From nobody Sat Sep 26 13:18:37 2026 Received: from mailgw.kylinos.cn (mailgw.kylinos.cn [124.126.103.232]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 209E825D530 for ; Tue, 1 Sep 2026 09:57:00 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=124.126.103.232 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788256623; cv=none; b=Xc3hxqSozCBmCGb1tAMU3JyhmqaJ52noZIwHw2WYJoEY4bbyXF+adzOKsCacY0aziCXqQ8kuhmTXrxQQKq9BbdY+yga+2KYUCVjx8DnzSORq6TkBRniNI3uKbw5OoX9NCDDPBdO+4c22HHa+D2DqyzE6zN/W0gY8tXQcXW1pPNQ= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1788256623; c=relaxed/simple; bh=pLU6H4VtoQMohAI3AVcy1kXr5S+mZmDCFeJzD3CFymw=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:MIME-Version; b=FssH24GPCDyvQNwn9qe+CwHk6tvgB14vVsNgMaRdNPjYdmgWzCncsslNtA+V29/T9Zmn0sSFPurieiyBHupCv47ZTJgBOZ0BINtGtwrTFlQFH+MW2n1FuKtYS490iXFaPCRYC58tfwvHrLA2mEl8e3d+F4W6hCc8h2RM/TdZoF8= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=kylinos.cn; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kylinos.cn; arc=none smtp.client-ip=124.126.103.232 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=none (p=none dis=none) header.from=kylinos.cn Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=kylinos.cn X-UUID: 7665532ea5eb11f19a56ed5b684f684d-20260901 X-CID-P-RULE: Release_Ham X-CID-O-INFO: VERSION:1.3.19,REQID:7f1f2c52-6a02-472d-8b22-12e4e64d2b06,IP:0,U RL:0,TC:0,Content:-25,EDM:25,RT:0,SF:0,FILE:0,BULK:0,RULE:Release_Ham,ACTI ON:release,TS:0 X-CID-META: VersionHash:7db8b62,CLOUDID:0f3500f0984a7eb79c7e8561c9ed82ee,BulkI D:nil,BulkQuantity:0,SF:102|865|898,TC:nil,Content:0|15|50,EDM:5,IP:nil,UR L:0,File:nil,RT:nil,Bulk:nil,QS:nil,BEC:nil,COL:0,OSI:0,OSA:0,AV:0,LES:1,S PR:NO,DKR:0,DKP:0,BRR:0,BRE:0,ARC:0 X-CID-BVR: 2,SSN|SDN X-CID-BAS: 2,SSN|SDN,0,_ X-CID-FACTOR: TF_CID_SPAM_SNR X-CID-RHF: D41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E X-UUID: 7665532ea5eb11f19a56ed5b684f684d-20260901 X-User: liwanwu@kylinos.cn Received: from kylinos.cn [(10.44.16.150)] by mailgw.kylinos.cn (envelope-from ) (Generic MTA with TLSv1.3 TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 256/256) with ESMTP id 1995746973; Tue, 01 Sep 2026 17:56:54 +0800 From: Wanwu Li To: Tejun Heo , David Vernet , Andrea Righi , Changwoo Min Cc: liwanwu@kylinos.cn, sched-ext@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] sched_ext: Reject NMI calls to lock-taking kfuncs Date: Tue, 1 Sep 2026 17:56:52 +0800 Message-Id: <20260901095652.1009104-1-liwanwu@kylinos.cn> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" commit e06ece82d7b0 ("sched_ext: Report NMI kicks with scx_error()") made scx_bpf_kick_cpu() reject NMI calls, and its cover letter describes the reachability: sched_ext kfuncs in the "any" category "are callable from tracing progs that can attach to functions running in NMI", and an unlucky call from there "could deadlock the machine". The fix in that series made the error/exit path lock-free so scx_error() is safe to call from NMI. That closes the *error* path of every kfunc, but not a kfunc's own business-logic lock acquisition on its success path. The remaining lock-taking kfuncs that scx_kfunc_context_filter() exposes to BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING have the same hazard: if an NMI lands on a CPU whose interrupted