From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0899333CEB1; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:09 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238270; cv=none; b=Iei/fmhMSU/QU5ZHf0hviapbo/geXLdrW329iysFdYSjSR/6gbQEcQgka+Dj9mmzrtSJ/iQ/s5gcU7hUo2Eb2KNGxc5mtfQi6J9XzLmF9aEHVHd9qu08P2iPRab4n4Tal4fAQ7RYbqxupK5FJwFetilHbAhsEOxGRJDWMnil0Zg= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238270; c=relaxed/simple; bh=a58bONVF1hEXJcHKI9R0Y6L9RqhnS7srP5e66tDrhlU=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=j2vZJtFqYoyH0Md4gHD6MZuHHaFu95GVBgIH0a6M698HTUQsRdGDMTQ6rD2gf6/hzGX7lhXJzBuY1/dyuq9t/X1ymQe7I+V50BzgJ7WkEoqfNr8VUQdxjePAbY+2RVxIJ7h5jye1+BA1CUyUZCBCpMLJKC+ns/29AhXZQOe5jfo= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=SUn7ybvs; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="SUn7ybvs" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 90FACC4CEFF; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:09 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238269; bh=a58bONVF1hEXJcHKI9R0Y6L9RqhnS7srP5e66tDrhlU=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=SUn7ybvsW2sSbfh5QDyOqiYItuRrVMBBoik2oR/X6jSwcw8xCzZNSyAH3kJuYQvAZ fIo6KUEZadxQPinmEALJmDOm3rVfShb47JolGUfcf+te3d9xJlswn8jZeW/8O8wLVy qVDuoLA3cNRlJnw5iW+8sXbg9y111abFquceknyyEmquq+BHDWZUCJyEbncq8Lp7FY DBOSPEacPYHcs2qLyHELmI5eHiRMdbV2uafK8wtCt+/1zu7kM9h7uIwxJ8RrozD936 GUnXMp5w67haXA84AA0J+Tq1l4mt6rPFB7Oxr28WLlSg8fSnsYBNt5BX2iiOeYJtvm K15fjqJq3qDhQ== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 7A904CCD1BE; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:09 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:06 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 01/28] mm: VM_SHADOW_STACK definition for riscv Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-1-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , David Hildenbrand , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=815; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=pkBAvc0IieGGas1vvYQtOkKUWHcQF724uRmRqVMGgPs=; b=VUBVVTDAkz7jwJ2C3jgClL9f8HO15z25YA/BhpcXvfbmCfho9WWkdfrHc1G5gnRgD+BziikYB zc+am72yislC9qPgWwy1p1oGuBPGxvwQo3I2eAaQqJILROv5diw4iqI X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 is used for riscv Reviewed-by: Zong Li Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti Acked-by: David Hildenbrand Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- include/linux/mm.h | 7 +++++++ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h index d16b33bacc32..2032d3f195f1 100644 --- a/include/linux/mm.h +++ b/include/linux/mm.h @@ -380,6 +380,13 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp); # define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_HIGH_ARCH_6 #endif =20 +#if defined(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) +/* + * Following x86 and picking up the same bitpos. + */ +# define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_HIGH_ARCH_5 +#endif + #ifndef VM_SHADOW_STACK # define VM_SHADOW_STACK VM_NONE #endif --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 307FB33DEDF; 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Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=1500; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=onQZPDO/5PI+EGQWomoauY3V7EJZG9au2H7fkbOgnBs=; b=lvCMW0ZxXnLNDcoSCS0dz8sseZUUceYVdmkvZqQMJJflgpNFfv8MskbwLB0L1hPH79GvUxSuA GNeooInsBj5CySypZFtJd60V+L+u/LKByXjcqfUg69jVPSLgO7SjJtn X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Make an entry for cfi extensions in extensions.yaml. Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta Acked-by: Rob Herring (Arm) --- Documentation/devicetree/bindings/riscv/extensions.yaml | 14 ++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/riscv/extensions.yaml b/Docu= mentation/devicetree/bindings/riscv/extensions.yaml index 543ac94718e8..3222326e32eb 100644 --- a/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/riscv/extensions.yaml +++ b/Documentation/devicetree/bindings/riscv/extensions.yaml @@ -444,6 +444,20 @@ properties: The standard Zicboz extension for cache-block zeroing as ratif= ied in commit 3dd606f ("Create cmobase-v1.0.pdf") of riscv-CMOs. =20 + - const: zicfilp + description: | + The standard Zicfilp extension for enforcing forward edge + control-flow integrity as ratified in commit 3f8e450 ("merge + pull request #227 from ved-rivos/0709") of riscv-cfi + github repo. + + - const: zicfiss + description: | + The standard Zicfiss extension for enforcing backward edge + control-flow integrity as ratified in commit 3f8e450 ("merge + pull request #227 from ved-rivos/0709") of riscv-cfi + github repo. + - const: zicntr description: The standard Zicntr extension for base counters and timers, as --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4951033DEFE; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238270; cv=none; b=KNDVkTnFueYdoaexcXl406zYR18t+AEiiarI6NCHAK6q7Pc68dGWAqZvuZxRoOdgulukcWNblWXKRTpM5CqfnBNzMAnCknQM2rt6ZFqlsRUmSMVXvoLiNVUkNld7QqjweWZZJ+loXjqg/ll9ZNxwpybZmkzzSOvUwUCerZbgqEI= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238270; c=relaxed/simple; bh=qy72dCosHMlyVaEZSO/0x0kMtkg5SMH4dAjVj3FsaHM=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=BocXFTpl5SuPKoPqcpNY0K3Ka2XQ1x1nqKL6C/B3jQFcD1FF2A4ocLeUZApDeUNQ2i6gr7DeapONGiU68CGtRoImOju1kudT5jfFQZh22V3S4ueM/vISie4VG2prm4Dzteo8gvX2Z1YlCMax6gIVQjNRkvfL85n1jL39CMlQ8wQ= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=VexfKeP+; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="VexfKeP+" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C30FFC2BCB2; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:09 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238269; bh=qy72dCosHMlyVaEZSO/0x0kMtkg5SMH4dAjVj3FsaHM=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=VexfKeP+0GjqQFjAzE5L+oif3T5em6hRrQJM306Vp8C5F7F0rCcsLxpeEuAYeCI1I 8NjBSEfuQAcYhYhTWQreFFnNZocUXdjoFeVtV/RNEmvdQiaw9fz5YYumGsP3FFQetf J7usdZjDhqoDb4hKYSL/QlFhVtRrLXUysCY4GuXyUW/mlU0AvdJytiaENX/2G6BKeX KqtTVUnFWMGign2esWSSqBR8fVudxfy87PD8tL34hv0hSKZPUc0DfrWsWvkjjYNHiD 5fxu+ZnKoh40/vzBHxoQN9HoMulY21Owfu5AgEYdV/OGz1r1k5edY4lhwyuhiJhi/a smppIJMFlM+Dg== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B0562CCF9E3; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:09 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:08 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 03/28] riscv: zicfiss / zicfilp enumeration Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-3-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=3586; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=deI8AoZPctoPZRL1uqTvQmr6gi6xgPskQ2JbS5WJlvk=; b=YQro2OnbakPseUD/kFjeSVeE/iiyJeU35txlhId36bc8S/GO70B2r5RwUtPmX2Oe2A5vQhCAM 9DaIjK+Ro39C0PnhGyRdJTEo4pb1xgSns4EiwWJHlwXzQ7VmsXEai4t X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta This patch adds support for detecting zicfiss and zicfilp. zicfiss and zicfilp stands for unprivleged integer spec extension for shadow stack and branch tracking on indirect branches, respectively. This patch looks for zicfiss and zicfilp in device tree and accordinlgy lights up bit in cpu feature bitmap. Furthermore this patch adds detection utility functions to return whether shadow stack or landing pads are supported by cpu. Reviewed-by: Zong Li Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/riscv/include/asm/hwcap.h | 2 ++ arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 36 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/cpufeature.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/c= pufeature.h index fbd0e4306c93..481f483ebf15 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/cpufeature.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/cpufeature.h @@ -150,4 +150,16 @@ static __always_inline bool riscv_cpu_has_extension_un= likely(int cpu, const unsi return __riscv_isa_extension_available(hart_isa[cpu].isa, ext); } =20 +static inline bool cpu_supports_shadow_stack(void) +{ + return (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) && + riscv_has_extension_unlikely(RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICFISS)); +} + +static inline bool cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr(void) +{ + return (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) && + riscv_has_extension_unlikely(RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICFILP)); +} + #endif diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/hwcap.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/hwcap.h index affd63e11b0a..7c4619a6d70d 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/hwcap.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/hwcap.h @@ -106,6 +106,8 @@ #define RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZAAMO 97 #define RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZALRSC 98 #define RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICBOP 99 +#define RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICFILP 100 +#define RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICFISS 101 =20 #define RISCV_ISA_EXT_XLINUXENVCFG 127 =20 diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c index 67b59699357d..5a1a194e1180 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -274,6 +274,24 @@ static int riscv_ext_svadu_validate(const struct riscv= _isa_ext_data *data, return 0; } =20 +static int riscv_cfilp_validate(const struct riscv_isa_ext_data *data, + const unsigned long *isa_bitmap) +{ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI)) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + +static int riscv_cfiss_validate(const struct riscv_isa_ext_data *data, + const unsigned long *isa_bitmap) +{ + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI)) + return -EINVAL; + + return 0; +} + static const unsigned int riscv_a_exts[] =3D { RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZAAMO, RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZALRSC, @@ -461,6 +479,10 @@ const struct riscv_isa_ext_data riscv_isa_ext[] =3D { __RISCV_ISA_EXT_DATA_VALIDATE(zicbop, RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICBOP, riscv_ext_zic= bop_validate), __RISCV_ISA_EXT_SUPERSET_VALIDATE(zicboz, RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICBOZ, riscv_xli= nuxenvcfg_exts, riscv_ext_zicboz_validate), __RISCV_ISA_EXT_DATA(ziccrse, RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICCRSE), + __RISCV_ISA_EXT_SUPERSET_VALIDATE(zicfilp, RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICFILP, riscv_x= linuxenvcfg_exts, + riscv_cfilp_validate), + __RISCV_ISA_EXT_SUPERSET_VALIDATE(zicfiss, RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICFISS, riscv_x= linuxenvcfg_exts, + riscv_cfiss_validate), __RISCV_ISA_EXT_DATA(zicntr, RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICNTR), __RISCV_ISA_EXT_DATA(zicond, RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICOND), __RISCV_ISA_EXT_DATA(zicsr, RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICSR), --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5B0FF33F8BB; 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Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=2296; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=kcKAh3qiYa6u+vavoC8VVP4XbgP0FdaLB3/LKiPnoo8=; b=5abQ/8Fyb67brrslHsppHvVHhbfMSh362P9OdeCdOVQdtEtbY5fxaIbvhvl5q8aWJDf/FV0Fq fHseZWEX8HbDzUjvYtlSnv7SPpsB46CG4aJqGJvIu5MxcK1mzpPlmzq X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta zicfiss and zicfilp extension gets enabled via b3 and b2 in *envcfg CSR. menvcfg controls enabling for S/HS mode. henvcfg control enabling for VS while senvcfg controls enabling for U/VU mode. zicfilp extension extends *status CSR to hold `expected landing pad` bit. A trap or interrupt can occur between an indirect jmp/call and target instr. `expected landing pad` bit from CPU is recorded into xstatus CSR so that when supervisor performs xret, `expected landing pad` state of CPU can be restored. zicfiss adds one new CSR - CSR_SSP: CSR_SSP contains current shadow stack pointer. Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins --- arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h index 4a37a98398ad..78f573ab4c53 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/csr.h @@ -18,6 +18,15 @@ #define SR_MPP _AC(0x00001800, UL) /* Previously Machine */ #define SR_SUM _AC(0x00040000, UL) /* Supervisor User Memory Access */ =20 +/* zicfilp landing pad status bit */ +#define SR_SPELP _AC(0x00800000, UL) +#define SR_MPELP _AC(0x020000000000, UL) +#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_M_MODE +#define SR_ELP SR_MPELP +#else +#define SR_ELP SR_SPELP +#endif + #define SR_FS _AC(0x00006000, UL) /* Floating-point Status */ #define SR_FS_OFF _AC(0x00000000, UL) #define SR_FS_INITIAL _AC(0x00002000, UL) @@ -212,6 +221,8 @@ #define ENVCFG_PMM_PMLEN_16 (_AC(0x3, ULL) << 32) #define ENVCFG_CBZE (_AC(1, UL) << 7) #define ENVCFG_CBCFE (_AC(1, UL) << 6) +#define ENVCFG_LPE (_AC(1, UL) << 2) +#define ENVCFG_SSE (_AC(1, UL) << 3) #define ENVCFG_CBIE_SHIFT 4 #define ENVCFG_CBIE (_AC(0x3, UL) << ENVCFG_CBIE_SHIFT) #define ENVCFG_CBIE_ILL _AC(0x0, UL) @@ -230,6 +241,11 @@ #define SMSTATEEN0_HSENVCFG (_ULL(1) << SMSTATEEN0_HSENVCFG_SHIFT) #define SMSTATEEN0_SSTATEEN0_SHIFT 63 #define SMSTATEEN0_SSTATEEN0 (_ULL(1) << SMSTATEEN0_SSTATEEN0_SHIFT) +/* + * zicfiss user mode csr + * CSR_SSP holds current shadow stack pointer. + */ +#define CSR_SSP 0x011 =20 /* mseccfg bits */ #define MSECCFG_PMM ENVCFG_PMM --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5E78633F8C0; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238270; cv=none; b=b2zuMUVY1cLMN3EOm9r2oW8GJknae7qZA/VF4kq+ZZ9JWS7haV7pCIWAENvgjj7FGBfwNrfW5cM5FfZg6OeJCTc8fkU7+3TqQR403b0PEivR76fO4TItjtWWq8+qmJQVUcss6YaBkIGJsZ1Kw9krEE9W9PaGfSlrq9tA15Zuuz8= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238270; c=relaxed/simple; bh=n7BCrIGqPEF5Gu8aeVOZniEvqQ3EM2NnS8zUD7EU50Q=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=lOqax8vmW/ti1mCxN/QJDe10ujUTSexEB/ru3apIrxN0CyYc6pQXqEEdDyxRxfL73MOQJUXF5XaxxCpHsUnm6LUqP6NIpmx/YU9DG49OpW9YChGalLf0abaotHF+SkeqQeEK0IcL9IMjCXGmG+d/Zbvp5jBbYQk2e42UqxrOhpk= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=mAxVi5Ai; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="mAxVi5Ai" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 045A6C2BCB3; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238270; bh=n7BCrIGqPEF5Gu8aeVOZniEvqQ3EM2NnS8zUD7EU50Q=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=mAxVi5Aixn588ZT6qSp5CJ26KUCTjwA200zOGcu6XkIrpnczMj3NhJ8+hEfO/Fky3 Aqp3OwQYIOtzhPmKnar+UZQooTVobDGsTumEhw8kOgc/2D2guv8u2A5isIv7W8DvW0 wcwllgcDTpibl+zc3NYTDL6T1EJ++/ki3mD8uakflM/seG/BKCLaYV8OWBjd3PV6pz 41FCdxC1oDMLk5JcqCU/ITTxvHviO3LZpEnKoZsveQtf9NDEanDo6k998umMUyDu9k ZlMfnjWr0q4ms0+kCniYI9zSEg05AGacjXCGYj1DBrEXY982vWcCbwfqODGw0uQqvQ PY4dDvRUCOteA== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E6DCCCCD1BE; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:09 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:10 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 05/28] riscv: usercfi state for task and save/restore of CSR_SSP on trap entry/exit Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-5-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=5573; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=R6UcK7O0yzGwyniKw/erlt2J+KJFzK3qt2jdwKTD2UE=; b=P3In58fAPn2b+Yc+zI4bwyTOWKO5OakinXHCHRb4p0ZM6TLJheA5BLTjNtR/NE8m5uRcs356W cDlDmB0hlwzDMKTiF+NRjq1f8m2ch4W/ya7frtSzfh82yxwztowwUES X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Carves out space in arch specific thread struct for cfi status and shadow stack in usermode on riscv. This patch does following - defines a new structure cfi_status with status bit for cfi feature - defines shadow stack pointer, base and size in cfi_status structure - defines offsets to new member fields in thread in asm-offsets.c - Saves and restore shadow stack pointer on trap entry (U --> S) and exit (S --> U) Shadow stack save/restore is gated on feature availiblity and implemented using alternative. CSR can be context switched in `switch_to` as well but soon as kernel shadow stack support gets rolled in, shadow stack pointer will need to be switched at trap entry/exit point (much like `sp`). It can be argued that kernel using shadow stack deployment scenario may not be as prevalant as user mode using this feature. But even if there is some minimal deployment of kernel shadow stack, that means that it needs to be supported. And thus save/restore of shadow stack pointer in entry.S instead of in `switch_to.h`. Reviewed-by: Charlie Jenkins Reviewed-by: Zong Li Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h | 3 +++ arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 4 ++++ arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 62 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pr= ocessor.h index da5426122d28..4c3dd94d0f63 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/processor.h @@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include =20 #define arch_get_mmap_end(addr, len, flags) \ ({ \ diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/= thread_info.h index 836d80dd2921..36918c9200c9 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/thread_info.h @@ -73,6 +73,9 @@ struct thread_info { */ unsigned long a0, a1, a2; #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI + struct cfi_state user_cfi_state; +#endif }; =20 #ifdef CONFIG_SHADOW_CALL_STACK diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/user= cfi.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..4c5233e8f3f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + * Copyright (C) 2024 Rivos, Inc. + * Deepak Gupta + */ +#ifndef _ASM_RISCV_USERCFI_H +#define _ASM_RISCV_USERCFI_H + +#ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ +#include + +#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI +struct cfi_state { + unsigned long ubcfi_en : 1; /* Enable for backward cfi. */ + unsigned long user_shdw_stk; /* Current user shadow stack pointer */ + unsigned long shdw_stk_base; /* Base address of shadow stack */ + unsigned long shdw_stk_size; /* size of shadow stack */ +}; + +#endif /* CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI */ + +#endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ + +#endif /* _ASM_RISCV_USERCFI_H */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offset= s.c index 7d42d3b8a32a..8a2b2656cb2f 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -51,6 +51,10 @@ void asm_offsets(void) #endif =20 OFFSET(TASK_TI_CPU_NUM, task_struct, thread_info.cpu); +#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI + OFFSET(TASK_TI_CFI_STATE, task_struct, thread_info.user_cfi_state); + OFFSET(TASK_TI_USER_SSP, task_struct, thread_info.user_cfi_state.user_shd= w_stk); +#endif OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_F0, task_struct, thread.fstate.f[0]); OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_F1, task_struct, thread.fstate.f[1]); OFFSET(TASK_THREAD_F2, task_struct, thread.fstate.f[2]); diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S index d3d92a4becc7..8410850953d6 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S @@ -92,6 +92,35 @@ REG_L a0, TASK_TI_A0(tp) .endm =20 +/* + * If previous mode was U, capture shadow stack pointer and save it away + * Zero CSR_SSP at the same time for sanitization. + */ +.macro save_userssp tmp, status + ALTERNATIVE("nops(4)", + __stringify( \ + andi \tmp, \status, SR_SPP; \ + bnez \tmp, skip_ssp_save; \ + csrrw \tmp, CSR_SSP, x0; \ + REG_S \tmp, TASK_TI_USER_SSP(tp); \ + skip_ssp_save:), + 0, + RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICFISS, + CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) +.endm + +.macro restore_userssp tmp, status + ALTERNATIVE("nops(4)", + __stringify( \ + andi \tmp, \status, SR_SPP; \ + bnez \tmp, skip_ssp_restore; \ + REG_L \tmp, TASK_TI_USER_SSP(tp); \ + csrw CSR_SSP, \tmp; \ + skip_ssp_restore:), + 0, + RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZICFISS, + CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) +.endm =20 SYM_CODE_START(handle_exception) /* @@ -148,6 +177,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START(handle_exception) =20 REG_L s0, TASK_TI_USER_SP(tp) csrrc s1, CSR_STATUS, t0 + save_userssp s2, s1 csrr s2, CSR_EPC csrr s3, CSR_TVAL csrr s4, CSR_CAUSE @@ -243,6 +273,7 @@ SYM_CODE_START_NOALIGN(ret_from_exception) call riscv_v_context_nesting_end #endif REG_L a0, PT_STATUS(sp) + restore_userssp s3, a0 /* * The current load reservation is effectively part of the processor's * state, in the sense that load reservations cannot be shared between --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 808F833FE26; 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charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-6-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=4219; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=lpSh/4YF4b6DV2vqO7uhXaAxm8ZQQfhDo9tNU1Zgc2g=; b=0EylOW1HFcIz/5REMir3O/jSROrnVVUk5arLG4UzCxrsPyagp0KCSw051bXWgRu0w/V5QIP59 g3KUekTmgpwAXR3nS2Bj03Wx2+Ir/1Z/wbGjSWUq8l95BYeMUQF6vu0 X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta `arch_calc_vm_prot_bits` is implemented on risc-v to return VM_READ | VM_WRITE if PROT_WRITE is specified. Similarly `riscv_sys_mmap` is updated to convert all incoming PROT_WRITE to (PROT_WRITE | PROT_READ). This is to make sure that any existing apps using PROT_WRITE still work. Earlier `protection_map[VM_WRITE]` used to pick read-write PTE encodings. Now `protection_map[VM_WRITE]` will always pick PAGE_SHADOWSTACK PTE encodings for shadow stack. Above changes ensure that existing apps continue to work because underneath kernel will be picking `protection_map[VM_WRITE|VM_READ]` PTE encodings. Reviewed-by: Zong Li Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti Signed-off-by: Arnd Bergmann Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 1 + arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c | 10 ++++++++++ arch/riscv/mm/init.c | 2 +- 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0ad1d19832eb --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/mman.h @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ +#ifndef __ASM_MMAN_H__ +#define __ASM_MMAN_H__ + +#include +#include +#include +#include + +static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot, + unsigned long pkey __always_unused) +{ + unsigned long ret =3D 0; + + /* + * If PROT_WRITE was specified, force it to VM_READ | VM_WRITE. + * Only VM_WRITE means shadow stack. + */ + if (prot & PROT_WRITE) + ret =3D (VM_READ | VM_WRITE); + return ret; +} + +#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pk= ey) + +#endif /* ! __ASM_MMAN_H__ */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgta= ble.h index 29e994a9afb6..4c4057a2550e 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -182,6 +182,7 @@ extern struct pt_alloc_ops pt_ops __meminitdata; #define PAGE_READ_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_READ | _PAGE_EXEC) #define PAGE_WRITE_EXEC __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_READ | \ _PAGE_EXEC | _PAGE_WRITE) +#define PAGE_SHADOWSTACK __pgprot(_PAGE_BASE | _PAGE_WRITE) =20 #define PAGE_COPY PAGE_READ #define PAGE_COPY_EXEC PAGE_READ_EXEC diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c index 795b2e815ac9..22fc9b3268be 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_riscv.c @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ =20 #include #include +#include =20 static long riscv_sys_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len, unsigned long prot, unsigned long flags, @@ -16,6 +17,15 @@ static long riscv_sys_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned = long len, if (unlikely(offset & (~PAGE_MASK >> page_shift_offset))) return -EINVAL; =20 + /* + * If PROT_WRITE is specified then extend that to PROT_READ + * protection_map[VM_WRITE] is now going to select shadow stack encodings. + * So specifying PROT_WRITE actually should select protection_map [VM_WRI= TE | VM_READ] + * If user wants to create shadow stack then they should use `map_shadow_= stack` syscall. + */ + if (unlikely((prot & PROT_WRITE) && !(prot & PROT_READ))) + prot |=3D PROT_READ; + return ksys_mmap_pgoff(addr, len, prot, flags, fd, offset >> (PAGE_SHIFT - page_shift_offset)); } diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c index d85efe74a4b6..62ab2c7de7c8 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/mm/init.c +++ b/arch/riscv/mm/init.c @@ -376,7 +376,7 @@ pgd_t early_pg_dir[PTRS_PER_PGD] __initdata __aligned(P= AGE_SIZE); static const pgprot_t protection_map[16] =3D { [VM_NONE] =3D PAGE_NONE, [VM_READ] =3D PAGE_READ, - [VM_WRITE] =3D PAGE_COPY, + [VM_WRITE] =3D PAGE_SHADOWSTACK, [VM_WRITE | VM_READ] =3D PAGE_COPY, [VM_EXEC] =3D PAGE_EXEC, [VM_EXEC | VM_READ] =3D PAGE_READ_EXEC, --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9233A340A62; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; 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charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-7-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=1304; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=9AtWvDKQ9q5op9YLRgkrDiWaHEAhrRbEgloHu05lQww=; b=+dm9mYjGoM5tguhKJhCeDS+GCYQNPbTcoO1hBHORKmhKyt329FWJFaW9QLB/N4dBqSR0uBKJ3 khcJ5aEfrGEDlHtAlbKqsJTvZ+omlQ+K5u89JygZ8WxJdGlTlyQsxAs X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta This patch implements creating shadow stack pte (on riscv). Creating shadow stack PTE on riscv means that clearing RWX and then setting W=3D1. Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 10 ++++++++++ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgta= ble.h index 4c4057a2550e..e4eb4657e1b6 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -425,6 +425,11 @@ static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_novma(pte_t pte) return __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_WRITE); } =20 +static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_shstk(pte_t pte) +{ + return __pte((pte_val(pte) & ~(_PAGE_LEAF)) | _PAGE_WRITE); +} + /* static inline pte_t pte_mkexec(pte_t pte) */ =20 static inline pte_t pte_mkdirty(pte_t pte) @@ -765,6 +770,11 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite_novma(pmd_t pmd) return pte_pmd(pte_mkwrite_novma(pmd_pte(pmd))); } =20 +static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite_shstk(pmd_t pte) +{ + return __pmd((pmd_val(pte) & ~(_PAGE_LEAF)) | _PAGE_WRITE); +} + static inline pmd_t pmd_wrprotect(pmd_t pmd) { return pte_pmd(pte_wrprotect(pmd_pte(pmd))); --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 94BF2340A6C; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238270; cv=none; b=AwBAuG+ym6I/8D0h3tYCcVQzoS4cdIa81lkl+lyodm8NZB21MWAuogrzB0/CVMswhwH7x49s/Ji/I1EigKDKEmw6voKln+FkmWV6Q9spSthEokQsPH82+v2bLRjraEhpeGmzWCzeSBJXThaEatxLeniNijCEzhf9FKcQfbeS4UA= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238270; c=relaxed/simple; bh=2XlQzHo8TfXDA80GJfcRCvbRJVXsgMZd7WmYI4u56MQ=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=ZIroIv4vTUw1ccRU4Y9H2BpiMlU2SB3LCfApUVZfAEMjhCKjBtyzHwAhee9rrnbmADK5OLHMVw9KoIAuN5MoAb4O35bpXw3IAY2ddiVSTEBTJ243b8ixinET1sHr4emkcnHKcYPBqY/RiI1E6o6/PgLmwRJ0kYWSOQ4BaBvbMpk= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=c0DQuGe9; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="c0DQuGe9" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 67389C4AF0D; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238270; bh=2XlQzHo8TfXDA80GJfcRCvbRJVXsgMZd7WmYI4u56MQ=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=c0DQuGe9Yv8wcbRUZX6wECKv4P1ij1PHvwifuPQDhiwNWhncEUM5mKa8KNFXvk4XJ Zh2WYyJs7uyf7CIdxExA9gPebOrzotUTiZ+Zha9lCtBlm4yab+In7taN8DEcmRrSbL x5GW3uVtizFJBazYhQi+auoaRwHlN0xQAD0hNHXsvzSPnI6IqYX9kd+MJz5Tiptofg HASdfvkp5s3yleD+1nPJs3n0c2CP0Tw28FQXVoMJyk9ntHuYVkFUJ1CrQ5TNk3P4pR ifQ0eDo3n7zJ1jN/gsU64Ezsov3jXqgifyyG7+ZtNqBP6wt/IWrL9JmqFVzaK0xZEH riLnY2FgVysYg== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 51707CCD1BC; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:13 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 08/28] riscv/mm: teach pte_mkwrite to manufacture shadow stack PTEs Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-8-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=2245; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=hYnrlxG2aSy5XgBcW07Fd+5qY0pd1xI872KUOKzj6JI=; b=uOUnZTSYae+1jU33LWJifpgmGC+oR/EMiZvhGu+tnHOPhB1RKqIVVIeCONun501aQFM0l8Qxe LB3LNaY8WQNAi0/g4infWveW5c7mSAInncPv0wFTQBcDMWr+lIOblri X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta pte_mkwrite creates PTEs with WRITE encodings for underlying arch. Underlying arch can have two types of writeable mappings. One that can be written using regular store instructions. Another one that can only be written using specialized store instructions (like shadow stack stores). pte_mkwrite can select write PTE encoding based on VMA range (i.e. VM_SHADOW_STACK) Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 7 +++++++ arch/riscv/mm/pgtable.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 23 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgta= ble.h index e4eb4657e1b6..b03e8f85221f 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -420,6 +420,10 @@ static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte) =20 /* static inline pte_t pte_mkread(pte_t pte) */ =20 +struct vm_area_struct; +pte_t pte_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma); +#define pte_mkwrite pte_mkwrite + static inline pte_t pte_mkwrite_novma(pte_t pte) { return __pte(pte_val(pte) | _PAGE_WRITE); @@ -765,6 +769,9 @@ static inline pmd_t pmd_mkyoung(pmd_t pmd) return pte_pmd(pte_mkyoung(pmd_pte(pmd))); } =20 +pmd_t pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma); +#define pmd_mkwrite pmd_mkwrite + static inline pmd_t pmd_mkwrite_novma(pmd_t pmd) { return pte_pmd(pte_mkwrite_novma(pmd_pte(pmd))); diff --git a/arch/riscv/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/riscv/mm/pgtable.c index 8b6c0a112a8d..17a4bd05a02f 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/mm/pgtable.c +++ b/arch/riscv/mm/pgtable.c @@ -165,3 +165,19 @@ pud_t pudp_invalidate(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsi= gned long address, return old; } #endif /* CONFIG_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE */ + +pte_t pte_mkwrite(pte_t pte, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) + return pte_mkwrite_shstk(pte); + + return pte_mkwrite_novma(pte); +} + +pmd_t pmd_mkwrite(pmd_t pmd, struct vm_area_struct *vma) +{ + if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) + return pmd_mkwrite_shstk(pmd); + + return pmd_mkwrite_novma(pmd); +} --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B7783342169; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238270; cv=none; b=iq86BhQqnxAYvVtSyb4hnha8oNNL4B8HVjN+iWCo86n3l2KVVH7aLVx/kqdQGyqqt+mrzH3Rq+0b/vK56EP8vO0jqP5r1yajEl0V7Vi/5zkJuoV5wigVDJ0efqO2fcUUKQPgsksqvlR79iFv88Olnk4ZyUi/p7nmO5aQWMduggI= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238270; c=relaxed/simple; bh=F5ju6oKJAylkflMB3tXqXcd6vIuwrr/MPiKJ+B9Ss3Y=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=MFZJFyztDJPzG5DP0xS3KavmiqpuGNEf0X+106j0HijVlD/QEy3DH9wkCINHrLIp6NXM9AnRBawnqhIlZSEHKhtE2z4j88AUXq2WNWV59YPgjd+2olBG0dIde+wncNfmRZzOSRiPLyC71Wlsye+H1G4Pp6tmgUrfqih8VGHRlws= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=hB38mnwV; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="hB38mnwV" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8185FC4AF4D; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238270; bh=F5ju6oKJAylkflMB3tXqXcd6vIuwrr/MPiKJ+B9Ss3Y=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=hB38mnwVB4iSc4U7WceEGAPxYIoQXtuvh/qLqmFMSno7Lg9kC1dbWLTSN50cSRFAv nokoc3Ywv0M/nt0XhF6tMjg2zuZxjlIr0Mc9UZ9B390Lp6AymoWQB800DEHGUAfTHf 0yHxKeit5+6PtekFnJg9ZPEWL9A4aCHfNPfxlXMkQZvHIqWJhCkG8MYKl9DgR3O3uM FbQzNKxLkffKf+omorGPrDmTTlqNDI7LuWiY/eznSexT0Pd/FR1DmTM6Tvj6Dl8u3X 43Mo/BqCRWxlfwPwhj7ActmhZrGqv8uSXezUTem/kJ+zbEfPx13/S7ZWvb/GBY6q1J s4oyV0aVGWTFQ== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6CDAACCD1BE; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:14 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 09/28] riscv/mm: write protect and shadow stack Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-9-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=2474; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=zG1PvbsubgVB7UstpLjRtN915FxsRLFbcnYegAn0YwA=; b=MOYH+M9XiFkmQH5an8qIwtNnNTe1iJrM5qBubNaFXeuZXU4mI0i4qcQSg1NxEzkrxbT0MUI7S ITCfjXuPAzxDXT5Plujjm5jZbk7IyOgVCHGjcXR9u7LZ4cfKuG1++rd X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta `fork` implements copy on write (COW) by making pages readonly in child and parent both. ptep_set_wrprotect and pte_wrprotect clears _PAGE_WRITE in PTE. Assumption is that page is readable and on fault copy on write happens. To implement COW on shadow stack pages, clearing up W bit makes them XWR = =3D 000. This will result in wrong PTE setting which says no perms but V=3D1 and PFN field pointing to final page. Instead desired behavior is to turn it into a readable page, take an access (load/store) fault on sspush/sspop (shadow stack) and then perform COW on such pages. This way regular reads would still be allowed and not lead to COW maintaining current behavior of COW on non-shadow stack but writeable memory. On the other hand it doesn't interfere with existing COW for read-write memory. Assumption is always that _PAGE_READ must have been set and thus setting _PAGE_READ is harmless. Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h | 12 ++++++++++-- 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgta= ble.h index b03e8f85221f..df4a04b64944 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/pgtable.h @@ -415,7 +415,7 @@ static inline int pte_special(pte_t pte) =20 static inline pte_t pte_wrprotect(pte_t pte) { - return __pte(pte_val(pte) & ~(_PAGE_WRITE)); + return __pte((pte_val(pte) & ~(_PAGE_WRITE)) | (_PAGE_READ)); } =20 /* static inline pte_t pte_mkread(pte_t pte) */ @@ -611,7 +611,15 @@ static inline pte_t ptep_get_and_clear(struct mm_struc= t *mm, static inline void ptep_set_wrprotect(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long address, pte_t *ptep) { - atomic_long_and(~(unsigned long)_PAGE_WRITE, (atomic_long_t *)ptep); + pte_t read_pte =3D READ_ONCE(*ptep); + /* + * ptep_set_wrprotect can be called for shadow stack ranges too. + * shadow stack memory is XWR =3D 010 and thus clearing _PAGE_WRITE will = lead to + * encoding 000b which is wrong encoding with V =3D 1. This should lead t= o page fault + * but we dont want this wrong configuration to be set in page tables. + */ + atomic_long_set((atomic_long_t *)ptep, + ((pte_val(read_pte) & ~(unsigned long)_PAGE_WRITE) | _PAGE_READ)); } =20 #define __HAVE_ARCH_PTEP_CLEAR_YOUNG_FLUSH --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C3FFA3431E2; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238270; cv=none; b=d15jF7ulOzAAQBbnhxpw3xCEwqxJnA1rIWy7yGIt6mEt13PNUFOGZOFDe771LJ15PzyCreOjRJHQeIMoaiZp6ZvqABAcAiR2pS9tkVTMKoTvus948YX8hlE+GOHal7cXkwyBJX/b9flZYm8LnvLz/p3OLSeMAOLBpEaSqrc7bzg= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238270; c=relaxed/simple; bh=DSZOcvWZFN0rHYCNWpvA9TGjDlKItx92qqP4c9rzaOM=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=X+JZMmjN6+29IRWhPdJ3J+PMhW+cWqFLKfDI8AerPCEDv+q6ol5mjrPsOsMnaGS2XJUeZRG4qVz3lY7hgocY0XucNN7EV96Afm/P97DOpBbtZsicqbeDTzZdUM9JHmJhUG91ZW01EoTuqERppUIlrBIyV42mfD0UNIy4LlCtIaY= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=KvdK1IcY; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="KvdK1IcY" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 94537C4AF51; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238270; bh=DSZOcvWZFN0rHYCNWpvA9TGjDlKItx92qqP4c9rzaOM=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=KvdK1IcYGXSlgjlbB9MiK86CO4touQjy+9RO+UK/jwaNnBK0lPakAMHFbJ3c4lr1m 6rtQvBJtdaMMQ0ALsdYSmILqMEGfQokePG0Kt/fNAn+vtQFCb8S267HjJobao3/BrQ g3khV9BJhPTthbH8NOQwIJxM+4BK4by+C+XrpjyvTcyMQYkxcEauOIlc+uau+jIhtb TzB52WRMqBI1rVr7nAjN2AeE9vX36IT+1I0BbnAcUy1+RCQYZ+G7eJFvQoe3D298vu JPFLR9hshTSLL3jcjXv/KspjIHLsKUSJBfAET8/UDhUF0rUcmccnJrQ6yDUzXj6Xca qGk00mSxucacA== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 86605CCF9E5; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:15 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 10/28] riscv/mm: Implement map_shadow_stack() syscall Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-10-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=5864; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=HpHI2zP/MHNPN2ZG0jq8qy7AdU5skeePc4YpaV5sqak=; b=LdZW8MX5X0gTuYgNZo+qz9v/7r3fspm5JhkJqUggQmQ+DtllbW/zuOG45fkr9bpQ/G8n4U+wl eEKWzSzcUPSBRnwWWMGMD6x+dEFdI8sefcErAEyd0GY8vXW/B9q0E14 X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta As discussed extensively in the changelog for the addition of this syscall on x86 ("x86/shstk: Introduce map_shadow_stack syscall") the existing mmap() and madvise() syscalls do not map entirely well onto the security requirements for shadow stack memory since they lead to windows where memory is allocated but not yet protected or stacks which are not properly and safely initialised. Instead a new syscall map_shadow_stack() has been defined which allocates and initialises a shadow stack page. This patch implements this syscall for riscv. riscv doesn't require token to be setup by kernel because user mode can do that by itself. However to provide compatibility and portability with other architectues, user mode can specify token set flag. Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 143 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= ++++ 2 files changed, 144 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile index f60fce69b725..2d0e0dcedbd3 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile @@ -125,3 +125,4 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI) +=3D acpi.o obj-$(CONFIG_ACPI_NUMA) +=3D acpi_numa.o =20 obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES) +=3D bugs.o +obj-$(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) +=3D usercfi.o diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0b3bbb41490a --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 +/* + * Copyright (C) 2024 Rivos, Inc. + * Deepak Gupta + */ + +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#define SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE sizeof(void *) + +/* + * Writes on shadow stack can either be `sspush` or `ssamoswap`. `sspush` = can happen + * implicitly on current shadow stack pointed to by CSR_SSP. `ssamoswap` t= akes pointer to + * shadow stack. To keep it simple, we plan to use `ssamoswap` to perform = writes on shadow + * stack. + */ +static noinline unsigned long amo_user_shstk(unsigned long *addr, unsigned= long val) +{ + /* + * Never expect -1 on shadow stack. Expect return addresses and zero + */ + unsigned long swap =3D -1; + + __enable_user_access(); + asm goto( + ".option push\n" + ".option arch, +zicfiss\n" + "1: ssamoswap.d %[swap], %[val], %[addr]\n" + _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault]) + ".option pop\n" + : [swap] "=3Dr" (swap), [addr] "+A" (*addr) + : [val] "r" (val) + : "memory" + : fault + ); + __disable_user_access(); + return swap; +fault: + __disable_user_access(); + return -1; +} + +/* + * Create a restore token on the shadow stack. A token is always XLEN wide + * and aligned to XLEN. + */ +static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsigned long *token_addr) +{ + unsigned long addr; + + /* Token must be aligned */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED(ssp, SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* On RISC-V we're constructing token to be function of address itself */ + addr =3D ssp - SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE; + + if (amo_user_shstk((unsigned long __user *)addr, (unsigned long)ssp) =3D= =3D -1) + return -EFAULT; + + if (token_addr) + *token_addr =3D addr; + + return 0; +} + +static unsigned long allocate_shadow_stack(unsigned long addr, unsigned lo= ng size, + unsigned long token_offset, bool set_tok) +{ + int flags =3D MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE; + struct mm_struct *mm =3D current->mm; + unsigned long populate, tok_loc =3D 0; + + if (addr) + flags |=3D MAP_FIXED_NOREPLACE; + + mmap_write_lock(mm); + addr =3D do_mmap(NULL, addr, size, PROT_READ, flags, + VM_SHADOW_STACK | VM_WRITE, 0, &populate, NULL); + mmap_write_unlock(mm); + + if (!set_tok || IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) + goto out; + + if (create_rstor_token(addr + token_offset, &tok_loc)) { + vm_munmap(addr, size); + return -EINVAL; + } + + addr =3D tok_loc; + +out: + return addr; +} + +SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, unsigned long, size= , unsigned int, flags) +{ + bool set_tok =3D flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN; + unsigned long aligned_size =3D 0; + + if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + + /* Anything other than set token should result in invalid param */ + if (flags & ~SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN) + return -EINVAL; + + /* + * Unlike other architectures, on RISC-V, SSP pointer is held in CSR_SSP = and is available + * CSR in all modes. CSR accesses are performed using 12bit index program= med in instruction + * itself. This provides static property on register programming and writ= es to CSR can't + * be unintentional from programmer's perspective. As long as programmer = has guarded areas + * which perform writes to CSR_SSP properly, shadow stack pivoting is not= possible. Since + * CSR_SSP is writeable by user mode, it itself can setup a shadow stack = token subsequent + * to allocation. Although in order to provide portablity with other arch= itecture (because + * `map_shadow_stack` is arch agnostic syscall), RISC-V will follow expec= tation of a token + * flag in flags and if provided in flags, setup a token at the base. + */ + + /* If there isn't space for a token */ + if (set_tok && size < SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE) + return -ENOSPC; + + if (addr && (addr & (PAGE_SIZE - 1))) + return -EINVAL; + + aligned_size =3D PAGE_ALIGN(size); + if (aligned_size < size) + return -EOVERFLOW; + + return allocate_shadow_stack(addr, aligned_size, size, set_tok); +} --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 04D0B344037; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238271; cv=none; b=YVi1+WCMqBasqIC/1Co1WGlOAg0GwLflB/7aqroihny8kz1aCjI3eXANkY96I48KR0+y1sL3EyBUdBuU4aP+XxZa8i68LGsnhUZ2Bq+mo7PcuAHRAI5yJpsk3toPO/1qjkXCU+Jxrra0IrRShvNZ7NkUKs+S7Ry3RBMOD+bNRpw= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238271; c=relaxed/simple; bh=sBNjkIEDOFpToniuMunkLQrwCp8Ll7kcmqpzuth7VfY=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=Obgc+3r+mnfGrJD+82CqCrL4ehr5/TNVj4/fikLtzgWzOnnzj0lVCIzQrp7e13/D9Y2tAPl/rXb7foXukRYqlQtp/i5bHVQLrbW1Ve0qXumPHNEWk+CfnYi6Qrw8gfDQ8UHeU2fSCmj/awW560oguQVQ5OSyMkgCayyOEEJtyNw= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=I+9I5VbI; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="I+9I5VbI" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id B9504C4AF0F; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238270; bh=sBNjkIEDOFpToniuMunkLQrwCp8Ll7kcmqpzuth7VfY=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=I+9I5VbILyLIyf5IhycZYXEfz5GMgz452woDJ30IipYiXtYe6qXNr+zWMgbk46EoJ xSCRbur2D6aVESilng32NkbulvsPNvUEcWipdIlNjUoxkcqn0z2UqUrrBOd2T2X0kC i8XAiT5A/OscTuYWNwwa35Q/VB1cfye78YvHHWTiEm52PdEiZBaTVgz8aPd7ffciGB 7vAJdo+AGAkSBTBEKyW/H1xQgg/Uy8Z/eowJ85Fd3SXiMikbZd/fUiRkX0I6RNp+jP 8mL6rgu2itXEOqaTKhx6RSd2xTvlwqm89bbVRvGmgT7gfNAmGvWghlw+A7wHrABxrR 1ja2iHBdqePPw== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 9F621CCF9E3; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:16 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 11/28] riscv/shstk: If needed allocate a new shadow stack on clone Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-11-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=9013; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=J6pR8GRxWFhgvoVIFkuG4OND1BCNoXiY7FcguKrzJIk=; b=MI+5sy9ihdDFWjRgT7vZ2yngZeYUq8FJMyEU8jpPWroM+DiGjB5E30oiHnuRjg6KP2LMEV8er 6SmwDlNlV0IDBqHO9JOM1yWXUFRX/FuAYZI9HiTddHRz0JUFcCLR5sR X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Userspace specifies CLONE_VM to share address space and spawn new thread. `clone` allow userspace to specify a new stack for new thread. However there is no way to specify new shadow stack base address without changing API. This patch allocates a new shadow stack whenever CLONE_VM is given. In case of CLONE_VFORK, parent is suspended until child finishes and thus can child use parent shadow stack. In case of !CLONE_VM, COW kicks in because entire address space is copied from parent to child. `clone3` is extensible and can provide mechanisms using which shadow stack as an input parameter can be provided. This is not settled yet and being extensively discussed on mailing list. Once that's settled, this commit will adapt to that. Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/include/asm/mmu_context.h | 7 ++ arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h | 25 ++++++++ arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 10 +++ arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 120 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= ++++ 4 files changed, 162 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/= mmu_context.h index 8c4bc49a3a0f..dbf27a78df6c 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/mmu_context.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/mmu_context.h @@ -48,6 +48,13 @@ static inline unsigned long mm_untag_mask(struct mm_stru= ct *mm) } #endif =20 +#define deactivate_mm deactivate_mm +static inline void deactivate_mm(struct task_struct *tsk, + struct mm_struct *mm) +{ + shstk_release(tsk); +} + #include =20 #endif /* _ASM_RISCV_MMU_CONTEXT_H */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/user= cfi.h index 4c5233e8f3f9..a16a5dff8b0e 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h @@ -8,6 +8,9 @@ #ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ #include =20 +struct task_struct; +struct kernel_clone_args; + #ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI struct cfi_state { unsigned long ubcfi_en : 1; /* Enable for backward cfi. */ @@ -16,6 +19,28 @@ struct cfi_state { unsigned long shdw_stk_size; /* size of shadow stack */ }; =20 +unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, + const struct kernel_clone_args *args); +void shstk_release(struct task_struct *tsk); +void set_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr, un= signed long size); +unsigned long get_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long *size= ); +void set_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr); +bool is_shstk_enabled(struct task_struct *task); + +#else + +#define shstk_alloc_thread_stack(tsk, args) 0 + +#define shstk_release(tsk) + +#define get_shstk_base(task, size) 0UL + +#define set_shstk_base(task, shstk_addr, size) do {} while (0) + +#define set_active_shstk(task, shstk_addr) do {} while (0) + +#define is_shstk_enabled(task) false + #endif /* CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI */ =20 #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c index 31a392993cb4..72d35adc6e0e 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c @@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include =20 #if defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR) && !defined(CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_PER_T= ASK) #include @@ -226,6 +227,7 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct ker= nel_clone_args *args) u64 clone_flags =3D args->flags; unsigned long usp =3D args->stack; unsigned long tls =3D args->tls; + unsigned long ssp =3D 0; struct pt_regs *childregs =3D task_pt_regs(p); =20 /* Ensure all threads in this mm have the same pointer masking mode. */ @@ -245,11 +247,19 @@ int copy_thread(struct task_struct *p, const struct k= ernel_clone_args *args) p->thread.s[1] =3D (unsigned long)args->fn_arg; p->thread.ra =3D (unsigned long)ret_from_fork_kernel_asm; } else { + /* allocate new shadow stack if needed. In case of CLONE_VM we have to */ + ssp =3D shstk_alloc_thread_stack(p, args); + if (IS_ERR_VALUE(ssp)) + return PTR_ERR((void *)ssp); + *childregs =3D *(current_pt_regs()); /* Turn off status.VS */ riscv_v_vstate_off(childregs); if (usp) /* User fork */ childregs->sp =3D usp; + /* if needed, set new ssp */ + if (ssp) + set_active_shstk(p, ssp); if (clone_flags & CLONE_SETTLS) childregs->tp =3D tls; childregs->a0 =3D 0; /* Return value of fork() */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c index 0b3bbb41490a..ec3d78efd6f3 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c @@ -19,6 +19,41 @@ =20 #define SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE sizeof(void *) =20 +bool is_shstk_enabled(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en; +} + +void set_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr, un= signed long size) +{ + task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_base =3D shstk_addr; + task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_size =3D size; +} + +unsigned long get_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long *size) +{ + if (size) + *size =3D task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_size; + return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_base; +} + +void set_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr) +{ + task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.user_shdw_stk =3D shstk_addr; +} + +/* + * If size is 0, then to be compatible with regular stack we want it to be= as big as + * regular stack. Else PAGE_ALIGN it and return back + */ +static unsigned long calc_shstk_size(unsigned long size) +{ + if (size) + return PAGE_ALIGN(size); + + return PAGE_ALIGN(min_t(unsigned long long, rlimit(RLIMIT_STACK), SZ_4G)); +} + /* * Writes on shadow stack can either be `sspush` or `ssamoswap`. `sspush` = can happen * implicitly on current shadow stack pointed to by CSR_SSP. `ssamoswap` t= akes pointer to @@ -141,3 +176,88 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr,= unsigned long, size, unsi =20 return allocate_shadow_stack(addr, aligned_size, size, set_tok); } + +/* + * This gets called during clone/clone3/fork. And is needed to allocate a = shadow stack for + * cases where CLONE_VM is specified and thus a different stack is specifi= ed by user. We + * thus need a separate shadow stack too. How does separate shadow stack i= s specified by + * user is still being debated. Once that's settled, remove this part of t= he comment. + * This function simply returns 0 if shadow stack are not supported or if = separate shadow + * stack allocation is not needed (like in case of !CLONE_VM) + */ +unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_struct *tsk, + const struct kernel_clone_args *args) +{ + unsigned long addr, size; + + /* If shadow stack is not supported, return 0 */ + if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) + return 0; + + /* + * If shadow stack is not enabled on the new thread, skip any + * switch to a new shadow stack. + */ + if (!is_shstk_enabled(tsk)) + return 0; + + /* + * For CLONE_VFORK the child will share the parents shadow stack. + * Set base =3D 0 and size =3D 0, this is special means to track this sta= te + * so the freeing logic run for child knows to leave it alone. + */ + if (args->flags & CLONE_VFORK) { + set_shstk_base(tsk, 0, 0); + return 0; + } + + /* + * For !CLONE_VM the child will use a copy of the parents shadow + * stack. + */ + if (!