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Mon, 15 Dec 2025 23:41:49 +0000 (GMT) Received: from pps.filterd (phxpaimrmta03.imrmtpd1.prodappphxaev1.oraclevcn.com [127.0.0.1]) by phxpaimrmta03.imrmtpd1.prodappphxaev1.oraclevcn.com (8.18.1.2/8.18.1.2) with ESMTP id 5BFMVrxD025010; Mon, 15 Dec 2025 23:41:48 GMT Received: from pps.reinject (localhost [127.0.0.1]) by phxpaimrmta03.imrmtpd1.prodappphxaev1.oraclevcn.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 4b0xk9j8jc-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 15 Dec 2025 23:41:48 +0000 Received: from phxpaimrmta03.imrmtpd1.prodappphxaev1.oraclevcn.com (phxpaimrmta03.imrmtpd1.prodappphxaev1.oraclevcn.com [127.0.0.1]) by pps.reinject (8.17.1.5/8.17.1.5) with ESMTP id 5BFNflPP007113; Mon, 15 Dec 2025 23:41:47 GMT Received: from bur-virt-x6-2-100.us.oracle.com (bur-virt-x6-2-100.us.oracle.com [10.153.92.40]) by phxpaimrmta03.imrmtpd1.prodappphxaev1.oraclevcn.com (PPS) with ESMTPS id 4b0xk9j8h9-1 (version=TLSv1.2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 bits=256 verify=NO); Mon, 15 Dec 2025 23:41:47 +0000 From: Ross Philipson To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev Cc: ross.philipson@oracle.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de, hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org, mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com, peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca, luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu, herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net, ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org, baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com, trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com Subject: [PATCH v15 28/28] x86/efi: EFI stub DRTM launch support for Secure Launch Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2025 15:33:16 -0800 Message-ID: <20251215233316.1076248-29-ross.philipson@oracle.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.7 In-Reply-To: <20251215233316.1076248-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> References: <20251215233316.1076248-1-ross.philipson@oracle.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=baseguard engine=ICAP:2.0.293,Aquarius:18.0.1121,Hydra:6.1.9,FMLib:17.12.100.49 definitions=2025-12-15_05,2025-12-15_03,2025-10-01_01 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=notspam policy=default score=0 adultscore=0 mlxscore=0 spamscore=0 bulkscore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 mlxlogscore=999 malwarescore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.12.0-2510240000 definitions=main-2512150204 X-Proofpoint-GUID: S3-F52aIXQmqNN7zR9luY9IdQwtz0QiE X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details-Enc: AW1haW4tMjUxMjE1MDIwNCBTYWx0ZWRfXz8ftYOC1ESpC MzJtfhcvryBZAM8pTJ9EzPY2rEgrzfTuppOJQhr2zFC+NuJhFckYSItKfnUzVqnwIqLnPU3A89z ZImt8Tx8hl6Zjdr63UsdjwRmAE9RhFhZcdHgp2+cs3wXJa/11YbTOumsZFlMYRIlLJ8mJNWOY79 Xt3NLxk1ICc583DMkZa1zUaFbBjXN9rfsltpBzYZ1tbQK+ewkR03vYqGLAiWutxcvnd0FoV6tHb FiA0t43nQL5ilX+VTcPxuunyp/XmAMdZKYrpRUm18tlv8pZkHaJznbRro43TwkUUS8jkOGsuHnt v+kDLhL6LHD9SvSqL/b/x2HWkz3TtWGqfPdZ+MBEIugGkSGaXFBiIM6mxpbAMD0yYat8f5N1aQV lqvFqsFlZ6Nweo4M36BlJFlMVezXzw== X-Authority-Analysis: v=2.4 cv=GbUaXAXL c=1 sm=1 tr=0 ts=69409cbd b=1 cx=c_pps a=WeWmnZmh0fydH62SvGsd2A==:117 a=WeWmnZmh0fydH62SvGsd2A==:17 a=wP3pNCr1ah4A:10 a=VkNPw1HP01LnGYTKEx00:22 a=yPCof4ZbAAAA:8 a=VwQbUJbxAAAA:8 a=mErUaaQqPOyLTE2wGXUA:9 X-Proofpoint-ORIG-GUID: S3-F52aIXQmqNN7zR9luY9IdQwtz0QiE Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" This support allows the DRTM launch to be initiated after an EFI stub launch of the Linux kernel is done. This is accomplished by providing a handler to jump to when a Secure Launch is in progress. This has to be called after the EFI stub does Exit Boot Services. Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson Reviewed-by: Ard Biesheuvel --- drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h | 8 ++ drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c | 100 ++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 108 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h b/drivers/firmware/efi/= libstub/efistub.h index f5ba032863a9..6e4cbf02500b 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/efistub.h @@ -135,6 +135,14 @@ void efi_set_u64_split(u64 data, u32 *lo, u32 *hi) *hi =3D upper_32_bits(data); } =20 +static inline +void efi_set_u64_form(u32 lo, u32 hi, u64 *data) +{ + u64 upper =3D hi; + + *data =3D lo | upper << 32; +} + /* * Allocation types for calls to boottime->allocate_pages. */ diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c b/drivers/firmware/efi= /libstub/x86-stub.c index 761121a77f9e..e664dfddc173 100644 --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/x86-stub.c @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ #include #include #include +#include +#include =20 #include #include @@ -795,6 +797,101 @@ static efi_status_t efi_decompress_kernel(unsigned lo= ng *kernel_entry, kernel_inittext_size); } =20 +#if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH)) + +static bool efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(struct slr_table *slrt, + struct boot_params *boot_params) +{ + struct slr_entry_intel_info *txt_info; + struct slr_entry_policy *policy; + bool updated =3D false; + int i; + + txt_info =3D slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_INTEL_INFO); + if (!txt_info) + return false; + + txt_info->boot_params_addr =3D (u64)boot_params; + + policy =3D slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_ENTRY_POLICY); + if (!policy) + return false; + + for (i =3D 0; i < policy->nr_entries; i++) { + if (policy->policy_entries[i].entity_type =3D=3D SLR_ET_BOOT_PARAMS) { + policy->policy_entries[i].entity =3D (u64)boot_params; + updated =3D true; + break; + } + } + + /* + * If this is a PE entry into EFI stub the mocked up boot params will + * be missing some of the setup header data needed for the second stage + * of the Secure Launch boot. + */ + if (image) { + struct setup_header *hdr =3D (struct setup_header *)((u8 *)image->image_= base + + offsetof(struct boot_params, hdr)); + u64 cmdline_ptr; + + boot_params->hdr.setup_sects =3D hdr->setup_sects; + boot_params->hdr.syssize =3D hdr->syssize; + boot_params->hdr.version =3D hdr->version; + boot_params->hdr.loadflags =3D hdr->loadflags; + boot_params->hdr.kernel_alignment =3D hdr->kernel_alignment; + boot_params->hdr.min_alignment =3D hdr->min_alignment; + boot_params->hdr.xloadflags =3D hdr->xloadflags; + boot_params->hdr.init_size =3D hdr->init_size; + boot_params->hdr.kernel_info_offset =3D hdr->kernel_info_offset; + efi_set_u64_form(boot_params->hdr.cmd_line_ptr, boot_params->ext_cmd_lin= e_ptr, + &cmdline_ptr); + boot_params->hdr.cmdline_size =3D strlen((const char *)cmdline_ptr); + } + + return updated; +} + +static void efi_secure_launch(struct boot_params *boot_params) +{ + struct slr_entry_dl_info *dlinfo; + efi_guid_t guid =3D SLR_TABLE_GUID; + dl_handler_func handler_callback; + struct slr_table *slrt; + + /* + * The presence of this table indicated a Secure Launch + * is being requested. + */ + slrt =3D (struct slr_table *)get_efi_config_table(guid); + if (!slrt || slrt->magic !=3D SLR_TABLE_MAGIC) + return; + + /* + * Since the EFI stub library creates its own boot_params on entry, the + * SLRT and TXT heap have to be updated with this version. + */ + if (!efi_secure_launch_update_boot_params(slrt, boot_params)) + return; + + /* Jump through DL stub to initiate Secure Launch */ + dlinfo =3D slr_next_entry_by_tag(slrt, NULL, SLR_ENTRY_DL_INFO); + + handler_callback =3D (dl_handler_func)dlinfo->dl_handler; + + handler_callback(&dlinfo->bl_context); + + unreachable(); +} + +#else + +static void efi_secure_launch(struct boot_params *boot_params) +{ +} + +#endif /* IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURE_LAUNCH) */ + static void __noreturn enter_kernel(unsigned long kernel_addr, struct boot_params *boot_params) { @@ -929,6 +1026,9 @@ void __noreturn efi_stub_entry(efi_handle_t handle, goto fail; } =20 + /* If a Secure Launch is in progress, this never returns */ + efi_secure_launch(boot_params); + /* * Call the SEV init code while still running with the firmware's * GDT/IDT, so #VC exceptions will be handled by EFI. --=20 2.43.7