From nobody Wed Oct 8 17:33:59 2025 Received: from mgamail.intel.com (mgamail.intel.com [198.175.65.10]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DE7F825B1D8; Thu, 26 Jun 2025 10:49:45 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=198.175.65.10 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1750934987; cv=none; b=qJ5DUXtnDBibZUg3Ry9nrOwS6onip9Y9kTgqbm8JnmF1cRR1fumFCaJkDPI1fpiz0PA1juFd9QCJupc5rovzh3z7Qjlh0kIZNYrfsNVuRIKEYRYFabARyGuUUaW826tOrGsRCpUClS31ZuLikOX8up5dMJ8mXcSzLTDBuAUFjMs= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1750934987; c=relaxed/simple; bh=UnEPQjbST0yIQL5kAKbK+dXltux/87JOeue/+D47lnw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=ffqFOinaW9fupjMljv+Wn4TXyZyhAVTkvbk5KWYHySSXOoJ0T+GCVTbEDXSJtCnbXQRKu2tDjU6sCDgUIxF40KXiLZ+QIQtKOG9H1PZyKhjb05FebQbicMogAjS44R5kF3HMCYqlEn2+zbBHCwjBmJzGEBNQAq6xVvNTrKyN48I= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=intel.com; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=intel.com header.i=@intel.com header.b=FQScZq+x; arc=none smtp.client-ip=198.175.65.10 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=intel.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=intel.com header.i=@intel.com header.b="FQScZq+x" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1750934986; x=1782470986; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=UnEPQjbST0yIQL5kAKbK+dXltux/87JOeue/+D47lnw=; b=FQScZq+xjQGi/LzB3IvO0/YC41ibu39Gf7+4HPS6wxHuYjEYLCKREu3f I3PujXCkjOwp/2FcZA4e5ay9wfWJfPxK+nccRLIdfVqboiO66jCmnvbnI 39Vn4Feqq7co5pw3FWLb9Hp9s0FHEpdLiEhHLdtEGhQCxXThlGotmAPYt didiK6wWZVIE22Qmr/SUtgZQtU4E0Vr/WN/LcbWXv6Yw0sci6xpnuga1Y vzMhu3fIC8pSpDcniJZjZUAG9Gdd+QICu3rTFhX/+KYBqXQ74ENXN28sC E/DxbOfYbPTKIqQ7o8+Fp7xSOluMNyiqZowEeIHy2VhhEhN996SB2hpAt A==; X-CSE-ConnectionGUID: XTaqbdbXTYusNGI9eYP7cw== X-CSE-MsgGUID: F07V3iv2RI6NgELoI03TTg== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6800,10657,11475"; a="70655804" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.16,267,1744095600"; d="scan'208";a="70655804" Received: from fmviesa009.fm.intel.com ([10.60.135.149]) by orvoesa102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Jun 2025 03:49:46 -0700 X-CSE-ConnectionGUID: q7IeTlpFRre97LBms66Sbg== X-CSE-MsgGUID: CVI+DdBOSdK+R73pK4IYCQ== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.16,267,1744095600"; d="scan'208";a="152784343" Received: from jairdeje-mobl1.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.124.220.86]) by fmviesa009-auth.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 26 Jun 2025 03:49:41 -0700 From: Kai Huang To: dave.hansen@intel.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: x86@kernel.org, kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, reinette.chatre@intel.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, ashish.kalra@amd.com, nik.borisov@suse.com, sagis@google.com, Farrah Chen Subject: [PATCH v3 4/6] x86/virt/tdx: Remove the !KEXEC_CORE dependency Date: Thu, 26 Jun 2025 22:48:50 +1200 Message-ID: X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.49.0 In-Reply-To: References: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" During kexec it is now guaranteed that all dirty cachelines of TDX private memory are flushed before jumping to the new kernel. The TDX private memory from the old kernel will remain as TDX private memory in the new kernel, but it is OK because kernel read/write to TDX private memory will never cause machine check, except on the platforms with the TDX partial write erratum, which has already been handled. It is safe to allow kexec to work together with TDX now. Remove the !KEXEC_CORE dependency. Signed-off-by: Kai Huang Tested-by: Farrah Chen Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index 71019b3b54ea..ca1c9f9e59be 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1899,7 +1899,6 @@ config INTEL_TDX_HOST depends on X86_X2APIC select ARCH_KEEP_MEMBLOCK depends on CONTIG_ALLOC - depends on !KEXEC_CORE depends on X86_MCE help Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious --=20 2.49.0