, + }; + tdx_ioctl(vm->fd, KVM_TDX_EXTEND_MEMORY, 0, &mapping); } =20 static void tdx_td_finalizemr(struct kvm_vm *vm) @@ -231,7 +241,7 @@ static void tdx_enable_capabilities(struct kvm_vm *vm) KVM_X2APIC_API_USE_32BIT_IDS | KVM_X2APIC_API_DISABLE_BROADCAST_QUIRK); vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_SPLIT_IRQCHIP, 24); - vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS, 1024); + vm_enable_cap(vm, KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS, 512); } =20 static void tdx_configure_memory_encryption(struct kvm_vm *vm) -- Isaku Yamahata Changes from v18: - rebased to v6.8-rc5: - uAPI brekage: KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION =3D> KVM_MEMORY_MAPPING + KVM_TDX_EXTEND_MEMORY - Drop CONFIG_KVM_MMU_PRIVATE - Require NO_RBP_MOD extension of TDX module - Use TDH.VP.RD(TD_VCPU_STATE_DETAILS) to drop buggy_hlt_workaround Changes from v17: - Changed tdx_seamcall() to use struct tdx_module_args - use TDH.SYS.RD() instead of TDH.SYS.INFO() - Drop workaround of pending interrupt - move the initializatin of loaded_vmcss_on_cpu to vmx_init() - More error handling on tdx 1.5 specific error code - drop changes of tools/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h - fixes typo, indent and tabs Changes from v16: - rebased v6.7-rc - Switched to TDX module 1.5. Unsupport TDX module 1.0 Changes from v15: - Added KVM_TDX_RELEASE_VM to reduce the destruction time - Catch up the TDX module interface to use struct tdx_module_args instead of struct tdx_module_output - Add tdh_mem_sept_rd() for SEPT_VE_DISABLE=3D1 and handle Secure-EPT viola= tion with SEPT_VE_DISABLE case. - Simplified tdx_reclaim_page() - Reorganize the locking of tdx_release_hkid(), and use smp_call_mask() instead of smp_call_on_cpu() to hold spinlock to race with invalidation on releasing guest memfd - Removed AMX check as the KVM upstream supports AMX. - Added CET flag to guest supported xss - add check if nr_pages isn't large with (nr_page << PAGE_SHIFT) >> PAGE_SHIFT - use __seamcall_saved_ret() - As struct tdx_module_args doesn't match with vcpu.arch.regs, copy regs before/after calling __seamcall_saved_ret(). Changes from v14: https://lore.kernel.org/all/cover.1685333727.git.isaku.yamahata@intel.com/ - rebased to v6.5-rc2, v11 KVM guest_memfd(), v11 TDX host kernel support - ABI change to add reserved member for future compatibility, dropped unused member. - handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI - handle FEAT_CTL MSR access Changes from v13: - rbased to v6.4-rc3 - Make use of KVM gmem. - Added check_cpuid callback for KVM_SET_CPUID2 as RFC patch. - ABI change of KVM_TDX_VM_INIT as VM scoped KVM ioctl. - Make TDX initialization non-depend on kvm hardware_enable. Use vmx_hardware_enable directly. - Drop a patch to prohibit dirty logging as new KVM gmem code base - Drop parameter only checking for some TDG.VP.VMCALL. Just default part Changes from v12: - ABI change of KVM_TDX_VM_INIT - Rename kvm_gfn_{private, shared} to kvm_gfn_to_{private, shared} - Move APIC BASE MSI initialization to KVM_TDX_VCPU_INIT - Fix MTRR patch - Make MapGpa hypercall always pass it to user space VMM - Split hooks to TDP MMU into two part. populating and zapping. Changes from v11: - ABI change of KVM_TDX_VM_INIT - Split the hook of TDP MMU to not modify handle_changed_spte() - Enhanced commit message on mtrr patch - Made KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS to x86 specific Changes from v10: - rebased to v6.2-rc3 - support mtrr with its own patches - Integrated fd-based private page v10 - Integrated TDX host kernel support v8 - Integrated kvm_init rework v2 - removed struct tdx_td_page and its initialization logic - cleaned up mmio spte and require enable_mmio_caching=3Dtrue for TDX - removed dubious WARN_ON_ONCE() - split a patch adding methods as nop into several patches Changes from v9: - rebased to v6.1-rc2 - Integrated fd-based private page v9 as prerequisite. - Integrated TDX host kernel support v6 - TDP MMU: Make handle_change_spte() return value. - TDX: removed seamcall_lock and return -EAGAIN so that TDP MMU can retry Changes from v8: - rebased to v6.0-rc7 - Integrated with kvm hardware initialization. Check all packages has at l= east one online CPU when creating guest TD and refuse cpu offline during guest= TDs are running. - Integrated fd-based private page v8 as prerequisite. - TDP MMU: Introduced more callbacks instead of single callback. Changes from v7: - Use xarray to track whether GFN is private or shared. Drop SPTE_SHARED_MA= SK. The complex state machine with SPTE_SHARED_MASK was ditched. - Large page support is implemented. But will be posted as independent RFC = patch. - fd-based private page v7 is integrated. This is mostly same to Chao's pat= ches. It's in github. Changes from v6: - rebased to v5.19 Changes from v5: - export __seamcall and use it - move mutex lock from callee function of smp_call_on_cpu to the caller. - rename mmu_prezap =3D> flush_shadow_all_private() and tdx_mmu_release_hkid - updated comment - drop the use of tdh_mng_key.reclaimid(): as the function is for backward compatibility to only return success - struct kvm_tdx_cmd: metadata =3D> flags, added __u64 error. - make this ioctl systemwide ioctl - ABI change to struct kvm_init_vm - guest_tsc_khz: use kvm->arch.default_tsc_khz - rename BUILD_BUG_ON_MEMCPY to MEMCPY_SAME_SIZE - drop exporting kvm_set_tsc_khz(). - fix kvm_tdp_page_fault() for mtrr emulation - rename it to kvm_gfn_shared_mask(), dropped kvm_gpa_shared_mask() - drop kvm_is_private_gfn(), kept kvm_is_private_gpa() keep kvm_{gfn, gpa}_private(), kvm_gpa_private() - update commit message - rename shadow_init_value =3D> shadow_nonprsent_value - added ept_violation_ve_test mode - shadow_nonpresent_value =3D> SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE in tdp_mmu.c - legacy MMU case =3D> - mmu_topup_shadow_page_cache(), kvm_mmu_create() - FNAME(sync_page)(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct kvm_mmu_page *sp) - #VE warning: - rename: REMOVED_SPTE =3D> __REMOVED_SPTE, SHADOW_REMOVED_SPTE =3D> REMOVE= D_SPTE - merge into Like we discussed, this patch should be merged with patch "KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero init value for shadow PTE". - fix pointed by Sagi. check !is_private check =3D> (kvm_gfn_shared_mask &&= !is_private) - introduce kvm_gfn_for_root(kvm, root, gfn) - add only_shared argument to kvm_tdp_mmu_handle_gfn() - use kvm_arch_dirty_log_supported() - rename SPTE_PRIVATE_PROHIBIT to SPTE_SHARED_MASK. - rename: is_private_prohibit_spte() =3D> spte_shared_mask() - fix: shadow_nonpresent_value =3D> SHADOW_NONPRESENT_VALUE in comment - dropped this patch as the change was merged into kvm/queue - update vt_apicv_post_state_restore() - use is_64_bit_hypercall() - comment: expand MSMI -> Machine Check System Management Interrupt - fixed TDX_SEPT_PFERR - tdvmcall_p[1234]_{write, read}() =3D> tdvmcall_a[0123]_{read,write}() - rename tdmvcall_exit_readon() =3D> tdvmcall_leaf() - remove optional zero check of argument. - do a check for static_call(kvm_x86_has_emulated_msr)(kvm, MSR_IA32_SMBASE) in kvm_vcpu_ioctl_smi and __apic_accept_irq. - WARN_ON_ONCE in tdx_smi_allowed and tdx_enable_smi_window. - introduce vcpu_deliver_init to x86_ops - sprinkeled KVM_BUG_ON() Changes from v4: - rebased to TDX host kernel patch series. - include all the patches to make this patch series working. - add [MARKER] patches to mark the patch layer clear. --- * What's TDX? TDX stands for Trust Domain Extensions, which extends Intel Virtual Machines Extensions (VMX) to introduce a kind of virtual machine guest called a Trust Domain (TD) for confidential computing. A TD runs in a CPU mode that is designed to protect the confidentiality of = its memory contents and its CPU state from any other software, including the ho= sting Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), unless explicitly shared by the TD itself. We have more detailed explanations below (***). We have the high-level design of TDX KVM below (****). In this patch series, we use "TD" or "guest TD" to differentiate it from the current "VM" (Virtual Machine), which is supported by KVM today. * The organization of this patch series This patch series is on top of the patches series "TDX host kernel support": https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1646007267.git.kai.huang@intel.com/ This patch series is available at https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm-upstream The related repositories (TDX qemu, TDX OVMF(tdvf) etc) are described at https://github.com/intel/tdx/wiki/TDX-KVM The relations of the layers are depicted as follows. The arrows below show the order of patch reviews we would like to have. The below layers are chosen so that the device model, for example, qemu can exercise each layering step by step. Check if TDX is supported, create TD = VM, create TD vcpu, allow vcpu running, populate TD guest private memory, and h= andle vcpu exits/hypercalls/interrupts to run TD fully. TDX vcpu interrupt/exits/hypercall<------------\ ^ | | | TD finalization | ^ | | | TDX EPT violation<------------\ | ^ | | | | | TD vcpu enter/exit | | ^ | | | | | TD vcpu creation/destruction | \-------KVM TDP MMU MapGPA ^ | ^ | | | TD VM creation/destruction \---------------KVM TDP MMU hooks ^ ^ | | TDX architectural definitions KVM TDP refactoring for TDX ^ ^ | | TDX, VMX <--------TDX host kernel KVM MMU GPA stolen bits coexistence support The followings are explanations of each layer. Each layer has a dummy comm= it that starts with [MARKER] in subject. It is intended to help to identify w= here each layer starts. TDX host kernel