From nobody Mon Oct 6 20:43:12 2025 Received: from mgamail.intel.com (mgamail.intel.com [198.175.65.12]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 618ED23A563; Thu, 17 Jul 2025 21:47:39 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=198.175.65.12 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1752788860; cv=none; b=ozr1IRH7sAoHmmyzae/2J1/x/FwHG+4/hJex5xhDDrk8XnB2YQgh9CvewxJiz+BgI9a/S8iXjg8ulVXAvyQSsJ67hrngBc7hKGSn8M1CG9mC1Q8A/fFs4FV7j5wbcrQPrX0sCPrYGilip2PlCd/t5fcV5mXjlHXm8zVd3YOVaFI= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1752788860; c=relaxed/simple; bh=9OR/ASG/rWDiMrfQLxRxrU+wLWwPeQ/hqJqOKsFyV/o=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=JODAD/86ew+T+9NSNMxNiUW/nFpr6jSXZ2S5f6dDRVbsudHkJaZM2DWPH1wds0Jr6phtM6t7HdZKGvAnEKrnBHlxR2Cv8Njva9WOqG0+GZ+qTKRSqzIuWlLM53XW3AShiSjA7yQh2oaCH9WTaU2PnqXQLAx9ep/YTwwHtLOh5hY= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=intel.com; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=intel.com header.i=@intel.com header.b=VI7MySrq; arc=none smtp.client-ip=198.175.65.12 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=intel.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=intel.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=intel.com header.i=@intel.com header.b="VI7MySrq" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=intel.com; i=@intel.com; q=dns/txt; s=Intel; t=1752788859; x=1784324859; h=from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:in-reply-to: references:mime-version:content-transfer-encoding; bh=9OR/ASG/rWDiMrfQLxRxrU+wLWwPeQ/hqJqOKsFyV/o=; b=VI7MySrqwSQbK/gJZY1E5sirNEbzgOoK8OeKBy0nZeu2Msf8x7LxDb+T W5Mkale/udigH1yIjxk2xzT+aC9xHYOFtXFT621jNA7ovQSaiiNhE9qTP JkTGjlCTD+B4HuEFL+vZ8ycQk3G+Az1nK6S3DS/YwcBs6vfJmUa7KPvEW VK7Te2cYZ9vKWvT+OoTkg7kiHODskvJZVBDVFaWaapCUNw4HngiqIpRLD Xdz9jhrpQWcwTB4fqHY+WqTvi5HnN+n/vV+ZwuUOEDnsNk94DN21kM+4X fLKYahgFd3a5okXOsKJPdYrO7P0iZH8z/JQsbV+Vr4S0AvqzAiari6TjK A==; X-CSE-ConnectionGUID: cUz10YecRvySBp+B1YNH7g== X-CSE-MsgGUID: VcYx93b6SdCUqPgC+esr2w== X-IronPort-AV: E=McAfee;i="6800,10657,11495"; a="66527815" X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.16,319,1744095600"; d="scan'208";a="66527815" Received: from orviesa010.jf.intel.com ([10.64.159.150]) by orvoesa104.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 17 Jul 2025 14:47:39 -0700 X-CSE-ConnectionGUID: 14nrw7LIRveY4h5G013b2Q== X-CSE-MsgGUID: kl44EH6CS5GbQGVevjfOrw== X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="6.16,319,1744095600"; d="scan'208";a="157295545" Received: from vverma7-mobl3.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO khuang2-desk.gar.corp.intel.com) ([10.124.221.39]) by orviesa010-auth.jf.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 17 Jul 2025 14:47:33 -0700 From: Kai Huang To: dave.hansen@intel.com, bp@alien8.de, tglx@linutronix.de, peterz@infradead.org, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com Cc: x86@kernel.org, kas@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, pbonzini@redhat.com, seanjc@google.com, kvm@vger.kernel.org, reinette.chatre@intel.com, isaku.yamahata@intel.com, dan.j.williams@intel.com, ashish.kalra@amd.com, nik.borisov@suse.com, chao.gao@intel.com, sagis@google.com, Farrah Chen Subject: [PATCH v4 5/7] x86/virt/tdx: Remove the !KEXEC_CORE dependency Date: Fri, 18 Jul 2025 09:46:42 +1200 Message-ID: <33eecfdd6297a0039c6898eaf2e17480fbf3782a.1752730040.git.kai.huang@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.50.1 In-Reply-To: References: Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" During kexec it is now guaranteed that all dirty cachelines of TDX private memory are flushed before jumping to the new kernel. The TDX private memory from the old kernel will remain as TDX private memory in the new kernel, but it is OK because kernel read/write to TDX private memory will never cause machine check, except on the platforms with the TDX partial write erratum, which has already been handled. It is safe to allow kexec to work together with TDX now. Remove the !KEXEC_CORE dependency. Signed-off-by: Kai Huang Tested-by: Farrah Chen Reviewed-by: Rick Edgecombe --- arch/x86/Kconfig | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index e924819ae133..41dfe282cf7a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1900,7 +1900,6 @@ config INTEL_TDX_HOST depends on X86_X2APIC select ARCH_KEEP_MEMBLOCK depends on CONTIG_ALLOC - depends on !KEXEC_CORE depends on X86_MCE help Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protects guest VMs from malicious --=20 2.50.0