From nobody Wed Feb 11 17:21:21 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 89E3D2FCBE5; Tue, 9 Dec 2025 10:05:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765274751; cv=none; b=ZMdT0UE9HMFlAwJTALkwkX2EAhy49/rFW8D8v/04DY/mXxHH/vPfaYOmIKxldFZ8fMjIwEP93wuOWbbIKmPli5TEc1yfRuTFTlwLJzw8gxfKYn3YLDZJ1jN/XRdZjE0v5jtjHAuKgGly36RtKMrzn9ZoYi1wRqg8cl+H1stpEnc= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765274751; c=relaxed/simple; bh=YUYqIvNjXnvmL0CNkyW+ra2WzRNZMTP9cgmJvuV1o7E=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=p35uvoj1qf4H3F1ufJ9Q5nhiHIAF+FK9ZoNbt+Y2C8gTGof3uzQBhnQMxd+0/HKmkYGK7WIVinOB+Voe2Tgsdv/JhmasVt2HQoZbwxC67rtiASJFZCgZMT29znYBcOWbRvIxBCSTK3uTsEmBX4UWEbIXXgrVaV709ldjZgNZHOk= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=u06yAno5; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="u06yAno5" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id B63B8C4CEF5; Tue, 9 Dec 2025 10:05:50 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1765274751; bh=YUYqIvNjXnvmL0CNkyW+ra2WzRNZMTP9cgmJvuV1o7E=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=u06yAno5ByUPTQh3swMXqJTf1tbyTSJUzlZPa32tC4aZm+GkABCiE243yzyJvfFOa JP9rbapwsr8wAXmSqWXGG3zpHgzwfbL39AwBDUdjqMNVTJIbvPMAtGrJgTcX2bHHEI LB1/dbIjUgI8+UIz6+qSKiCkj6XU6GITJ2qKQpF6FHRsx+XExDLEBRouLTIlK82E/i gYYgP+2/5/PohSvgOxsRI6Is18+JhZ0ybrSBhHrQ+qfRHro+gLLCgQMCtjdb3eE+gK 6C0HPxymu2Jc0cjFhKNPZlZq9gh4JdgxMgJ+MfUypoDfW1uRxFIWeH2QMb2Tl7rJeY pIKxF/KHO415w== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list), keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS-TRUSTED), linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM) Subject: [PATCH v2 1/5] KEYS: trusted: Remove dead branch from tpm2_unseal_cmd Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2025 12:05:24 +0200 Message-ID: <20251209100529.1700779-2-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.52.0 In-Reply-To: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" TPM2_Unseal requires TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, and tpm2_unseal_cmd() always does set up either password or HMAC session. Remove the branch in tpm2_unseal_cmd() conditionally setting TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS. It is faulty but luckily it is never exercised at run-time, and thus does not cause regressions. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 10 +--------- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 9 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trus= ted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 9074ae1a5896..27424e1a4a63 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -450,9 +450,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_options *options, u32 blob_handle) { - struct tpm_header *head; u16 data_len; - int offset; u8 *data; int rc; =20 @@ -488,14 +486,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, options->blobauth_len); tpm_buf_append(buf, options->blobauth, options->blobauth_len); =20 - if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { + if (tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, TPM2_SA_ENCRYPT, NULL, 0); - } else { - offset =3D buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - head =3D (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - if (tpm_buf_length(buf) =3D=3D offset) - head->tag =3D cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS); - } } =20 rc =3D tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(chip, buf); --=20 2.52.0 From nobody Wed Feb 11 17:21:21 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BA2DD328607; Tue, 9 Dec 2025 10:05:56 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765274756; cv=none; b=n58V0Uvx6Un65Egau9Lq2pTOiJVYfR/zZv7ffmvYiWoXILAa6IgV4lBrMyWuQr7kfBh+8+zft2vDrdvFjC2y4OnvHk8fAxWEb9BO8i0icLNv07joXpeibCt3VlBIJKK/wetiM2EtF/D33FPrXpndkO8yiNbDjX+11ngQoLaHhS8= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765274756; c=relaxed/simple; bh=+/iE2nY+wCSKxR3DAC0xcgYWEXR/x9Hj89HmjeyMfS0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=gZQFcW/doUUBHovJCE7P/T91NJcQz/cRKpGqixBllkXaw/P9PTsDMdqcrK9nKWoVPVhn/MmccR1bQeEoatd4iknWiyZF+TYukG49IjCobcuDD9miFLuLssCFtDa4MRU9TzHc8B+VQbiL4Ux9tiIIeZeMsgTBZcaHmH+00jATFik= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=T8/z5N6L; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="T8/z5N6L" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id A769FC4CEF5; Tue, 9 Dec 2025 10:05:55 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1765274756; bh=+/iE2nY+wCSKxR3DAC0xcgYWEXR/x9Hj89HmjeyMfS0=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=T8/z5N6L0j10ieqUEbbc46s1Hj258deq/aPK+WafbiToguLULjWeB50yRilfR6Hhr 