support: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/cover.1646007267.git.kai.huang@intel.c= om/ The guts of system-wide initialization of TDX module. There is an independent patch series for host x86. TDX KVM patches call functi= ons this patch series provides to initialize the TDX module. TDX, VMX coexistence: Infrastructure to allow TDX to coexist with VMX and trigger the initialization of the TDX module. This layer starts with "KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX" TDX architectural definitions: Add TDX architectural definitions and helper functions This layer starts with "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural defi= nitions". TD VM creation/destruction: Guest TD creation/destroy allocation and releasing of TDX specific = vm and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement. This layer starts with "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruc= tion". TD vcpu creation/destruction: guest TD creation/destroy Allocation and releasing of TDX specific = vm and vcpu structure. Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement. This layer starts with "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destr= uction" TDX EPT violation: Create an initial guest memory image with TDX measurement. Handle secure EPT violations to populate guest pages with TDX SEAMCALLs. This layer starts with "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation" TD vcpu enter/exit: Allow TDX vcpu to enter into TD and exit from TD. Save CPU state b= efore entering into TD. Restore CPU state after exiting from TD. This layer starts with "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit" TD vcpu interrupts/exit/hypercall: Handle various exits/hypercalls and allow interrupts to be injected= so that TD vcpu can continue running. This layer starts with "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu exits/interrup= ts/hypercalls" KVM MMU GPA shared bit: Introduce framework to handle shared bit repurposed bit of GPA TDX repurposed a bit of GPA to indicate shared or private. If it's shar= ed, it's the same as the conventional VMX EPT case. VMM can access sha= red guest pages. If it's private, it's handled by Secure-EPT and the g= uest page is encrypted. This layer starts with "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA stolen bit= s" KVM TDP refactoring for TDX: TDX Secure EPT requires different constants. e.g. initial value EPT entry value etc. Various refactoring for those differences. This layer starts with "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring fo= r TDX" KVM TDP MMU hooks: Introduce framework to TDP MMU to add hooks in addition to direct E= PT access TDX added Secure EPT which is an enhancement to VMX EPT. Un= like conventional VMX EPT, CPU can't directly read/write Secure EPT. Ins= tead, use TDX SEAMCALLs to operate on Secure EPT. This layer starts with "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks" KVM TDP MMU MapGPA: Introduce framework to handle switching guest pages from private/sh= ared to shared/private. For a given GPA, a guest page can be assigned t= o a private GPA or a shared GPA exclusively. With TDX MapGPA hypercall, guest TD converts GPA assignments from private (or shared) to share= d (or private). This layer starts with "[MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU MapGPA " KVM guest private memory: (not shown in the above diagram) [PATCH v4 00/12] KVM: mm: fd-based approach for supporting KVM guest private memory: https://lkml.org/lkml/2022/1/18/395 Guest private memory requires different memory management in KVM. = The patch proposes a way for it. Integration with TDX KVM. (***) * TDX module A CPU-attested software module called the "TDX module" is designed to imple= ment the TDX architecture, and it is loaded by the UEFI firmware today. It can be loaded by the kernel or driver at runtime, but in this patch series we assu= me that the TDX module is already loaded and initialized. The TDX module provides two main new logical modes of operation built upon = the new SEAM (Secure Arbitration Mode) root and non-root CPU modes added to the= VMX architecture. TDX root mode is mostly identical to the VMX root operation m= ode, and the TDX functions (described later) are triggered by the new SEAMCALL instruction with the desired interface function selected by an input operand (leaf number, in RAX). TDX non-root mode is used for TD guest operation. T= DX non-root operation (i.e. "guest TD" mode) is similar to the VMX non-root operation (i.e. guest VM), with changes and restrictions to better assure t= hat no other software or hardware has direct visibility of the TD memory and st= ate. TDX transitions between TDX root operation and TDX non-root operation inclu= de TD Entries, from TDX root to TDX non-root mode, and TD Exits from TDX non-root= to TDX root mode. A TD Exit might be