From nobody Fri Jan 9 11:49:42 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9510832E69F; Mon, 5 Jan 2026 05:15:12 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1767590112; cv=none; b=ca4lW5ntE85WQdzIb56XE6AS0eb8Irp9rwD02LG9cCAcNRsnsC/cFx91p6G5TLULVZp/DByqxTeray3ikhFA+Sd/1bMCwGu6/3J10dkcFLdUuJB5nIH66IHiSgmfVooMYreW1WlDHycZhw1H1G1pQIZh+epQcvhblmH1XjYiI88= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1767590112; c=relaxed/simple; bh=6GiGUP+X4gmyZFn4wILAzmE5Daf6tx/zz/5Ty9L/V2o=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=WOT7aAxlYxbZod0omeQFhJEbtAJb67aGoFauKGR29C2c/KnNlMUFc1CnmuW9OlRoFdJ/uZ+fib4VHjrYW1p/CAvzvkcml4KdS+BXPbbTOu41QVjUKvDeoGHgguO4VS3icixSu333LtpguV0SjN4j9rHwHnpdAj3XBh38Gz88ihk= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Hn+T5ja7; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Hn+T5ja7" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id EAC91C2BCB0; Mon, 5 Jan 2026 05:15:11 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1767590112; bh=6GiGUP+X4gmyZFn4wILAzmE5Daf6tx/zz/5Ty9L/V2o=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=Hn+T5ja72OrFlu0ck1rY36j7hbDeSAIJtr1r2XfD5CZBBnXK82U0S2S5vVueu6vnL Ghn7LwihQM4Z1AZgO8m2aTE58Q+/Bjc/ZK+eWiEUcVhHFW0NBhChppDwY4rzIw+g+C 9p8jFujFM0C3hdvjFzSGjopv0y2xHajarIJvzOiV6qYl0h0iSEtW22Hz9i75CDqSyT 1QIjgA+t/pE1tWp7u+IpsDLawczDOM+9cHXE3mm2OstI914Q9UN3LNYriQKKxBDTTM ALoc6OJvSK74qp7/vu/2Sm30b3bE6cpISIQX3QSUh3SiADUd6TRP9CGyKcBloveSWy OJK/pBYjbcdtw== From: Eric Biggers To: linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ard Biesheuvel , "Jason A . Donenfeld" , Herbert Xu , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, sparclinux@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, Holger Dengler , Harald Freudenberger , Eric Biggers Subject: [PATCH 33/36] lib/crypto: aesgcm: Use new AES library API Date: Sun, 4 Jan 2026 21:13:06 -0800 Message-ID: <20260105051311.1607207-34-ebiggers@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.52.0 In-Reply-To: <20260105051311.1607207-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> References: <20260105051311.1607207-1-ebiggers@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Switch from the old AES library functions (which use struct crypto_aes_ctx) to the new ones (which use struct aes_enckey). This eliminates the unnecessary computation and caching of the decryption round keys. The new AES en/decryption functions are also much faster and use AES instructions when supported by the CPU. Note: aes_encrypt_new() will be renamed to aes_encrypt() once all callers of the old aes_encrypt() have been updated. Signed-off-by: Eric Biggers --- include/crypto/gcm.h | 2 +- lib/crypto/aesgcm.c | 12 ++++++------ 2 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/crypto/gcm.h b/include/crypto/gcm.h index fd9df607a836..b524e47bd4d0 100644 --- a/include/crypto/gcm.h +++ b/include/crypto/gcm.h @@ -64,11 +64,11 @@ static inline int crypto_ipsec_check_assoclen(unsigned = int assoclen) return 0; } =20 struct aesgcm_ctx { be128 ghash_key; - struct crypto_aes_ctx aes_ctx; + struct aes_enckey aes_key; unsigned int authsize; }; =20 int aesgcm_expandkey(struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *key, unsigned int keysize, unsigned int authsize); diff --git a/lib/crypto/aesgcm.c b/lib/crypto/aesgcm.c index ac0b2fcfd606..19106fe008fd 100644 --- a/lib/crypto/aesgcm.c +++ b/lib/crypto/aesgcm.c @@ -10,11 +10,11 @@ #include #include #include #include =20 -static void aesgcm_encrypt_block(const struct crypto_aes_ctx *ctx, void *d= st, +static void aesgcm_encrypt_block(const struct aes_enckey *key, void *dst, const void *src) { unsigned long flags; =20 /* @@ -24,11 +24,11 @@ static void aesgcm_encrypt_block(const struct crypto_ae= s_ctx *ctx, void *dst, * mitigates this risk to some extent by pulling the entire S-box into * the caches before doing any substitutions, but this strategy is more * effective when running with interrupts disabled. */ local_irq_save(flags); - aes_encrypt(ctx, dst, src); + aes_encrypt_new(key, dst, src); local_irq_restore(flags); } =20 /** * aesgcm_expandkey - Expands the AES and GHASH keys for the AES-GCM key @@ -47,16 +47,16 @@ int aesgcm_expandkey(struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, const u8 *= key, { u8 kin[AES_BLOCK_SIZE] =3D {}; int ret; =20 ret =3D crypto_gcm_check_authsize(authsize) ?: - aes_expandkey(&ctx->aes_ctx, key, keysize); + aes_prepareenckey(&ctx->aes_key, key, keysize); if (ret) return ret; =20 ctx->authsize =3D authsize; - aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_ctx, &ctx->ghash_key, kin); + aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_key, &ctx->ghash_key, kin); =20 return 0; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(aesgcm_expandkey); =20 @@ -95,11 +95,11 @@ static void aesgcm_mac(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx, co= nst u8 *src, int src_len, aesgcm_ghash(&ghash, &ctx->ghash_key, assoc, assoc_len); aesgcm_ghash(&ghash, &ctx->ghash_key, src, src_len); aesgcm_ghash(&ghash, &ctx->ghash_key, &tail, sizeof(tail)); =20 ctr[3] =3D cpu_to_be32(1); - aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_ctx, buf, ctr); + aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_key, buf, ctr); crypto_xor_cpy(authtag, buf, (u8 *)&ghash, ctx->authsize); =20 memzero_explicit(&ghash, sizeof(ghash)); memzero_explicit(buf, sizeof(buf)); } @@ -117,11 +117,11 @@ static void aesgcm_crypt(const struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx= , u8 *dst, const u8 *src, * inadvertent IV reuse, which must be avoided at all cost for * stream ciphers such as AES-CTR. Given the range of 'int * len', this cannot happen, so no explicit test is necessary. */ ctr[3] =3D cpu_to_be32(n++); - aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_ctx, buf, ctr); + aesgcm_encrypt_block(&ctx->aes_key, buf, ctr); crypto_xor_cpy(dst, src, buf, min(len, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)); =20 dst +=3D AES_BLOCK_SIZE; src +=3D AES_BLOCK_SIZE; len -=3D AES_BLOCK_SIZE; --=20 2.52.0