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Wed, 12 Nov 2025 19:05:55 +0000 (UTC) Received: from dovecot-director2.suse.de ([2a07:de40:b281:106:10:150:64:167]) by imap1.dmz-prg2.suse.org with ESMTPSA id e+88O5PaFGn+RQAAD6G6ig (envelope-from ); Wed, 12 Nov 2025 19:05:55 +0000 From: Nikolay Borisov To: x86@kernel.org Cc: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, mhocko@suse.de, asit.k.mallick@intel.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Nikolay Borisov Subject: [RESEND PATCH v2] x86/tsx: Set default TSX mode to auto Date: Wed, 12 Nov 2025 21:05:48 +0200 Message-ID: <20251112190548.750746-1-nik.borisov@suse.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.51.1 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Flag: NO X-Rspamd-Queue-Id: A03E51F798 X-Rspamd-Action: no action X-Rspamd-Server: rspamd1.dmz-prg2.suse.org X-Spamd-Result: default: False [-3.01 / 50.00]; BAYES_HAM(-3.00)[99.99%]; MID_CONTAINS_FROM(1.00)[]; NEURAL_HAM_LONG(-1.00)[-1.000]; R_MISSING_CHARSET(0.50)[]; R_DKIM_ALLOW(-0.20)[suse.com:s=susede1]; NEURAL_HAM_SHORT(-0.20)[-1.000]; MIME_GOOD(-0.10)[text/plain]; MX_GOOD(-0.01)[]; MIME_TRACE(0.00)[0:+]; FUZZY_RATELIMITED(0.00)[rspamd.com]; DKIM_SIGNED(0.00)[suse.com:s=susede1]; TO_DN_SOME(0.00)[]; RBL_SPAMHAUS_BLOCKED_OPENRESOLVER(0.00)[2a07:de40:b281:104:10:150:64:97:from]; SPAMHAUS_XBL(0.00)[2a07:de40:b281:104:10:150:64:97:from]; ARC_NA(0.00)[]; RCVD_COUNT_TWO(0.00)[2]; TO_MATCH_ENVRCPT_ALL(0.00)[]; FROM_HAS_DN(0.00)[]; RECEIVED_SPAMHAUS_BLOCKED_OPENRESOLVER(0.00)[2a07:de40:b281:106:10:150:64:167:received]; DNSWL_BLOCKED(0.00)[2a07:de40:b281:106:10:150:64:167:received,2a07:de40:b281:104:10:150:64:97:from]; FROM_EQ_ENVFROM(0.00)[]; RCVD_VIA_SMTP_AUTH(0.00)[]; RCVD_TLS_ALL(0.00)[]; DKIM_TRACE(0.00)[suse.com:+]; RCPT_COUNT_FIVE(0.00)[6]; DBL_BLOCKED_OPENRESOLVER(0.00)[imap1.dmz-prg2.suse.org:rdns,imap1.dmz-prg2.suse.org:helo,suse.com:dkim,suse.com:mid,suse.com:email] X-Spam-Score: -3.01 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" At SUSE we've been releasing our kernels with TSX enabled for the past 6 years and some customers have started to rely on it. Furthermore, the last known vulnerability concerning TSX was TAA (CVE-2019-11135) and a significant amount time has passed since then without anyone reporting any issues. Intel has released numerous processors which do not have the TAA vulnerability (Cooper/Ice Lake, Sapphire/Emerald/Granite Rappids) yet TSX remains being disabled by default. The main aim of this patch is to reduce the divergence between SUSE's configuration and the upstream by switching the default TSX mode to auto. I believe this strikes the right balance between keeping it enabled where appropriate (i.e every machine which doesn't contain the TAA vulnerability) and disabling it preventively. Signed-off-by: Nikolay Borisov --- Changes since v2: * Reworded the changelog log to hopefully make it clear that this has been= in use for quite some time. arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig index fa3b616af03a..83f5132e2212 100644 --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig @@ -1812,7 +1812,7 @@ config ARCH_PKEY_BITS choice prompt "TSX enable mode" depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL - default X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_OFF + default X86_INTEL_TSX_MODE_AUTO help Intel's TSX (Transactional Synchronization Extensions) feature allows to optimize locking protocols through lock elision which -- 2.51.1