From nobody Tue Dec 2 00:25:37 2025 Received: from mail-pj1-f53.google.com (mail-pj1-f53.google.com [209.85.216.53]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256 (128/128 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 080D5311C1F for ; Mon, 24 Nov 2025 14:59:08 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=209.85.216.53 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1763996350; cv=none; b=HQt4LeFY3pGxKBs2F8G8Blr0UuTvdljf2wIPPyPUlkR2EZt5raZDlWpCU5UEIYMVEF0x66PPoop4I9nX2sJDBEUSBso4y4Lw8rikOJa09ynsiciXabRA+A0MojIU+TsQqfiQRarxvhzNpBGLO4EeIQJtYaOK6J7ou63c8NZO56w= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1763996350; c=relaxed/simple; bh=2alUDv8rvceCb5R0lAIMpgim+otu2LkDkNJp3n4GNU8=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-ID:MIME-Version:Content-Type; b=VKzSqm2263em5dg7ApKC8vJgZBatxSsBkEJTe9Y+2M9VhXGGHQo1yfHV4xGn30JWuEjxkfhxRhJXRKW8K7Nl+uEIHVI7cRdh3bl8k3yY4Al3EQkjMjMtU3WoQgP62Vn6320kHUil3a6+u0Ll8ChRL9bQJJ5N5lBLi+Akx7Ze1Qo= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gmail.com; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b=Lmc8TUCw; arc=none smtp.client-ip=209.85.216.53 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=gmail.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=gmail.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=gmail.com header.i=@gmail.com header.b="Lmc8TUCw" Received: by mail-pj1-f53.google.com with SMTP id 98e67ed59e1d1-34374febdefso4461347a91.0 for ; Mon, 24 Nov 2025 06:59:08 -0800 (PST) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=gmail.com; s=20230601; t=1763996348; x=1764601148; darn=vger.kernel.org; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:message-id:date:subject:cc :to:from:from:to:cc:subject:date:message-id:reply-to; bh=Xb/VAa48jm4ZVOyqZFMVfLn47WQAUiV4skOomqo7/fk=; b=Lmc8TUCw8zEh6pp+UGkQZWgl82kzg8HJn2UB51yJmScKIE0aIfF0xJAqDOQT4A7A6B P6gyhruyc5g+ivirXeFkEmGfB6xwgJyeD1ET07kG9Hmfx0Z7/OUTsO8Ifwp62TAiwCFu 1QCLHPE8tAC5k0Te6GDRmC415MWI6KNI5t4hzpdIYRLmNrTMb99Xn3z5E5QmfhcmVjUm 1VngG8OKEzn/QeE0bygIQOCDnvwE+Qmo8Kgf05SGSD4M59hdVXlS+anuCROX8WiUkba0 Bv0kimkeKH0eKJwEbVcj1/1QFJ0LUDK6rNkyg/qI3a+sNdV37ejw1sieQqAEXi5ZJ4Jq rDAw== X-Google-DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=1e100.net; s=20230601; t=1763996348; x=1764601148; h=content-transfer-encoding:mime-version:message-id:date:subject:cc :to:from:x-gm-gg:x-gm-message-state:from:to:cc:subject:date :message-id:reply-to; bh=Xb/VAa48jm4ZVOyqZFMVfLn47WQAUiV4skOomqo7/fk=; b=WLIUjMhks7whn0ld82/h1dYRQqpWv0DEZewan5AOxpf9tZscJ5uLJ8EAHlngovRrQp ALfKTinU74J3E8Xg/9BbY4ynuOTJkNR5KQNDlu306t3thXFCz7mt1QQQskJ5EoDYedPg JzKgx5cUSNnRTiC2QJ+EOKecG/nVAKqowr6grgichCcoUkS1cK/SvtwPGM+7xOXs7mF0 5rFT8JMXdyNe6V0jsV1gmPyFvJlOCTNIwMtrD2mIAp0B/gC/O0Je26sjg/JgfuMBJMTv +qBqJTY3MiA23I+FCH5tFQvn+MMPSVvve0USUBxDZIU0YiO7O/iNoo7pIhIW0PO5mTnH U5BA== X-Forwarded-Encrypted: i=1; AJvYcCUGd3GhyMHEWjABframGgh2lsdvfK5eqIhsebEzx9denx2oKpo43ehkVdU69xIEzoWbpnuiScvZpbg8zzY=@vger.kernel.org X-Gm-Message-State: AOJu0YxkfMxL41KaYbHKmfYQ6Di7UxtEgfKv/3vtQxBARsa0QW4XnKbV iETDVvGv+PLvp5HCHX8+GobkHY+QEEcAcHCsHdlPLNHumPOZzq0ONHEE X-Gm-Gg: ASbGnctTO6K4Omw1mwUjlesdG8QZxO0yt7tjDiAN0qYpaMufwsdmlnWb7mQ8x4Sa5E/ tZFHGQjOOoyl7V7lz/ff8gP5/KjnYraEg82ezL4SpfMgwH5SqD3U+Mnvcx4WdGEfu1OEn1EWles a6NrAwqu286EJ8eGdR0PF2M13icAT66ZbPBJKAS+gNm3slFi/ka0GBM/jFz84thGbkYGUzoKSWw eSDVWhhJoXQd9HZ+dJbVMwqMtScNSp0IRlXlHSfSo9lKXd5QghrJmiYFNTI2yXagBZH2dn3n0LJ haB1vFZO3BdywTGNfz8J54ZlOB7fBq8Lm5ft/pnRwuJLrFg13D1I7+s46Qi9O9ENz59o6uhlzhy blURM9eWCa8m40A/WU+ugRrD8bt+wtSGb1qEEM2ZjKWGQXsSw/e0WHLztjmwQ9iBanBrHTsyoG3 Q6TQPkbn1eKHs= X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGHT+IF47tZPA1s/sNz5ZKhfOqmGjsFMQe6TdOQJCoWicSrdNNBoEVVUABWVfRIaFbBPxSsULWLDjw== X-Received: by 2002:a17:90b:48c5:b0:345:badf:f1b7 with SMTP id 98e67ed59e1d1-34733f3eb64mr11950422a91.28.1763996348107; Mon, 24 Nov 2025 06:59:08 -0800 (PST) Received: from lgs.. ([2408:843c:3010:c65:73e9:29e7:cb49:995d]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id