(args->flags & CLONE_VM)) + return 0; + + /* + * reaching here means, CLONE_VM was specified and thus a separate shadow + * stack is needed for new cloned thread. Note: below allocation is happe= ning + * using current mm. + */ + size =3D calc_shstk_size(args->stack_size); + addr =3D allocate_shadow_stack(0, size, 0, false); + if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) + return addr; + + set_shstk_base(tsk, addr, size); + + return addr + size; +} + +void shstk_release(struct task_struct *tsk) +{ + unsigned long base =3D 0, size =3D 0; + /* If shadow stack is not supported or not enabled, nothing to release */ + if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack() || !is_shstk_enabled(tsk)) + return; + + /* + * When fork() with CLONE_VM fails, the child (tsk) already has a + * shadow stack allocated, and exit_thread() calls this function to + * free it. In this case the parent (current) and the child share + * the same mm struct. Move forward only when they're same. + */ + if (!tsk->mm || tsk->mm !=3D current->mm) + return; + + /* + * We know shadow stack is enabled but if base is NULL, then + * this task is not managing its own shadow stack (CLONE_VFORK). So + * skip freeing it. + */ + base =3D get_shstk_base(tsk, &size); + if (!base) + return; + + vm_munmap(base, size); + set_shstk_base(tsk, 0, 0); +} --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 06A5B34403A; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238271; cv=none; b=GNTYrUQ0l0BsjJcBqB3p4Bad3QgopU1sRUcQitOulnkfc/s/8QTUMEeyD9kecN/ymvTD2dbciBIP+wxIotTicsqJLxELHPuoR9ezFXglle9aP4JkRkimG6OFPT2uLZRtQQ3wiURHsEgjsFHYIH9EK0A07PanxDRz31tL9gDN5xs= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238271; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Nt2zLD8Sdg7vBJGX6xA427HFGzcGQt9fZjSPUHt4WCk=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=Vc1DZ+1DFMWO+YoqzdyYfOKNG2cdY7c4o7sak2Mw6tdiRS5vOqLvXRdPRB3Ih5RD98oib9yLYZrAPaN4Aiy9Q45gBFuCkvuP4SuQmwHGpI5IM6fWLkVjUwx8uQUcfMEwMuwy+i2jLGddG4npxx2D4hfmnwCwt0N6giI4cO1ntjo= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=q8ECC6CS; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="q8ECC6CS" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C9FF3C4AF54; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238270; bh=Nt2zLD8Sdg7vBJGX6xA427HFGzcGQt9fZjSPUHt4WCk=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=q8ECC6CS9VGDVXaL8WrOz84y8tbF/74RAQP7lrImrX9zuHaBeN+kPDWC9HgaZ/WgC nOYJ5+NU5XCYOddMWXT3kqYRNsM+4RVEmDnaQ8WbwOl5NnEXuPTIZCrzIFJ8YZ4UpS C/VS0lEZShhf9KLJ2DD4XoiYaDAEXc77hxCAhWi2MLYd+NttKVu3Aniq6VXF3r2UXW 6+7fRBBsTITYi25gBqtH69t1h1zEHVVefDAkHHTcUuWQi790ECEaRnf5LE5puuURh2 igl4MQckAtRi6el8Jz+EUtBAYfYFGkSI7/5V8vzRcXpvWIfrJxBilG47JHCfsIMoTT VWBkrPrllQM7w== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id B7CB1CCD193; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:17 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 12/28] riscv: Implements arch agnostic shadow stack prctls Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-12-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=7429; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=z5xdZaKwg2qUwtrY22O4fobOm82lvR70DFtbPBo8Rjw=; b=7ohyxhZdXPWWRljekiJ/o0UFgCd1w47jPDlYBJz6qBlD1T6GKgX0GI7yeEo4Z4BuMICU/ONif bN0W19fqYsOAadBjibdA1WX+unF/OP9BlXvXWWDaV48bWhlDU+Armho X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Implement architecture agnostic prctls() interface for setting and getting shadow stack status. prctls implemented are PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS and PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS. As part of PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS/PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, only PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE is implemented because RISCV allows each mode to write to their own shadow stack using `sspush` or `ssamoswap`. PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS locks current configuration of shadow stack enabling. Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h | 16 ++++++ arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 8 +++ arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 110 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= ++++ 3 files changed, 134 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/user= cfi.h index a16a5dff8b0e..d71093f414df 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ =20 #ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ #include +#include =20 struct task_struct; struct kernel_clone_args; @@ -14,6 +15,7 @@ struct kernel_clone_args; #ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI struct cfi_state { unsigned long ubcfi_en : 1; /* Enable for backward cfi. */ + unsigned long ubcfi_locked : 1; unsigned long user_shdw_stk; /* Current user shadow stack pointer */ unsigned long shdw_stk_base; /* Base address of shadow stack */ unsigned long shdw_stk_size; /* size of shadow stack */ @@ -26,6 +28,12 @@ void set_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned l= ong shstk_addr, unsigned unsigned long get_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long *size= ); void set_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr); bool is_shstk_enabled(struct task_struct *task); +bool is_shstk_locked(struct task_struct *task); +bool is_shstk_allocated(struct task_struct *task); +void set_shstk_lock(struct task_struct *task); +void set_shstk_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable); + +#define PR_SHADOW_STACK_SUPPORTED_STATUS_MASK (PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE) =20 #else =20 @@ -41,6 +49,14 @@ bool is_shstk_enabled(struct task_struct *task); =20 #define is_shstk_enabled(task) false =20 +#define is_shstk_locked(task) false + +#define is_shstk_allocated(task) false + +#define set_shstk_lock(task) do {} while (0) + +#define set_shstk_status(task, enable) do {} while (0) + #endif /* CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI */ =20 #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c index 72d35adc6e0e..a137d3483646 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c @@ -156,6 +156,14 @@ void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long = pc, regs->epc =3D pc; regs->sp =3D sp; =20 + /* + * clear shadow stack state on exec. + * libc will set it later via prctl. + */ + set_shstk_status(current, false); + set_shstk_base(current, 0, 0); + set_active_shstk(current, 0); + #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT regs->status &=3D ~SR_UXL; =20 diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c index ec3d78efd6f3..08620bdae696 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c @@ -24,6 +24,16 @@ bool is_shstk_enabled(struct task_struct *task) return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en; } =20 +bool is_shstk_allocated(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_base; +} + +bool is_shstk_locked(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_locked; +} + void set_shstk_base(struct task_struct *task, unsigned long shstk_addr, un= signed long size) { task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.shdw_stk_base =3D shstk_addr; @@ -42,6 +52,26 @@ void set_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task, unsigned= long shstk_addr) task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.user_shdw_stk =3D shstk_addr; } =20 +void set_shstk_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable) +{ + if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) + return; + + task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en =3D enable ? 1 : 0; + + if (enable) + task->thread.envcfg |=3D ENVCFG_SSE; + else + task->thread.envcfg &=3D ~ENVCFG_SSE; + + csr_write(CSR_ENVCFG, task->thread.envcfg); +} + +void set_shstk_lock(struct task_struct *task) +{ + task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_locked =3D 1; +} + /* * If size is 0, then to be compatible with regular stack we want it to be= as big as * regular stack. Else PAGE_ALIGN it and return back @@ -261,3 +291,83 @@ void shstk_release(struct task_struct *tsk) vm_munmap(base, size); set_shstk_base(tsk, 0, 0); } + +int arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __us= er *status) +{ + unsigned long bcfi_status =3D 0; + + if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) + return -EINVAL; + + /* this means shadow stack is enabled on the task */ + bcfi_status |=3D (is_shstk_enabled(t) ? PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE : 0); + + return copy_to_user(status, &bcfi_status, sizeof(bcfi_status)) ? -EFAULT = : 0; +} + +int arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long stat= us) +{ + unsigned long size =3D 0, addr =3D 0; + bool enable_shstk =3D false; + + if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Reject unknown flags */ + if (status & ~PR_SHADOW_STACK_SUPPORTED_STATUS_MASK) + return -EINVAL; + + /* bcfi status is locked and further can't be modified by user */ + if (is_shstk_locked(t)) + return -EINVAL; + + enable_shstk =3D status & PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE; + /* Request is to enable shadow stack and shadow stack is not enabled alre= ady */ + if (enable_shstk && !is_shstk_enabled(t)) { + /* shadow stack was allocated and enable request again + * no need to support such usecase and return EINVAL. + */ + if (is_shstk_allocated(t)) + return -EINVAL; + + size =3D calc_shstk_size(0); + addr =3D allocate_shadow_stack(0, size, 0, false); + if (IS_ERR_VALUE(addr)) + return -ENOMEM; + set_shstk_base(t, addr, size); + set_active_shstk(t, addr + size); + } + + /* + * If a request to disable shadow stack happens, let's go ahead and relea= se it + * Although, if CLONE_VFORKed child did this, then in that case we will e= nd up + * not releasing the shadow stack (because it might be needed in parent).= Although + * we will disable it for VFORKed child. And if VFORKed child tries to en= able again + * then in that case, it'll get entirely new shadow stack because followi= ng condition + * are true + * - shadow stack was not enabled for vforked child + * - shadow stack base was anyways pointing to 0 + * This shouldn't be a big issue because we want parent to have availabil= ity of shadow + * stack whenever VFORKed child releases resources via exit or exec but a= t the same + * time we want VFORKed child to break away and establish new shadow stac= k if it desires + * + */ + if (!enable_shstk) + shstk_release(t); + + set_shstk_status(t, enable_shstk); + return 0; +} + +int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long arg) +{ + /* If shtstk not supported or not enabled on task, nothing to lock here */ + if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack() || + !is_shstk_enabled(task) || arg !=3D 0) + return -EINVAL; + + set_shstk_lock(task); + + return 0; +} --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4250C3446D2; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238271; cv=none; b=WI2NzjiKMxR6v5dnT16J3ophCaW0qataPXuLMW1kZqgfLMpshNFx1x/XXV6PGgAAMXf7pHThe10HUOYb2ma+akkkYaNjzPBXbnwnUij5Oi4zBLUiifUj7ocR4hti0doFDJiO2Eaerg/FYteZYpFWeKgRkd/BDUmIstr5g+FXwrM= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238271; c=relaxed/simple; bh=JxdFhs6m+jpZSuVM0h6LrugZL2h/LmWZ4qPYhd8l21c=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=h/bSP4od2z/xDmqjQyWeZYaY2q0OVfydbo/eQ49ClNCZggOtDgwv4v4HYsWAwQynLqOLNbAgtNndsQK9SIizH5Jf6duUkU6dv0z8ccS8v9msA+CClxM2hVneRdI/2W27d5QpIs/rFYNKx+xSYIAa9IQXxq40iXLA0fP8ghJT+RQ= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=Ozu6c6zW; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="Ozu6c6zW" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 21BFCC19424; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238271; bh=JxdFhs6m+jpZSuVM0h6LrugZL2h/LmWZ4qPYhd8l21c=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=Ozu6c6zW5YuVEEMMTwPJrPeXOq5xt/FTeOhMt9FoDm4P1PkMwgZnSOAVN24KjtPkf cqlugsUx+DmVDQIeKPK84BpHnttwlb8jITSDekMPPLUFC9QUogaBkRRQo6wVqfVmNS MGAR/gv4Se5OU9xuceN0xbh97rarWS6XiZSBl0o3Pg3CmgEqkMg1lFUIeJn6omhBmF qm4FPdcIFTmGvLJT/Le77VAef6Fdt0kh2i7Bf+5pWkxsPOMBqD9bv6lbtODajpbqwS PDe4puUKP7wY1WfvUc1buxa4wqYXIsAKbZ8hYO7WxknDuLlxwKqYp5IejneyW/1qB2 U/nqNjbGSInVQ== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id F1A83CCF9E3; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:10 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:18 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 13/28] prctl: arch-agnostic prctl for indirect branch tracking Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-13-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=5257; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=//BKFL/B5DGzgzNcxCALX3+BH8HxJjmHBkOpM1C2zRA=; b=8w38XN3fpWvxghP9so4m8W6hU0s3vWBmymgOTEGZoG1n837CzqTylYWDsbYuATki/OCII29Ee XGgTEL7dJ12BlBrq02CpzZ+QSQZhZRR63qh9X7D6rE1glFh2AYf2bH9 X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Three architectures (x86, aarch64, riscv) have support for indirect branch tracking feature in a very similar fashion. On a very high level, indirect branch tracking is a CPU feature where CPU tracks branches which uses memory operand to perform control transfer in program. As part of this tracking on indirect branches, CPU goes in a state where it expects a landing pad instr on target and if not found then CPU raises some fault (architecture dependent) x86 landing pad instr - `ENDBRANCH` arch64 landing pad instr - `BTI` riscv landing instr - `lpad` Given that three major arches have support for indirect branch tracking, This patch makes `prctl` for indirect branch tracking arch agnostic. To allow userspace to enable this feature for itself, following prtcls are defined: - PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS: Gets current configured status for indirect branch tracking. - PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS: Sets a configuration for indirect branch tracking. Following status options are allowed - PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE: Enables indirect branch tracking on user thread. - PR_INDIR_BR_LP_DISABLE; Disables indirect branch tracking on user thread. - PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS: Locks configured status for indirect branch tracking for user thread. Reviewed-by: Mark Brown Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- include/linux/cpu.h | 4 ++++ include/uapi/linux/prctl.h | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ kernel/sys.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 61 insertions(+) diff --git a/include/linux/cpu.h b/include/linux/cpu.h index 487b3bf2e1ea..8239cd95a005 100644 --- a/include/linux/cpu.h +++ b/include/linux/cpu.h @@ -229,4 +229,8 @@ static inline bool cpu_attack_vector_mitigated(enum cpu= _attack_vectors v) #define smt_mitigations SMT_MITIGATIONS_OFF #endif =20 +int arch_get_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __use= r *status); +int arch_set_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long statu= s); +int arch_lock_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long stat= us); + #endif /* _LINUX_CPU_H_ */ diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h index 51c4e8c82b1e..9b4afdc85099 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/prctl.h @@ -386,4 +386,31 @@ struct prctl_mm_map { # define PR_FUTEX_HASH_SET_SLOTS 1 # define PR_FUTEX_HASH_GET_SLOTS 2 =20 +/* + * Get the current indirect branch tracking configuration for the current + * thread, this will be the value configured via PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS. + */ +#define PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS 79 + +/* + * Set the indirect branch tracking configuration. PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE w= ill + * enable cpu feature for user thread, to track all indirect branches and = ensure + * they land on arch defined landing pad instruction. + * x86 - If enabled, an indirect branch must land on `ENDBRANCH` instructi= on. + * arch64 - If enabled, an indirect branch must land on `BTI` instruction. + * riscv - If enabled, an indirect branch must land on `lpad` instruction. + * PR_INDIR_BR_LP_DISABLE will disable feature for user thread and indirect + * branches will no more be tracked by cpu to land on arch defined landing= pad + * instruction. + */ +#define PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS 80 +# define PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE (1UL << 0) + +/* + * Prevent further changes to the specified indirect branch tracking + * configuration. All bits may be locked via this call, including + * undefined bits. + */ +#define PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS 81 + #endif /* _LINUX_PRCTL_H */ diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c index 8b58eece4e58..9071422c1609 100644 --- a/kernel/sys.c +++ b/kernel/sys.c @@ -2388,6 +2388,21 @@ int __weak arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task= _struct *t, unsigned long st return -EINVAL; } =20 +int __weak arch_get_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned lon= g __user *status) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +int __weak arch_set_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned lon= g status) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + +int __weak arch_lock_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned lo= ng status) +{ + return -EINVAL; +} + #define PR_IO_FLUSHER (PF_MEMALLOC_NOIO | PF_LOCAL_THROTTLE) =20 static int prctl_set_vma(unsigned long opt, unsigned long addr, @@ -2868,6 +2883,21 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(prctl, int, option, unsigned long, a= rg2, unsigned long, arg3, case PR_FUTEX_HASH: error =3D futex_hash_prctl(arg2, arg3, arg4); break; + case PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS: + if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) + return -EINVAL; + error =3D arch_get_indir_br_lp_status(me, (unsigned long __user *)arg2); + break; + case PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS: + if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) + return -EINVAL; + error =3D arch_set_indir_br_lp_status(me, arg2); + break; + case PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS: + if (arg3 || arg4 || arg5) + return -EINVAL; + error =3D arch_lock_indir_br_lp_status(me, arg2); + break; default: trace_task_prctl_unknown(option, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5); error =3D -EINVAL; --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5C8B93451C8; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238271; cv=none; b=DbDAtjT2ar996wkbdevocTqHdIfWNBGSjmvunt/FkCLCh8evE/OeFiGlkXga8Z3Pc4XDzJJPIFCBZ7Fp3jB3m/yQY5nJqouZ4ce/oORw/KVmzQ7TVFA/8GSLMuATu1UQV5NP6rOp4av/pBNr4P9xKjQ3NWHbjDLJq23OsVu9tmY= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238271; c=relaxed/simple; bh=jITwKi6/QU94R2n/wVFjXlji4euY1SMuYxJ9iDKSgQM=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=J6OCzdwj3Q47BgKoMQeLYpT0yWAmARxXMKfWK1JFkosXCUloiaa5vtvwqo1qpCKnsWLobgNZ2THKWhQoEl4hl/TBmM3hA88T1/filqEU6XJ3VbvCSmxnAlfKtqZ+WBbcwZKNnKfGzpgtGzGLQZyJ7RxNFbK9EMeWcPxrNehlJ0U= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=cjRGrY5r; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="cjRGrY5r" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3D074C16AAE; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238271; bh=jITwKi6/QU94R2n/wVFjXlji4euY1SMuYxJ9iDKSgQM=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=cjRGrY5rdrpdl9QbSwxyKgLEeEkLy6o7mZplM98qZn+qTPYwRuHJw8bKaDfXtxCI7 7ROuRG2SOsJI+yOfMopTFajb458MySLBUW2AInF1sxUk+PhHNzZ7mVIgS/l3CZ/BVX rP69p4bcQei5vJOGbKqsgsvlVwyWFI2RufqR0eCqefrK9rKwYjsjO5BjSk84uoz4Sg UBjvPkfXxZEagSvlB0mcKAZe2XF3f6Qcfegnd1kF9w3cUUqpbyw/eAXo+EhBqXBYvA xcK6ike13WJnMiOpIuCneySt/WYzn8s84ivPmjI5nZMyvlmrWtRPkxZiAoi0mh4EQ8 KfvpVtV47CH/w== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2B6AFCCD1BC; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:19 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 14/28] riscv: Implements arch agnostic indirect branch tracking prctls Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-14-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=5718; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=nTPZyNBNXm6/CcBEgex+4RYKED4Z+c7hR2hQbyF4T7Q=; b=jVEGpJ5fOHaE/PBKTfFkdz54GjVoFhiyMmL9dxcCE2pbGMmsR6LWmchxWivXqD7Y1A8ZEFV+P up4JZGQoAGrBGQjkLupb9lcggEEYPaHyP8i4XYaXAMXGEruAzHVGNPv X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta prctls implemented are: PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS, PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS and PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h | 14 +++++++ arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 4 ++ arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 5 +++ arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 79 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= ++++ 4 files changed, 102 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/user= cfi.h index d71093f414df..4501d741a609 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h @@ -16,6 +16,8 @@ struct kernel_clone_args; struct cfi_state { unsigned long ubcfi_en : 1; /* Enable for backward cfi. */ unsigned long ubcfi_locked : 1; + unsigned long ufcfi_en : 1; /* Enable for forward cfi. Note that ELP goes= in sstatus */ + unsigned long ufcfi_locked : 1; unsigned long user_shdw_stk; /* Current user shadow stack pointer */ unsigned long shdw_stk_base; /* Base address of shadow stack */ unsigned long shdw_stk_size; /* size of shadow stack */ @@ -32,6 +34,10 @@ bool is_shstk_locked(struct task_struct *task); bool is_shstk_allocated(struct task_struct *task); void set_shstk_lock(struct task_struct *task); void set_shstk_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable); +bool is_indir_lp_enabled(struct task_struct *task); +bool is_indir_lp_locked(struct task_struct *task); +void set_indir_lp_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable); +void set_indir_lp_lock(struct task_struct *task); =20 #define PR_SHADOW_STACK_SUPPORTED_STATUS_MASK (PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE) =20 @@ -57,6 +63,14 @@ void set_shstk_status(struct task_struct *task, bool ena= ble); =20 #define set_shstk_status(task, enable) do {} while (0) =20 +#define is_indir_lp_enabled(task) false + +#define is_indir_lp_locked(task) false + +#define set_indir_lp_status(task, enable) do {} while (0) + +#define set_indir_lp_lock(task) do {} while (0) + #endif /* CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI */ =20 #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S index 8410850953d6..036a6ca7641f 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S @@ -174,6 +174,10 @@ SYM_CODE_START(handle_exception) * or vector in kernel space. */ li t0, SR_SUM | SR_FS_VS +#ifdef CONFIG_64BIT + li t1, SR_ELP + or t0, t0, t1 +#endif =20 REG_L s0, TASK_TI_USER_SP(tp) csrrc s1, CSR_STATUS, t0 diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c index a137d3483646..49f527e3acfd 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c @@ -163,6 +163,11 @@ void start_thread(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long = pc, set_shstk_status(current, false); set_shstk_base(current, 0, 0); set_active_shstk(current, 0); + /* + * disable indirect branch tracking on exec. + * libc will enable it later via prctl. + */ + set_indir_lp_status(current, false); =20 #ifdef CONFIG_64BIT regs->status &=3D ~SR_UXL; diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c index 08620bdae696..2ebe789caa6b 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c @@ -72,6 +72,35 @@ void set_shstk_lock(struct task_struct *task) task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_locked =3D 1; } =20 +bool is_indir_lp_enabled(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_en; +} + +bool is_indir_lp_locked(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_locked; +} + +void set_indir_lp_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable) +{ + if (!cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr()) + return; + + task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_en =3D enable ? 