5xkmUaHwC/ACEGoTW5VMOA807fzVwpHtLW7lkaHWTYM6M3qX/MVaxBRxceKVXksKNQ 9QMn5nCgnriB3jCMpE/eqOcwPY5ckJAxhKaxtuBJHJWqgJkAPSA2nEg0pqe7FGcFuH 1CjIrZX4M+TP6Of1oIn5gYgP7WxPjQPusAanyzZRF29Il0xZPsyEdWA1aaBhdz6MGv i9X1oePB2k8Yr3V5zmEXNvJGN5DKaKB/nan60TbQfWPcvG6OhUv7ZfdPz9/htfYlpI QfuACbr9aDtsg== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list) Subject: [PATCH v2 2/5] tpm2-sessions: Define TPM2_NAME_MAX_SIZE Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2025 12:05:25 +0200 Message-ID: <20251209100529.1700779-3-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.52.0 In-Reply-To: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" This is somewhat cosmetic change but it does serve a purpose on tracking the value set for the maximum length of TPM names, and to clearly states what components it is composed of. It also anchors the value so that when buffers are declared for this particular purpose, the same value is used for the capacity. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- v2: - Rename TPM2_NAME_SIZE as TPM2_NULL_NAME_SIZE. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c | 2 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 2 +- include/linux/tpm.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++----------- 3 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c index f5dcadb1ab3c..0f321c307bc6 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-sysfs.c @@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static ssize_t null_name_show(struct device *dev, struc= t device_attribute *attr, char *buf) { struct tpm_chip *chip =3D to_tpm_chip(dev); - int size =3D TPM2_NAME_SIZE; + int size =3D TPM2_NULL_NAME_SIZE; =20 bin2hex(buf, chip->null_key_name, size); size *=3D 2; diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessi= ons.c index 79f27a46bd7f..a0c88fb1804c 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ struct tpm2_auth { * we must compute and remember */ u32 name_h[AUTH_MAX_NAMES]; - u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][2 + SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; + u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; }; =20 #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 42e2a091f43d..922a43ef23b5 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -28,9 +28,33 @@ #define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20 /* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */ #define TPM_BUFSIZE 4096 =20 +/* + * SHA-512 is, as of today, the largest digest in the TCG algorithm reposi= tory. + */ #define TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE + +/* + * A TPM name digest i.e., TPMT_HA, is a concatenation of TPM_ALG_ID of the + * name algorithm and hash of TPMT_PUBLIC. + */ +#define TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE (TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE + 2) + +/* + * The maximum number of PCR banks. + */ #define TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS 8 =20 +/* + * fixed define for the size of a name. This is actually HASHALG size + * plus 2, so 32 for SHA256 + */ +#define TPM2_NULL_NAME_SIZE 34 + +/* + * The maximum size for an object context + */ +#define TPM2_MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE 4096 + struct tpm_chip; struct trusted_key_payload; struct trusted_key_options; @@ -140,17 +164,6 @@ struct tpm_chip_seqops { /* fixed define for the curve we use which is NIST_P256 */ #define EC_PT_SZ 32 =20 -/* - * fixed define for the size of a name. This is actually HASHALG size - * plus 2, so 32 for SHA256 - */ -#define TPM2_NAME_SIZE 34 - -/* - * The maximum size for an object context - */ -#define TPM2_MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE 4096 - struct tpm_chip { struct device dev; struct device devs; @@ -212,7 +225,7 @@ struct tpm_chip { /* saved context for NULL seed */ u8 null_key_context[TPM2_MAX_CONTEXT_SIZE]; /* name of NULL seed */ - u8 null_key_name[TPM2_NAME_SIZE]; + u8 null_key_name[TPM2_NULL_NAME_SIZE]; u8 null_ec_key_x[EC_PT_SZ]; u8 null_ec_key_y[EC_PT_SZ]; struct tpm2_auth *auth; --=20 2.52.0 From nobody Wed Feb 11 17:21:21 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 2E06132862A; Tue, 9 Dec 2025 10:06:01 