asynchronous, triggered by some external event (e.g., external interrupt or SMI) or an exception, or it might be synchronous, triggered by a TDCALL (TDG.VP.VMCALL) function. TD VCPUs can be entered using SEAMCALL(TDH.VP.ENTER) by KVM. TDH.VP.ENTER i= s one of the TDX interface functions as mentioned above, and "TDH" stands for Tru= st Domain Host. Those host-side TDX interface functions are categorized into various areas just for better organization, such as SYS (TDX module managem= ent), MNG (TD management), VP (VCPU), PHYSMEM (physical memory), MEM (private mem= ory), etc. For example, SEAMCALL(TDH.SYS.INFO) returns the TDX module information. TDCS (Trust Domain Control Structure) is the main control structure of a gu= est TD, and encrypted (using the guest TD's ephemeral private key). At a high level, TDCS holds information for controlling TD operation as a whole, execution, EPTP, MSR bitmaps, etc that KVM needs to set it up. Note that M= SR bitmaps are held as part of TDCS (unlike VMX) because they are meant to hav= e the same value for all VCPUs of the same TD. Trust Domain Virtual Processor State (TDVPS) is the root control structure = of a TD VCPU. It helps the TDX module control the operation of the VCPU, and ho= lds the VCPU state while the VCPU is not running. TDVPS is opaque to software a= nd DMA access, accessible only by using the TDX module interface functions (su= ch as TDH.VP.RD, TDH.VP.WR). TDVPS includes TD VMCS, and TD VMCS auxiliary struct= ures, such as virtual APIC page, virtualization exception information, etc. Several VMX control structures (such as Shared EPT and Posted interrupt descriptor) are directly managed and accessed by the host VMM. These contr= ol structures are pointed to by fields in the TD VMCS. The above means that 1) KVM needs to allocate different data structures for= TDs, 2) KVM can reuse the existing code for TDs for some operations, 3) it needs= to define TD-specific handling for others. 3) Redirect operations to . 3) Redirect operations to the TDX specific callbacks, like "if (is_td_vcpu(vcp= u)) tdx_callback() else vmx_callback();". *TD Private Memory TD private memory is designed to hold TD private content, encrypted by the = CPU using the TD ephemeral key. An encryption engine holds a table of encryption keys, and an encryption key is selected for each memory transaction based o= n a Host Key Identifier (HKID). By design, the host VMM does not have access to= the encryption keys. In the first generation of MKTME, HKID is "stolen" from the physical addres= s by allocating a configurable number of bits from the top of the physical address. The HKID space is partitioned into shared HKIDs for legacy MKTME accesses and private HKIDs for SEAM-mode-only accesses. We use 0 for the sh= ared HKID on the host so that MKTME can be opaque or bypassed on the host. During TDX non-root operation (i.e. guest TD), memory accesses can be quali= fied as either shared or private, based on the value of a new SHARED bit in the = Guest Physical Address (GPA). The CPU translates shared GPAs using the usual VMX= EPT (Extended Page Table) or "Shared EPT" (in this document), which resides in = host VMM memory. The Shared EPT is directly managed by the host VMM - the same as with the current VMX. Since guest TDs usually require I/O, and the data exc= hange needs to be done via shared memory, thus KVM needs to use the current EPT functionality even for TDs. * Secure EPT and Minoring using the TDP code The CPU translates private GPAs using a separate Secure EPT. The Secure EPT pages are encrypted and integrity-protected with the TD's ephemeral private key. Secure EPT can be managed _indirectly_ by the host VMM, using the TDX interface functions, and thus conceptually Secure EPT is a subset of EPT (w= hy "subset"). Since execution of such interface functions takes much longer ti= me than accessing memory directly, in KVM we use the existing TDP code to mino= r the Secure EPT for the TD. This way, we can effectively walk Secure EPT without using the TDX interface functions. * VM life cycle and TDX specific operations The userspace VMM, such as QEMU, needs to build and treat TDs differently. = For example, a TD needs to boot in private memory, and the host software cannot= copy the initial image to private memory. * TSC Virtualization The TDX module helps TDs maintain reliable TSC (Time Stamp Counter) values (e.g. consistent among the TD VCPUs) and the virtual TSC frequency is deter= mined by TD configuration, i.e. when the TD is created, not per VCPU. The curren= t KVM owns TSC virtualization for VMs, but the TDX module does for TDs. * MCE support for TDs The TDX module doesn't allow VMM to inject MCE. Instead PV way is needed f= or TD to communicate with VMM. For now, KVM silently ignores MCE request by VMM.