From nobody Sat Feb 7 16:39:25 2026 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [193.142.43.55]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AADA5346A10; Wed, 22 Oct 2025 12:49:06 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=193.142.43.55 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761137353; cv=none; b=tPsEfu+oGUxkLqXI+3u0edGeO2SRtgHS9/jZfLbbgQhkFn0EgkierRRKrXncT9szQpqDI/av07WtITjwsYbM8Yah04adDO/RXln8uutwLgQHgj1zVqvnU4M0AloRitSxUuMegiHkSNsgx/NnpEJwKTYpGYP/MXHT6Q715RNgvQk= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761137353; c=relaxed/simple; bh=B6FY70g1YU4tpzw5guto+VK5McncnWIMenNCFYwqfSs=; h=Message-ID:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Date; b=Hb2NiYv2XjmUL/nfVbEU2fRUDCcWBmecl12PRgR1fBAxLxUGZcqaz1R2olxDNZR9eKFqLPvGkUOpOw6L06ZkN1OkDVlpMBslpIXw/ZU06CUVZUKiB62L5LnPA6fu+fr4h03mg2VUIQLHr4DqPDiPdNQjxrcyvMzFjpw7WAyogYU= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linutronix.de; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linutronix.de; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b=U1KJk30u; dkim=permerror (0-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b=9duIHEc7; arc=none smtp.client-ip=193.142.43.55 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linutronix.de Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linutronix.de Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b="U1KJk30u"; dkim=permerror (0-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b="9duIHEc7" Message-ID: <20251022103111.917094276@linutronix.de> DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020; t=1761137343; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: references:references; bh=fZFzuFe1kZwWOtUDwXLfQwu5MJAw6qMRRDC36ZwVfYw=; b=U1KJk30ufn2daIIfpJLCyMNcDD+IEHyiM35RXdJyNFqli00qUJLPFpmDIOujbK1fxDdH2L tjiUEaiE7IgsNIT5KsXJt1G9zm/AJp4Lsh1G3ywv7kDU9dk0C4AE0gfNPZl4PR3dfJ6NmE 58SsfnZoc59jDBYsUIakGUJ2m+BspUW3Slu7AHVDiiYVJ9cadbiruMSAouVuJOl2uyL6Eo v9MFcoSjMPvFojzkQ1BmeeFxP3+3k1h5BlhwTqljGQY1SShNXeAEzN8iFLWW2VqNOuoMAc D0S5mgGpOsd8ckS2gxrI5IGG5xyaNCdATH1d7uIyR+mjuOcs6oOu9DUSSdinnA== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1761137343; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: references:references; bh=fZFzuFe1kZwWOtUDwXLfQwu5MJAw6qMRRDC36ZwVfYw=; b=9duIHEc7jKDi/buS4tMXry00HW91mCoD9cY348w5IsDS561BCWYuWi4kka8K69tlaLPq+w 6je/OLsxmDQeH4DQ== From: Thomas Gleixner To: LKML Cc: kernel test robot , Russell King , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Linus Torvalds , x86@kernel.org, Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Nicholas Piggin , Christophe Leroy , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Heiko Carstens , Christian Borntraeger , Sven Schnelle , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Mathieu Desnoyers , Andrew Cooper , David Laight , Julia Lawall , Nicolas Palix , Peter Zijlstra , Darren Hart , Davidlohr Bueso , =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A9=20Almeida?= , Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , Jan Kara , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [patch V4 01/12] ARM: uaccess: Implement missing __get_user_asm_dword() References: <20251022102427.400699796@linutronix.de> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2025 14:49:03 +0200 (CEST) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" When CONFIG_CPU_SPECTRE=3Dn then get_user() is missing the 8 byte ASM varia= nt for no real good reason. This prevents using get_user(u64) in generic code. Implement it as a sequence of two 4-byte reads with LE/BE awareness and make the unsigned long (or long long) type for the intermediate variable to read into dependend on the the target type. The __long_type() macro and idea was lifted from PowerPC. Thanks to Christophe for pointing it out. Reported-by: kernel test robot Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Russell King Cc: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202509120155.pFgwfeUD-lkp@int= el.com/ Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- V2a: Solve the *ptr issue vs. unsigned long long - Russell/Christophe V2: New patch to fix the 0-day fallout --- arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/arm/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -283,10 +283,17 @@ extern int __put_user_8(void *, unsigned __gu_err; \ }) =20 +/* + * This is a type: either unsigned long, if the argument fits into + * that type, or otherwise unsigned long long. + */ +#define __long_type(x) \ + __typeof__(__builtin_choose_expr(sizeof(x) > sizeof(0UL), 0ULL, 0UL)) + #define __get_user_err(x, ptr, err, __t) \ do { \ unsigned long __gu_addr =3D (unsigned long)(ptr); \ - unsigned long __gu_val; \ + __long_type(x) __gu_val; \ unsigned int __ua_flags; \ __chk_user_ptr(ptr); \ might_fault(); \ @@ -295,6 +302,7 @@ do { \ case 1: __get_user_asm_byte(__gu_val, __gu_addr, err, __t); break; \ case 2: __get_user_asm_half(__gu_val, __gu_addr, err, __t); break; \ case 4: __get_user_asm_word(__gu_val, __gu_addr, err, __t); break; \ + case 8: __get_user_asm_dword(__gu_val, __gu_addr, err, __t); break; \ default: (__gu_val) =3D __get_user_bad(); \ } \ uaccess_restore(__ua_flags); \ @@ -353,6 +361,22 @@ do { \ #define __get_user_asm_word(x, addr, err, __t) \ __get_user_asm(x, addr, err, "ldr" __t) =20 +#ifdef __ARMEB__ +#define __WORD0_OFFS 4 +#define __WORD1_OFFS 0 +#else +#define __WORD0_OFFS 0 +#define __WORD1_OFFS 4 +#endif + +#define __get_user_asm_dword(x, addr, err, __t) \ + ({ \ + unsigned long __w0, __w1; \ + __get_user_asm(__w0, addr + __WORD0_OFFS, err, "ldr" __t); \ + __get_user_asm(__w1, addr + __WORD1_OFFS, err, "ldr" __t); \ + (x) =3D ((u64)__w1 << 32) | (u64) __w0; \ +}) + #define __put_user_switch(x, ptr, __err, __fn) \ do { \ const __typeof__(*(ptr)) __user *__pu_ptr =3D (ptr); 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bh=riOmJf9FiDkmu6m5dlKP9M/8U5xAklSgvZrcN3Urpuk=; b=c9i65Wm4Ndn7xeahqxPTBb1lBCVdU45gHjWmlQg4SLcOj8eWI5HtH7HvaRK1ZUB9k8rBDG Gx+1L2LJJs+DE4BUuyz6Xim5IsBGOcpvPeb4SUNSDuQY6R55/sbXPqRaUMCAiy5IS094PX lZWMlDtD1VoKF0yg7T1LtnVAYUCmsEfIZ/3UP6zfrlhJaBclsz/Z4EtMyGl7NQ86/R6hqZ Z+GDCBGK5+8+cm7t+MbQHYi3nOuNsF10sT8L3BN0VAxIO9btUWTX6jDPdrNue1ezJbyxtY LSaElDNUE/TA27K6IKH3FqpttCp8c5IAfDLS7IrI3OfC3bp70o/bRhLrRAomkg== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1761137344; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: references:references; bh=riOmJf9FiDkmu6m5dlKP9M/8U5xAklSgvZrcN3Urpuk=; b=N3NMFaOLtlMBqCJ+capZ3I/cpgRy5k1V+/BakEg2gVtf1MEHK6L4ptAYIger3BijJcCLQD gGotCKbI0u8BU+Ag== From: Thomas Gleixner To: LKML Cc: Linus Torvalds , kernel test robot , Russell King , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, x86@kernel.org, Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Nicholas Piggin , Christophe Leroy , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Heiko Carstens , Christian Borntraeger , Sven Schnelle , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Mathieu Desnoyers , Andrew Cooper , David Laight , Julia Lawall , Nicolas Palix , Peter Zijlstra , Darren Hart , Davidlohr Bueso , =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A9=20Almeida?= , Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , Jan Kara , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [patch V4 02/12] uaccess: Provide ASM GOTO safe wrappers for unsafe_*_user() References: <20251022102427.400699796@linutronix.de> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2025 14:49:04 +0200 (CEST) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" ASM GOTO is miscompiled by GCC when it is used inside a auto cleanup scope: bool foo(u32 __user *p, u32 val) { scoped_guard(pagefault) unsafe_put_user(val, p, efault); return true; efault: return false; } e80: e8 00 00 00 00 call e85 e85: 65 48 8b 05 00 00 00 00 mov %gs:0x0(%rip),%rax e8d: 83 80 04 14 00 00 01 addl $0x1,0x1404(%rax) // pf_disable++ e94: 89 37 mov %esi,(%rdi) e96: 83 a8 04 14 00 00 01 subl $0x1,0x1404(%rax) // pf_disable-- e9d: b8 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%eax // success ea2: e9 00 00 00 00 jmp ea7 // ret ea7: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax // fail ea9: e9 00 00 00 00 jmp eae // ret which is broken as it leaks the pagefault disable counter on failure. Clang at least fails the build. Linus suggested to add a local label into the macro scope and let that jump to the actual caller supplied error label. __label__ local_label; \ arch_unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, local_label); \ if (0) { \ local_label: \ goto label; \ That works for both GCC and clang. clang: c80: 0f 1f 44 00 00 nopl 0x0(%rax,%rax,1)=09 c85: 65 48 8b 0c 25 00 00 00 00 mov %gs:0x0,%rcx c8e: ff 81 04 14 00 00 incl 0x1404(%rcx) // pf_disable++ c94: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax // set retval to fal= se c96: 89 37 mov %esi,(%rdi) // write c98: b0 01 mov $0x1,%al // set retval to true c9a: ff 89 04 14 00 00 decl 0x1404(%rcx) // pf_disable-- ca0: 2e e9 00 00 00 00 cs jmp ca6 // ret The exception table entry points correctly to c9a GCC: f70: e8 00 00 00 00 call f75 f75: 65 48 8b 05 00 00 00 00 mov %gs:0x0(%rip),%rax f7d: 83 80 04 14 00 00 01 addl $0x1,0x1404(%rax) // pf_disable++ f84: 8b 17 mov (%rdi),%edx f86: 89 16 mov %edx,(%rsi) f88: 83 a8 04 14 00 00 01 subl $0x1,0x1404(%rax) // pf_disable-- f8f: b8 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%eax // success f94: e9 00 00 00 00 jmp f99 // ret f99: 83 a8 04 14 00 00 01 subl $0x1,0x1404(%rax) // pf_disable-- fa0: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax // fail fa2: e9 00 00 00 00 jmp fa7 // ret The exception table entry points correctly to f99 So both compilers optimize out the extra