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765274762; cv=none; b=PLf90AhQ2S8agqlvXXx8iCh0+rw8+h02fBQJP0Hd98JXg++F7POh7cIv8PgS4C//vpr6Hs/q1Ny1MNteNXZ5gVZa5zYLN5fqtAqcVs0ccpvb4K9O67E1xlmL2d6eckJ84kCtFhSxBFTBwux12m/Omwm3LnxtvrO1iK79czWao7E= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765274762; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Asnf8kp6ydxd52P1mUKm/6OYCpqSyZOXusN/uJBns0I=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=R/9kNx4QA9O91jHzDW2vl1dKiDRtAnaSaIpHoa0sBYWAtQ1AYsVMkLePqWdfGBMwFmTwqUMmdzJlWph7Kb+0MWJVXDx9MqaSZTvJBL8Sh1K0E0aCl6pohxunJ/p4EpsjMRIz5BIrtp81mURJkNfa8Y9SDDx8thOOnV1YFORjsiU= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=SHm9Mdb3; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="SHm9Mdb3" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id BF217C116B1; Tue, 9 Dec 2025 10:06:00 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1765274761; bh=Asnf8kp6ydxd52P1mUKm/6OYCpqSyZOXusN/uJBns0I=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=SHm9Mdb3SvzSEG0DLF9GwbHcgWYK54dp+DYJDLNCipb2EX29/hBMS0HqU62I7lRf6 4gWhCq1QtoZSJO3568pDBOM9qyFkugK7zIUDuKEwvIJMo/NX7b0z1mZoLImD7H7iw/ 7MKXKb5utMXyHuBFyclPFr7j2XCrGR/Ky+cO3u2eakPcWylNy0BpEJ9GvzqTrp45ID tPKVriFx7767OJcrzhvGNVUzpt3Pq8mWDO5vaTvpO8PVNYtDfkkKAdUX+I6MoH20YE LD5cQHS1OJ9odctCkhvC1Xc/lm0iMNIuJF3HB0sabqXX5sMrbMAsOvgiM3a03Yrn+s 4CJC0PoDEpMeQ== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list), keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS-TRUSTED), linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM) Subject: [PATCH v2 3/5] KEYS: trusted: Re-orchestrate tpm2_read_public() calls Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2025 12:05:26 +0200 Message-ID: <20251209100529.1700779-4-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.52.0 In-Reply-To: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" tpm2_load_cmd() and tpm2_unseal_cmd() use the same parent, and calls to tpm_buf_append_name() cause the exact same TPM2_ReadPublic command to be sent to the chip, causing unnecessary traffic. 1. Export tpm2_read_public in order to make it callable from 'trusted_tpm2'. 2. Re-orchestrate tpm2_seal_trusted() and tpm2_unseal_trusted() in order to halve the name resolutions required: 2a. Move tpm2_read_public() calls into trusted_tpm2. 2b. Pass TPM name to tpm_buf_append_name(). 2c. Rework tpm_buf_append_name() to use the pre-resolved name. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 3 +- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 95 +++++------------ include/linux/tpm.h | 10 +- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 124 ++++++++++++++-------- 4 files changed, 118 insertions(+), 114 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 2682f5ec09cb..5b04e74b6377 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -199,7 +199,8 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_PCR_EXTEND); =20 if (!disable_pcr_integrity) { - rc =3D tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, pcr_idx, NULL); + rc =3D tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, pcr_idx, (u8 *)&pcr_idx, + sizeof(u32)); if (rc) return rc; tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, NULL, 0); diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessi= ons.c index a0c88fb1804c..0816a91134fc 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -136,8 +136,8 @@ struct tpm2_auth { * handle, but they are part of the session by name, which * we must compute and remember */ - u32 name_h[AUTH_MAX_NAMES]; u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; + u16 name_size_tbl[AUTH_MAX_NAMES]; }; =20 #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC @@ -163,7 +163,17 @@ static int name_size(const u8 *name) } } =20 -static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name) +/** + * tpm2_read_public: Resolve TPM name for a handle + * @chip: TPM chip to use. + * @handle: TPM handle. + * @name: A buffer for returning the name blob. Must have a + * capacity of 'SHA512_DIGET_SIZE + 2' bytes at minimum + * + * Returns size of TPM handle name of success. + * Returns tpm_transmit_cmd error codes when TPM2_ReadPublic fails. + */ +int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name) { u32 mso =3D tpm2_handle_mso(handle); off_t offset =3D TPM_HEADER_SIZE; @@ -212,14 +222,16 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u3= 2 handle, void *name) memcpy(name, &buf->data[offset], rc); return name_size_alg; } +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_read_public); #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ =20 /** - * tpm_buf_append_name() - add a handle area to the buffer - * @chip: the TPM chip structure - * @buf: The buffer to be appended - * @handle: The handle to be appended - * @name: The name