= MSRs related to MCE (e.g, MCE bank registers) can be naturally emulated by paravirtualizing MSR access. [1] For details, the specifications, [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7], are available. * Restrictions or future work Some features are not included to reduce patch size. Those features are addressed as future independent patch series. - large page (2M, 1G) - qemu gdb stub - guest PMU - and more * Prerequisites It's required to load the TDX module and initialize it. It's out of the sc= ope of this patch series. Another independent patch for the common x86 code is planned. It defines CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST and this patch series uses CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST. It's assumed that With CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST=3Dy, t= he TDX module is initialized and ready for KVM to use the TDX module APIs for TDX = guest life cycle like tdh.mng.init are ready to use. Concretely Global initialization, LP (Logical Processor) initialization, gl= obal configuration, the key configuration, and TDMR and PAMT initialization are = done. The state of the TDX module is SYS_READY. Please refer to the TDX module specification, the chapter Intel TDX Module Lifecycle State Machine ** Detecting the TDX module readiness. TDX host patch series implements the detection of the TDX module availabili= ty and its initialization so that KVM can use it. Also it manages Host KeyID (HKID) assigned to guest TD. The assumed APIs the TDX host patch series provides are - const struct tdsysinfo_struct *tdx_get_sysinfo(void); Return the system wide information about the TDX module. NULL if the TDX isn't initialized. - int tdx_enable(void); Initialization of TDX module so that the TDX module is ready for KVM to u= se. - extern u32 tdx_global_keyid __read_mostly; global host key id that is used for the TDX module itself. - u32 tdx_get_num_keyid(void); return the number of available TDX private host key id. - int tdx_keyid_alloc(void); Allocate HKID for guest TD. - void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid); Free HKID for guest TD. (****) * TDX KVM high-level design - Host key ID management Host Key ID (HKID) needs to be assigned to each TDX guest for memory encryp= tion. It is assumed The TDX host patch series implements necessary functions, u32 tdx_get_global_keyid(void), int tdx_keyid_alloc(void) and, void tdx_keyid_free(int keyid). - Data structures and VM type Because TDX is different from VMX, define its own VM/VCPU structures, struct kvm_tdx and struct vcpu_tdx instead of struct kvm_vmx and struct vcpu_vmx. = To identify the VM, introduce VM-type to specify which VM type, VMX (default) = or TDX, is used. - VM life cycle and TDX specific operations Re-purpose the existing KVM_MEMORY_ENCRYPT_OP to add TDX specific operation= s. New commands are used to get the TDX system parameters, set TDX specific VM= /VCPU parameters, set initial guest memory and measurement. The creation of TDX VM requires five additional operations in addition to t= he conventional VM creation. - Get KVM system capability to check if TDX VM type is supported - VM creation (KVM_CREATE_VM) - New: Get the TDX specific system parameters. KVM_TDX_GET_CAPABILITY. - New: Set TDX specific VM parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VM. - VCPU creation (KVM_CREATE_VCPU) - New: Set TDX specific VCPU parameters. KVM_TDX_INIT_VCPU. - New: Initialize guest memory as boot state and extend the measurement w= ith the memory. KVM_TDX_INIT_MEM_REGION. - New: Finalize VM. KVM_TDX_FINALIZE. Complete measurement of the initial TDX VM contents. - VCPU RUN (KVM_VCPU_RUN) - Protected guest state Because the guest state (CPU state and guest memory) is protected, the KVM = VMM can't operate on them. For example, accessing CPU registers, injecting exceptions, and accessing guest memory. Those operations are handled as silently ignored, returning zero or initial reset value when it's requested= via KVM API ioctls. VM/VCPU state and callbacks for TDX specific operations. Define tdx specific VM state and VCPU state instead of VMX ones. Redir= ect operations to TDX specific callbacks. "if (tdx) tdx_op() else vmx_op()= ". Operations on the CPU state silently ignore operations on the guest state. For example, the write = to CPU registers is ignored and the read from CPU registers returns 0. . ignore access to CPU registers except for allowed ones. . TSC: add a check if tsc is immutable and return an error. Because th= e KVM implementation updates the internal tsc state and it's difficult to b= ack out those changes. Instead, skip the logic. . dirty logging: add check if dirty logging is supported. . exceptions/SMI/MCE/SIPI/INIT: silently ignore Note: virtual external interrupt and NMI can be injected into TDX guest= s. - KVM MMU integration One bit of the guest physical address (bit 51 or 47) is