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Wed, 08 Apr 2026 17:48:22 +0800 (CST) From: Feng Yang To: ast@kernel.org, daniel@iogearbox.net, andrii@kernel.org, martin.lau@linux.dev, eddyz87@gmail.com, memxor@gmail.com, song@kernel.org, yonghong.song@linux.dev, jolsa@kernel.org, john.fastabend@gmail.com, kpsingh@kernel.org, mattbobrowski@google.com Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH bpf] bpf: Fix Null-Pointer Dereference in kernel_clone() via BPF fmod_ret on security_task_alloc Date: Wed, 8 Apr 2026 17:48:16 +0800 Message-Id: <20260408094816.228322-1-yangfeng59949@163.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.25.1 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-CM-TRANSID: PigvCgAHhYZhJNZp8Gn5AA--.90S2 X-Coremail-Antispam: 1Uf129KBjvJXoWxtrW8tF43Kr15Kw4ftFW5ZFb_yoWfWr43pF yUGr17CrW0qr4UXr47tF4UZr13J3y8ZF4rCr98uryIyF4Yvw1kJw1UGr1qgryYkrWkGw1x tF42g34xKw17ZaDanT9S1TB71UUUUU7qnTZGkaVYY2UrUUUUjbIjqfuFe4nvWSU5nxnvy2 9KBjDUYxBIdaVFxhVjvjDU0xZFpf9x07U6q2_UUUUU= X-CM-SenderInfo: p1dqww5hqjkmqzuzqiywtou0bp/xtbC0AcyqmnWJGei4QAA3w Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" From: Feng Yang Using the following BPF program will cause a kernel panic: SEC("fmod_ret/security_task_alloc") int fmod_task_alloc(void *ctx) { return 1; } [ 383.899321] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000= b99 [ 383.899327] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode [ 383.899330] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page [ 383.899332] PGD 8000000108a60067 P4D 8000000108a60067 PUD 104550067 PMD 0 [ 383.899341] Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI [ 383.899346] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 12925 Comm: test Kdump: loaded Not tainte= d 7.0.0-rc6+ #1 PREEMPT(lazy) [ 383.899349] Hardware name: innotek GmbH VirtualBox/VirtualBox, BIOS Virt= ualBox 12/01/2006 [ 383.899351] RIP: 0010:get_task_pid+0x20/0x80 [ 383.899358] Code: 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 f3 0f 1e fa 0f 1f 44 00 = 00 55 89 f5 53 48 89 fb e8 0b 98 0a 00 85 ed 75 32 48 81 c3 98 0b 00 00 <48= > 8b 1b 48 85 db 74 14 b8 01 00 00 00 f0 0f c1 03 85 c0 74 27 8d [ 383.899362] RSP: 0018:ffffd3ca0ab13b38 EFLAGS: 00010206 [ 383.899367] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: 0000000000000b99 RCX: 00000000000= 00008 [ 383.899371] RDX: ffff8b2c85860000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000000= 00001 [ 383.899374] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000010754cf50c8 R09: 0000010754c= f50c8 [ 383.899377] R10: ffffffff95a6c000 R11: 0000000000000024 R12: 00000000000= 00000 [ 383.899380] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000001 R15: 00000000012= 00000 [ 383.899384] FS: 00007f3eae907740(0000) GS:ffff8b2d05e5c000(0000) knlGS:= 0000000000000000 [ 383.899388] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 [ 383.899390] CR2: 0000000000000b99 CR3: 0000000106a94003 CR4: 00000000000= 706f0 [ 383.899393] Call Trace: [ 383.899397] [ 383.899401] kernel_clone+0xe8/0x480 [ 383.899406] __do_sys_clone+0x65/0x90 [ 383.899410] do_syscall_64+0xca/0x860 [ 383.899421] ? next_uptodate_folio+0x85/0x2a0 [ 383.899427] ? percpu_counter_add_batch+0x4c/0x90 [ 383.899434] ? filemap_map_pages+0x3b7/0x4d0 [ 383.899437] ? do_read_fault+0x107/0x210 [ 383.899442] ? do_fault+0x1b2/0x330 [ 383.899445] ? __handle_mm_fault+0x49b/0x7a0 [ 383.899448] ? count_memcg_events+0xc4/0x160 [ 383.899453] ? handle_mm_fault+0xbb/0x370 [ 383.899456] ? do_user_addr_fault+0x209/0x680 [ 383.899459] ? irqentry_exit+0x7a/0x660 [ 383.899462] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e [ 383.899466] RIP: 0033:0x7f3eaeb426e7 [ 383.899470] Code: 5d c3 90 f3 0f 1e fa 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 00 45 31 = c0 31 d2 31 f6 bf 11 00 20 01 4c 8d 90 d0 02 00 00 b8 38 00 00 00 0f 05 <48= > 3d 00 f0 ff ff 77 39 89 c2 85 c0 75 2c 64 48 8b 04 25 10 00 00 [ 383.899472] RSP: 002b:00007fff23a2c838 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 000000= 0000000038 [ 383.899477] RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f3eaeb= 426e7 [ 383.899479] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 00000000012= 00011 [ 383.899481] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000000= 00000 [ 383.899483] R10: 00007f3eae907a10 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000= 00001 [ 383.899485] R13: 00007fff23a2dbe8 R14: 0000000000403de0 R15: 00007f3eaec= f5000 [ 383.899488] [ 383.899489] Modules linked in: nft_fib_inet nft_fib_ipv4 nft_fib_ipv6 nf= t_fib nft_reject_inet nf_reject_ipv4 nf_reject_ipv6 nft_reject nft_ct nft_c= hain_nat nf_nat nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 ip_set rfkill nf= _tables sunrpc intel_rapl_msr intel_rapl_common intel_uncore_frequency_comm= on intel_pmc_core pmt_telemetry snd_intel8x0 pmt_discovery pmt_class snd_ac= 97_codec intel_pmc_ssram_telemetry ac97_bus intel_vsec snd_pcm snd_timer sn= d rapl soundcore joydev sg i2c_piix4 pcspkr vboxguest i2c_smbus nfnetlink s= r_mod cdrom sd_mod ata_generic vmwgfx ahci libahci ata_piix drm_ttm_helper = ghash_clmulni_intel video ttm e1000 wmi libata serio_raw dm_mirror dm_regio= n_hash dm_log dm_multipath dm_mod fuse i2c_dev autofs4 [ 383.899624] CR2: 0000000000000b99 This is because 1. The BPF program is designed to override the normal behavior of `security_task_alloc` and forcibly return a non-zero error value (e.g., `-ENOMEM` or `1`). 