of the handle (may be NULL) + * tpm_buf_append_name() - Append a handle and store TPM name + * @chip: TPM chip to use. + * @buf: TPM buffer containing the TPM command in-transit. + * @handle: TPM handle to be appended. + * @name: TPM name of the handle + * @name_size: Size of the TPM name. * * In order to compute session HMACs, we need to know the names of the * objects pointed to by the handles. For most objects, this is simply @@ -236,15 +248,14 @@ static int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u3= 2 handle, void *name) * will be caused by an incorrect programming model and indicated by a * kernel message. * - * Ends the authorization session on failure. + * Returns zero on success. + * Returns -EIO when the authorization area state is malformed. */ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name) + u32 handle, u8 *name, u16 name_size) { #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC - enum tpm2_mso_type mso =3D tpm2_handle_mso(handle); struct tpm2_auth *auth; - u16 name_size_alg; int slot; int ret; #endif @@ -269,36 +280,15 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct= tpm_buf *buf, } tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); auth->session +=3D 4; - - if (mso =3D=3D TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || - mso =3D=3D TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || - mso =3D=3D TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - if (!name) { - ret =3D tpm2_read_public(chip, handle, auth->name[slot]); - if (ret < 0) - goto err; - - name_size_alg =3D ret; - } - } else { - if (name) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "handle 0x%08x does not use a name\n", - handle); - ret =3D -EIO; - goto err; - } - } - - auth->name_h[slot] =3D handle; - if (name) - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size_alg); + memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size); + auth->name_size_tbl[slot] =3D name_size; #endif return 0; =20 #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC err: tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); - return tpm_ret_to_err(ret); + return ret; #endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); @@ -606,22 +596,8 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, s= truct tpm_buf *buf) attrs =3D chip->cc_attrs_tbl[i]; =20 handles =3D (attrs >> TPM2_CC_ATTR_CHANDLES) & GENMASK(2, 0); + offset_s +=3D handles * sizeof(u32); =20 - /* - * just check the names, it's easy to make mistakes. This - * would happen if someone added a handle via - * tpm_buf_append_u32() instead of tpm_buf_append_name() - */ - for (i =3D 0; i < handles; i++) { - u32 handle =3D tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); - - if (auth->name_h[i] !=3D handle) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "invalid handle 0x%08x\n", handle); - ret =3D -EIO; - goto err; - } - } - /* point offset_s to the start of the sessions */ val =3D tpm_buf_read_u32(buf, &offset_s); /* point offset_p to the start of the parameters */ offset_p =3D offset_s + val; @@ -682,23 +658,8 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, s= truct tpm_buf *buf) /* ordinal is already BE */ sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->ordinal, sizeof(head->ordinal)); /* add the handle names */ - for (i =3D 0; i < handles; i++) { - enum tpm2_mso_type mso =3D tpm2_handle_mso(auth->name_h[i]); - - if (mso =3D=3D TPM2_MSO_PERSISTENT || - mso =3D=3D TPM2_MSO_VOLATILE || - mso =3D=3D TPM2_MSO_NVRAM) { - ret =3D name_size(auth->name[i]); - if (ret < 0) - goto err; - - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], ret); - } else { - __be32 h =3D cpu_to_be32(auth->name_h[i]); - - sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&h, 4); - } - } + for (i =3D 0; i < handles; i++) + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], auth->name_size_tbl[i]); if (offset_s !