repurposed to indic= ate if the guest physical address is private (the bit is cleared) or shared (the b= it is set). The bits are called stolen bits. - Stolen bits framework systematically tracks which guest physical address, shared or private, = is used. - Shared EPT and secure EPT There are two EPTs. Shared EPT (the conventional one) and Secure EPT(the new one). Shared EPT is handled the same for the stolen bit set. Secure EPT points to private guest pages. To resolve EPT violation, KVM walks one of two EPTs based on faulted GPA. Because it's costly to access secure EPT during walking EPTs with SEAMCALLs for the private guest physical address, another private EPT is used as a shadow of Secure-EPT with the existing logic at the cost of extra memory. The following depicts the relationship. KVM | TDX module | | | -------------+---------- | | | | | | V V | | shared GPA private GPA | | CPU shared EPT pointer KVM private EPT pointer | CPU secure EPT point= er | | | | | | | | V V | V shared EPT private EPT--------mirror----->Secure EPT | | | | | \--------------------+------\ | | | | | V | V V shared guest page | private guest page | | non-encrypted memory | encrypted memory | - Operating on Secure EPT Use the TDX module APIs to operate on Secure EPT. To call the TDX API during resolving EPT violation, add hooks to additional operation and w= iring it to TDX backend. * References [1] TDX specification https://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/developer/articles/technical/int= el-trust-domain-extensions.html [2] Intel Trust Domain Extensions (Intel TDX) https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790 [3] Intel CPU Architectural Extensions Specification https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/i= ntel-tdx-cpu-architectural-specification.pdf [4] Intel TDX Module 1.0 Specification https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-m= odule-1.0-public-spec-v0.931.pdf [5] Intel TDX Loader Interface Specification https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents-tps/in= tel-tdx-seamldr-interface-specification.pdf [6] Intel TDX Guest-Hypervisor Communication Interface https://cdrdv2.intel.com/v1/dl/getContent/726790 [7] Intel TDX Virtual Firmware Design Guide https://www.intel.com/content/dam/develop/external/us/en/documents/tdx-v= irtual-firmware-design-guide-rev-1.01.pdf [8] intel public github kvm TDX branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/kvm TDX guest branch: https://github.com/intel/tdx/tree/guest qemu TDX https://github.com/intel/qemu-tdx [9] TDVF https://github.com/tianocore/edk2-staging/tree/TDVF This was merged into EDK2 main branch. https://github.com/tianocore/edk2 Chao Gao (2): KVM: x86/mmu: Assume guest MMIOs are shared KVM: x86: Allow to update cached values in kvm_user_return_msrs w/o wrmsr Isaku Yamahata (101): x86/tdx: Warning with 32bit build shift-count-overflow KVM: x86: Pass is_private to gmem hook of gmem_max_level KVM: Add new members to struct kvm_gfn_range to operate on KVM: x86/mmu: Pass around full 64-bit error code for the KVM page fault KVM: x86: Use PFERR_GUEST_ENC_MASK to indicate fault is private KVM: Add KVM vcpu ioctl to pre-populate guest memory KVM: Document KVM_MEMORY_MAPPING ioctl KVM: x86: Implement kvm_arch_{, pre_}vcpu_memory_mapping() KVM: x86: Add is_vm_type_supported callback KVM: x86/vmx: initialize loaded_vmcss_on_cpu in vmx_init() KVM: x86/vmx: Refactor KVM VMX module init/exit functions KVM: TDX: Initialize the TDX module when loading the KVM intel kernel module KVM: TDX: Add placeholders for TDX VM/vcpu structure KVM: TDX: Make TDX VM type supported [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX architectural definitions KVM: TDX: Define TDX architectural definitions KVM: TDX: Add C wrapper functions for SEAMCALLs to the TDX module KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to print TDX SEAMCALL error [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD VM creation/destruction KVM: TDX: Add helper functions to allocate/free TDX private host key id KVM: TDX: Add helper function to read TDX metadata in array KVM: TDX: Get system-wide info about TDX module on initialization KVM: TDX: Add place holder for TDX VM specific mem_enc_op ioctl KVM: TDX: Make KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPUS backend specific KVM: TDX: create/destroy VM structure KVM: TDX: initialize VM with TDX specific parameters KVM: TDX: Make pmu_intel.c ignore guest TD case KVM: TDX: Refuse to unplug the last cpu on the package [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu creation/destruction KVM: TDX: create/free TDX vcpu structure KVM: TDX: Do TDX specific vcpu initialization [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM MMU GPA shared bits KVM: x86/mmu: Add address conversion functions for TDX shared bit of GPA [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP refactoring for TDX KVM: x86/mmu: Replace hardcoded value 0 for the initial value for SPTE KVM: x86/mmu: Add Suppress VE bit to shadow_mmio_mask/shadow_present_mask KVM: x86/mmu: Track shadow MMIO value on a per-VM basis KVM: x86/mmu: Disallow fast page fault on private GPA KVM: VMX: Introduce test mode related to EPT violation VE [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: KVM TDP MMU hooks KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Init role member of struct kvm_mmu_page at allocation KVM: x86/mmu: Add a new is_private member for union kvm_mmu_page_role KVM: x86/mmu: Add a private pointer to struct kvm_mmu_page KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Apply mmu notifier callback to only shared GPA KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Sprinkle __must_check KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Support TDX private mapping for TDP MMU [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TDX EPT violation KVM: TDX: Add accessors VMX VMCS helpers KVM: TDX: Require TDP MMU and mmio caching for TDX KVM: TDX: TDP MMU TDX support KVM: TDX: MTRR: implement get_mt_mask() for TDX [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD finalization KVM: x86: Add hooks in kvm_arch_vcpu_memory_mapping() KVM: TDX: Create initial guest memory KVM: TDX: Extend memory measurement with initial guest memory KVM: TDX: Finalize VM initialization [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu enter/exit KVM: TDX: Implement TDX vcpu enter/exit path KVM: TDX: vcpu_run: save/restore host state(host kernel gs) KVM: TDX: restore host xsave state when exit from the guest TD KVM: TDX: restore user ret MSRs [MARKER] The start of TDX KVM patch series: TD vcpu exits/interrupts/hypercalls KVM: TDX: Complete interrupts after tdexit KVM: TDX: restore debug store when TD exit KVM: TDX: handle vcpu migration over logical processor KVM: x86: Add a switch_db_regs flag to handle TDX's auto-switched behavior KVM: TDX: remove use of struct vcpu_vmx from posted_interrupt.c KVM: TDX: Implement interrupt injection KVM: TDX: Implements vcpu request_immediate_exit KVM: TDX: Implement methods to inject NMI KVM: TDX: Add a place holder to handle TDX VM exit KVM: TDX: handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI KVM: TDX: handle ept violation/misconfig exit KVM: TDX: handle EXCEPTION_NMI and EXTERNAL_INTERRUPT KVM: TDX: Handle EXIT_REASON_OTHER_SMI with MSMI KVM: TDX: Add a place holder for handler of TDX hypercalls (TDG.VP.VMCALL) KVM: TDX: handle KVM hypercall with TDG.VP.VMCALL KVM: TDX: Add KVM Exit for TDX TDG.VP.VMCALL KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV CPUID hypercall KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV HLT hypercall KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV port io hypercall KVM: TDX: Implement callbacks for MSR operations for TDX KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV rdmsr/wrmsr hypercall KVM: TDX: Handle MSR MTRRCap and MTRRDefType access KVM: TDX: Handle MSR IA32_FEAT_CTL MSR and IA32_MCG_EXT_CTL KVM: TDX: Handle TDG.VP.VMCALL hypercall KVM: TDX: Silently discard SMI request KVM: TDX: Silently ignore INIT/SIPI KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to CPU state KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore guest instruction emulation KVM: TDX: Add a method to ignore dirty logging KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore VMX preemption timer KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore accesses to TSC KVM: TDX: Ignore setting up mce KVM: TDX: Add a method to ignore for TDX to ignore hypercall patch KVM: TDX: Add methods to ignore virtual apic related operation KVM: TDX: Inhibit APICv for TDX guest Documentation/virt/kvm: Document on Trust Domain Extensions(TDX) KVM: x86: design documentation on TDX support of x86 KVM TDP MMU RFC: KVM: x86: Add x86 callback to check cpuid RFC: KVM: x86, TDX: Add check for KVM_SET_CPUID2 Kai Huang (7): x86/virt/tdx: Rename _offset to _member for TD_SYSINFO_MAP() macro x86/virt/tdx: Move TDMR metadata fields map table to local variable x86/virt/tdx: Unbind global metadata read with 'struct tdx_tdmr_sysinfo' x86/virt/tdx: Support global metadata read for all element sizes x86/virt/tdx: Export global metadata read infrastructure x86/virt/tdx: Export TDX KeyID information x86/virt/tdx: Export SEAMCALL functions Michael Roth (1): KVM: x86: Add gmem hook for determining max NPT mapping level Sean Christopherson (15): KVM: x86/mmu: Introduce kvm_mmu_map_tdp_page() for use by TDX KVM: VMX: Move out vmx_x86_ops to 'main.c' to wrap VMX and TDX KVM: TDX: Add TDX "architectural" error codes KVM: TDX: x86: Add ioctl to get TDX systemwide parameters KVM: Allow page-sized MMU caches to be initialized with custom 64-bit values KVM: x86/mmu: Allow