2. User space triggers a process creation syscall (like `fork` or `clone`). The kernel invokes `copy_process` to allocate and initialize a new `task_struct` for the child process. 3. `copy_process` invokes `security_task_alloc`. Due to the attached BPF program, it returns the positive value `1`. 4. `copy_process` treats any non-zero return from `security_task_alloc` as a failure. It aborts initialization, cleans up, and returns the error code cast to a pointer via `ERR_PTR(1)` (which evaluates to the memory address `0x1`). 5. In `kernel_clone()`, the kernel uses the `IS_ERR()` macro to check if the returned `task_struct *p` is an error pointer. However, `IS_ERR()` only checks for negative error codes in the range `[-MAX_ERRNO, -1]`. Since `0x1` is not in this range, the check `IS_ERR(p)` evaluates to `false`. 6. The kernel incorrectly assumes `p` is a valid `task_struct` pointer and proceeds to call `get_task_pid(p, PIDTYPE_PID)`. This dereferences the invalid address `0x1` (plus the offset of the `thread_pid` field), triggering a general protection fault or null-pointer dereference. Currently, fmod_ret does not validate return values. Such validation should be similar to that of BPF_LSM, so we implement the same changes by referencing `bpf_lsm_get_retval_range` = to fix this issue. Reported-by: Quan Sun <2022090917019@std.uestc.edu.cn> Reported-by: Yinhao Hu Reported-by: Kaiyan Mei Reviewed-by: Dongliang Mu Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/973a1b7b-8ee7-407a-890a-11455d9cc5bf@st= d.uestc.edu.cn/ Signed-off-by: Feng Yang --- include/linux/bpf_lsm.h | 8 ++++++++ kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 4 +++- 3 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h index 643809cc78c3..434ae335b188 100644 --- a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h +++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h @@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ void bpf_lsm_find_cgroup_shim(const struct bpf_prog *prog= , bpf_func_t *bpf_func) =20 int bpf_lsm_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog, struct bpf_retval_range *range); +void bpf_security_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog, + struct bpf_retval_range *range); int bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name__s= tr, const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p, int flags); int bpf_remove_dentry_xattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name= __str); @@ -91,6 +93,12 @@ static inline int bpf_lsm_get_retval_range(const struct = bpf_prog *prog, { return -EOPNOTSUPP; } + +static inline void bpf_security_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *pr= og, + struct bpf_retval_range *range) +{ +} + static inline int bpf_set_dentry_xattr_locked(struct dentry *dentry, const= char *name__str, const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p, int flags) { diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c index c5c925f00202..537af87b3d5d 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c @@ -448,3 +448,29 @@ int bpf_lsm_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *pr= og, } return 0; } + +/* hooks return 0 or 1 */ +BTF_SET_START(bool_security_hooks) +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM +BTF_ID(func, security_xfrm_state_pol_flow_match) +#endif +#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT +BTF_ID(func, security_audit_rule_known) +#endif +BTF_ID(func, security_inode_xattr_skipcap) +BTF_SET_END(bool_security_hooks) + +/* Similar to bpf_lsm_get_retval_range, + * ensure that the return values of fmod_ret are valid. + */ +void bpf_security_get_retval_range(const struct bpf_prog *prog, + struct bpf_retval_range *retval_range) +{ + if (btf_id_set_contains(&bool_security_hooks, prog->aux->attach_btf_id)) { + retval_range->minval =3D 0; + retval_range->maxval =3D 1; + } else { + retval_range->minval =3D -MAX_ERRNO; + retval_range->maxval =3D 0; + } +} diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 594260c1f382..3bfc67983e12 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -18413,8 +18413,10 @@ static bool return_retval_range(struct bpf_verifie= r_env *env, struct bpf_retval_ *range =3D retval_range(0, 0); break; case BPF_TRACE_RAW_TP: - case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: return false; + case BPF_MODIFY_RETURN: + bpf_security_get_retval_range(env->prog, range); + break; case BPF_TRACE_ITER: default: break; --=20 2.27.0