1 : 0; + + if (enable) + task->thread.envcfg |=3D ENVCFG_LPE; + else + task->thread.envcfg &=3D ~ENVCFG_LPE; + + csr_write(CSR_ENVCFG, task->thread.envcfg); +} + +void set_indir_lp_lock(struct task_struct *task) +{ + task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_locked =3D 1; +} /* * If size is 0, then to be compatible with regular stack we want it to be= as big as * regular stack. Else PAGE_ALIGN it and return back @@ -371,3 +400,53 @@ int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *= task, =20 return 0; } + +int arch_get_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long __use= r *status) +{ + unsigned long fcfi_status =3D 0; + + if (!cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr()) + return -EINVAL; + + /* indirect branch tracking is enabled on the task or not */ + fcfi_status |=3D (is_indir_lp_enabled(t) ? PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE : 0); + + return copy_to_user(status, &fcfi_status, sizeof(fcfi_status)) ? -EFAULT = : 0; +} + +int arch_set_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *t, unsigned long statu= s) +{ + bool enable_indir_lp =3D false; + + if (!cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr()) + return -EINVAL; + + /* indirect branch tracking is locked and further can't be modified by us= er */ + if (is_indir_lp_locked(t)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Reject unknown flags */ + if (status & ~PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE) + return -EINVAL; + + enable_indir_lp =3D (status & PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE); + set_indir_lp_status(t, enable_indir_lp); + + return 0; +} + +int arch_lock_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *task, + unsigned long arg) +{ + /* + * If indirect branch tracking is not supported or not enabled on task, + * nothing to lock here + */ + if (!cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr() || + !is_indir_lp_enabled(task) || arg !=3D 0) + return -EINVAL; + + set_indir_lp_lock(task); + + return 0; +} --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7F961345CA7; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238271; cv=none; b=WhTBv2E8qsFYpHUhBwpvfpW85ZwDEOmnimqm20wfpN4yCiQg0gsdUq2tk6S12vKPfosv5Yvyb2b0a7mRi3iPNg3KY72D70vD4D9p93wfYqxMeYMQhcJp2Xx6AfOaa0wdFPlEx+uyGQf7cKj0bpye8i3ZsSRZV6e4xPmLqbUlRvs= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238271; c=relaxed/simple; bh=PQvU5xoVu9xdabKrvJjMn/h8KvGLMR4b4TqTR/qjjvs=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=brlA/5fhONZFFWlir/b4GdIpkv1vuoWzDnJS7jSOsJivHM9rdlz+wFmKKDkWAu4P3gWIxARLMTMCljQaJhl64fVa5w1rRxn1WsEXeFd9D/BbZPnWMOWDRPiNdFGvLrQK7HrBak0POAYIOxYm8a5RU61t8xC8lvrYiFKZb4Koxg0= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=VpHjf79W; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="VpHjf79W" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5F689C2BC86; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238271; bh=PQvU5xoVu9xdabKrvJjMn/h8KvGLMR4b4TqTR/qjjvs=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=VpHjf79W1Nd1DGg4M/OK+I1qWqE68LELXZTxP6ouvId65DRQMMccPJN7zI5VR2NE8 GmphBxw7dpFZpKIYZGXWh3ZdMhbrdyTavu7ULGl6pL0pzaanmixzvYW2gDPPRDHI6L CVqsh9kjGXe1hBei4gwAYicv4DUm7h1+0hR4hD1LytCtRnSyRsbMS+BP/U1GzIAQVZ LHJ+EMe5hhrYVsBBq41cxk8LPcngJb5ImWe9jUuTp7ASXEEc0qlopvvoMQ1uF+Bi/1 pqbDXSQTiKBT+vORMMSS5o/vHmsoQ7foWn94mGgWSlNS5sriqj5rXCnIl3oszr5jOm Nj9mBotTZ9x0Q== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 46AB2CCF9E5; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:20 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 15/28] riscv/traps: Introduce software check exception and uprobe handling Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-15-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=5526; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=cLWo2uhDyVt9R1FCZMW60Uodtrv8YQrfhgpUR4+sGS4=; b=ShYWs2ZFBHyYvh+a2IqZjOc7Eu6Ff3RNZVEK9nlVPjLL3zscDmC0bX3g7Q18htFuN8JIPS2oC M3nPHqw++taALlxHiLalac0BGKjR/bvH5JjUj0WeM+l3EmZ2ypyS/Fj X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta zicfiss / zicfilp introduces a new exception to priv isa `software check exception` with cause code =3D 18. This patch implements software check exception. Additionally it implements a cfi violation handler which checks for code in xtval. If xtval=3D2, it means that sw check exception happened because of an indirect branch not landing on 4 byte aligned PC or not landing on `lpad` instruction or label value embedded in `lpad` not matching label value setup in `x7`. If xtval=3D3, it means that sw check exception happened because of mismatch between link register (x1 or x5) and top of shadow stack (on execution of `sspopchk`). In case of cfi violation, SIGSEGV is raised with code=3DSEGV_CPERR. SEGV_CPERR was introduced by x86 shadow stack patches. To keep uprobes working, handle the uprobe event first before reporting the CFI violation in software-check exception handler. Because when the landing pad is activated, if the uprobe point is set at the lpad instruction at the beginning of a function, the system triggers a software -check exception instead of an ebreak exception due to the exception priority, then uprobe can't work successfully. Co-developed-by: Zong Li Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h | 1 + arch/riscv/include/asm/entry-common.h | 2 ++ arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S | 3 ++ arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c | 54 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= ++++ 4 files changed, 60 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h b/arch/riscv/include/a= sm/asm-prototypes.h index a9988bf21ec8..41ec5cdec367 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/asm-prototypes.h @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ DECLARE_DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_ecall_u); DECLARE_DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_ecall_s); DECLARE_DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_ecall_m); DECLARE_DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_break); +DECLARE_DO_ERROR_INFO(do_trap_software_check); =20 asmlinkage void ret_from_fork_kernel(void *fn_arg, int (*fn)(void *), stru= ct pt_regs *regs); asmlinkage void ret_from_fork_user(struct pt_regs *regs); diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm= /entry-common.h index b28ccc6cdeea..34ed149af5d1 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/entry-common.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/entry-common.h @@ -40,4 +40,6 @@ static inline int handle_misaligned_store(struct pt_regs = *regs) } #endif =20 +bool handle_user_cfi_violation(struct pt_regs *regs); + #endif /* _ASM_RISCV_ENTRY_COMMON_H */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S index 036a6ca7641f..53c5aa0b6a16 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/entry.S @@ -495,6 +495,9 @@ SYM_DATA_START_LOCAL(excp_vect_table) RISCV_PTR do_page_fault /* load page fault */ RISCV_PTR do_trap_unknown RISCV_PTR do_page_fault /* store page fault */ + RISCV_PTR do_trap_unknown /* cause=3D16 */ + RISCV_PTR do_trap_unknown /* cause=3D17 */ + RISCV_PTR do_trap_software_check /* cause=3D18 is sw check exception */ SYM_DATA_END_LABEL(excp_vect_table, SYM_L_LOCAL, excp_vect_table_end) =20 #ifndef CONFIG_MMU diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c index 80230de167de..d939a8dbdb15 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/traps.c @@ -366,6 +366,60 @@ void do_trap_ecall_u(struct pt_regs *regs) =20 } =20 +#define CFI_TVAL_FCFI_CODE 2 +#define CFI_TVAL_BCFI_CODE 3 +/* handle cfi violations */ +bool handle_user_cfi_violation(struct pt_regs *regs) +{ + unsigned long tval =3D csr_read(CSR_TVAL); + bool is_fcfi =3D (tval =3D=3D CFI_TVAL_FCFI_CODE && cpu_supports_indirect= _br_lp_instr()); + bool is_bcfi =3D (tval =3D=3D CFI_TVAL_BCFI_CODE && cpu_supports_shadow_s= tack()); + + /* + * Handle uprobe event first. The probe point can be a valid target + * of indirect jumps or calls, in this case, forward cfi violation + * will be triggered instead of breakpoint exception. Clear ELP flag + * on sstatus image as well to avoid recurring fault. + */ + if (is_fcfi && probe_breakpoint_handler(regs)) { + regs->status &=3D ~SR_ELP; + return true; + } + + if (is_fcfi || is_bcfi) { + do_trap_error(regs, SIGSEGV, SEGV_CPERR, regs->epc, + "Oops - control flow violation"); + return true; + } + + return false; +} + +/* + * software check exception is defined with risc-v cfi spec. Software check + * exception is raised when:- + * a) An indirect branch doesn't land on 4 byte aligned PC or `lpad` + * instruction or `label` value programmed in `lpad` instr doesn't + * match with value setup in `x7`. reported code in `xtval` is 2. + * b) `sspopchk` instruction finds a mismatch between top of shadow stack = (ssp) + * and x1/x5. reported code in `xtval` is 3. + */ +asmlinkage __visible __trap_section void do_trap_software_check(struct pt_= regs *regs) +{ + if (user_mode(regs)) { + irqentry_enter_from_user_mode(regs); + + /* not a cfi violation, then merge into flow of unknown trap handler */ + if (!handle_user_cfi_violation(regs)) + do_trap_unknown(regs); + + irqentry_exit_to_user_mode(regs); + } else { + /* sw check exception coming from kernel is a bug in kernel */ + die(regs, "Kernel BUG"); + } +} + #ifdef CONFIG_MMU asmlinkage __visible noinstr void do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs) { --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 974DC345CCE; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238271; cv=none; b=gxxlHQWLi3CGwszwL0wurdjLWM+Xh/yAy3b4xi5NC6WS93G5jLYuadFArf88JmFuv7BvuTbD53Cnvf0ZIZbcWp3F2zRjwiyW2JjNcjjdpNe+gWZHVa+B/QGlSu/FJ2QpXiHAmsnhRDHHmMluMkE7SM2LxavViRvZSsl/fHm4tTg= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238271; c=relaxed/simple; bh=qtzfTIDLQudHuwJbPQKZOmfk4VQHfbiISADd/7PYHv4=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=ZkPCDV0Soz43hb1RGJBr7dxe1jm3ey1JeC8biXnnLkwf4z+QuJJ3w7Q2N/f7AxgKoBdVYBZAgmCnPjARIiBhZ+FEX0Cm+c9Rmopn4aqhr1hOFKWexOGNoi61BtRywT+shM7DgbKiOqBU9wg3QEKKMuPFDPsuSOzyFTjWT8XIKCM= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=ll1nOhcH; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="ll1nOhcH" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 7A41CC4AF0B; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238271; bh=qtzfTIDLQudHuwJbPQKZOmfk4VQHfbiISADd/7PYHv4=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=ll1nOhcHYOrNY+XAKUhJxZde0l92pEu1y+HSMdfYPM3TJjPBAeryAkvR19RXk2SAu 37aTLm7pFKYx+6mDVU9UvJ0T3OZaMeIshrJ2usXwHAE2Ai2zLAItb5Bcm0LgbIjnro aEQfqjeUQfjHoM5SQK7tGLyexbCbY12903xe6XG1lKE9gIr+T1EtL7zOpFnDA9pSvH LU7O/94ss6d7gZad9LB1g1gvLJyaRTJz+Jtohdgm0q3gxrG3Bok+L+8WpJOvS99eve qCMhKye7F4LkNAF5QNq2uwNdn3dAJOADawFDQdmNOGFInN375rgHdddAJUz/ifqEAG fcbHJLOYsA0qQ== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 6830ECCD1BC; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:21 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 16/28] riscv: signal: abstract header saving for setup_sigcontext Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-16-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=5523; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=dExd/Izz/D7h0D55LYL2T1f4YGSOKQzNdmSpGgskn9Y=; b=QgQTfB2eNI0QYcfrnurHQIJGNKVcsYThxrj1bDCZwBl88dFrH+7Jbdd0RU1NDoKAViMFI5YOs jiYNmXQLPGuCh9z1zp6WkxjqL1loxigsdW9DRAq1TOlSVRAOiPBN95V X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Andy Chiu The function save_v_state() served two purposes. First, it saved extension context into the signal stack. Then, it constructed the extension header if there was no fault. The second part is independent of the extension itself. As a result, we can pull that part out, so future extensions may reuse it. This patch adds arch_ext_list and makes setup_sigcontext() go through all possible extensions' save() callback. The callback returns a positive value indicating the size of the successfully saved extension. Then the kernel proceeds to construct the header for that extension. The kernel skips an extension if it does not exist, or if the saving fails for some reasons. The error code is propagated out on the later case. This patch does not introduce any functional changes. Signed-off-by: Andy Chiu --- arch/riscv/include/asm/vector.h | 3 ++ arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c | 62 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------= ---- 2 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/vector.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/vecto= r.h index b61786d43c20..75d8bd417797 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/vector.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/vector.h @@ -423,6 +423,9 @@ static inline bool riscv_v_vstate_ctrl_user_allowed(voi= d) { return false; } #define riscv_v_thread_free(tsk) do {} while (0) #define riscv_v_setup_ctx_cache() do {} while (0) #define riscv_v_thread_alloc(tsk) do {} while (0) +#define get_cpu_vector_context() do {} while (0) +#define put_cpu_vector_context() do {} while (0) +#define riscv_v_vstate_set_restore(task, regs) do {} while (0) =20 #endif /* CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_V */ =20 diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c index 08378fea3a11..a5e3d54fe54b 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c @@ -68,18 +68,19 @@ static long save_fp_state(struct pt_regs *regs, #define restore_fp_state(task, regs) (0) #endif =20 -#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_V - -static long save_v_state(struct pt_regs *regs, void __user **sc_vec) +static long save_v_state(struct pt_regs *regs, void __user *sc_vec) { - struct __riscv_ctx_hdr __user *hdr; struct __sc_riscv_v_state __user *state; void __user *datap; long err; =20 - hdr =3D *sc_vec; - /* Place state to the user's signal context space after the hdr */ - state =3D (struct __sc_riscv_v_state __user *)(hdr + 1); + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_V) || + !((has_vector() || has_xtheadvector()) && + riscv_v_vstate_query(regs))) + return 0; + + /* Place state to the user's signal context spac */ + state =3D (struct __sc_riscv_v_state __user *)sc_vec; /* Point datap right after the end of __sc_riscv_v_state */ datap =3D state + 1; =20 @@ -97,15 +98,11 @@ static long save_v_state(struct pt_regs *regs, void __u= ser **sc_vec) err |=3D __put_user((__force void *)datap, &state->v_state.datap); /* Copy the whole vector content to user space datap. */ err |=3D __copy_to_user(datap, current->thread.vstate.datap, riscv_v_vsiz= e); - /* Copy magic to the user space after saving all vector conetext */ - err |=3D __put_user(RISCV_V_MAGIC, &hdr->magic); - err |=3D __put_user(riscv_v_sc_size, &hdr->size); if (unlikely(err)) - return err; + return -EFAULT; =20 - /* Only progress the sv_vec if everything has done successfully */ - *sc_vec +=3D riscv_v_sc_size; - return 0; + /* Only return the size if everything has done successfully */ + return riscv_v_sc_size; } =20 /* @@ -142,10 +139,20 @@ static long __restore_v_state(struct pt_regs *regs, v= oid __user *sc_vec) */ return copy_from_user(current->thread.vstate.datap, datap, riscv_v_vsize); } -#else -#define save_v_state(task, regs) (0) -#define __restore_v_state(task, regs) (0) -#endif + +struct arch_ext_priv { + __u32 magic; + long (*save)(struct pt_regs *regs, void __user *sc_vec); +}; + +struct arch_ext_priv arch_ext_list[] =3D { + { + .magic =3D RISCV_V_MAGIC, + .save =3D &save_v_state, + }, +}; + +const size_t nr_arch_exts =3D ARRAY_SIZE(arch_ext_list); =20 static long restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs, struct sigcontext __user *sc) @@ -270,7 +277,8 @@ static long setup_sigcontext(struct rt_sigframe __user = *frame, { struct sigcontext __user *sc =3D &frame->uc.uc_mcontext; struct __riscv_ctx_hdr __user *sc_ext_ptr =3D &sc->sc_extdesc.hdr; - long err; + struct arch_ext_priv *arch_ext; + long err, i, ext_size; =20 /* sc_regs is structured the same as the start of pt_regs */ err =3D __copy_to_user(&sc->sc_regs, regs, sizeof(sc->sc_regs)); @@ -278,8 +286,20 @@ static long setup_sigcontext(struct rt_sigframe __user= *frame, if (has_fpu()) err |=3D save_fp_state(regs, &sc->sc_fpregs); /* Save the vector state. */ - if ((has_vector() || has_xtheadvector()) && riscv_v_vstate_query(regs)) - err |=3D save_v_state(regs, (void __user **)&sc_ext_ptr); + for (i =3D 0; i < nr_arch_exts; i++) { + arch_ext =3D &arch_ext_list[i]; + if (!arch_ext->save) + continue; + + ext_size =3D arch_ext->save(regs, sc_ext_ptr + 1); + if (ext_size <=3D 0) { + err |=3D ext_size; + } else { + err |=3D __put_user(arch_ext->magic, &sc_ext_ptr->magic); + err |=3D __put_user(ext_size, &sc_ext_ptr->size); + sc_ext_ptr =3D (void *)sc_ext_ptr + ext_size; + } + } /* Write zero to fp-reserved space and check it on restore_sigcontext */ err |=3D __put_user(0, &sc->sc_extdesc.reserved); 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Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:22 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 17/28] riscv/signal: save and restore of shadow stack for signal Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-17-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Deepak Gupta , Andy Chiu X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=11288; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=3t0NE1k+pebqdVa636O1oAJ+CKIPx7xe0CIi2eA/n+I=; b=QWmGcNZp3i5izNJS83gakOgbCT1PmJMqUfo0Kxxti+5Ajbhmtff8+y8N20UrRyEWOz1vHUKTO cKwk+6kNxEqDmUesiljf0l2Qqgrn/x+FDx2NXZiM+NsnC8aZhO4a+ZY X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Save shadow stack pointer in sigcontext structure while delivering signal. Restore shadow stack pointer from sigcontext on sigreturn. As part of save operation, kernel uses `ssamoswap` to save snapshot of current shadow stack on shadow stack itself (can be called as a save token). During restore on sigreturn, kernel retrieves token from top of shadow stack and validates it. This allows that user mode can't arbitrary pivot to any shadow stack address without having a token and thus provide strong security assurance between signaly delivery and sigreturn window. Use ABI compatible way of saving/restoring shadow stack pointer into signal stack. This follows what Vector extension, where extra registers are placed in a form of extension header + extension body in the stack. The extension header indicates the size of the extra architectural states plus the size of header itself, and a magic identifier of the extension. Then, the extensions body contains the new architectural states in the form defined by uapi. Signed-off-by: Andy Chiu Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h | 10 ++++ arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 4 ++ arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h | 1 + arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c | 86 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= ++++ arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 56 +++++++++++++++++++++ 5 files changed, 157 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/user= cfi.h index 4501d741a609..ec4b8a53eb74 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ #include #include +#include =20 struct task_struct; struct kernel_clone_args; @@ -34,6 +35,9 @@ bool is_shstk_locked(struct task_struct *task); bool is_shstk_allocated(struct task_struct *task); void set_shstk_lock(struct task_struct *task); void set_shstk_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable); +unsigned long get_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task); +int restore_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long shstk_ptr); +int save_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *saved_shstk_pt= r); bool is_indir_lp_enabled(struct task_struct *task); bool is_indir_lp_locked(struct task_struct *task); void set_indir_lp_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable); @@ -71,6 +75,12 @@ void set_indir_lp_lock(struct task_struct *task); =20 #define set_indir_lp_lock(task) do {} while (0) =20 +#define restore_user_shstk(tsk, shstk_ptr) -EINVAL + +#define save_user_shstk(tsk, saved_shstk_ptr) -EINVAL + +#define get_active_shstk(task) 0UL + #endif /* CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI */ =20 #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/riscv/include/uapi= /asm/ptrace.h index beff8df80ac9..261bfe70f60a 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h @@ -127,6 +127,10 @@ struct __riscv_v_regset_state { */ #define RISCV_MAX_VLENB (8192) =20 +struct __sc_riscv_cfi_state { + unsigned long ss_ptr; /* shadow stack pointer */ +}; + #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ =20 #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_RISCV_PTRACE_H */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h b/arch/riscv/include/= uapi/asm/sigcontext.h index 748dffc9ae19..d22d0815d605 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/sigcontext.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ =20 /* The Magic number for signal context frame header. */ #define RISCV_V_MAGIC 0x53465457 +#define RISCV_ZICFISS_MAGIC 0x9487 #define END_MAGIC 0x0 =20 /* The size of END signal context header. */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c index a5e3d54fe54b..1bcda11e0680 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/signal.c @@ -22,11 +22,13 @@ #include #include #include +#include =20 unsigned long signal_minsigstksz __ro_after_init; =20 extern u32 __user_rt_sigreturn[2]; static size_t riscv_v_sc_size __ro_after_init; +static size_t riscv_zicfiss_sc_size __ro_after_init; =20 #define DEBUG_SIG 0 =20 @@ -140,6 +142,62 @@ static long __restore_v_state(struct pt_regs *regs, vo= id __user *sc_vec) return copy_from_user(current->thread.vstate.datap, datap, riscv_v_vsize); } =20 +static long save_cfiss_state(struct pt_regs *regs, void __user *sc_cfi) +{ + struct __sc_riscv_cfi_state __user *state =3D sc_cfi; + unsigned long ss_ptr =3D 0; + long err =3D 0; + + if (!is_shstk_enabled(current)) + return 0; + + /* + * Save a pointer to shadow stack itself on shadow stack as a form of tok= en. + * A token on shadow gives following properties + * - Safe save and restore for shadow stack switching. Any save of shadow= stack + * must have had saved a token on shadow stack. Similarly any restore o= f shadow + * stack must check the token before restore. Since writing to shadow s= tack with + * address of shadow stack itself is not easily allowed. A restore with= out a save + * is quite difficult for an attacker to perform. + * - A natural break. A token in shadow stack provides a natural break in= shadow stack + * So a single linear range can be bucketed into different shadow stack= segments. Any + * sspopchk will detect the condition and fault to kernel as sw check e= xception. + */ + err |=3D save_user_shstk(current, &ss_ptr); + err |=3D __put_user(ss_ptr, &state->ss_ptr); + if (unlikely(err)) + return -EFAULT; + + return riscv_zicfiss_sc_size; +} + +static long __restore_cfiss_state(struct pt_regs *regs, void __user *sc_cf= i) +{ + struct __sc_riscv_cfi_state __user *state =3D sc_cfi; + unsigned long ss_ptr =3D 0; + long err; + + /* + * Restore shadow stack as a form of token stored on shadow stack itself = as a safe + * way to restore. + * A token on shadow gives following properties + * - Safe save and restore for shadow stack switching. Any save of shadow= stack + * must have had saved a token on shadow stack. Similarly any restore o= f shadow + * stack must check the token before restore. Since writing to shadow s= tack with + * address of shadow stack itself is not easily allowed. A restore with= out a save + * is quite difficult for an attacker to perform. + * - A natural break. A token in shadow stack provides a natural break in= shadow stack + * So a single linear range can be bucketed into different shadow stack= segments. + * sspopchk will detect the condition and fault to kernel as sw check e= xception. + */ + err =3D __copy_from_user(&ss_ptr, &state->ss_ptr, sizeof(unsigned long)); + + if (unlikely(err)) + return err; + + return restore_user_shstk(current, ss_ptr); +} + struct arch_ext_priv { __u32 magic; long (*save)(struct pt_regs *regs, void __user *sc_vec); @@ -150,6 +208,10 @@ struct arch_ext_priv arch_ext_list[] =3D { .magic =3D RISCV_V_MAGIC, .save =3D &save_v_state, }, + { + .magic =3D RISCV_ZICFISS_MAGIC, + .save =3D &save_cfiss_state, + }, }; =20 const size_t nr_arch_exts =3D ARRAY_SIZE(arch_ext_list); @@ -202,6 +264,12 @@ static long restore_sigcontext(struct pt_regs *regs, =20 err =3D __restore_v_state(regs, sc_ext_ptr); break; + case RISCV_ZICFISS_MAGIC: + if (!is_shstk_enabled(current) || size !