d2e1a72fcca58-7c3f175275asm14937606b3a.69.2025.11.24.06.59.00 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 24 Nov 2025 06:59:07 -0800 (PST) From: Guangshuo Li To: HighPoint Linux Team , "James E.J. Bottomley" , "Martin K. Petersen" , James Bottomley , Andrew Morton , linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: Guangshuo Li , stable@vger.kernel.org Subject: [PATCH] [SCSI] hptiop: Add inbound queue offset bounds check in iop_get_config_itl Date: Mon, 24 Nov 2025 22:58:48 +0800 Message-ID: <20251124145848.45687-1-lgs201920130244@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable In the driver code for the MV=E2=80=91based queue variant (struct hpt_iopmu= _mv of the hptiop driver), the field "inbound_head" is read from the hardware register and used as an index into the array "inbound_q[MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN]". For examp= le: u32 inbound_head =3D readl(&hba->u.mv.mu->inbound_head); /* ... */ memcpy_toio(&hba->u.mv.mu->inbound_q[inbound_head], &p, 8); The code then increments head and wraps it to zero when it equals MVIOP_QUE= UE_LEN. However, the driver does *not* check that the initial value of "inbound_hea= d" is strictly less than "MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN". If the hardware (or attacker=E2=80= =91controlled firmware/hardware device) writes a malicious value into the inbound_head re= gister (which could be =E2=89=A5 MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN), then subsequent "memcpy_toio" w= ill write past the end of "inbound_q", leading to an out=E2=80=91of=E2=80=91bounds wr= ite condition. Since inbound_q is allocated with exactly MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN entries (see: __le64 inbound_q[MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN]; /* MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN =3D=3D 512 */ ), indexing at e.g. "inbound_head =3D=3D 512" or greater results in undefin= ed memory access and potential corruption of adjacent fields or memory regions. This issue is particularly concerning in scenarios where an attacker has co= ntrol or influence over the hardware/firmware on the adapter card (for example a = malicious or compromised controller), because they could deliberately set "inbound_he= ad" to a value outside the expected [0,=E2=80=AFMVIOP_QUEUE_LEN=E2=80=911] range, = thus forcing the driver to write arbitrary data beyond the queue bounds. To mitigate this issue, we add a check to validate the value of "inbound_he= ad" before it is used as an index. If "inbound_head" is found to be out of boun= ds (=E2=89=A5 MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN), the head will be reset to 0, and "head" will be set to 1 to ensure that a v= alid entry is written to the queue. The resetting of "inbound_head" to 0 ensures that the queue proc= essing can continue safely and predictably, while the adjustment of "head =3D 1" ensures that t= he next valid index is used for subsequent writes. This prevents any out-of-bounds writes and ensures that the queue continues= to operate safely even if the hardware is compromised. Fixes: 00f5970193e22 ("[SCSI] hptiop: add more adapter models and other fix= es") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Guangshuo Li --- drivers/scsi/hptiop.c | 8 ++++++++ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/scsi/hptiop.c b/drivers/scsi/hptiop.c index c01370893a81..a1a3840e6ea8 100644 --- a/drivers/scsi/hptiop.c +++ b/drivers/scsi/hptiop.c @@ -166,6 +166,14 @@ static void mv_inbound_write(u64 p, struct hptiop_hba = *hba) if (head =3D=3D MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN) head =3D 0; =20 + if (inbound_head >=3D MVIOP_QUEUE_LEN) { + dev_err(&hba->pdev->dev, + "hptiop: inbound_head out of range (%u)\n", + inbound_head); + inbound_head =3D 0; + head =3D 1; + } + memcpy_toio(&hba->u.mv.mu->inbound_q[inbound_head], &p, 8); writel(head, &hba->u.mv.mu->inbound_head); writel(MVIOP_MU_INBOUND_INT_POSTQUEUE, --=20 2.43.0