=3D tpm_buf_length(buf)) sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_s], tpm_buf_length(buf) - offset_s); diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 922a43ef23b5..9f684fc7ae04 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -543,7 +543,7 @@ static inline struct tpm2_auth *tpm2_chip_auth(struct t= pm_chip *chip) } =20 int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, - u32 handle, u8 *name); + u32 handle, u8 *name, u16 name_size); void tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *bu= f, u8 attributes, u8 *passphrase, int passphraselen); @@ -557,6 +557,7 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, st= ruct tpm_buf *buf); int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, int rc); void tpm2_end_auth_session(struct tpm_chip *chip); +int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, void *name); #else #include =20 @@ -580,6 +581,13 @@ static inline int tpm_buf_check_hmac_response(struct t= pm_chip *chip, { return rc; } + +static inline int tpm2_read_public(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 handle, + void *name) +{ + memcpy(name, &handle, sizeof(u32)); + return sizeof(u32); +} #endif /* CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC */ =20 #endif diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trus= ted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 27424e1a4a63..63539b344ffb 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -203,7 +203,9 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options) { + u8 parent_name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; off_t offset =3D TPM_HEADER_SIZE; + u16 parent_name_size; int blob_len =3D 0; int hash; u32 flags; @@ -220,6 +222,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, if (rc) return rc; =20 + rc =3D tpm2_read_public(chip, options->keyhandle, parent_name); + if (rc < 0) + goto out_put; + + parent_name_size =3D rc; + rc =3D tpm2_start_auth_session(chip); if (rc) goto out_put; @@ -234,7 +242,8 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE); tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE); =20 - rc =3D tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc =3D tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, parent_name, + parent_name_size); if (rc) goto out_put; =20 @@ -326,48 +335,38 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, } =20 /** - * tpm2_load_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Load command - * - * @chip: TPM chip to use - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * @options: authentication values and other options - * @blob_handle: returned blob handle + * tpm2_load_cmd() - Execute TPM2_Load + * @chip: TPM chip to use. + * @payload: Key data in clear text. + * @options: Trusted key options. + * @parent_name: A cryptographic name, i.e. a TPMT_HA blob, of the + * parent key. + * @blob: The decoded payload for the key. + * @blob_handle: On success, will contain handle to the loaded keyedhash + * blob. * - * Return: 0 on success. - * -E2BIG on wrong payload size. - * -EPERM on tpm error status. - * < 0 error from tpm_send. + * Return -E2BIG when the blob size is too small for all the data. + * Returns tpm_transmit_cmd() error codes when either TPM2_Load fails. */ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options, + u8 *parent_name, + u16 parent_name_size, + const u8 *blob, u32 *blob_handle) { u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) =3D NULL; unsigned int private_len; unsigned int public_len; unsigned int blob_len; - u8 *blob, *pub; + const u8 *pub; int rc; u32 attrs; =20 - rc =3D tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); - if (rc) { - /* old form */ - blob =3D payload->blob; - payload->old_format =3D 1; - } else { - /* Bind for cleanup: */ - blob_ref =3D blob; - } - - /* new format carries keyhandle but old format doesn't */ - if (!options->keyhandle) - return -EINVAL; - /* must be big enough for at least the two be16 size counts */ if (payload->blob_len < 4) - return -EINVAL; + return -E2BIG; =20 private_len =3D get_unaligned_be16(blob); =20 @@ -406,7 +405,8 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE); tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_LOAD); =20 - rc =3D tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc =3D tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, parent_name, + parent_name_size); if (rc) return rc; =20 @@ -434,20 +434,23 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, } =20 /** - * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - execute a TPM2_Unload command + * tpm2_unseal_cmd() - Execute TPM2_Unload * - * @chip: TPM chip to use - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * @options: authentication values and other options - * @blob_handle: blob handle + * @chip: TPM chip to use + * @payload: Key data in clear text. + * @options: Trusted key options. + * @parent_name: A cryptographic name, i.e. a TPMT_HA blob, of the + * parent key. + * @blob_handle: Handle to the loaded keyedhash blob. * - * Return: 0 on success - * -EPERM on tpm error status - * < 0 error from tpm_send + * Return -E2BIG when the blob size is too small for all the data. + * Returns