=3D riscv_zicfiss_sc_size) + return -EINVAL; + + err =3D __restore_cfiss_state(regs, sc_ext_ptr); + break; default: return -EINVAL; } @@ -223,6 +291,16 @@ static size_t get_rt_frame_size(bool cal_all) total_context_size +=3D riscv_v_sc_size; } =20 + if (is_shstk_enabled(current)) + total_context_size +=3D riscv_zicfiss_sc_size; + + /* + * Preserved a __riscv_ctx_hdr for END signal context header if an + * extension uses __riscv_extra_ext_header + */ + if (total_context_size) + total_context_size +=3D sizeof(struct __riscv_ctx_hdr); + frame_size +=3D total_context_size; =20 frame_size =3D round_up(frame_size, 16); @@ -359,6 +437,11 @@ static int setup_rt_frame(struct ksignal *ksig, sigset= _t *set, #ifdef CONFIG_MMU regs->ra =3D (unsigned long)VDSO_SYMBOL( current->mm->context.vdso, rt_sigreturn); + + /* if bcfi is enabled x1 (ra) and x5 (t0) must match. not sure if we need= this? */ + if (is_shstk_enabled(current)) + regs->t0 =3D regs->ra; + #else /* * For the nommu case we don't have a VDSO. Instead we push two @@ -487,6 +570,9 @@ void __init init_rt_signal_env(void) { riscv_v_sc_size =3D sizeof(struct __riscv_ctx_hdr) + sizeof(struct __sc_riscv_v_state) + riscv_v_vsize; + + riscv_zicfiss_sc_size =3D sizeof(struct __riscv_ctx_hdr) + + sizeof(struct __sc_riscv_cfi_state); /* * Determine the stack space required for guaranteed signal delivery. * The signal_minsigstksz will be populated into the AT_MINSIGSTKSZ entry diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c index 2ebe789caa6b..8bc3e1e3f712 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c @@ -52,6 +52,11 @@ void set_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task, unsigned= long shstk_addr) task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.user_shdw_stk =3D shstk_addr; } =20 +unsigned long get_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task) +{ + return task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.user_shdw_stk; +} + void set_shstk_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable) { if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) @@ -169,6 +174,57 @@ static int create_rstor_token(unsigned long ssp, unsig= ned long *token_addr) return 0; } =20 +/* + * Save user shadow stack pointer on shadow stack itself and return pointe= r to saved location + * returns -EFAULT if operation was unsuccessful + */ +int save_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long *saved_shstk_pt= r) +{ + unsigned long ss_ptr =3D 0; + unsigned long token_loc =3D 0; + int ret =3D 0; + + if (saved_shstk_ptr =3D=3D NULL) + return -EINVAL; + + ss_ptr =3D get_active_shstk(tsk); + ret =3D create_rstor_token(ss_ptr, &token_loc); + + if (!ret) { + *saved_shstk_ptr =3D token_loc; + set_active_shstk(tsk, token_loc); + } + + return ret; +} + +/* + * Restores user shadow stack pointer from token on shadow stack for task = `tsk` + * returns -EFAULT if operation was unsuccessful + */ +int restore_user_shstk(struct task_struct *tsk, unsigned long shstk_ptr) +{ + unsigned long token =3D 0; + + token =3D amo_user_shstk((unsigned long __user *)shstk_ptr, 0); + + if (token =3D=3D -1) + return -EFAULT; + + /* invalid token, return EINVAL */ + if ((token - shstk_ptr) !=3D SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE) { + pr_info_ratelimited( + "%s[%d]: bad restore token in %s: pc=3D%p sp=3D%p, token=3D%p, shstk_pt= r=3D%p\n", + tsk->comm, task_pid_nr(tsk), __func__, (void *)(task_pt_regs(tsk)->epc), + (void *)(task_pt_regs(tsk)->sp), (void *)token, (void *)shstk_ptr); 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b=ZnrAnwisfWXesXdZGRkda9uXbFVbo1OPr5zzVhjwBToh2zxL2toNtb7vgSLpxIo5N fTIbfvXGQ/SIum7MtJEzGcJG6sFA2ZLKyLU35Xo7WYi4rIFdiDhEFFH86yQ2k92l45 gXK4l5R2rPprk6S1OiqpCYIrv92QaHHx/ZcyvLVtqCM+lko87Y4kSHkQ5lqWAPdVjw wjRlfjo4KwHrp7Hb6nEvjPbhMgJC39JH5b2nXnhubZ9JrS21qeCVg65dliCEU2pJIU MAfblaG5tSW9zSEgdHdIvXLMhaK4Y7ov7y3bNRzDWTubBY6khzlzB2HwgSEbdSXjU6 lA7XoOsSfuY8A== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A7A69CCD193; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:23 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 18/28] riscv/kernel: update __show_regs to print shadow stack register Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-18-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=1056; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=wP5UX7zWs0Sv1DUPgXKgMTygpamqW2/FxBkyaeLpPmk=; b=cOimIoa1X2is1Y41a/4qQZE+fBUFk52El9b9X40fsXGZFt+o+jE1enWeNX2BX2/X7O8eqkUrJ AIJ1cQtXvC6ClkxVVYXv3iIDm9TNp602490d/piu38b6mrM1c8+mqj7 X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Updating __show_regs to print captured shadow stack pointer as well. On tasks where shadow stack is disabled, it'll simply print 0. Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta Reviewed-by: Alexandre Ghiti --- arch/riscv/kernel/process.c | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c index 49f527e3acfd..aacb23978f93 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/process.c @@ -93,8 +93,8 @@ void __show_regs(struct pt_regs *regs) regs->s8, regs->s9, regs->s10); pr_cont(" s11: " REG_FMT " t3 : " REG_FMT " t4 : " REG_FMT "\n", regs->s11, regs->t3, regs->t4); - pr_cont(" t5 : " REG_FMT " t6 : " REG_FMT "\n", - regs->t5, regs->t6); + pr_cont(" t5 : " REG_FMT " t6 : " REG_FMT " ssp : " REG_FMT "\n", + regs->t5, regs->t6, get_active_shstk(current)); =20 pr_cont("status: " REG_FMT " badaddr: " REG_FMT " cause: " REG_FMT "\n", regs->status, regs->badaddr, regs->cause); --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0F9BB346E52; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:12 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238272; cv=none; b=SSwIAcRvjxcbykFuUk6Z4dLhRFNHIMoX8mJmA3h0yfP8TtHJ90WSFEbHhP2yJtAz/48cS9UOLU8yUIkdXCEe09SZ/ybKB6vl2vB31lc6uxwandxf8faPBgL4BDAJYLBF7lw0pwJxDbwL3y+jZQb08vhLrwWxwKE3blkCnT8wEi8= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238272; c=relaxed/simple; bh=fKwB1yva/J6Z5A9jncT1vgZQza3VT45SHzJy2KbYGPo=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=jiUScJ8BVKe+QE0tU1CrHgFuOF9kWUcSr1lQmv8LZOO5vBRbB49eE+8Dtc73IUX1cMhbs0nQ1DevEko20fyJOQs1lmnBiuSJPYQa+Z1EfdDNv3CKbpQsNLO3qnZc8ooKiwWylZfOQcA0YIPcuE8Me0PwzyC4afb/97ks6XJwEAs= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=U2xzOpVe; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="U2xzOpVe" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DE3D7C2BCC7; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238271; bh=fKwB1yva/J6Z5A9jncT1vgZQza3VT45SHzJy2KbYGPo=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=U2xzOpVeSYOJU+GRW0KojQKjqknCvdu5bm3UpLoKDVyiVYbt0ux93hl/t7H/T+8tI oXoFjUwYpmcsYrmZ2x7RuIk9dpG54TWS8Te+jVTBoHC/4R8ZMWYefKKxyoli63tRa8 w3D5kttu59yKIq1v6LLH8lUsGHDMhZXgWYv7qCox7TiqEtvj3grX06/fORjLPtYb8L xNEPSj0ywbobFOvjP4CzU0TMO41yFudguQnu52VccCKMdZJgDb0YRkoLlaRUrgCGET AAt8JNzDMGaatbMnOgCrKQIyJurwQ87heDA4mWltxuq06zwr3eKjNzxcAxhjCPQhmo HeOYMuHkT2fkQ== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id CBEEECCF9E3; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:11 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:24 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 19/28] riscv/ptrace: riscv cfi status and state via ptrace and in core files Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-19-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=6909; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=Lgv2+2JEKJz8I+eOPU23ZhagSpES8G7xWPFmmF1jXYI=; b=MrU2NaznLxQUGXOIjrN5xwuNy8InrpDiQl1fcqxJb223wyqsz/U/NbY2l/rcPyAoSILgdkaNi Wj2wsJu/lV3B8svilZf13UnaT8h4Ub7C14JOoVPnSOHwNLU6IAzciYy X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Expose a new register type NT_RISCV_USER_CFI for risc-v cfi status and state. Intentionally both landing pad and shadow stack status and state are rolled into cfi state. Creating two different NT_RISCV_USER_XXX would not be useful and wastage of a note type. Enabling, disabling and locking of feature is not allowed via ptrace set interface. However setting `elp` state or setting shadow stack pointer are allowed via ptrace set interface . It is expected `gdb` might have use to fixup `elp` state or `shadow stack` pointer. Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 30 ++++++++++++ arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c | 95 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= ++++ include/uapi/linux/elf.h | 2 + 3 files changed, 127 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h b/arch/riscv/include/uapi= /asm/ptrace.h index 261bfe70f60a..b2a18dfeb2fb 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h @@ -131,6 +131,36 @@ struct __sc_riscv_cfi_state { unsigned long ss_ptr; /* shadow stack pointer */ }; =20 +#define PTRACE_CFI_LP_EN_BIT 0 +#define PTRACE_CFI_LP_LOCK_BIT 1 +#define PTRACE_CFI_ELP_BIT 2 +#define PTRACE_CFI_SS_EN_BIT 3 +#define PTRACE_CFI_SS_LOCK_BIT 4 +#define PTRACE_CFI_SS_PTR_BIT 5 + +#define PTRACE_CFI_LP_EN_STATE (1 << PTRACE_CFI_LP_EN_BIT) +#define PTRACE_CFI_LP_LOCK_STATE (1 << PTRACE_CFI_LP_LOCK_BIT) +#define PTRACE_CFI_ELP_STATE (1 << PTRACE_CFI_ELP_BIT) +#define PTRACE_CFI_SS_EN_STATE (1 << PTRACE_CFI_SS_EN_BIT) +#define PTRACE_CFI_SS_LOCK_STATE (1 << PTRACE_CFI_SS_LOCK_BIT) +#define PTRACE_CFI_SS_PTR_STATE (1 << PTRACE_CFI_SS_PTR_BIT) + +#define PRACE_CFI_STATE_INVALID_MASK ~(PTRACE_CFI_LP_EN_STATE | \ + PTRACE_CFI_LP_LOCK_STATE | \ + PTRACE_CFI_ELP_STATE | \ + PTRACE_CFI_SS_EN_STATE | \ + PTRACE_CFI_SS_LOCK_STATE | \ + PTRACE_CFI_SS_PTR_STATE) + +struct __cfi_status { + __u64 cfi_state; +}; + +struct user_cfi_state { + struct __cfi_status cfi_status; + __u64 shstk_ptr; +}; + #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ =20 #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_RISCV_PTRACE_H */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c index 8e86305831ea..56b9e3871862 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/ptrace.c @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include =20 enum riscv_regset { REGSET_X, @@ -31,6 +32,9 @@ enum riscv_regset { #ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_ISA_SUPM REGSET_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI + REGSET_CFI, +#endif }; =20 static int riscv_gpr_get(struct task_struct *target, @@ -184,6 +188,87 @@ static int tagged_addr_ctrl_set(struct task_struct *ta= rget, } #endif =20 +#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI +static int riscv_cfi_get(struct task_struct *target, + const struct user_regset *regset, + struct membuf to) +{ + struct user_cfi_state user_cfi; + struct pt_regs *regs; + + memset(&user_cfi, 0, sizeof(user_cfi)); + regs =3D task_pt_regs(target); + + if (is_indir_lp_enabled(target)) { + user_cfi.cfi_status.cfi_state |=3D PTRACE_CFI_LP_EN_STATE; + user_cfi.cfi_status.cfi_state |=3D is_indir_lp_locked(target) ? + PTRACE_CFI_LP_LOCK_STATE : 0; + user_cfi.cfi_status.cfi_state |=3D (regs->status & SR_ELP) ? + PTRACE_CFI_ELP_STATE : 0; + } + + if (is_shstk_enabled(target)) { + user_cfi.cfi_status.cfi_state |=3D (PTRACE_CFI_SS_EN_STATE | + PTRACE_CFI_SS_PTR_STATE); + user_cfi.cfi_status.cfi_state |=3D is_shstk_locked(target) ? + PTRACE_CFI_SS_LOCK_STATE : 0; + user_cfi.shstk_ptr =3D get_active_shstk(target); + } + + return membuf_write(&to, &user_cfi, sizeof(user_cfi)); +} + +/* + * Does it make sense to allowing enable / disable of cfi via ptrace? + * Not allowing enable / disable / locking control via ptrace for now. + * Setting shadow stack pointer is allowed. GDB might use it to unwind or + * some other fixup. Similarly gdb might want to suppress elp and may want + * to reset elp state. + */ +static int riscv_cfi_set(struct task_struct *target, + const struct user_regset *regset, + unsigned int pos, unsigned int count, + const void *kbuf, const void __user *ubuf) +{ + int ret; + struct user_cfi_state user_cfi; + struct pt_regs *regs; + + regs =3D task_pt_regs(target); + + ret =3D user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, &user_cfi, 0, -1); + if (ret) + return ret; + + /* + * Not allowing enabling or locking shadow stack or landing pad + * There is no disabling of shadow stack or landing pad via ptrace + * rsvd field should be set to zero so that if those fields are needed in= future + */ + if ((user_cfi.cfi_status.cfi_state & + (PTRACE_CFI_LP_EN_STATE | PTRACE_CFI_LP_LOCK_STATE | + PTRACE_CFI_SS_EN_STATE | PTRACE_CFI_SS_LOCK_STATE)) || + (user_cfi.cfi_status.cfi_state & PRACE_CFI_STATE_INVALID_MASK)) + return -EINVAL; + + /* If lpad is enabled on target and ptrace requests to set / clear elp, d= o that */ + if (is_indir_lp_enabled(target)) { + if (user_cfi.cfi_status.cfi_state & + PTRACE_CFI_ELP_STATE) /* set elp state */ + regs->status |=3D SR_ELP; + else + regs->status &=3D ~SR_ELP; /* clear elp state */ + } + + /* If shadow stack enabled on target, set new shadow stack pointer */ + if (is_shstk_enabled(target) && + (user_cfi.cfi_status.cfi_state & PTRACE_CFI_SS_PTR_STATE)) + set_active_shstk(target, user_cfi.shstk_ptr); + + return 0; +} +#endif + static const struct user_regset riscv_user_regset[] =3D { [REGSET_X] =3D { USER_REGSET_NOTE_TYPE(PRSTATUS), @@ -224,6 +309,16 @@ static const struct user_regset riscv_user_regset[] = =3D { .set =3D tagged_addr_ctrl_set, }, #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI + [REGSET_CFI] =3D { + .core_note_type =3D NT_RISCV_USER_CFI, + .align =3D sizeof(__u64), + .n =3D sizeof(struct user_cfi_state) / sizeof(__u64), + .size =3D sizeof(__u64), + .regset_get =3D riscv_cfi_get, + .set =3D riscv_cfi_set, + }, +#endif }; =20 static const struct user_regset_view riscv_user_native_view =3D { diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/elf.h b/include/uapi/linux/elf.h index 819ded2d39de..ee30dcd80901 100644 --- a/include/uapi/linux/elf.h +++ b/include/uapi/linux/elf.h @@ -545,6 +545,8 @@ typedef struct elf64_shdr { #define NT_RISCV_VECTOR 0x901 /* RISC-V vector registers */ #define NN_RISCV_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL "LINUX" #define NT_RISCV_TAGGED_ADDR_CTRL 0x902 /* RISC-V tagged address control (= prctl()) */ +#define NN_RISCV_USER_CFI "LINUX" +#define NT_RISCV_USER_CFI 0x903 /* RISC-V shadow stack state */ #define NN_LOONGARCH_CPUCFG "LINUX" #define NT_LOONGARCH_CPUCFG 0xa00 /* LoongArch CPU config registers */ #define NN_LOONGARCH_CSR "LINUX" --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 4A4E7347BAC; 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Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=1428; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=I1jqcPRPd1hxfvYCXrKsXB3tX7WWaFK9J8/4Z0z3BE8=; b=xCBjpk/iSQFbeSy6+6gIPaOZhBCwwQccR0WZSjcuz9R2d+fRxs75EZfgTs1Ck7ISXZLfk8/vt 1oOMYt+JiMSBeEnQK1MaOTY8fFfWj+WwdKJeydK2u38ORkBYHCZRvTH X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Adding enumeration of zicfilp and zicfiss extensions in hwprobe syscall. Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/hwprobe.h | 2 ++ arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c | 2 ++ 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/hwprobe.h b/arch/riscv/include/uap= i/asm/hwprobe.h index 5d30a4fae37a..0efc9c7d1199 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/hwprobe.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/uapi/asm/hwprobe.h @@ -82,6 +82,8 @@ struct riscv_hwprobe { #define RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZAAMO (1ULL << 56) #define RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZALRSC (1ULL << 57) #define RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZABHA (1ULL << 58) +#define RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZICFILP (1ULL << 59) +#define RISCV_HWPROBE_EXT_ZICFISS (1ULL << 60) #define RISCV_HWPROBE_KEY_CPUPERF_0 5 #define RISCV_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_UNKNOWN (0 << 0) #define RISCV_HWPROBE_MISALIGNED_EMULATED (1 << 0) diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprob= e.c index 000f4451a9d8..d13d9d0d1669 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/sys_hwprobe.c @@ -114,6 +114,8 @@ static void hwprobe_isa_ext0(struct riscv_hwprobe *pair, EXT_KEY(ZCMOP); EXT_KEY(ZICBOM); EXT_KEY(ZICBOZ); + EXT_KEY(ZICFILP); + EXT_KEY(ZICFISS); EXT_KEY(ZICNTR); EXT_KEY(ZICOND); EXT_KEY(ZIHINTNTL); --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 65AD2347BC6; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:12 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238272; cv=none; b=P5nxPBLoUo5pBLL08CDsP+hKgBRQvdjRBbUjqSK5Lap24lg1QuJsscbuRvHHQ6mvgtumE0WaEzI+mbOU65ScKtIh4HeAnHg3iPaB4tO6lisgUHwSuKsjvMDgGzfg93NH7nxv5l5qlTbt6cmC8eMbrLSFGKJBiWGSD0A7eFrWTrw= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238272; c=relaxed/simple; bh=9anbjlp/dCVq4jdi8+AUUQHUYCld9sH/aI/ellmQ/s0=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=ECPMPVmMxXVSHhNVi/kPzmPglzVY7CY8v4tHKB0HGIGxjjMmvSJqm5otqWVpdcfYiLTYmRiBSEl8x7BaVAHnAN1XCzIaxJzWPE9Y0tf0OsCoVj6WReg8tuNK3w0nNXxxHhTakPBu6lVTdPt5i2UjiseokjIRGiD/WRK25otdO4w= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=EWyh/56x; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="EWyh/56x" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 3574CC2BD00; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:12 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238272; bh=9anbjlp/dCVq4jdi8+AUUQHUYCld9sH/aI/ellmQ/s0=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=EWyh/56x65kNs9KdFDGTR47glgC6jgkgZbwjB+QolFkgRhOJYJMsBHNf96E78tJpV w2ZOFBo/kbbn1iMQnArIZW+FOZrKmhqI5XxwZe7SYoqRz+Atsvw03unOZcB3I4u3Bj hG6I/N1DheGV+4c28FVPugyieZwR19VkZliCiN7GWGdcDuipE5WAIoRiGQeK7oM1uo c8d2O2juatPcyHmKkOlezNmSHiPGcjYyV8zxY4kLxCWMboTA88yXw8bJFRpSqr+TCK lXUESXUqLqlsJ6Caf266bO+Ps7aqmTUVeD3c8in8HgyIPzAXvwEvJtAWO+0fFSRlHt 11HZNoLm8FFeA== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A5B3CCF9E6; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:12 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:26 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 21/28] riscv: kernel command line option to opt out of user cfi Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-21-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=8599; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=4CrwjAc9RtzBMVfTPQPILf3kD5i9soL8MqVxmZnq8R4=; b=Y0ckbOTjS/xG3fya0NTDF9B5n1TT9F46fszfFpUt/npkScNMR11iZJmBYnkFRrteM1jkkw+Fu Y6kwqz+dO1xApYo2LnFlBaVRELWuN7CZdes6SYpwllK3XJ+MYCAQn/I X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta This commit adds a kernel command line option using which user cfi can be disabled. User backward cfi and forward cfi can be enabled independently. Kernel command line parameter "riscv_nousercfi" can take below values: - "all" : Disable forward and backward cfi both. - "bcfi" : Disable backward cfi. - "fcfi" : Disable forward cfi Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 ++++ arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h | 7 +++ arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c | 9 +++- arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++-= ---- 4 files changed, 70 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-) diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentatio= n/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt index 6c42061ca20e..453127ef8746 100644 --- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt +++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt @@ -6453,6 +6453,14 @@ replacement properties are not found. See the Kconfig entry for RISCV_ISA_FALLBACK. =20 + riscv_nousercfi=3D + all Disable user cfi ABI to userspace even if cpu extension + are available. + bcfi Disable user backward cfi ABI to userspace even if + shadow stack extension is available. + fcfi Disable user forward cfi ABI to userspace even if landing + pad extension is available. + ro [KNL] Mount root device read-only on boot =20 rodata=3D [KNL,EARLY] diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/user= cfi.h index ec4b8a53eb74..451bfa607745 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/usercfi.h @@ -5,6 +5,10 @@ #ifndef _ASM_RISCV_USERCFI_H #define _ASM_RISCV_USERCFI_H =20 +#define CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_FCFI 1 +#define CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_BCFI 2 +#define CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI 3 + #ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ #include #include @@ -83,6 +87,9 @@ void set_indir_lp_lock(struct task_struct *task); =20 #endif /* CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI */ =20 +bool is_user_shstk_enabled(void); +bool is_user_lpad_enabled(void); + #endif /* __ASSEMBLER__ */ =20 #endif /* _ASM_RISCV_USERCFI_H */ diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c index 5a1a194e1180..f7f3368bd8f5 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/cpufeature.c @@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include =20 #define NUM_ALPHA_EXTS ('z' - 'a' + 1) =20 @@ -45,6 +46,8 @@ struct riscv_isainfo hart_isa[NR_CPUS]; =20 u32 thead_vlenb_of; =20 +extern unsigned long riscv_nousercfi; + /** * riscv_isa_extension_base() - Get base extension word * @@ -277,7 +280,8 @@ static int riscv_ext_svadu_validate(const struct riscv_= isa_ext_data *data, static int riscv_cfilp_validate(const struct riscv_isa_ext_data *data, const unsigned long *isa_bitmap) { - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI)) + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) || + (riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_FCFI)) return -EINVAL; =20 return 0; @@ -286,7 +290,8 @@ static int riscv_cfilp_validate(const struct riscv_isa_= ext_data *data, static int riscv_cfiss_validate(const struct riscv_isa_ext_data *data, const unsigned long *isa_bitmap) { - if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI)) + if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) || + (riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_BCFI)) return -EINVAL; =20 return 0; diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c index 8bc3e1e3f712..92f536d46fc7 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/usercfi.c @@ -17,6 +17,8 @@ #include #include =20 +unsigned long riscv_nousercfi; + #define SHSTK_ENTRY_SIZE sizeof(void *) =20 bool is_shstk_enabled(struct task_struct *task) @@ -59,7 +61,7 @@ unsigned long get_active_shstk(struct task_struct *task) =20 void set_shstk_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable) { - if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) + if (!is_user_shstk_enabled()) return; =20 task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ubcfi_en =3D enable ? 1 : 0; @@ -89,7 +91,7 @@ bool is_indir_lp_locked(struct task_struct *task) =20 void set_indir_lp_status(struct task_struct *task, bool enable) { - if (!cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr()) + if (!is_user_lpad_enabled()) return; =20 task->thread_info.user_cfi_state.ufcfi_en =3D enable ? 1 : 0; @@ -259,7 +261,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(map_shadow_stack, unsigned long, addr, = unsigned long, size, unsi bool set_tok =3D flags & SHADOW_STACK_SET_TOKEN; unsigned long aligned_size =3D 0; =20 - if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) + if (!is_user_shstk_enabled()) return -EOPNOTSUPP; =20 /* Anything other than set token should result in invalid param */ @@ -306,7 +308,7 @@ unsigned long shstk_alloc_thread_stack(struct task_stru= ct *tsk, unsigned long addr, size; =20 /* If shadow stack is not supported, return 0 */ - if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) + if (!is_user_shstk_enabled()) return 0; =20 /* @@ -352,7 +354,7 @@ void shstk_release(struct task_struct *tsk) { unsigned long base =3D 0, size =3D 0; /* If shadow stack is not supported or not enabled, nothing to release */ - if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack() || !is_shstk_enabled(tsk)) + if (!is_user_shstk_enabled() || !is_shstk_enabled(tsk)) return; =20 /* @@ -381,7 +383,7 @@ int arch_get_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t,= unsigned long __user *st { unsigned long bcfi_status =3D 0; =20 - if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) + if (!is_user_shstk_enabled()) return -EINVAL; =20 /* this means shadow stack is enabled on the task */ @@ -395,7 +397,7 @@ int arch_set_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t,= unsigned long status) unsigned long size =3D 0, addr =3D 0; bool enable_shstk =3D false; =20 - if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack()) + if (!is_user_shstk_enabled()) return -EINVAL; =20 /* Reject unknown flags */ @@ -448,7 +450,7 @@ int arch_lock_shadow_stack_status(struct task_struct *t= ask, unsigned long arg) { /* If shtstk not supported or not enabled on task, nothing to lock here */ - if (!cpu_supports_shadow_stack() || + if (!is_user_shstk_enabled() || !is_shstk_enabled(task) || arg !=3D 0) return -EINVAL; =20 @@ -461,7 +463,7 @@ int arch_get_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *t, = unsigned long __user *sta { unsigned long fcfi_status =3D 0; =20 - if (!cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr()) + if (!is_user_lpad_enabled()) return -EINVAL; =20 /* indirect branch tracking is enabled on the task or not */ @@ -474,7 +476,7 @@ int arch_set_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *t, = unsigned long status) { bool enable_indir_lp =3D false; =20 - if (!cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr()) + if (!is_user_lpad_enabled()) return -EINVAL; =20 /* indirect branch tracking is locked and further can't be modified by us= er */ @@ -498,7 +500,7 @@ int arch_lock_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *ta= sk, * If indirect branch tracking is not supported or not enabled on task, * nothing to lock here */ - if (!cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr() || + if (!is_user_lpad_enabled() || !is_indir_lp_enabled(task) || arg !=3D 0) return -EINVAL; =20 @@ -506,3 +508,38 @@ int arch_lock_indir_br_lp_status(struct task_struct *t= ask, =20 return 0; } + +bool is_user_shstk_enabled(void) +{ + return (cpu_supports_shadow_stack() && + !(riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_BCFI)); +} + +bool is_user_lpad_enabled(void) +{ + return (cpu_supports_indirect_br_lp_instr() && + !(riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_FCFI)); +} + +static int __init setup_global_riscv_enable(char *str) +{ + if (strcmp(str, "all") =3D=3D 0) + riscv_nousercfi =3D CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI; + + if (strcmp(str, "fcfi") =3D=3D 0) + riscv_nousercfi |=3D CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_FCFI; + + if (strcmp(str, "bcfi") =3D=3D 0) + riscv_nousercfi |=3D CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_BCFI; + + if (riscv_nousercfi) + pr_info("riscv user cfi disabled via cmdline" + "shadow stack status : %s, landing pad status : %s\n", + (riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_BCFI) ? "disabled" : + "enabled", (riscv_nousercfi & CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_FCFI) ? + "disabled" : "enabled"); + + return 1; +} + +__setup("riscv_nousercfi=3D", setup_global_riscv_enable); --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 970C4347FE4; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:12 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238272; cv=none; b=PMzTJcJROYt9PM7x6OUB45qV5W856yeLhmF02OCpACdDo+/WmqfY1sBuMUB/4PZbC2Gnlv/WyesHA7Q7TidOqwkDgIFE1EpQv9OhQ+3cRhZcpuyph7dQlEXk8ZgQZIxSpqExtWjkyjY4m6xilOMxDVDJ6pQ6f6R0LH1kfmyeaUc= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238272; c=relaxed/simple; bh=IWV/cc7nU5utSG71ajaBhItrAAJIoLJKysavG0licH4=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=szxW+bk/scBGx7/Lmd4fvf0K0b2ajqz/1OlU4oonXfS153gxMDmYkMypp+ZtsJku0P1vPA9qp0sUDa+PgvYCBBTlHmcHQ4O60Tyj+q+bGmp02A1xiNBHETORCkKeHI686zkbHcUCFkXT1R0an0gc+qouNljwfj/6b/9a78pr9+Q= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=mWIpyM8H; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="mWIpyM8H" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5AB65C16AAE; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:12 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238272; bh=IWV/cc7nU5utSG71ajaBhItrAAJIoLJKysavG0licH4=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=mWIpyM8H6bWoKpo5Rli7eZRDm9XlJqRXSgXRdz5a+qhrrYbvKqfI1bKyIozDXv+jS 5OBnO3v8jU8NP/rE8vRlie8cfTGUht76VUJrrurG4qtRBOBJjhIkiPn3ojTxHioaeF UwMihFXkEZhqczkHLBHLoteXL45MY6EctdcynmjcjdD8izCkoptgPNvm6v9XF4Maxe c1xGvzFMleFMLi+Qd8TnAWiYrmeWhaGNGrS7/8iLNAgwNHyjPeG60/7O/pqK65a18u eADdOQq8R4AiXScbBop0qk+EiumO+BotOUJiPoY29sZX9P4bz6LssGwftemmi+QZsi tpqSC80u/RJ6A== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 400AACCD193; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:12 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:27 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 22/28] riscv: enable kernel access to shadow stack memory via FWFT sbi call Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-22-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=2857; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=6jhZAX7qSjG5giCOVCgCSSpmySXxQ3X5SeSFJU/GKzQ=; b=ZCaVgmPZIW7VK3LK8GgkkQBvDVa+uyflBrrczukk04MC55+npWLHhbPfAbtwExQcSkFtFpdbS +BKAHlfx6IJBt1jeqE2Z4QqW8yNdtteCLrx4EJUxKVKoSV6HcH1Va+f X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Kernel will have to perform shadow stack operations on user shadow stack. Like during signal delivery and sigreturn, shadow stack token must be created and validated respectively. Thus shadow stack access for kernel must be enabled. In future when kernel shadow stacks are enabled for linux kernel, it must be enabled as early as possible for better coverage and prevent imbalance between regular stack and shadow stack. After `relocate_enable_mmu` has been done, this is as early as possible it can enabled. Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 6 ++++++ arch/riscv/kernel/head.S | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 33 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offset= s.c index 8a2b2656cb2f..af827448a609 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/asm-offsets.c @@ -533,4 +533,10 @@ void asm_offsets(void) DEFINE(FREGS_A6, offsetof(struct __arch_ftrace_regs, a6)); DEFINE(FREGS_A7, offsetof(struct __arch_ftrace_regs, a7)); #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_SBI + DEFINE(SBI_EXT_FWFT, SBI_EXT_FWFT); + DEFINE(SBI_EXT_FWFT_SET, SBI_EXT_FWFT_SET); + DEFINE(SBI_FWFT_SHADOW_STACK, SBI_FWFT_SHADOW_STACK); + DEFINE(SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK, SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK); +#endif } diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S index bdf3352acf4c..9c99c5ad6fe8 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/head.S @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include "efi-header.S" =20 __HEAD @@ -170,6 +171,19 @@ secondary_start_sbi: call relocate_enable_mmu #endif call .Lsetup_trap_vector +#if defined(CONFIG_RISCV_SBI) && defined(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) + li a7, SBI_EXT_FWFT + li a6, SBI_EXT_FWFT_SET + li a0, SBI_FWFT_SHADOW_STACK + li a1, 1 /* enable supervisor to access shadow stack access */ + li a2, SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK + ecall + beqz a0, 1f + la a1, riscv_nousercfi + li a0, CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_BCFI + REG_S a0, (a1) +1: +#endif scs_load_current call smp_callin #endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ @@ -330,6 +344,19 @@ SYM_CODE_START(_start_kernel) la tp, init_task la sp, init_thread_union + THREAD_SIZE addi sp, sp, -PT_SIZE_ON_STACK +#if defined(CONFIG_RISCV_SBI) && defined(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) + li a7, SBI_EXT_FWFT + li a6, SBI_EXT_FWFT_SET + li a0, SBI_FWFT_SHADOW_STACK + li a1, 1 /* enable supervisor to access shadow stack access */ + li a2, SBI_FWFT_SET_FLAG_LOCK + ecall + beqz a0, 1f + la a1, riscv_nousercfi + li a0, CMDLINE_DISABLE_RISCV_USERCFI_BCFI + REG_S a0, (a1) +1: +#endif scs_load_current =20 #ifdef CONFIG_KASAN --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 9CACA347FED; 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charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-23-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=8621; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=TV4bCjkXahYptQE9wDELJEswpUT0u946Au4FFg8Mqeg=; b=WuwmPjZ57Lz1WTkUy08ZHlE6SgJkgZj1nufDQGh0+c4ds4GM/+oSdiAO+nIbfS+62NQrJVEX+ MfbFCiZqEM5AjGqWYJGp7hGtd4UI40tiz/Wn2zulA0rYVb7FZ+ZBZhY X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Jim Shu user mode tasks compiled with zicfilp may call indirectly into vdso (like hwprobe indirect calls). Add landing pad compile support in vdso. vdso with landing pad in it will be nop for tasks which have not enabled landing pad. Furthermore, adding support for C sources of vdso to be compiled with shadow stack and landing pad enabled as well. Landing pad and shadow stack instructions are emitted only when VDSO_CFI cflags option is defined during compile. Signed-off-by: Jim Shu Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/Makefile | 5 +++- arch/riscv/include/asm/assembler.h | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++= ++++ arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile | 11 +++++++- arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/flush_icache.S | 4 +++ arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/getcpu.S | 4 +++ arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/note.S | 3 ++ arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/rt_sigreturn.S | 4 +++ arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/sys_hwprobe.S | 4 +++ arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S | 5 +++- 9 files changed, 81 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/Makefile b/arch/riscv/Makefile index ecf2fcce2d92..f60c2de0ca08 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/Makefile @@ -81,9 +81,12 @@ riscv-march-$(CONFIG_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_ZACAS) :=3D $(riscv-m= arch-y)_zacas # Check if the toolchain supports Zabha riscv-march-$(CONFIG_TOOLCHAIN_HAS_ZABHA) :=3D $(riscv-march-y)_zabha =20 +KBUILD_BASE_ISA =3D -march=3D$(shell echo $(riscv-march-y) | sed -E 's/(rv= 32ima|rv64ima)fd([^v_]*)v?/\1\2/') +export KBUILD_BASE_ISA + # Remove F,D,V from isa string for all. Keep extensions between "fd" and "= v" by # matching non-v and non-multi-letter extensions out with the filter ([^v_= ]*) -KBUILD_CFLAGS +=3D -march=3D$(shell echo $(riscv-march-y) | sed -E 's/(rv3= 2ima|rv64ima)fd([^v_]*)v?/\1\2/') +KBUILD_CFLAGS +=3D $(KBUILD_BASE_ISA) =20 KBUILD_AFLAGS +=3D -march=3D$(riscv-march-y) =20 diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/assembler.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/as= sembler.h index 16931712beab..f449c4392c29 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/assembler.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/assembler.h @@ -80,3 +80,47 @@ .endm =20 #endif /* __ASM_ASSEMBLER_H */ + +#if defined(VDSO_CFI) && (__riscv_xlen =3D=3D 64) +.macro vdso_lpad, label =3D 0 +lpad \label +.endm +#else +.macro vdso_lpad, label =3D 0 +.endm +#endif + +/* + * This macro emits a program property note section identifying + * architecture features which require special handling, mainly for + * use in assembly files included in the VDSO. + */ +#define NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 5 +#define GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_AND 0xc0000000 + +#define GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_ZICFILP (1U << 0) +#define GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_ZICFISS (1U << 1) + +#if defined(VDSO_CFI) && (__riscv_xlen =3D=3D 64) +#define GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_DEFAULT \ + (GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_ZICFILP | GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_ZICF= ISS) +#endif + +#ifdef GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_DEFAULT +.macro emit_riscv_feature_1_and, feat =3D GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_DEF= AULT + .pushsection .note.gnu.property, "a" + .p2align 3 + .word 4 + .word 16 + .word NT_GNU_PROPERTY_TYPE_0 + .asciz "GNU" + .word GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_AND + .word 4 + .word \feat + .word 0 + .popsection +.endm +#else +.macro emit_riscv_feature_1_and, feat =3D 0 +.endm +#endif diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makef= ile index 9ebb5e590f93..272f1d837a80 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile @@ -17,6 +17,11 @@ ifdef CONFIG_VDSO_GETRANDOM vdso-syms +=3D getrandom endif =20 +ifdef VDSO_CFI_BUILD +CFI_MARCH =3D _zicfilp_zicfiss +CFI_FULL =3D -fcf-protection=3Dfull +endif + # Files to link into the vdso obj-vdso =3D $(patsubst %, %.o, $(vdso-syms)) note.o =20 @@ -27,6 +32,10 @@ endif ccflags-y :=3D -fno-stack-protector ccflags-y +=3D -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING ccflags-y +=3D -fno-builtin +ccflags-y +=3D $(KBUILD_BASE_ISA)$(CFI_MARCH) +ccflags-y +=3D $(CFI_FULL) +asflags-y +=3D $(KBUILD_BASE_ISA)$(CFI_MARCH) +asflags-y +=3D $(CFI_FULL) =20 ifneq ($(c-gettimeofday-y),) CFLAGS_vgettimeofday.o +=3D -fPIC -include $(c-gettimeofday-y) @@ -79,7 +88,7 @@ include/generated/vdso-offsets.h: $(obj)/vdso.so.dbg FORCE # The DSO images are built using a special linker script # Make sure only to export the intended __vdso_xxx symbol offsets. quiet_cmd_vdsold_and_check =3D VDSOLD $@ - cmd_vdsold_and_check =3D $(LD) $(ld_flags) -T $(filter-out FORCE,$^)= -o $@.tmp && \ + cmd_vdsold_and_check =3D $(LD) $(CFI_FULL) $(ld_flags) -T $(filter-o= ut FORCE,$^) -o $@.tmp && \ $(OBJCOPY) $(patsubst %, -G __vdso_%, $(vdso-syms)) $@.= tmp $@ && \ rm $@.tmp && \ $(cmd_vdso_check) diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/flush_icache.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso= /flush_icache.S index 8f884227e8bc..e4c56970905e 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/flush_icache.S +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/flush_icache.S @@ -5,11 +5,13 @@ =20 #include #include +#include =20 .text /* int __vdso_flush_icache(void *start, void *end, unsigned long flags); */ SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_flush_icache) .cfi_startproc + vdso_lpad #ifdef CONFIG_SMP li a7, __NR_riscv_flush_icache ecall @@ -20,3 +22,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_flush_icache) ret .cfi_endproc SYM_FUNC_END(__vdso_flush_icache) + +emit_riscv_feature_1_and diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/getcpu.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/getcp= u.S index 9c1bd531907f..5c1ecc4e1465 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/getcpu.S +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/getcpu.S @@ -5,14 +5,18 @@ =20 #include #include +#include =20 .text /* int __vdso_getcpu(unsigned *cpu, unsigned *node, void *unused); */ SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_getcpu) .cfi_startproc + vdso_lpad /* For now, just do the syscall. */ li a7, __NR_getcpu ecall ret .cfi_endproc SYM_FUNC_END(__vdso_getcpu) + +emit_riscv_feature_1_and diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/note.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/note.S index 2a956c942211..3d92cc956b95 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/note.S +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/note.S @@ -6,7 +6,10 @@ =20 #include #include +#include =20 ELFNOTE_START(Linux, 0, "a") .long LINUX_VERSION_CODE ELFNOTE_END + +emit_riscv_feature_1_and diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/rt_sigreturn.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso= /rt_sigreturn.S index 3dc022aa8931..e82987dc3739 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/rt_sigreturn.S +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/rt_sigreturn.S @@ -5,12 +5,16 @@ =20 #include #include +#include =20 .text SYM_FUNC_START(__vdso_rt_sigreturn) .cfi_startproc .cfi_signal_frame + vdso_lpad li a7, __NR_rt_sigreturn ecall .cfi_endproc SYM_FUNC_END(__vdso_rt_sigreturn) + +emit_riscv_feature_1_and diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/sys_hwprobe.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/= sys_hwprobe.S index 77e57f830521..f1694451a60c 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/sys_hwprobe.S +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/sys_hwprobe.S @@ -3,13 +3,17 @@ =20 #include #include +#include =20 .text SYM_FUNC_START(riscv_hwprobe) .cfi_startproc + vdso_lpad li a7, __NR_riscv_hwprobe ecall ret =20 .cfi_endproc SYM_FUNC_END(riscv_hwprobe) + +emit_riscv_feature_1_and diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S b/arch/riscv/kernel= /vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S index 5f0dad8f2373..916ab30a88f7 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/vgetrandom-chacha.S @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ =20 #include #include +#include =20 .text =20 @@ -74,7 +75,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_chacha20_blocks_nostack) #define _20 20, 20, 20, 20 #define _24 24, 24, 24, 24 #define _25 25, 25, 25, 25 - + vdso_lpad /* * The ABI requires s0-s9 saved. * This does not violate the stack-less requirement: no sensitive data @@ -247,3 +248,5 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__arch_chacha20_blocks_nostack) =20 ret SYM_FUNC_END(__arch_chacha20_blocks_nostack) + +emit_riscv_feature_1_and --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C138B34845C; 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charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-24-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Deepak Gupta , Charles Mirabile X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=9505; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=U3OSZvLkmOpTiyhLDlADEu2VG72GrWdUd6MDBXC96H8=; b=hBQ+Xi9Ga/wpcVKGlQSqRMrgpnRpT6/7SlouwmC0J5mKupsOduieg6h3hUuPUEZ9njmcCxRK9 ckIKK+0t2RCDjT3w5aGx6fMnGwauE3vh4AcVaW+GEgynglNZXK4+mHM X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Shadow stack instructions are taken from zimop (mandated on RVA23). Any hardware prior to RVA23 profile will fault on shadow stack instruction. Any userspace with shadow stack instruction in it will fault on such hardware. Thus such userspace can't be brought onto such a hardware. It's not known how userspace will respond to such binary fragmentation. However in order to keep kernel portable across such different hardware, `arch/riscv/kernel/vdso_cfi` is created which has logic (Makefile) to compile `arch/riscv/kernel/vdso` sources with cfi flags and then changes in `arch/riscv/kernel/vdso.c` for selecting appropriate vdso depending on whether underlying hardware(cpu) implements zimop extension. Offset of vdso symbols will change due to having two different vdso binaries, there is added logic to include new generated vdso offset header and dynamically select offset (like for rt_sigreturn). Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta Acked-by: Charles Mirabile --- arch/riscv/Makefile | 3 +++ arch/riscv/include/asm/vdso.h | 13 ++++++++++++- arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile | 1 + arch/riscv/kernel/vdso.c | 7 +++++++ arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++------= --- arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh | 4 +++- arch/riscv/kernel/vdso_cfi/Makefile | 25 +++++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/riscv/kernel/vdso_cfi/vdso-cfi.S | 11 +++++++++++ 8 files changed, 82 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/riscv/Makefile b/arch/riscv/Makefile index f60c2de0ca08..b74b63da16a7 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/Makefile @@ -176,6 +176,8 @@ ifeq ($(CONFIG_MMU),y) prepare: vdso_prepare vdso_prepare: prepare0 $(Q)$(MAKE) $(build)=3Darch/riscv/kernel/vdso include/generated/vdso-offs= ets.h + $(if $(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI),$(Q)$(MAKE) \ + $(build)=3Darch/riscv/kernel/vdso_cfi include/generated/vdso-cfi-offsets= .h) $(if $(CONFIG_COMPAT),$(Q)$(MAKE) \ $(build)=3Darch/riscv/kernel/compat_vdso include/generated/compat_vdso-o= ffsets.h) =20 @@ -183,6 +185,7 @@ endif endif =20 vdso-install-y +=3D arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/vdso.so.dbg +vdso-install-$(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) +=3D arch/riscv/kernel/vdso_cfi/vdso= -cfi.so.dbg vdso-install-$(CONFIG_COMPAT) +=3D arch/riscv/kernel/compat_vdso/compat_vd= so.so.dbg =20 BOOT_TARGETS :=3D Image Image.gz Image.bz2 Image.lz4 Image.lzma Image.lzo = Image.zst Image.xz loader loader.bin xipImage vmlinuz.efi diff --git a/arch/riscv/include/asm/vdso.h b/arch/riscv/include/asm/vdso.h index f80357fe24d1..35bf830a5576 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/vdso.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/vdso.h @@ -18,9 +18,19 @@ =20 #ifndef __ASSEMBLER__ #include +#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI +#include +#endif =20 +#ifdef CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI #define VDSO_SYMBOL(base, name) \ - (void __user *)((unsigned long)(base) + __vdso_##name##_offset) + (riscv_has_extension_unlikely(RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZIMOP) ? \ + (void __user *)((unsigned long)(base) + __vdso_##name##_cfi_offset) : \ + (void __user *)((unsigned long)(base) + __vdso_##name##_offset)) +#else +#define VDSO_SYMBOL(base, name) \ + ((void __user *)((unsigned long)(base) + __vdso_##name##_offset)) +#endif =20 #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT #include @@ -33,6 +43,7 @@ extern char compat_vdso_start[], compat_vdso_end[]; #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ =20 extern char vdso_start[], vdso_end[]; +extern char vdso_cfi_start[], vdso_cfi_end[]; =20 #endif /* !__ASSEMBLER__ */ =20 diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile index 2d0e0dcedbd3..9026400cba10 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/Makefile @@ -72,6 +72,7 @@ obj-y +=3D vendor_extensions/ obj-y +=3D probes/ obj-y +=3D tests/ obj-$(CONFIG_MMU) +=3D vdso.o vdso/ +obj-$(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) +=3D vdso_cfi/ =20 obj-$(CONFIG_RISCV_MISALIGNED) +=3D traps_misaligned.o obj-$(CONFIG_RISCV_MISALIGNED) +=3D unaligned_access_speed.o diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso.c b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso.c index 3a8e038b10a2..bf080e519101 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso.c +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso.c @@ -98,6 +98,13 @@ static struct __vdso_info compat_vdso_info __ro_after_in= it =3D { =20 static int __init vdso_init(void) { + /* Hart implements zimop, expose cfi compiled vdso */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI) && + riscv_has_extension_unlikely(RISCV_ISA_EXT_ZIMOP)) { + vdso_info.vdso_code_start =3D vdso_cfi_start; + vdso_info.vdso_code_end =3D vdso_cfi_end; + } + __vdso_init(&vdso_info); #ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT __vdso_init(&compat_vdso_info); diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makef= ile index 272f1d837a80..a842dc034571 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/Makefile @@ -20,6 +20,10 @@ endif ifdef VDSO_CFI_BUILD CFI_MARCH =3D _zicfilp_zicfiss CFI_FULL =3D -fcf-protection=3Dfull +CFI_SUFFIX =3D -cfi +OFFSET_SUFFIX =3D _cfi +ccflags-y +=3D -DVDSO_CFI=3D1 +asflags-y +=3D -DVDSO_CFI=3D1 endif =20 # Files to link into the vdso @@ -48,13 +52,20 @@ endif CFLAGS_hwprobe.o +=3D -fPIC =20 # Build rules -targets :=3D $(obj-vdso) vdso.so vdso.so.dbg vdso.lds +vdso_offsets :=3D vdso$(if $(VDSO_CFI_BUILD),$(CFI_SUFFIX),)-offsets.h +vdso_o :=3D vdso$(if $(VDSO_CFI_BUILD),$(CFI_SUFFIX),).o +vdso_so :=3D vdso$(if $(VDSO_CFI_BUILD),$(CFI_SUFFIX),).so +vdso_so_dbg :=3D vdso$(if $(VDSO_CFI_BUILD),$(CFI_SUFFIX),).so.dbg +vdso_lds :=3D vdso.lds + +targets :=3D $(obj-vdso) $(vdso_so) $(vdso_so_dbg) $(vdso_lds) + obj-vdso :=3D $(addprefix $(obj)/, $(obj-vdso)) =20 -obj-y +=3D vdso.o -CPPFLAGS_vdso.lds +=3D -P -C -U$(ARCH) +obj-y +=3D vdso$(if $(VDSO_CFI_BUILD),$(CFI_SUFFIX),).o +CPPFLAGS_$(vdso_lds) +=3D -P -C -U$(ARCH) ifneq ($(filter vgettimeofday, $(vdso-syms)),) -CPPFLAGS_vdso.lds +=3D -DHAS_VGETTIMEOFDAY +CPPFLAGS_$(vdso_lds) +=3D -DHAS_VGETTIMEOFDAY endif =20 # Disable -pg to prevent insert call site @@ -63,12 +74,12 @@ CFLAGS_REMOVE_getrandom.o =3D $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) $(CC_F= LAGS_SCS) CFLAGS_REMOVE_hwprobe.o =3D $(CC_FLAGS_FTRACE) $(CC_FLAGS_SCS) =20 # Force dependency -$(obj)/vdso.o: $(obj)/vdso.so +$(obj)/$(vdso_o): $(obj)/$(vdso_so) =20 # link rule for the .so file, .lds has to be first -$(obj)/vdso.so.dbg: $(obj)/vdso.lds $(obj-vdso) FORCE +$(obj)/$(vdso_so_dbg): $(obj)/$(vdso_lds) $(obj-vdso) FORCE $(call if_changed,vdsold_and_check) -LDFLAGS_vdso.so.dbg =3D -shared -soname=3Dlinux-vdso.so.1 \ +LDFLAGS_$(vdso_so_dbg) =3D -shared -soname=3Dlinux-vdso.so.1 \ --build-id=3Dsha1 --eh-frame-hdr =20 # strip rule for the .so file @@ -79,9 +90,9 @@ $(obj)/%.so: $(obj)/%.so.dbg FORCE # Generate VDSO offsets using helper script gen-vdsosym :=3D $(src)/gen_vdso_offsets.sh quiet_cmd_vdsosym =3D VDSOSYM $@ - cmd_vdsosym =3D $(NM) $< | $(gen-vdsosym) | LC_ALL=3DC sort > $@ + cmd_vdsosym =3D $(NM) $< | $(gen-vdsosym) $(OFFSET_SUFFIX) | LC_ALL=3DC s= ort > $@ =20 -include/generated/vdso-offsets.h: $(obj)/vdso.so.dbg FORCE +include/generated/$(vdso_offsets): $(obj)/$(vdso_so_dbg) FORCE $(call if_changed,vdsosym) =20 # actual build commands diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh b/arch/riscv/kernel= /vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh index c2e5613f3495..bd5d5afaaa14 100755 --- a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso/gen_vdso_offsets.sh @@ -2,4 +2,6 @@ # SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 =20 LC_ALL=3DC -sed -n -e 's/^[0]\+\(0[0-9a-fA-F]*\) . \(__vdso_[a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)$/\#define = \2_offset\t0x\1/p' +SUFFIX=3D${1:-""} +sed -n -e \ +'s/^[0]\+\(0[0-9a-fA-F]*\) . \(__vdso_[a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)$/\#define \2'$SUFFIX= '_offset\t0x\1/p' diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso_cfi/Makefile b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso_c= fi/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8ebd190782b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso_cfi/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +# RISC-V VDSO CFI Makefile +# This Makefile builds the VDSO with CFI support when CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CF= I is enabled + +# setting VDSO_CFI_BUILD triggers build for vdso differently +VDSO_CFI_BUILD :=3D 1 + +# Set the source directory to the main vdso directory +src :=3D $(srctree)/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso + +# Copy all .S and .c files from vdso directory to vdso_cfi object build di= rectory +vdso_c_sources :=3D $(wildcard $(src)/*.c) +vdso_S_sources :=3D $(wildcard $(src)/*.S) +vdso_c_objects :=3D $(addprefix $(obj)/, $(notdir $(vdso_c_sources))) +vdso_S_objects :=3D $(addprefix $(obj)/, $(notdir $(vdso_S_sources))) + +$(vdso_S_objects): $(obj)/%.S: $(src)/%.S + $(Q)cp $< $@ + +$(vdso_c_objects): $(obj)/%.c: $(src)/%.c + $(Q)cp $< $@ + +# Include the main VDSO Makefile which contains all the build rules and so= urces +# The VDSO_CFI_BUILD variable will be passed to it to enable CFI compilati= on +include $(src)/Makefile diff --git a/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso_cfi/vdso-cfi.S b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso= _cfi/vdso-cfi.S new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..d426f6accb35 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/kernel/vdso_cfi/vdso-cfi.S @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ +/* + * Copyright 2025 Rivos, Inc + */ + +#define vdso_start vdso_cfi_start +#define vdso_end vdso_cfi_end + +#define __VDSO_PATH "arch/riscv/kernel/vdso_cfi/vdso-cfi.so" + +#include "../vdso/vdso.S" --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DD4BC34886E; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:12 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238273; cv=none; b=b1h2KKoEN/6wLvz7shtstL2FmcY0hYIdY+ywuIQ+Gh6r8vQjl2AnKxk5ysJuwUqhVwpUWuRPJwdiwFcYQFngFMIWx3ROEDfWDXxPxJQ+bZpCiPV+sctqx9uRr5zcvpycZHVvP6ndJwrH1oUCDCltU3rcAlyM7I0gXvIB62ngl5Q= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238273; c=relaxed/simple; bh=Ei3i6pCUom8eAx3LyrcIPVLrF6EpFXz5PrC+5I2lBc0=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=loty9ZdYsSZn3qlpk7TEV5RpCDAzHWPVl5mAxyIhzxuCqkRdsFYx8UuZLdgemTlKDKK1ADjOG6jC4MprkEfA6q0ayGzWW++ryCdsVCNgEWmw0OODbsGF7mQ35jzg7SKyF7JubWoRwsQVO8nlxcxEpezRRQq8WJav2X8Dwxoe0T0= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=egzYIV+F; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="egzYIV+F" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C0E62C19422; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:12 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238272; bh=Ei3i6pCUom8eAx3LyrcIPVLrF6EpFXz5PrC+5I2lBc0=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=egzYIV+F6sc5eOeiyUAa0/POROUfnPTHQes13oB7rCy4DY/z4vOkMeC5OgWekGpLL co9/qiolnKhsllt1Y6QPRYc4+7g1D/8ZCDq7HDJXtaWK7MQrQJwrKQQgmlvWrNUuoM dkxlSKf73cX5C792YDBzYqOhvGdcxo87R0XFmUWCNIPEiTbx2tCq+CxODhRNMxHF1f Mluh4XWlKOd2Nye40u7OcoH6Thfoj4jYUtd1AcOIAj9ru0JwXKHI3O/kTZlTqByNlX 9cO3LtBgOwsbU5ULZEfkrcPHhcGSR5TCneNrvM8qxFRPhatpxNH6BB9/iQsQE8zBt4 3TnkotYHABqaA== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id A3F78CCF9E5; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:12 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:30 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 25/28] riscv: create a config for shadow stack and landing pad instr support Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-25-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=2394; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=zi+etEd135eK9OaxRpxj8DKs2cttYpN7VPg6r2ftWq4=; b=NULkWKLZARWqV0WWPqBWvPEE2Syjy487jSqwmiZtwhrkXnaV01qRffUz5piYl0VjGsejoPMFd QISC42GXiurDCrbUzGEn7It4bc9jwpkX8hNfuiiiv/0wop9XUQPCgl3 X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta This patch creates a config for shadow stack support and landing pad instr support. Shadow stack support and landing instr support can be enabled by selecting `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI`. Selecting `CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI` wires up path to enumerate CPU support and if cpu support exists, kernel will support cpu assisted user mode cfi. If CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI is selected, select `ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS`, `ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK` and DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME for riscv. Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- arch/riscv/Kconfig | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++ arch/riscv/configs/hardening.config | 4 ++++ 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/riscv/Kconfig b/arch/riscv/Kconfig index 0c6038dc5dfd..4f9f9358e6e3 100644 --- a/arch/riscv/Kconfig +++ b/arch/riscv/Kconfig @@ -1146,6 +1146,28 @@ config RANDOMIZE_BASE =20 If unsure, say N. =20 +config RISCV_USER_CFI + def_bool y + bool "riscv userspace control flow integrity" + depends on 64BIT && $(cc-option,-mabi=3Dlp64 -march=3Drv64ima_zicfiss) &&= \ + $(cc-option,-fcf-protection=3Dfull) + depends on RISCV_ALTERNATIVE + select RISCV_SBI + select ARCH_HAS_USER_SHADOW_STACK + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + select DYNAMIC_SIGFRAME + help + Provides CPU assisted control flow integrity to userspace tasks. + Control flow integrity is provided by implementing shadow stack for + backward edge and indirect branch tracking for forward edge in program. + Shadow stack protection is a hardware feature that detects function + return address corruption. This helps mitigate ROP attacks. + Indirect branch tracking enforces that all indirect branches must land + on a landing pad instruction else CPU will fault. This mitigates against + JOP / COP attacks. Applications must be enabled to use it, and old user- + space does not get protection "for free". + default y. + endmenu # "Kernel features" =20 menu "Boot options" diff --git a/arch/riscv/configs/hardening.config b/arch/riscv/configs/harde= ning.config new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..089f4cee82f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/arch/riscv/configs/hardening.config @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ +# RISCV specific kernel hardening options + +# Enable control flow integrity support for usermode. +CONFIG_RISCV_USER_CFI=3Dy --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 03D5434888D; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:13 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238273; cv=none; b=q3YHZ4t7pwMIYkA6pIig4TNTDH3R54oBS1tG3z5U04by4AVvkXf0jCCm/+FQnWKXe2Vhwdz3o/+KQyJef94qj0R3eari83swTTzumFqN6PLTft4KFXSZkj6H4QSpfyGV4J7wdIoqIVB/GtbMj92T7fpmBLKVPE8HQHDZAY/gZA4= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238273; c=relaxed/simple; bh=bPL6vxe17/1hYXtbU8DLV1GggN8NhUYMmyQybHsKecI=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=XZPiiniGzTdX//ViN8rC7n4iBFkU9GHtymNP+9tMOIQLHpkYQ+Hf/sGdnqHIJOh5abxi9lk+axEiSAOgyOHENnocnVR4ghobVwV5ilkmZXBZWGYDrMHsEEhXz2kbNCKNzW2EklX6LrDUSxpEhjd/IulkHBQaXBidXH+LQOQRosQ= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=tAL8BqOx; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="tAL8BqOx" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D9324C4AF16; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:12 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238272; bh=bPL6vxe17/1hYXtbU8DLV1GggN8NhUYMmyQybHsKecI=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=tAL8BqOx2S5UIR2NMhzWRzn1sBt4rxP0CGagYYorB/eX8SUORGhjJ0/sa5unKiG0n pvxAjjLED7N7Orl6oITj9AqjklEh6CHS6K7Msmw9NLWkLSY3pCr/dTWHJqQ8AylMr2 Nwv376hF2xKhglDOL+Ony6EqV/yhBF10yc0mvJFjs8tzm3uFs8f91HksxyboDtIttS yJl9LJHwFdymNYY+zkgH7t8/yoaQIT4ZdVhy8RgjBY50Gt1ib3u8pdOVDi6+ADFs2y oQC5cqhvY/ygB4QPeZ+SDO5CcKnU7yWqmDV0plJQCVyE2HswYF6tuJp5figsugoUOh WHJvTk7hY7L9Q== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id C5B88CCD193; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:12 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:31 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 26/28] riscv: Documentation for landing pad / indirect branch tracking Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-26-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=6062; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=7LCUsE6kNUEwcM1QtIZIjQu/BHRL3vY+rwSlBm5MqpY=; b=ipuDwWSI/04qT6RIaANW4ewszxyYVUEQ6id0gaZsYEVtbEubqhL3Dv1wawJYb81cPaJpot0SV hFGpShFiXftCOrVGzjTrCfnmQHZetdqv6OfQwJ+1lnIk2jAJfCD9noE X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Adding documentation on landing pad aka indirect branch tracking on riscv and kernel interfaces exposed so that user tasks can enable it. Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst | 115 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= ++++ 2 files changed, 116 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/= index.rst index eecf347ce849..be7237b69682 100644 --- a/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ RISC-V architecture uabi vector cmodx + zicfilp =20 features =20 diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst b/Documentation/arch/risc= v/zicfilp.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..3575c7db2cef --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfilp.rst @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +:Author: Deepak Gupta +:Date: 12 January 2024 + +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D +Tracking indirect control transfers on RISC-V Linux +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D + +This document briefly describes the interface provided to userspace by Lin= ux +to enable indirect branch tracking for user mode applications on RISC-V + +1. Feature Overview +-------------------- + +Memory corruption issues usually result into crashes, however when in hand= s of +an adversary and if used creatively can result into a variety security iss= ues. + +One of those security issues can be code re-use attacks on program where a= dversary +can use corrupt function pointers and chain them together to perform jump = oriented +programming (JOP) or call oriented programming (COP) and thus compromising= control +flow integrity (CFI) of the program. + +Function pointers live in read-write memory and thus are susceptible to co= rruption +and allows an adversary to reach any program counter (PC) in address space= . On +RISC-V zicfilp extension enforces a restriction on such indirect control +transfers: + +- indirect control transfers must land on a landing pad instruction ``lpad= ``. + There are two exception to this rule: + + - rs1 =3D x1 or rs1 =3D x5, i.e. a return from a function and returns are + protected using shadow stack (see zicfiss.rst) + + - rs1 =3D x7. On RISC-V compiler usually does below to reach function + which is beyond the offset possible J-type instruction:: + + auipc x7, + jalr (x7) + + Such form of indirect control transfer are still immutable and don't r= ely + on memory and thus rs1=3Dx7 is exempted from tracking and considered s= oftware + guarded jumps. + +``lpad`` instruction is pseudo of ``auipc rd, `` with ``rd=3Dx0= `` and +is a HINT nop. ``lpad`` instruction must be aligned on 4 byte boundary and +compares 20 bit immediate with x7. If ``imm_20bit`` =3D=3D 0, CPU doesn't = perform +any comparision with ``x7``. If ``imm_20bit`` !=3D 0, then ``imm_20bit`` m= ust +match ``x7`` else CPU will raise ``software check exception`` (``cause=3D1= 8``) +with ``*tval =3D 2``. + +Compiler can generate a hash over function signatures and setup them (trun= cated +to 20bit) in x7 at callsites and function prologues can have ``lpad`` with= same +function hash. This further reduces number of program counters a call site= can +reach. + +2. ELF and psABI +----------------- + +Toolchain sets up :c:macro:`GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_FCFI` for property +:c:macro:`GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_AND` in notes section of the object= file. + +3. Linux enabling +------------------ + +User space programs can have multiple shared objects loaded in its address= space +and it's a difficult task to make sure all the dependencies have been comp= iled +with support of indirect branch. Thus it's left to dynamic loader to enable +indirect branch tracking for the program. + +4. prctl() enabling +-------------------- + +:c:macro:`PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` / :c:macro:`PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS= ` / +:c:macro:`PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS` are three prctls added to manage ind= irect +branch tracking. prctls are arch agnostic and returns -EINVAL on other arc= hes. + +* prctl(PR_SET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS, unsigned long arg) + +If arg1 is :c:macro:`PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` and if CPU supports ``zicfilp`` +then kernel will enable indirect branch tracking for the task. Dynamic loa= der +can issue this :c:macro:`prctl` once it has determined that all the objects +loaded in address space support indirect branch tracking. Additionally if = there +is a `dlopen` to an object which wasn't compiled with ``zicfilp``, dynamic +loader can issue this prctl with arg1 set to 0 (i.e. +:c:macro:`PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` being clear) + +* prctl(PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS, unsigned long * arg) + +Returns current status of indirect branch tracking. If enabled it'll return +:c:macro:`PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE` + +* prctl(PR_LOCK_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS, unsigned long arg) + +Locks current status of indirect branch tracking on the task. User space m= ay +want to run with strict security posture and wouldn't want loading of obje= cts +without ``zicfilp`` support in it and thus would want to disallow disablin= g of +indirect branch tracking. In that case user space can use this prctl to lo= ck +current settings. + +5. violations related to indirect branch tracking +-------------------------------------------------- + +Pertaining to indirect branch tracking, CPU raises software check exceptio= n in +following conditions: + +- missing ``lpad`` after indirect call / jmp +- ``lpad`` not on 4 byte boundary +- ``imm_20bit`` embedded in ``lpad`` instruction doesn't match with ``x7`` + +In all 3 cases, ``*tval =3D 2`` is captured and software check exception is +raised (``cause=3D18``) + +Linux kernel will treat this as :c:macro:`SIGSEGV` with code =3D +:c:macro:`SEGV_CPERR` and follow normal course of signal delivery. --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 266163491C9; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:13 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238273; cv=none; b=hdorlfzT9rRPLCmxKkZhHj9oQc2Tq4ZQTZUd33a+pYO9mplOKGBfJWEnqtGDhwE9GY/rDpJgqjRMZjVZG2ZryiOcpeNslnVPBVElXQIjc2qDyTaIxvFjwKb1Gpr5JCkPD/kTGs4mtSSn2sYW5HaN4wJ7ctfWHnFZV4BvBvzwSfg= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238273; c=relaxed/simple; bh=vz6N485yPKrgHZ+kKlWiFl6fZ4uLMzOsy4Z4Okbzjvo=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=K/zS3OMsmbNUhpzo640vKw34QHTR8Xdzjekzi1HPk/vPLOLoJF+jiOaAirDd/2pdF5yFiLnYpBgtS84xN+pOoVTAxdUmyhvBHOFMTEtnXUbd8JMlM+y1NivYTtfLT11svETaDvhHIjDWuJkPxApE7KAbxCXT1Y6+X+wQgHVLczk= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=qBrhla9v; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="qBrhla9v" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0A248C19421; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:13 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238273; bh=vz6N485yPKrgHZ+kKlWiFl6fZ4uLMzOsy4Z4Okbzjvo=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=qBrhla9vf2itJ6lTFhT0ci8evKqspCL7++33zzK1hSSba0wvUaWZZbPeQEWPyMvGI InpklbZDgDXBMinPeetEYupksouiJ++79Q3WaEjv55PDs+WrvSSq9fPusCiy47NTZ1 Uztor4gQXgsOu6s/U+jVj2smXLu0yvkCGtKrEP8Qn/tyHduc/z3uAoDV0IdkEGzN70 W22gf5A3LMNubFYu6TW2W1vaLbD06QKvETD/Mc6AzxvDkr9K+xhxsXqUra/IYn8mgH mLvngUDwEhu2aLb62XTkboP7JSENAZ5NIVCez4Yd+h7V1bLAyVkufe34dW4AwLnMi2 +ulN9Pj1QW7lA== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id E5C08CCF9E3; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:12 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:32 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 27/28] riscv: Documentation for shadow stack on riscv Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-27-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Zong Li , Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=9680; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=B2WSexk3yw/VKkukKcshyN9jkOKoLBIyBUeyBharWo4=; b=+ehqElqPyQ0Y1aOWPBKaB8Z0//2cF5vou6U3f395wZ9tPB9EVerbePx+WtLlZ03UCVCXTk56e NK7efVRmmfqBMxx+vBuY6NhxUoA1VrQxQbmzty6qltKrY60enzOTaCH X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Adding documentation on shadow stack for user mode on riscv and kernel interfaces exposed so that user tasks can enable it. Reviewed-by: Zong Li Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst | 1 + Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst | 179 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= ++++ 2 files changed, 180 insertions(+) diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst b/Documentation/arch/riscv/= index.rst index be7237b69682..e240eb0ceb70 100644 --- a/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/index.rst @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ RISC-V architecture vector cmodx zicfilp + zicfiss =20 features =20 diff --git a/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst b/Documentation/arch/risc= v/zicfiss.rst new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..7fb86d5ba120 --- /dev/null +++ b/Documentation/arch/riscv/zicfiss.rst @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 + +:Author: Deepak Gupta +:Date: 12 January 2024 + +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D +Shadow stack to protect function returns on RISC-V Linux +=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D= =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D + +This document briefly describes the interface provided to userspace by Lin= ux +to enable shadow stack for user mode applications on RISC-V + +1. Feature Overview +-------------------- + +Memory corruption issues usually result into crashes, however when in hand= s of +an adversary and if used creatively can result into a variety security iss= ues. + +One of those security issues can be code re-use attacks on program where +adversary can use corrupt return addresses present on stack and chain them +together to perform return oriented programming (ROP) and thus compromising +control flow integrity (CFI) of the program. + +Return addresses live on stack and thus in read-write memory and thus are +susceptible to corruption and which allows an adversary to reach any progr= am +counter (PC) in address space. On RISC-V ``zicfiss`` extension provides an +alternate stack termed as shadow stack on which return addresses can be sa= fely +placed in prolog of the function and retrieved in epilog. ``zicfiss`` exte= nsion +makes following changes: + +- PTE encodings for shadow stack virtual memory + An earlier reserved encoding in first stage translation i.e. + PTE.R=3D0, PTE.W=3D1, PTE.X=3D0 becomes PTE encoding for shadow stack p= ages. + +- ``sspush x1/x5`` instruction pushes (stores) ``x1/x5`` to shadow stack. + +- ``sspopchk x1/x5`` instruction pops (loads) from shadow stack and compar= es + with ``x1/x5`` and if un-equal, CPU raises ``software check exception`` = with + ``*tval =3D 3`` + +Compiler toolchain makes sure that function prologue have ``sspush x1/x5``= to +save return address on shadow stack in addition to regular stack. Similarly +function epilogs have ``ld x5, offset(x2)`` followed by ``sspopchk x5`` to +ensure that popped value from regular stack matches with popped value from +shadow stack. + +2. Shadow stack protections and linux memory manager +----------------------------------------------------- + +As mentioned earlier, shadow stacks get new page table encodings and thus = have +some special properties assigned to them and instructions that operate on = them +as below: + +- Regular stores to shadow stack memory raises access store faults. This w= ay + shadow stack memory is protected from stray inadvertent writes. + +- Regular loads to shadow stack memory are allowed. This allows stack trace + utilities or backtrace functions to read true callstack (not tampered). + +- Only shadow stack instructions can generate shadow stack load or shadow = stack + store. + +- Shadow stack load / shadow stack store on read-only memory raises AMO/st= ore + page fault. Thus both ``sspush x1/x5`` and ``sspopchk x1/x5`` will raise= AMO/ + store page fault. This simplies COW handling in kernel during fork, kern= el + can convert shadow stack pages into read-only memory (as it does for reg= ular + read-write memory) and as soon as subsequent ``sspush`` or ``sspopchk`` = in + userspace is encountered, then kernel can perform COW. + +- Shadow stack load / shadow stack store on read-write, read-write-execute + memory raises an access fault. This is a fatal condition because shadow = stack + should never be operating on read-write, read-write-execute memory. + +3. ELF and psABI +----------------- + +Toolchain sets up :c:macro:`GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_BCFI` for property +:c:macro:`GNU_PROPERTY_RISCV_FEATURE_1_AND` in notes section of the object= file. + +4. Linux enabling +------------------ + +User space programs can have multiple shared objects loaded in its address= space +and it's a difficult task to make sure all the dependencies have been comp= iled +with support of shadow stack. Thus it's left to dynamic loader to enable +shadow stack for the program. + +5. prctl() enabling +-------------------- + +:c:macro:`PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS` / :c:macro:`PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STAT= US` / +:c:macro:`PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS` are three prctls added to manage sh= adow +stack enabling for tasks. prctls are arch agnostic and returns -EINVAL on = other +arches. + +* prctl(PR_SET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, unsigned long arg) + +If arg1 :c:macro:`PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE` and if CPU supports ``zicfiss`` = then +kernel will enable shadow stack for the task. Dynamic loader can issue this +:c:macro:`prctl` once it has determined that all the objects loaded in add= ress +space have support for shadow stack. Additionally if there is a +:c:macro:`dlopen` to an object which wasn't compiled with ``zicfiss``, dyn= amic +loader can issue this prctl with arg1 set to 0 (i.e. +:c:macro:`PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE` being clear) + +* prctl(PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, unsigned long * arg) + +Returns current status of indirect branch tracking. If enabled it'll return +:c:macro:`PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE`. + +* prctl(PR_LOCK_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, unsigned long arg) + +Locks current status of shadow stack enabling on the task. User space may = want +to run with strict security posture and wouldn't want loading of objects +without ``zicfiss`` support in it and thus would want to disallow disablin= g of +shadow stack on current task. In that case user space can use this prctl to +lock current settings. + +5. violations related to returns with shadow stack enabled +----------------------------------------------------------- + +Pertaining to shadow stack, CPU raises software check exception in followi= ng +condition: + +- On execution of ``sspopchk x1/x5``, ``x1/x5`` didn't match top of shadow + stack. If mismatch happens then cpu does ``*tval =3D 3`` and raise softw= are + check exception. + +Linux kernel will treat this as :c:macro:`SIGSEGV` with code =3D +:c:macro:`SEGV_CPERR` and follow normal course of signal delivery. + +6. Shadow stack tokens +----------------------- +Regular stores on shadow stacks are not allowed and thus can't be tampered +with via arbitrary stray writes due to bugs. However method of pivoting / +switching to shadow stack is simply writing to csr ``CSR_SSP`` and that wi= ll +change active shadow stack for the program. Instances of writes to ``CSR_S= SP`` +in the address space of the program should be mostly limited to context +switching, stack unwind, longjmp or similar mechanisms (like context switc= hing +of green threads) in languages like go, rust. This can be problematic beca= use +an attacker can use memory corruption bugs and eventually use such context +switching routines to pivot to any shadow stack. Shadow stack tokens can h= elp +mitigate this problem by making sure that: + +- When software is switching away from a shadow stack, shadow stack pointer + should be saved on shadow stack itself and call it ``shadow stack token`` + +- When software is switching to a shadow stack, it should read the + ``shadow stack token`` from shadow stack pointer and verify that + ``shadow stack token`` itself is pointer to shadow stack itself. + +- Once the token verification is done, software can perform the write to + ``CSR_SSP`` to switch shadow stack. + +Here software can be user mode task runtime itself which is managing vario= us +contexts as part of single thread. Software can be kernel as well when ker= nel +has to deliver a signal to user task and must save shadow stack pointer. K= ernel +can perform similar procedure by saving a token on user shadow stack itsel= f. +This way whenever :c:macro:`sigreturn` happens, kernel can read the token = and +verify the token and then switch to shadow stack. Using this mechanism, ke= rnel +helps user task so that any corruption issue in user task is not exploited= by +adversary by arbitrarily using :c:macro:`sigreturn`. Adversary will have to +make sure that there is a ``shadow stack token`` in addition to invoking +:c:macro:`sigreturn` + +7. Signal shadow stack +----------------------- +Following structure has been added to sigcontext for RISC-V:: + + struct __sc_riscv_cfi_state { + unsigned long ss_ptr; + }; + +As part of signal delivery, shadow stack token is saved on current shadow = stack +itself and updated pointer is saved away in :c:macro:`ss_ptr` field in +:c:macro:`__sc_riscv_cfi_state` under :c:macro:`sigcontext`. Existing shad= ow +stack allocation is used for signal delivery. During :c:macro:`sigreturn`, +kernel will obtain :c:macro:`ss_ptr` from :c:macro:`sigcontext` and verify= the +saved token on shadow stack itself and switch shadow stack. --=20 2.43.0 From nobody Tue Feb 10 03:42:44 2026 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5506B34A3C5; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:13 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238273; cv=none; b=nOsnMOryU4wUXSALhgL0q+q51YKy9sJrb6Xit40+PLlvbvbWuPVjs8HiyhKcPeR0xitEAyl/g0SDtiNe2N/byddgQLN4vxr8shzdx5P6ye/RNLppK964GZfM1WazbhkU4w3iiRs8yTR+onw2LM7VgymAXpv3mXKevmomJsAtMeE= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761238273; c=relaxed/simple; bh=fQShIQQ+ak3sZ7vPOttttxaX+iCQFP+V6YCuFOVSbJ4=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=I7kjo/WpssvPG2460Oz6OwOeU5mDq1ALUm4DSsknJBhCEX5JTG7tCIm7MRJJegoBSPwzLxYc0BbflYiUPTBv9yKZ+Q/Z+y3XOIDTUfhaknlqI5daf+Ip9pY1x1zUU5N7bpnjOOzDwJnb647oADHghFgxn76xzJXj9LuQfFTzB3Q= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=MXed7/t2; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="MXed7/t2" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 30194C4AF0C; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:13 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1761238273; bh=fQShIQQ+ak3sZ7vPOttttxaX+iCQFP+V6YCuFOVSbJ4=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:Reply-To:From; b=MXed7/t2lV6opOlu8ZwhgndcpsylY2qRSlSc8q7IZ5ODdJA4D7B/Jv7bOSBy0FhlE 9utj3rTBTywyQwv4c4oniZw7UYr/nKARf9rlITxL7X+eC4iG0m7HlJDDDHtLgMkQJr k6SH1QEAX3sngx730y9Ahq8JWoHAySHswKUH/QlmggXdKuho/+gVcpBGeyUh+g8aro y1gJfDoJ//8gE2pl6aqDRS2Z/GS7BNqTl47imTWkd08hzZCq/EwfahnXNbDSjQ5mOe KocoQ+6E90WTlvf5j70vmEDMJzIfEeGVjCe53JAU0bMxnjqKkJDlgPZvp3mq+xs4SG 4tQa7XQYDScEw== Received: from aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org (localhost.localdomain [127.0.0.1]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 17AC0CCD193; Thu, 23 Oct 2025 16:51:13 +0000 (UTC) From: Deepak Gupta via B4 Relay Date: Thu, 23 Oct 2025 09:51:33 -0700 Subject: [PATCH v22 28/28] kselftest/riscv: kselftest for user mode cfi Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-28-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> References: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> In-Reply-To: <20251023-v5_user_cfi_series-v22-0-1935270f7636@rivosinc.com> To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Andrew Morton , "Liam R. Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes , Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , Albert Ou , Conor Dooley , Rob Herring , Krzysztof Kozlowski , Arnd Bergmann , Christian Brauner , Peter Zijlstra , Oleg Nesterov , Eric Biederman , Kees Cook , Jonathan Corbet , Shuah Khan , Jann Horn , Conor Dooley , Miguel Ojeda , Alex Gaynor , Boqun Feng , Gary Guo , =?utf-8?q?Bj=C3=B6rn_Roy_Baron?= , Andreas Hindborg , Alice Ryhl , Trevor Gross , Benno Lossin Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, devicetree@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, alistair.francis@wdc.com, richard.henderson@linaro.org, jim.shu@sifive.com, andybnac@gmail.com, kito.cheng@sifive.com, charlie@rivosinc.com, atishp@rivosinc.com, evan@rivosinc.com, cleger@rivosinc.com, alexghiti@rivosinc.com, samitolvanen@google.com, broonie@kernel.org, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com, rust-for-linux@vger.kernel.org, Deepak Gupta X-Mailer: b4 0.13.0 X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; t=1761238267; l=22627; i=debug@rivosinc.com; s=20251023; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=WOWAxX6A3QXldgq80P/nMdsBb70DMucV+lm3CHQPnco=; b=+H2AUUxMrQmL2+HeTK89QaAu63YnS11vzS4vnbywzcUHukQ78zj0ZKvgT5MzeCm2QfFNnNVWw c6geAxb5t08BUUFlLuXyG1Ft4Z6JKg8sbUjt5ybg/2yCxqubKpi2TzG X-Developer-Key: i=debug@rivosinc.com; a=ed25519; pk=O37GQv1thBhZToXyQKdecPDhtWVbEDRQ0RIndijvpjk= X-Endpoint-Received: by B4 Relay for debug@rivosinc.com/20251023 with auth_id=553 X-Original-From: Deepak Gupta Reply-To: debug@rivosinc.com From: Deepak Gupta Adds kselftest for RISC-V control flow integrity implementation for user mode. There is not a lot going on in kernel for enabling landing pad for user mode. cfi selftest are intended to be compiled with zicfilp and zicfiss enabled compiler. Thus kselftest simply checks if landing pad / shadow stack for the process are enabled or not and executes ptrace selftests on cfi. selftest then register a signal handler for SIGSEGV. Any control flow violation are reported as SIGSEGV with si_code =3D SEGV_CPERR. Test will fail on receiving any SEGV_CPERR. Shadow stack part has more changes in kernel and thus there are separate tests for that - Exercise `map_shadow_stack` syscall - `fork` test to make sure COW works for shadow stack pages - gup tests Kernel uses FOLL_FORCE when access happens to memory via /proc//mem. Not breaking that for shadow stack. - signal test. Make sure signal delivery results in token creation on shadow stack and consumes (and verifies) token on sigreturn - shadow stack protection test. attempts to write using regular store instruction on shadow stack memory must result in access faults - ptrace test: adds landing pad violation, clears ELP and continues In case toolchain doesn't support cfi extension, cfi kselftest wont get built. Test outut =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D """ TAP version 13 1..5 This is to ensure shadow stack is indeed enabled and working This is to ensure shadow stack is indeed enabled and working ok 1 shstk fork test ok 2 map shadow stack syscall ok 3 shadow stack gup tests ok 4 shadow stack signal tests ok 5 memory protections of shadow stack memory """ Suggested-by: Charlie Jenkins Signed-off-by: Charlie Jenkins Signed-off-by: Deepak Gupta --- tools/testing/selftests/riscv/Makefile | 2 +- tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/.gitignore | 3 + tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/Makefile | 16 + tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/cfi_rv_test.h | 82 +++++ tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/riscv_cfi_test.c | 173 +++++++++ tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.c | 385 +++++++++++++++++= ++++ tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.h | 27 ++ 7 files changed, 687 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftes= ts/riscv/Makefile index 099b8c1f46f8..5671b4405a12 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/Makefile +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/Makefile @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ ARCH ?=3D $(shell uname -m 2>/dev/null || echo not) =20 ifneq (,$(filter $(ARCH),riscv)) -RISCV_SUBTARGETS ?=3D abi hwprobe mm sigreturn vector +RISCV_SUBTARGETS ?=3D abi hwprobe mm sigreturn vector cfi else RISCV_SUBTARGETS :=3D endif diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/.gitignore b/tools/testing/s= elftests/riscv/cfi/.gitignore new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..82545863bac6 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/.gitignore @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +cfitests +riscv_cfi_test +shadowstack diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/Makefile b/tools/testing/sel= ftests/riscv/cfi/Makefile new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..55165a93845f --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/Makefile @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +CFLAGS +=3D -I$(top_srcdir)/tools/include + +CFLAGS +=3D -march=3Drv64gc_zicfilp_zicfiss -fcf-protection=3Dfull + +ifeq ($(shell $(CC) $(CFLAGS) -nostdlib -xc /dev/null -o /dev/null > /dev/= null 2>&1; echo $$?),0) +TEST_GEN_PROGS :=3D cfitests + +include ../../lib.mk + +$(OUTPUT)/cfitests: riscv_cfi_test.c shadowstack.c + $(CC) -o$@ $(CFLAGS) $(LDFLAGS) $^ +else +include ../../lib.mk + +$(shell echo "Toolchain doesn't support CFI, skipping CFI kselftest." >&2) +endif diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/cfi_rv_test.h b/tools/testin= g/selftests/riscv/cfi/cfi_rv_test.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..1c8043f2b778 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/cfi_rv_test.h @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +#ifndef SELFTEST_RISCV_CFI_H +#define SELFTEST_RISCV_CFI_H +#include +#include +#include "shadowstack.h" + +#define CHILD_EXIT_CODE_SSWRITE 10 +#define CHILD_EXIT_CODE_SIG_TEST 11 + +#define my_syscall5(num, arg1, arg2, arg3, arg4, arg5) \ +({ \ + register long _num __asm__ ("a7") =3D (num); \ + register long _arg1 __asm__ ("a0") =3D (long)(arg1); \ + register long _arg2 __asm__ ("a1") =3D (long)(arg2); \ + register long _arg3 __asm__ ("a2") =3D (long)(arg3); \ + register long _arg4 __asm__ ("a3") =3D (long)(arg4); \ + register long _arg5 __asm__ ("a4") =3D (long)(arg5); \ + \ + __asm__ volatile( \ + "ecall\n" \ + : "+r" \ + (_arg1) \ + : "r"(_arg2), "r"(_arg3), "r"(_arg4), "r"(_arg5), \ + "r"(_num) \ + : "memory", "cc" \ + ); \ + _arg1; \ +}) + +#define my_syscall3(num, arg1, arg2, arg3) \ +({ \ + register long _num __asm__ ("a7") =3D (num); \ + register long _arg1 __asm__ ("a0") =3D (long)(arg1); \ + register long _arg2 __asm__ ("a1") =3D (long)(arg2); \ + register long _arg3 __asm__ ("a2") =3D (long)(arg3); \ + \ + __asm__ volatile( \ + "ecall\n" \ + : "+r" (_arg1) \ + : "r"(_arg2), "r"(_arg3), \ + "r"(_num) \ + : "memory", "cc" \ + ); \ + _arg1; \ +}) + +#ifndef __NR_prctl +#define __NR_prctl 167 +#endif + +#ifndef __NR_map_shadow_stack +#define __NR_map_shadow_stack 453 +#endif + +#define CSR_SSP 0x011 + +#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__ +#define __ASM_STR(x) x +#else +#define __ASM_STR(x) #x +#endif + +#define csr_read(csr) \ +({ \ + register unsigned long __v; \ + __asm__ __volatile__ ("csrr %0, " __ASM_STR(csr) \ + : "=3Dr" (__v) : \ + : "memory"); \ + __v; \ +}) + +#define csr_write(csr, val) \ +({ \ + unsigned long __v =3D (unsigned long)(val); \ + __asm__ __volatile__ ("csrw " __ASM_STR(csr) ", %0" \ + : : "rK" (__v) \ + : "memory"); \ +}) + +#endif diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/riscv_cfi_test.c b/tools/tes= ting/selftests/riscv/cfi/riscv_cfi_test.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..486a2e779053 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/riscv_cfi_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only + +#include "../../kselftest.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include + +#include "cfi_rv_test.h" + +/* do not optimize cfi related test functions */ +#pragma GCC push_options +#pragma GCC optimize("O0") + +void sigsegv_handler(int signum, siginfo_t *si, void *uc) +{ + struct ucontext *ctx =3D (struct ucontext *)uc; + + if (si->si_code =3D=3D SEGV_CPERR) { + ksft_print_msg("Control flow violation happened somewhere\n"); + ksft_print_msg("PC where violation happened %lx\n", ctx->uc_mcontext.gre= gs[0]); + exit(-1); + } + + /* all other cases are expected to be of shadow stack write case */ + exit(CHILD_EXIT_CODE_SSWRITE); +} + +bool register_signal_handler(void) +{ + struct sigaction sa =3D {}; + + sa.sa_sigaction =3D sigsegv_handler; + sa.sa_flags =3D SA_SIGINFO; + if (sigaction(SIGSEGV, &sa, NULL)) { + ksft_print_msg("Registering signal handler for landing pad violation fai= led\n"); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +long ptrace(int request, pid_t pid, void *addr, void *data); + +bool cfi_ptrace_test(void) +{ + pid_t pid; + int status, ret =3D 0; + unsigned long ptrace_test_num =3D 0, total_ptrace_tests =3D 2; + + struct user_cfi_state cfi_reg; + struct iovec iov; + + pid =3D fork(); + + if (pid =3D=3D -1) { + ksft_exit_fail_msg("%s: fork failed\n", __func__); + exit(1); + } + + if (pid =3D=3D 0) { + /* allow to be traced */ + ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME, 0, NULL, NULL); + raise(SIGSTOP); + asm volatile ( + "la a5, 1f\n" + "jalr a5 \n" + "nop \n" + "nop \n" + "1: nop\n" + : : : "a5"); + exit(11); + /* child shouldn't go beyond here */ + } + + /* parent's code goes here */ + iov.iov_base =3D &cfi_reg; + iov.iov_len =3D sizeof(cfi_reg); + + while (ptrace_test_num < total_ptrace_tests) { + memset(&cfi_reg, 0, sizeof(cfi_reg)); + waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + if (WIFSTOPPED(status)) { + errno =3D 0; + ret =3D ptrace(PTRACE_GETREGSET, pid, (void *)NT_RISCV_USER_CFI, &iov); + if (ret =3D=3D -1 && errno) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("%s: PTRACE_GETREGSET failed\n", __func__); + } else + ksft_exit_fail_msg("%s: child didn't stop, failed\n", __func__); + + switch (ptrace_test_num) { +#define CFI_ENABLE_MASK (PTRACE_CFI_LP_EN_STATE | \ + PTRACE_CFI_SS_EN_STATE | \ + PTRACE_CFI_SS_PTR_STATE) + case 0: + if ((cfi_reg.cfi_status.cfi_state & CFI_ENABLE_MASK) !=3D CFI_ENABLE_MA= SK) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("%s: ptrace_getregset failed, %llu\n", __func__, + cfi_reg.cfi_status.cfi_state); + if (!cfi_reg.shstk_ptr) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("%s: NULL shadow stack pointer, test failed\n", + __func__); + break; + case 1: + if (!(cfi_reg.cfi_status.cfi_state & PTRACE_CFI_ELP_STATE)) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("%s: elp must have been set\n", __func__); + /* clear elp state. not interested in anything else */ + cfi_reg.cfi_status.cfi_state =3D 0; + + ret =3D ptrace(PTRACE_SETREGSET, pid, (void *)NT_RISCV_USER_CFI, &iov); + if (ret =3D=3D -1 && errno) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("%s: PTRACE_GETREGSET failed\n", __func__); + break; + default: + ksft_exit_fail_msg("%s: unreachable switch case\n", __func__); + break; + } + ptrace(PTRACE_CONT, pid, NULL, NULL); + ptrace_test_num++; + } + + waitpid(pid, &status, 0); + if (WEXITSTATUS(status) !=3D 11) + ksft_print_msg("%s, bad return code from child\n", __func__); + + ksft_print_msg("%s, ptrace test succeeded\n", __func__); + return true; +} + +int main(int argc, char *argv[]) +{ + int ret =3D 0; + unsigned long lpad_status =3D 0, ss_status =3D 0; + + ksft_print_header(); + + ksft_print_msg("Starting risc-v tests\n"); + + /* + * Landing pad test. Not a lot of kernel changes to support landing + * pad for user mode except lighting up a bit in senvcfg via a prctl + * Enable landing pad through out the execution of test binary + */ + ret =3D my_syscall5(__NR_prctl, PR_GET_INDIR_BR_LP_STATUS, &lpad_status, = 0, 0, 0); + if (ret) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Get landing pad status failed with %d\n", ret); + + if (!(lpad_status & PR_INDIR_BR_LP_ENABLE)) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Landing pad is not enabled, should be enabled via gl= ibc\n"); + + ret =3D my_syscall5(__NR_prctl, PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, &ss_status, 0= , 0, 0); + if (ret) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Get shadow stack failed with %d\n", ret); + + if (!(ss_status & PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE)) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Shadow stack is not enabled, should be enabled via g= libc\n"); + + if (!register_signal_handler()) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Registering signal handler for SIGSEGV failed\n"); + + ksft_print_msg("Landing pad and shadow stack are enabled for binary\n"); + cfi_ptrace_test(); + + execute_shadow_stack_tests(); + + return 0; +} + +#pragma GCC pop_options diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.c b/tools/testin= g/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..53387dbd9cf5 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.c @@ -0,0 +1,385 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only + +#include "../../kselftest.h" +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include +#include "shadowstack.h" +#include "cfi_rv_test.h" + +static struct shadow_stack_tests shstk_tests[] =3D { + { "shstk fork test\n", shadow_stack_fork_test }, + { "map shadow stack syscall\n", shadow_stack_map_test }, + { "shadow stack gup tests\n", shadow_stack_gup_tests }, + { "shadow stack signal tests\n", shadow_stack_signal_test}, + { "memory protections of shadow stack memory\n", shadow_stack_protection_= test } +}; + +#define RISCV_SHADOW_STACK_TESTS ARRAY_SIZE(shstk_tests) + +/* do not optimize shadow stack related test functions */ +#pragma GCC push_options +#pragma GCC optimize("O0") + +void zar(void) +{ + unsigned long ssp =3D 0; + + ssp =3D csr_read(CSR_SSP); + ksft_print_msg("Spewing out shadow stack ptr: %lx\n" + " This is to ensure shadow stack is indeed enabled and working\n", + ssp); +} + +void bar(void) +{ + zar(); +} + +void foo(void) +{ + bar(); +} + +void zar_child(void) +{ + unsigned long ssp =3D 0; + + ssp =3D csr_read(CSR_SSP); + ksft_print_msg("Spewing out shadow stack ptr: %lx\n" + " This is to ensure shadow stack is indeed enabled and working\n", + ssp); +} + +void bar_child(void) +{ + zar_child(); +} + +void foo_child(void) +{ + bar_child(); +} + +typedef void (call_func_ptr)(void); +/* + * call couple of functions to test push pop. + */ +int shadow_stack_call_tests(call_func_ptr fn_ptr, bool parent) +{ + ksft_print_msg("dummy calls for sspush and sspopchk in context of %s\n", + parent ? "parent" : "child"); + + (fn_ptr)(); + + return 0; +} + +/* forks a thread, and ensure shadow stacks fork out */ +bool shadow_stack_fork_test(unsigned long test_num, void *ctx) +{ + int pid =3D 0, child_status =3D 0, parent_pid =3D 0, ret =3D 0; + unsigned long ss_status =3D 0; + + ksft_print_msg("Exercising shadow stack fork test\n"); + + ret =3D my_syscall5(__NR_prctl, PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, &ss_status, 0= , 0, 0); + if (ret) { + ksft_exit_skip("Shadow stack get status prctl failed with errorcode %d\n= ", ret); + return false; + } + + if (!(ss_status & PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE)) + ksft_exit_skip("Shadow stack is not enabled, should be enabled via glibc= \n"); + + parent_pid =3D getpid(); + pid =3D fork(); + + if (pid) { + ksft_print_msg("Parent pid %d and child pid %d\n", parent_pid, pid); + shadow_stack_call_tests(&foo, true); + } else { + shadow_stack_call_tests(&foo_child, false); + } + + if (pid) { + ksft_print_msg("Waiting on child to finish\n"); + wait(&child_status); + } else { + /* exit child gracefully */ + exit(0); + } + + if (pid && WIFSIGNALED(child_status)) { + ksft_print_msg("Child faulted, fork test failed\n"); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +/* exercise `map_shadow_stack`, pivot to it and call some functions to ens= ure it works */ +#define SHADOW_STACK_ALLOC_SIZE 4096 +bool shadow_stack_map_test(unsigned long test_num, void *ctx) +{ + unsigned long shdw_addr; + int ret =3D 0; + + ksft_print_msg("Exercising shadow stack map test\n"); + + shdw_addr =3D my_syscall3(__NR_map_shadow_stack, NULL, SHADOW_STACK_ALLOC= _SIZE, 0); + + if (((long)shdw_addr) <=3D 0) { + ksft_print_msg("map_shadow_stack failed with error code %d\n", + (int)shdw_addr); + return false; + } + + ret =3D munmap((void *)shdw_addr, SHADOW_STACK_ALLOC_SIZE); + + if (ret) { + ksft_print_msg("munmap failed with error code %d\n", ret); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +/* + * shadow stack protection tests. map a shadow stack and + * validate all memory protections work on it + */ +bool shadow_stack_protection_test(unsigned long test_num, void *ctx) +{ + unsigned long shdw_addr; + unsigned long *write_addr =3D NULL; + int ret =3D 0, pid =3D 0, child_status =3D 0; + + ksft_print_msg("Exercising shadow stack protection test (WPT)\n"); + + shdw_addr =3D my_syscall3(__NR_map_shadow_stack, NULL, SHADOW_STACK_ALLOC= _SIZE, 0); + + if (((long)shdw_addr) <=3D 0) { + ksft_print_msg("map_shadow_stack failed with error code %d\n", + (int)shdw_addr); + return false; + } + + write_addr =3D (unsigned long *)shdw_addr; + pid =3D fork(); + + /* no child was created, return false */ + if (pid =3D=3D -1) + return false; + + /* + * try to perform a store from child on shadow stack memory + * it should result in SIGSEGV + */ + if (!pid) { + /* below write must lead to SIGSEGV */ + *write_addr =3D 0xdeadbeef; + } else { + wait(&child_status); + } + + /* test fail, if 0xdeadbeef present on shadow stack address */ + if (*write_addr =3D=3D 0xdeadbeef) { + ksft_print_msg("Shadow stack WPT failed\n"); + return false; + } + + /* if child reached here, then fail */ + if (!pid) { + ksft_print_msg("Shadow stack WPT failed: child reached unreachable state= \n"); + return false; + } + + /* if child exited via signal handler but not for write on ss */ + if (WIFEXITED(child_status) && + WEXITSTATUS(child_status) !=3D CHILD_EXIT_CODE_SSWRITE) { + ksft_print_msg("Shadow stack WPT failed: child wasn't signaled for write= \n"); + return false; + } + + ret =3D munmap(write_addr, SHADOW_STACK_ALLOC_SIZE); + if (ret) { + ksft_print_msg("Shadow stack WPT failed: munmap failed, error code %d\n", + ret); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +#define SS_MAGIC_WRITE_VAL 0xbeefdead + +int gup_tests(int mem_fd, unsigned long *shdw_addr) +{ + unsigned long val =3D 0; + + lseek(mem_fd, (unsigned long)shdw_addr, SEEK_SET); + if (read(mem_fd, &val, sizeof(val)) < 0) { + ksft_print_msg("Reading shadow stack mem via gup failed\n"); + return 1; + } + + val =3D SS_MAGIC_WRITE_VAL; + lseek(mem_fd, (unsigned long)shdw_addr, SEEK_SET); + if (write(mem_fd, &val, sizeof(val)) < 0) { + ksft_print_msg("Writing shadow stack mem via gup failed\n"); + return 1; + } + + if (*shdw_addr !=3D SS_MAGIC_WRITE_VAL) { + ksft_print_msg("GUP write to shadow stack memory failed\n"); + return 1; + } + + return 0; +} + +bool shadow_stack_gup_tests(unsigned long test_num, void *ctx) +{ + unsigned long shdw_addr =3D 0; + unsigned long *write_addr =3D NULL; + int fd =3D 0; + bool ret =3D false; + + ksft_print_msg("Exercising shadow stack gup tests\n"); + shdw_addr =3D my_syscall3(__NR_map_shadow_stack, NULL, SHADOW_STACK_ALLOC= _SIZE, 0); + + if (((long)shdw_addr) <=3D 0) { + ksft_print_msg("map_shadow_stack failed with error code %d\n", (int)shdw= _addr); + return false; + } + + write_addr =3D (unsigned long *)shdw_addr; + + fd =3D open("/proc/self/mem", O_RDWR); + if (fd =3D=3D -1) + return false; + + if (gup_tests(fd, write_addr)) { + ksft_print_msg("gup tests failed\n"); + goto out; + } + + ret =3D true; +out: + if (shdw_addr && munmap(write_addr, SHADOW_STACK_ALLOC_SIZE)) { + ksft_print_msg("munmap failed with error code %d\n", ret); + ret =3D false; + } + + return ret; +} + +volatile bool break_loop; + +void sigusr1_handler(int signo) +{ + break_loop =3D true; +} + +bool sigusr1_signal_test(void) +{ + struct sigaction sa =3D {}; + + sa.sa_handler =3D sigusr1_handler; + sa.sa_flags =3D 0; + sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask); + if (sigaction(SIGUSR1, &sa, NULL)) { + ksft_print_msg("Registering signal handler for SIGUSR1 failed\n"); + return false; + } + + return true; +} + +/* + * shadow stack signal test. shadow stack must be enabled. + * register a signal, fork another thread which is waiting + * on signal. Send a signal from parent to child, verify + * that signal was received by child. If not test fails + */ +bool shadow_stack_signal_test(unsigned long test_num, void *ctx) +{ + int pid =3D 0, child_status =3D 0, ret =3D 0; + unsigned long ss_status =3D 0; + + ksft_print_msg("Exercising shadow stack signal test\n"); + + ret =3D my_syscall5(__NR_prctl, PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, &ss_status, 0= , 0, 0); + if (ret) { + ksft_print_msg("Shadow stack get status prctl failed with errorcode %d\n= ", ret); + return false; + } + + if (!(ss_status & PR_SHADOW_STACK_ENABLE)) + ksft_print_msg("Shadow stack is not enabled, should be enabled via glibc= \n"); + + /* this should be caught by signal handler and do an exit */ + if (!sigusr1_signal_test()) { + ksft_print_msg("Registering sigusr1 handler failed\n"); + exit(-1); + } + + pid =3D fork(); + + if (pid =3D=3D -1) { + ksft_print_msg("Signal test: fork failed\n"); + goto out; + } + + if (pid =3D=3D 0) { + while (!break_loop) + sleep(1); + + exit(11); + /* child shouldn't go beyond here */ + } + + /* send SIGUSR1 to child */ + kill(pid, SIGUSR1); + wait(&child_status); + +out: + + return (WIFEXITED(child_status) && + WEXITSTATUS(child_status) =3D=3D 11); +} + +int execute_shadow_stack_tests(void) +{ + int ret =3D 0; + unsigned long test_count =3D 0; + unsigned long shstk_status =3D 0; + bool test_pass =3D false; + + ksft_print_msg("Executing RISC-V shadow stack self tests\n"); + ksft_set_plan(RISCV_SHADOW_STACK_TESTS); + + ret =3D my_syscall5(__NR_prctl, PR_GET_SHADOW_STACK_STATUS, &shstk_status= , 0, 0, 0); + + if (ret !=3D 0) + ksft_exit_fail_msg("Get shadow stack status failed with %d\n", ret); + + /* + * If we are here that means get shadow stack status succeeded and + * thus shadow stack support is baked in the kernel. + */ + while (test_count < RISCV_SHADOW_STACK_TESTS) { + test_pass =3D (*shstk_tests[test_count].t_func)(test_count, NULL); + ksft_test_result(test_pass, shstk_tests[test_count].name); + test_count++; + } + + ksft_finished(); + + return 0; +} + +#pragma GCC pop_options diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.h b/tools/testin= g/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..0be510167de3 --- /dev/null +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/riscv/cfi/shadowstack.h @@ -0,0 +1,27 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only */ + +#ifndef SELFTEST_SHADOWSTACK_TEST_H +#define SELFTEST_SHADOWSTACK_TEST_H +#include +#include + +/* + * a cfi test returns true for success or false for fail + * takes a number for test number to index into array and void pointer. + */ +typedef bool (*shstk_test_func)(unsigned long test_num, void *); + +struct shadow_stack_tests { + char *name; + shstk_test_func t_func; +}; + +bool shadow_stack_fork_test(unsigned long test_num, void *ctx); +bool shadow_stack_map_test(unsigned long test_num, void *ctx); +bool shadow_stack_protection_test(unsigned long test_num, void *ctx); +bool shadow_stack_gup_tests(unsigned long test_num, void *ctx); +bool shadow_stack_signal_test(unsigned long test_num, void *ctx); + +int execute_shadow_stack_tests(void); + +#endif --=20 2.43.0