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Miller" , Luc Van Oostenryck , Chris Li , "Paul E. McKenney" , Alexander Potapenko , Arnd Bergmann , Bart Van Assche , Christoph Hellwig , Dmitry Vyukov , Eric Dumazet , Frederic Weisbecker , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Herbert Xu , Ian Rogers , Jann Horn , Joel Fernandes , Johannes Berg , Jonathan Corbet , Josh Triplett , Justin Stitt , Kees Cook , Kentaro Takeda , Lukas Bulwahn , Mark Rutland , Mathieu Desnoyers , Miguel Ojeda , Nathan Chancellor , Neeraj Upadhyay , Nick Desaulniers , Steven Rostedt , Tetsuo Handa , Thomas Gleixner , Thomas Graf , Uladzislau Rezki , Waiman Long , kasan-dev@googlegroups.com, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kbuild@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-sparse@vger.kernel.org, linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev, rcu@vger.kernel.org Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Enable context analysis for the KFENCE subsystem. Notable, kfence_handle_page_fault() required minor restructure, which also fixed a subtle race; arguably that function is more readable now. Signed-off-by: Marco Elver --- v4: * Rename capability -> context analysis. v2: * Remove disable/enable_context_analysis() around headers. * Use __context_unsafe() instead of __no_context_analysis. --- mm/kfence/Makefile | 2 ++ mm/kfence/core.c | 20 +++++++++++++------- mm/kfence/kfence.h | 14 ++++++++------ mm/kfence/report.c | 4 ++-- 4 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/kfence/Makefile b/mm/kfence/Makefile index 2de2a58d11a1..a503e83e74d9 100644 --- a/mm/kfence/Makefile +++ b/mm/kfence/Makefile @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 =20 +CONTEXT_ANALYSIS :=3D y + obj-y :=3D core.o report.o =20 CFLAGS_kfence_test.o :=3D -fno-omit-frame-pointer -fno-optimize-sibling-ca= lls diff --git a/mm/kfence/core.c b/mm/kfence/core.c index 577a1699c553..ebf442fb2c2b 100644 --- a/mm/kfence/core.c +++ b/mm/kfence/core.c @@ -133,8 +133,8 @@ struct kfence_metadata *kfence_metadata __read_mostly; static struct kfence_metadata *kfence_metadata_init __read_mostly; =20 /* Freelist with available objects. */ -static struct list_head kfence_freelist =3D LIST_HEAD_INIT(kfence_freelist= ); -static DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kfence_freelist_lock); /* Lock protecting freel= ist. */ +DEFINE_RAW_SPINLOCK(kfence_freelist_lock); /* Lock protecting freelist. */ +static struct list_head kfence_freelist __guarded_by(&kfence_freelist_lock= ) =3D LIST_HEAD_INIT(kfence_freelist); =20 /* * The static key to set up a KFENCE allocation; or if static keys are not= used @@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ static bool kfence_unprotect(unsigned long addr) } =20 static inline unsigned long metadata_to_pageaddr(const struct kfence_metad= ata *meta) + __must_hold(&meta->lock) { unsigned long offset =3D (meta - kfence_metadata + 1) * PAGE_SIZE * 2; unsigned long pageaddr =3D (unsigned long)&__kfence_pool[offset]; @@ -289,6 +290,7 @@ static inline bool kfence_obj_allocated(const struct kf= ence_metadata *meta) static noinline void metadata_update_state(struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_object_sta= te next, unsigned long *stack_entries, size_t num_stack_entries) + __must_hold(&meta->lock) { struct kfence_track *track =3D next =3D=3D KFENCE_OBJECT_ALLOCATED ? &meta->alloc_track : &meta->free_t= rack; @@ -486,7 +488,7 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *ca= che, size_t size, gfp_t g alloc_covered_add(alloc_stack_hash, 1); =20 /* Set required slab fields. */ - slab =3D virt_to_slab((void *)meta->addr); + slab =3D virt_to_slab(addr); slab->slab_cache =3D cache; slab->objects =3D 1; =20 @@ -515,6 +517,7 @@ static void *kfence_guarded_alloc(struct kmem_cache *ca= che, size_t size, gfp_t g static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfence_metadata *meta, = bool zombie) { struct kcsan_scoped_access assert_page_exclusive; + u32 alloc_stack_hash; unsigned long flags; bool init; =20 @@ -547,9 +550,10 @@ static void kfence_guarded_free(void *addr, struct kfe= nce_metadata *meta, bool z /* Mark the object as freed. */ metadata_update_state(meta, KFENCE_OBJECT_FREED, NULL, 0); init =3D slab_want_init_on_free(meta->cache); + alloc_stack_hash =3D meta->alloc_stack_hash; raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&meta->lock, flags); =20 - alloc_covered_add(meta->alloc_stack_hash, -1); + alloc_covered_add(alloc_stack_hash, -1); =20 /* Check canary bytes for memory corruption. */ check_canary(meta); @@ -594,6 +598,7 @@ static void rcu_guarded_free(struct