non-zero value for non-present SPTE and removed SPTE KVM: x86/tdp_mmu: Don't zap private pages for unsupported cases KVM: VMX: Split out guts of EPT violation to common/exposed function KVM: TDX: Add load_mmu_pgd method for TDX KVM: TDX: Add support for find pending IRQ in a protected local APIC KVM: x86: Assume timer IRQ was injected if APIC state is proteced KVM: VMX: Modify NMI and INTR handlers to take intr_info as function argument KVM: VMX: Move NMI/exception handler to common helper KVM: x86: Split core of hypercall emulation to helper function KVM: TDX: Handle TDX PV MMIO hypercall Yan Zhao (1): KVM: x86/mmu: Do not enable page track for TD guest Yang Weijiang (1): KVM: TDX: Add TSX_CTRL msr into uret_msrs list Yao Yuan (1): KVM: TDX: Handle vmentry failure for INTEL TD guest Yuan Yao (1): KVM: TDX: Retry seamcall when TDX_OPERAND_BUSY with operand SEPT Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 37 +- Documentation/virt/kvm/index.rst | 2 + .../virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst | 33 + Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/index.rst | 2 + Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/intel-tdx.rst | 362 ++ Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst | 443 +++ arch/x86/events/intel/ds.c | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 1 + arch/x86/include/asm/kvm-x86-ops.h | 21 +- arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 79 +- arch/x86/include/asm/shared/tdx.h | 9 +- arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h | 31 +- arch/x86/include/asm/vmx.h | 14 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h | 86 + arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/vmx.h | 5 +- arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig | 3 +- arch/x86/kvm/Makefile | 3 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c | 27 +- arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/irq.c | 3 + arch/x86/kvm/lapic.c | 33 +- arch/x86/kvm/lapic.h | 2 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu.h | 37 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 247 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 87 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmutrace.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c | 3 + arch/x86/kvm/mmu/paging_tmpl.h | 2 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.c | 17 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/spte.h | 28 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_iter.h | 14 +- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.c | 442 ++- arch/x86/kvm/mmu/tdp_mmu.h | 7 +- arch/x86/kvm/smm.h | 7 +- arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 8 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h | 166 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c | 1268 +++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.c | 46 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h | 28 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.c | 43 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/posted_intr.h | 13 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c | 3347 +++++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h | 268 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h | 273 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h | 34 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c | 21 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h | 400 ++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmcs.h | 5 + arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 663 +--- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.h | 52 +- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h | 276 ++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 166 +- arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 4 + arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S | 4 + arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c | 95 +- arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h | 2 - include/linux/kvm_host.h | 7 + include/linux/kvm_types.h | 1 + include/uapi/linux/kvm.h | 99 + virt/kvm/guest_memfd.c | 3 + virt/kvm/kvm_main.c | 115 +- 61 files changed, 8741 insertions(+), 758 deletions(-) create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/intel-tdx-layer-status.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/intel-tdx.rst create mode 100644 Documentation/virt/kvm/x86/tdx-tdp-mmu.rst create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/pmu_intel.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_arch.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_errno.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_error.c create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx_ops.h create mode 100644 arch/x86/kvm/vmx/x86_ops.h base-commit: ffd2cb6b718e189e7e2d5d0c19c25611f92e061a --=20 2.25.1