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[62.43.64.127]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id 5b1f17b1804b1-48066c37433sm237357355e9.10.2026.01.30.04.59.18 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Fri, 30 Jan 2026 04:59:19 -0800 (PST) From: Aleksandr Nesterenko To: jeff.johnson@oss.qualcomm.com, davem@davemloft.net, kuba@kernel.org Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Aleksandr Nesterenko Subject: [PATCH] wifi: ath9k: add range check for epid in htc_issue_send() Date: Fri, 30 Jan 2026 13:59:15 +0100 Message-Id: <20260130125915.47036-1-alexandernesterenko837@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" The fix for CVE-2024-53156 (commit 8619593634cb ("wifi: ath9k: add range check for conn_rsp_epid in htc_connect_service()")) added a bounds check for conn_rsp_epid in htc_connect_service() to prevent out-of-bounds array access. However, htc_issue_send() accesses target->endpoint[epid] directly without validating the epid parameter. While htc_connect_service() now validates the endpoint ID before storing it, htc_issue_send() can still receive invalid epid values from callers such as htc_send() and htc_send_epid(). This provides defense-in-depth against out-of-bounds access. Fixes: fb9987d0f748 ("ath9k_htc: Support for AR9271 chipset.") Signed-off-by: Aleksandr Nesterenko --- drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c | 9 ++++++++- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c b/drivers/net/wireles= s/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c index 00dc97ac53b9..7821a31c0abb 100644 --- a/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c +++ b/drivers/net/wireless/ath/ath9k/htc_hst.c @@ -23,9 +23,16 @@ static int htc_issue_send(struct htc_target *target, str= uct sk_buff* skb, =20 { struct htc_frame_hdr *hdr; - struct htc_endpoint *endpoint =3D &target->endpoint[epid]; + struct htc_endpoint *endpoint; int status; =20 + if (epid >=3D ENDPOINT_MAX) { + kfree_skb(skb); + return -EINVAL; + } + + endpoint =3D &target->endpoint[epid]; + hdr =3D skb_push(skb, sizeof(struct htc_frame_hdr)); hdr->endpoint_id =3D epid; hdr->flags =3D flags; --=20 2.34.1