rcu_head *h) * which partial initialization succeeded. */ static unsigned long kfence_init_pool(void) + __context_unsafe(/* constructor */) { unsigned long addr, start_pfn; int i; @@ -1220,6 +1225,7 @@ bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, boo= l is_write, struct pt_regs { const int page_index =3D (addr - (unsigned long)__kfence_pool) / PAGE_SIZ= E; struct kfence_metadata *to_report =3D NULL; + unsigned long unprotected_page =3D 0; enum kfence_error_type error_type; unsigned long flags; =20 @@ -1253,9 +1259,8 @@ bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, boo= l is_write, struct pt_regs if (!to_report) goto out; =20 - raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags); - to_report->unprotected_page =3D addr; error_type =3D KFENCE_ERROR_OOB; + unprotected_page =3D addr; =20 /* * If the object was freed before we took the look we can still @@ -1267,7 +1272,6 @@ bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, boo= l is_write, struct pt_regs if (!to_report) goto out; =20 - raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags); error_type =3D KFENCE_ERROR_UAF; /* * We may race with __kfence_alloc(), and it is possible that a @@ -1279,6 +1283,8 @@ bool kfence_handle_page_fault(unsigned long addr, boo= l is_write, struct pt_regs =20 out: if (to_report) { + raw_spin_lock_irqsave(&to_report->lock, flags); + to_report->unprotected_page =3D unprotected_page; kfence_report_error(addr, is_write, regs, to_report, error_type); raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore(&to_report->lock, flags); } else { diff --git a/mm/kfence/kfence.h b/mm/kfence/kfence.h index dfba5ea06b01..f9caea007246 100644 --- a/mm/kfence/kfence.h +++ b/mm/kfence/kfence.h @@ -34,6 +34,8 @@ /* Maximum stack depth for reports. */ #define KFENCE_STACK_DEPTH 64 =20 +extern raw_spinlock_t kfence_freelist_lock; + /* KFENCE object states. */ enum kfence_object_state { KFENCE_OBJECT_UNUSED, /* Object is unused. */ @@ -53,7 +55,7 @@ struct kfence_track { =20 /* KFENCE metadata per guarded allocation. */ struct kfence_metadata { - struct list_head list; /* Freelist node; access under kfence_freelist_lo= ck. */ + struct list_head list __guarded_by(&kfence_freelist_lock); /* Freelist no= de. */ struct rcu_head rcu_head; /* For delayed freeing. */ =20 /* @@ -91,13 +93,13 @@ struct kfence_metadata { * In case of an invalid access, the page that was unprotected; we * optimistically only store one address. */ - unsigned long unprotected_page; + unsigned long unprotected_page __guarded_by(&lock); =20 /* Allocation and free stack information. */ - struct kfence_track alloc_track; - struct kfence_track free_track; + struct kfence_track alloc_track __guarded_by(&lock); + struct kfence_track free_track __guarded_by(&lock); /* For updating alloc_covered on frees. */ - u32 alloc_stack_hash; + u32 alloc_stack_hash __guarded_by(&lock); #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG struct slabobj_ext obj_exts; #endif @@ -141,6 +143,6 @@ enum kfence_error_type { void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is_write, struct pt_r= egs *regs, const struct kfence_metadata *meta, enum kfence_error_type type); =20 -void kfence_print_object(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadat= a *meta); +void kfence_print_object(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_metadat= a *meta) __must_hold(&meta->lock); =20 #endif /* MM_KFENCE_KFENCE_H */ diff --git a/mm/kfence/report.c b/mm/kfence/report.c index 10e6802a2edf..787e87c26926 100644 --- a/mm/kfence/report.c +++ b/mm/kfence/report.c @@ -106,6 +106,7 @@ static int get_stack_skipnr(const unsigned long stack_e= ntries[], int num_entries =20 static void kfence_print_stack(struct seq_file *seq, const struct kfence_m= etadata *meta, bool show_alloc) + __must_hold(&meta->lock) { const struct kfence_track *track =3D show_alloc ? &meta->alloc_track : &m= eta->free_track; u64 ts_sec =3D track->ts_nsec; @@ -207,8 +208,6 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is= _write, struct pt_regs *r if (WARN_ON(type !=3D KFENCE_ERROR_INVALID && !meta)) return; =20 - if (meta) - lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock); /* * Because we may generate reports in printk-unfriendly parts of the * kernel, such as scheduler code, the use of printk() could deadlock. @@ -263,6 +262,7 @@ void kfence_report_error(unsigned long address, bool is= _write, struct pt_regs *r stack_trace_print(stack_entries + skipnr, num_stack_entries - skipnr, 0); =20 if (meta) { + lockdep_assert_held(&meta->lock); pr_err("\n"); kfence_print_object(NULL, meta); } --=20 2.52.0.322.g1dd061c0dc-goog