context already holds the lock, the kfunc's raw spinlock acquisition spins forever and hard-locks the CPU: - scx_bpf_destroy_dsq() -> dsq->lock - scx_bpf_dsq_reenq() -> rq's deferred_reenq_lock - scx_bpf_cpuperf_set() / scx_bpf_cidperf_set() -> rq->lock - scx_bpf_sub_grant() / scx_bpf_sub_revoke() -> pshard lock (via the shared sub_cap_preamble()) - bpf_iter_scx_dsq_next() / bpf_iter_scx_dsq_destroy() -> dsq->lock (bpf_iter_scx_dsq_new() is lockless and needs no guard) As things stand, there is no scenario for reenqueueing, iterating a DSQ, setting a performance target or granting sub-caps from NMI. The guards defend against a buggy or malicious BPF program turning an "any"-category kfunc into a machine-wide hard-lockup through the door that scx_kfunc_context_filter() already opens. This matches the intent of scx_bpf_kick_cpu()'s NMI check, which the commit cited above added not to enable an NMI use case but to surface such a bug as a clean abort. Route all of them through a new scx_kfunc_nmi_safe() helper and reuse scx_bpf_kick_cpu()'s existing in_nmi() check - now shared with its cid equivalent scx_bpf_kick_cid() through scx_kick_cpu() - so the rule is stated once and the coverage is auditable from one place. scx_error() is already NMI-safe (commit f883dbb64ca5 ("sched_ext: Make exit claiming lock-free")), so the reject-abort cannot deadlock the lock acquisition. Read-only members of the reachable sets (dsq_peek, dsq_nr_queued, cpuperf_cur/cap, sub_caps, the idle cpumask helpers and the cid lookups) take no scheduler lock on the path a tracing program reaches them, and were audited to that effect; they are correctly left unguarded. The select_cpu kfuncs do take pi_lock, but scx_kfunc_context_filter() only exposes the any/idle/cid sets to BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING, and struct_ops run in task context, so no lock-taking path here is reachable from NMI. Signed-off-by: Wanwu Li Acked-by: Andrea Righi --- kernel/sched/ext/ext.c | 27 ++++++++++++++++++++------- kernel/sched/ext/internal.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/sched/ext/sub.c | 3 +++ 3 files changed, 45 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/sched/ext/ext.c b/kernel/sched/ext/ext.c index 10af28a9f2c0..a0b886975e1d 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/ext/ext.c +++ b/kernel/sched/ext/ext.c @@ -5108,6 +5108,9 @@ static void destroy_dsq(struct scx_sched *sch, u64 ds= q_id) struct scx_dispatch_q *dsq; unsigned long flags; =20 + if (!scx_kfunc_nmi_safe("scx_bpf_destroy_dsq()", sch)) + return; + rcu_read_lock(); =20 dsq =3D find_user_dsq(sch, dsq_id); @@ -9518,14 +9521,8 @@ void scx_kick_cpu(struct scx_sched *sch, s32 cpu, u6= 4 flags) struct rq *this_rq; unsigned long irq_flags; =20 - /* - * The per-cpu kick list is guarded only by local_irq_save(), which does - * not mask NMIs, so kicking from NMI could corrupt it and is unsupported. - */ - if (unlikely(in_nmi())) { - scx_error(sch, "scx_bpf_kick_cpu() called from NMI"); + if (!scx_kfunc_nmi_safe("scx_bpf_kick_cpu()", sch)) return; - } =20 local_irq_save(irq_flags); =20 @@ -9756,6 +9753,9 @@ __bpf_kfunc struct task_struct *bpf_iter_scx_dsq_next= (struct bpf_iter_scx_dsq *i if (!kit->dsq) return NULL; =20 + if (!scx_kfunc_nmi_safe(__func__, kit->dsq->sched)) + return