tpm_transmit_cmd() error codes when either TPM2_Load fails. */ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options, + u8 *parent_name, + u16 parent_name_size, u32 blob_handle) { u16 data_len; @@ -465,7 +468,8 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, tpm_buf_init(buf, TPM_BUFSIZE); tpm_buf_reset(buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL); =20 - rc =3D tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, NULL); + rc =3D tpm_buf_append_name(chip, buf, options->keyhandle, parent_name, + parent_name_size); if (rc) return rc; =20 @@ -526,30 +530,60 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, } =20 /** - * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - unseal the payload of a trusted key + * tpm2_unseal_trusted() - Unseal a trusted key + * @chip: TPM chip to use. + * @payload: Key data in clear text. + * @options: Trusted key options. * - * @chip: TPM chip to use - * @payload: the key data in clear and encrypted form - * @options: authentication values and other options - * - * Return: Same as with tpm_send. + * Return -E2BIG when the blob size is too small for all the data. + * Return -EINVAL when parent's key handle has not been set. + * Returns tpm_transmit_cmd() error codes when either TPM2_Load or TPM2_Un= seal + * fails. */ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct trusted_key_payload *payload, struct trusted_key_options *options) { + u8 *blob_ref __free(kfree) =3D NULL; + u8 parent_name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; + u16 parent_name_size; u32 blob_handle; + u8 *blob; int rc; =20 + /* + * Try to decode the provided blob as an ASN.1 blob. Assume that the + * blob is in the legacy format if decoding does not end successfully. + */ + rc =3D tpm2_key_decode(payload, options, &blob); + if (rc) { + blob =3D payload->blob; + payload->old_format =3D 1; + } else { + blob_ref =3D blob; + } + + if (!options->keyhandle) + return -EINVAL; + rc =3D tpm_try_get_ops(chip); if (rc) return rc; =20 - rc =3D tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle); + rc =3D tpm2_read_public(chip, options->keyhandle, parent_name); + if (rc < 0) + goto out; + + parent_name_size =3D rc; + + rc =3D tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, parent_name, + parent_name_size, blob, &blob_handle); if (rc) goto out; =20 - rc =3D tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle); + rc =3D tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, parent_name, + parent_name_size, blob_handle); + tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle); =20 out: --=20 2.52.0 From nobody Wed Feb 11 17:21:21 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BC661257827; Tue, 9 Dec 2025 10:06:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765274767; cv=none; b=uaPSg8TfkdkqKD8lc9ItKHVNh4myPwbrB/9jwyTde3JlizHKSPrtOF2W6xKf9zPj0gacKO48t4cPg8KE73gIUg4iMCtazb7zigBzrm2QMVmVfQROkpRpVDz3j1yquequrd9DbsKuyivFPXRqngd8ROihukG4SlHv/lcbHjhTCBM= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1765274767; c=relaxed/simple; bh=j3sRY/5DqDHwhme3v+bOihyZBmakSNazCo3LEzMzmDU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=agfqoGgK6xlFPdZRHduCiLMaHaYpyb9iHvFtrilIA4/vloYe3ycsSmu59i2NnUqwWxYw723F088Uh9nljR8x1XgHCuSMjoZDl5qwzTLm95HcDT+bsVtW7MmlL2TN7wOPgXaoj6JjR5S1ah1zrA+KKnIxr8Dph318kR9HkStOkW0= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=dD0pyKIk; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="dD0pyKIk" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 7DED2C4CEF5; Tue, 9 Dec 2025 10:06:05 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1765274766; bh=j3sRY/5DqDHwhme3v+bOihyZBmakSNazCo3LEzMzmDU=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=dD0pyKIk41a6EcxgBJquA8Ny8x0WcWOgcQWA9BlKKPJi94OuTgpD7pIIk9dm9eis5 65DYB1r5aMHGM1r5QipeJDGDLZ9hFJ1YOSNyfAmzLa5NdeDzAZVQGplVHBXoUVmvpX zpt75bYlHNDjWq6Ftb629qToUt/QtKV+2FXN26e7ul7TYBpjcip+YOvCA8bxTN+otk p31Uc3ACTMd+rkPJdGvwdJfv/z+23iD/dHaGjJNSMiFRLxnPCsdUU8cNucsYtYcmAr QN7sJWN4E3XubcPflCALvmuDIgal0Y1seEJE/QRel31OSqb78m5b0224V/cph3Y4ei sifeCemc5Bvzw== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list) Subject: [PATCH v2 4/5] tpm2-sessions: Remove AUTH_MAX_NAMES Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2025 12:05:27 +0200 Message-ID: <20251209100529.1700779-5-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.52.0 In-Reply-To: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" In all of the call sites only one session is ever append. Thus, reduce AUTH_MAX_NAMES, which leads into removing constant completely. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 31 +++++++++++-------------------- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessi= ons.c index 0816a91134fc..62a200ae72d7 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -72,9 +72,6 @@ #include #include =20 -/* maximum number of names the TPM must remember for authorization */ -#define AUTH_MAX_NAMES 3 - #define AES_KEY_BYTES AES_KEYSIZE_128 #define AES_KEY_BITS (AES_KEY_BYTES*8) =20 @@ -136,8 +133,8 @@ struct tpm2_auth { * handle, but they are part of the session by name, which * we must compute and remember */ - u8 name[AUTH_MAX_NAMES][TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; - u16 name_size_tbl[AUTH_MAX_NAMES]; + u8 name[TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE]; + u16 name_size; }; =20 #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC @@ -254,11 +251,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm2_read_public); int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle, u8 *name, u16 name_size) { -#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC struct tpm2_auth *auth; - int slot; int ret; -#endif + + if (tpm_buf_length(buf) !=3D TPM_HEADER_SIZE) { + dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n"); + ret =3D -EIO; + goto err; + } =20 if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, handle); @@ -266,12 +266,6 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct = tpm_buf *buf, } =20 #ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC - slot =3D (tpm_buf_length(buf) - TPM_HEADER_SIZE) / 4; - if (slot >=3D AUTH_MAX_NAMES) { - dev_err(&chip->dev, "too many handles\n"); - ret =3D -EIO; - goto err; - } auth =3D chip->auth; if (auth->session !=3D tpm_buf_length(buf)) { dev_err(&chip->dev, "session state malformed"); @@ -280,16 +274,14 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct= tpm_buf *buf, } tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); auth->session +=3D 4; - memcpy(auth->name[slot], name, name_size); - auth->name_size_tbl[slot] =3D name_size; + memcpy(auth->name, name, name_size); + auth->name_size =3D name_size; #endif return 0; =20 -#ifdef CONFIG_TCG_TPM2_HMAC err: tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); return ret; -#endif } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); =20 @@ -658,8 +650,7 @@ int tpm_buf_fill_hmac_session(struct tpm_chip *chip, st= ruct tpm_buf *buf) /* ordinal is already BE */ sha256_update(&sctx, (u8 *)&head->ordinal, sizeof(head->ordinal)); /* add the handle names */ - for (i =3D 0; i < handles; i++) - sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name[i], auth->name_size_tbl[i]); + sha256_update(&sctx, auth->name, auth->name_size); if (offset_s !=3D tpm_buf_length(buf)) sha256_update(&sctx, &buf->data[offset_s], tpm_buf_length(buf) - offset_s); --=20 2.52.0 From nobody Wed Feb 11 17:21:21 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8E2D4329363; Tue, 9 Dec 2025 10:06:12 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; 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Tue, 9 Dec 2025 10:06:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1765274771; bh=lFclNY4ilmi3695kNXRdXxM9YoJOMGgWQ5HzjC24uFc=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=mt9yCgxH/RJ007Yxau2zzHvn9/KRYv0R5lMmVBk/q7RX+07B6qNZuldn/ZahmUdkp IE7jcSrSe04/KmuMM3Yp9s6OGtEPxs/Xh4NFhcJe0XK6itWXJC6cYxx63nLjCnOTFh ldIj0hi1un46fqq4V5FR33s0hx9eMp8mn8C2qrkDnh1iiuPJKnc81NQ1xCO9FQE0KS d7/NKAKU61hGiiEHlNg/oJcpwWxe0lwbavZNmgbZ69JjFY+mfQd6XV+4Kvs5ZI3Bni 4Xx8NiUJem66w6sCgKl9crp0QMxiW138pI6xZO8DsS93Ya0Ew1pQZxaKjA/yYWRyo+ HPGwvfXr/CxMg== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: Jarkko Sakkinen , Peter Huewe , Jason Gunthorpe , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list) Subject: [PATCH v2 5/5] tpm-buf: Remove tpm_buf_append_handle Date: Tue, 9 Dec 2025 12:05:28 +0200 Message-ID: <20251209100529.1700779-6-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.52.0 In-Reply-To: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20251209100529.1700779-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Since the number of handles is fixed to a single handle, eliminate all uses of buf->handles and deduce values during compile-time. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen v2: - Streamline the code change and remove dead code. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 25 ------------------------- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c | 6 ++---- drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c | 14 ++------------ include/linux/tpm.h | 2 -- 4 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c index 73be8a87b472..752c69b8a4f5 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c @@ -40,7 +40,6 @@ static void __tpm_buf_reset(struct tpm_buf *buf, u16 buf_= size, u16 tag, u32 ordi buf->flags =3D 0; buf->length =3D sizeof(*head); buf->capacity =3D buf_size - sizeof(*buf); - buf->handles =3D 0; head->tag =3D cpu_to_be16(tag); head->length =3D cpu_to_be32(sizeof(*head)); head->ordinal =3D cpu_to_be32(ordinal); @@ -56,7 +55,6 @@ static void __tpm_buf_reset_sized(struct tpm_buf *buf, u1= 6 buf_size) buf->flags =3D TPM_BUF_TPM2B; buf->length =3D 2; buf->capacity =3D buf_size - sizeof(*buf); - buf->handles =3D 0; buf->data[0] =3D 0; buf->data[1] =3D 0; } @@ -177,29 +175,6 @@ void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32= value) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u32); =20 -/** - * tpm_buf_append_handle() - Add a handle - * @buf: &tpm_buf instance - * @handle: a TPM object handle - * - * Add a handle to the buffer, and increase the count tracking the number = of - * handles in the command buffer. Works only for command buffers. - */ -void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle) -{ - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) - return; - - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B) { - WARN(1, "tpm-buf: invalid type: TPM2B\n"); - buf->flags |=3D TPM_BUF_INVALID; - return; - } - - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); - buf->handles++; -} - /** * tpm_buf_read() - Read from a TPM buffer * @buf: &tpm_buf instance diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c index 5b04e74b6377..dbcd46c5e09d 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-cmd.c @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ int tpm2_pcr_extend(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 pcr_idx, return rc; tpm_buf_append_hmac_session(chip, buf, 0, NULL, 0); } else { - tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, pcr_idx); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, pcr_idx); tpm_buf_append_auth(chip, buf, NULL, 0); } =20 @@ -281,10 +281,8 @@ int tpm2_get_random(struct tpm_chip *chip, u8 *dest, s= ize_t max) TPM2_SA_CONTINUE_SESSION, NULL, 0); } else { - offset =3D buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; head =3D (struct tpm_header *)buf->data; - if (tpm_buf_length(buf) =3D=3D offset) - head->tag =3D cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS); + head->tag =3D cpu_to_be16(TPM2_ST_NO_SESSIONS); } tpm_buf_append_u16(buf, num_bytes); =20 diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessi= ons.c index 62a200ae72d7..f2b8ca893e15 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm2-sessions.c @@ -261,7 +261,7 @@ int tpm_buf_append_name(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct t= pm_buf *buf, } =20 if (!tpm2_chip_auth(chip)) { - tpm_buf_append_handle(buf, handle); + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, handle); return 0; } =20 @@ -288,17 +288,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_name); void tpm_buf_append_auth(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u8 *passphrase, int passphrase_len) { - /* offset tells us where the sessions area begins */ - int offset =3D buf->handles * 4 + TPM_HEADER_SIZE; - u32 len =3D 9 + passphrase_len; - - if (tpm_buf_length(buf) !=3D offset) { - /* not the first session so update the existing length */ - len +=3D get_unaligned_be32(&buf->data[offset]); - put_unaligned_be32(len, &buf->data[offset]); - } else { - tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, len); - } + tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, 9 + passphrase_len); /* auth handle */ tpm_buf_append_u32(buf, TPM2_RS_PW); /* nonce */ diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index 9f684fc7ae04..e68995df8796 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -395,7 +395,6 @@ enum tpm_buf_flags { */ struct tpm_buf { u8 flags; - u8 handles; u16 length; u16 capacity; u8 data[]; @@ -441,7 +440,6 @@ void tpm_buf_append_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u32 = value); u8 tpm_buf_read_u8(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset); u16 tpm_buf_read_u16(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset); u32 tpm_buf_read_u32(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *offset); -void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_buf *buf, u32 handle); =20 /* * Check if TPM device is in the firmware upgrade mode. --=20 2.52.0