NULL; + guard(raw_spinlock_irqsave)(&kit->dsq->lock); =20 return nldsq_cursor_next_task(&kit->cursor, kit->dsq); @@ -9777,6 +9777,9 @@ __bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_scx_dsq_destroy(struct bpf_= iter_scx_dsq *it) if (!list_empty(&kit->cursor.node)) { unsigned long flags; =20 + if (!scx_kfunc_nmi_safe(__func__, kit->dsq->sched)) + return; + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&kit->dsq->lock, flags); list_del_init(&kit->cursor.node); raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&kit->dsq->lock, flags); @@ -9857,6 +9860,9 @@ __bpf_kfunc void scx_bpf_dsq_reenq(u64 dsq_id, u64 re= enq_flags, return; } =20 + if (!scx_kfunc_nmi_safe(__func__, sch)) + return; + /* not specifying any filter bits is the same as %SCX_REENQ_ANY */ if (!(reenq_flags & __SCX_REENQ_FILTER_MASK)) reenq_flags |=3D SCX_REENQ_ANY; @@ -10244,6 +10250,9 @@ __bpf_kfunc void scx_bpf_cpuperf_set(s32 cpu, u32 p= erf, const struct bpf_prog_au if (unlikely(!sch)) return; =20 + if (!scx_kfunc_nmi_safe(__func__, sch)) + return; + scx_cpuperf_set(sch, cpu, perf); } =20 @@ -10269,6 +10278,10 @@ __bpf_kfunc s32 scx_bpf_cidperf_set(s32 cid, u32 p= erf, sch =3D scx_prog_sched(aux); if (unlikely(!sch)) return -ENODEV; + + if (!scx_kfunc_nmi_safe(__func__, sch)) + return -EBUSY; + cpu =3D scx_cid_to_cpu(sch, cid); if (cpu < 0) return cpu; diff --git a/kernel/sched/ext/internal.h b/kernel/sched/ext/internal.h index 27bbf5e04d90..49b165effd67 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/ext/internal.h +++ b/kernel/sched/ext/internal.h @@ -2091,6 +2091,28 @@ extern struct scx_sched *scx_enabling_sub_sched; #define scx_error(sch, fmt, args...) \ scx_exit((sch), SCX_EXIT_ERROR, 0, fmt, ##args) =20 +/* + * sched_ext kfuncs that take scheduler locks are not NMI-safe: a + * BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING program can be attached to a function that runs in + * NMI, and scx_kfunc_context_filter() lets such a program call every kfun= c in + * the any/cid/idle sets. Acquiring the rq, dsq or pshard raw spinlocks - = or + * touching the irq-masking-only kick list - from NMI while the interrupted + * context on the same CPU already holds them deadlocks (or corrupts) it. + * scx_bpf_kick_cpu() was the first guard; route all of them through here. + * + * Returns true when the caller may proceed, false when running from NMI a= nd + * the kfunc must bail without touching locks. scx_error() is NMI-safe (se= e the + * lock-free ->aborting claim). + */ +static inline bool scx_kfunc_nmi_safe(const char *who, struct scx_sched *s= ch) +{ + if (unlikely(in_nmi())) { + scx_error(sch, "%s called from NMI", who); + return false; + } + return true; +} + /** * scx_root_protected_live - Root sched for paths that only run while live * diff --git a/kernel/sched/ext/sub.c b/kernel/sched/ext/sub.c index 0554448835bd..b5125a871562 100644 --- a/kernel/sched/ext/sub.c +++ b/kernel/sched/ext/sub.c @@ -2265,6 +2265,9 @@ static s32 sub_cap_preamble(u64 cgroup_id, u64 caps, = const struct bpf_prog_aux * if (unlikely(!parent)) return -ENODEV; =20 + if (!scx_kfunc_nmi_safe("sub-cap kfuncs", parent)) + return -EBUSY; + if (!scx_is_cid_type()) { scx_error(parent, "sub-cap kfuncs require a cid-form scheduler"); return -EOPNOTSUPP; --=20 2.25.1