goto and emit correct and efficient code. Provide a generic wrapper to do that to avoid modifying all the affected architecture specific implementation with that workaround. The only change required for architectures is to rename unsafe_*_user() to arch_unsafe_*_user(). That's done in subsequent changes. Suggested-by: Linus Torvalds Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- include/linux/uaccess.h | 72 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= ++--- 1 file changed, 68 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h @@ -518,7 +518,34 @@ long strncpy_from_user_nofault(char *dst long count); long strnlen_user_nofault(const void __user *unsafe_addr, long count); =20 -#ifndef __get_kernel_nofault +#ifdef arch_get_kernel_nofault +/* + * Wrap the architecture implementation so that @label can be outside of a + * cleanup() scope. A regular C goto works correctly, but ASM goto does + * not. Clang rejects such an attempt, but GCC silently emits buggy code. + */ +#define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, label) \ +do { \ + __label__ local_label; \ + arch_get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, local_label); \ + if (0) { \ + local_label: \ + goto label; \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, label) \ +do { \ + __label__ local_label; \ + arch_get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, local_label); \ + if (0) { \ + local_label: \ + goto label; \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#elif !defined(__get_kernel_nofault) /* arch_get_kernel_nofault */ + #define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, label) \ do { \ type __user *p =3D (type __force __user *)(src); \ @@ -535,7 +562,8 @@ do { \ if (__put_user(data, p)) \ goto label; \ } while (0) -#endif + +#endif /* !__get_kernel_nofault */ =20 /** * get_kernel_nofault(): safely attempt to read from a location @@ -549,7 +577,42 @@ do { \ copy_from_kernel_nofault(&(val), __gk_ptr, sizeof(val));\ }) =20 -#ifndef user_access_begin +#ifdef user_access_begin + +#ifdef arch_unsafe_get_user +/* + * Wrap the architecture implementation so that @label can be outside of a + * cleanup() scope. A regular C goto works correctly, but ASM goto does + * not. Clang rejects such an attempt, but GCC silently emits buggy code. + * + * Some architectures use internal local labels already, but this extra + * indirection here is harmless because the compiler optimizes it out + * completely in any case. This construct just ensures that the ASM GOTO + * target is always in the local scope. The C goto 'label' works correct + * when leaving a cleanup() scope. + */ +#define unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label) \ +do { \ + __label__ local_label; \ + arch_unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, local_label); \ + if (0) { \ + local_label: \ + goto label; \ + } \ +} while (0) + +#define unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, label) \ +do { \ + __label__ local_label; \ + arch_unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, local_label); \ + if (0) { \ + local_label: \ + goto label; \ + } \ +} while (0) +#endif /* arch_unsafe_get_user */ + +#else /* user_access_begin */ #define user_access_begin(ptr,len) access_ok(ptr, len) #define user_access_end() do { } while (0) #define unsafe_op_wrap(op, err) do { if (unlikely(op)) goto err; } while (= 0) @@ -559,7 +622,8 @@ do { \ #define unsafe_copy_from_user(d,s,l,e) unsafe_op_wrap(__copy_from_user(d,s= ,l),e) static inline unsigned long user_access_save(void) { return 0UL; } static inline void user_access_restore(unsigned long flags) { } -#endif +#endif /* !user_access_begin */ + #ifndef user_write_access_begin #define user_write_access_begin user_access_begin #define user_write_access_end user_access_end From nobody Sat Feb 7 16:39:25 2026 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [193.142.43.55]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AEA06345757; 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charset="utf-8" ASM GOTO is miscompiled by GCC when it is used inside a auto cleanup scope: bool foo(u32 __user *p, u32 val) { scoped_guard(pagefault) unsafe_put_user(val, p, efault); return true; efault: return false; } It ends up leaking the pagefault disable counter in the fault path. clang at least fails the build. Rename unsafe_*_user() to arch_unsafe_*_user() which makes the generic uaccess header wrap it with a local label that makes both compilers emit correct code. Same for the kernel_nofault() variants. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h | 12 ++++++------ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -528,18 +528,18 @@ static __must_check __always_inline bool #define user_access_save() smap_save() #define user_access_restore(x) smap_restore(x) =20 -#define unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, label) \ +#define arch_unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, label) \ __put_user_size((__typeof__(*(ptr)))(x), (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)), label) =20 #ifdef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT -#define unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, err_label) \ +#define arch_unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, err_label) \ do { \ __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \ __get_user_size(__gu_val, (ptr), sizeof(*(ptr)), err_label); \ (x) =3D (__force __typeof__(*(ptr)))__gu_val; \ } while (0) #else // !CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT -#define unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, err_label) \ +#define arch_unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, err_label) \ do { \ int __gu_err; \ __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; \ @@ -618,11 +618,11 @@ do { \ } while (0) =20 #ifdef CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT -#define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ +#define arch_get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ __get_user_size(*((type *)(dst)), (__force type __user *)(src), \ sizeof(type), err_label) #else // !CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT -#define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ +#define arch_get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ do { \ int __kr_err; \ \ @@ -633,7 +633,7 @@ do { \ } while (0) #endif // CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT =20 -#define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ +#define arch_put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ __put_user_size(*((type *)(src)), (__force type __user *)(dst), \ sizeof(type), err_label) From nobody Sat Feb 7 16:39:25 2026 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [193.142.43.55]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id AEB57345CD2; 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charset="utf-8" ASM GOTO is miscompiled by GCC when it is used inside a auto cleanup scope: bool foo(u32 __user *p, u32 val) { scoped_guard(pagefault) unsafe_put_user(val, p, efault); return true; efault: return false; } It ends up leaking the pagefault disable counter in the fault path. clang at least fails the build. Rename unsafe_*_user() to arch_unsafe_*_user() which makes the generic uaccess header wrap it with a local label that makes both compilers emit correct code. Same for the kernel_nofault() variants. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Madhavan Srinivasan Cc: Michael Ellerman Cc: Nicholas Piggin Cc: Christophe Leroy Cc: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/powerpc/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ user_write_access_begin(const void __use #define user_write_access_begin user_write_access_begin #define user_write_access_end prevent_current_write_to_user =20 -#define unsafe_get_user(x, p, e) do { \ +#define arch_unsafe_get_user(x, p, e) do { \ __long_type(*(p)) __gu_val; \ __typeof__(*(p)) __user *__gu_addr =3D (p); \ \ @@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ user_write_access_begin(const void __use (x) =3D (__typeof__(*(p)))__gu_val; \ } while (0) =20 -#define unsafe_put_user(x, p, e) \ +#define arch_unsafe_put_user(x, p, e) \ __put_user_size_goto((__typeof__(*(p)))(x), (p), sizeof(*(p)), e) =20 #define unsafe_copy_from_user(d, s, l, e) \ @@ -504,11 +504,11 @@ do { \ unsafe_put_user(*(u8*)(_src + _i), (u8 __user *)(_dst + _i), e); 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charset="utf-8" ASM GOTO is miscompiled by GCC when it is used inside a auto cleanup scope: bool foo(u32 __user *p, u32 val) { scoped_guard(pagefault) unsafe_put_user(val, p, efault); return true; efault: return false; } It ends up leaking the pagefault disable counter in the fault path. clang at least fails the build. Rename unsafe_*_user() to arch_unsafe_*_user() which makes the generic uaccess header wrap it with a local label that makes both compilers emit correct code. Same for the kernel_nofault() variants. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Paul Walmsley Cc: Palmer Dabbelt Cc: linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h | 8 ++++---- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) --- a/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/riscv/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -437,10 +437,10 @@ unsigned long __must_check clear_user(vo __clear_user(untagged_addr(to), n) : n; } =20 -#define __get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ +#define arch_get_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ __get_user_nocheck(*((type *)(dst)), (__force __user type *)(src), err_la= bel) =20 -#define __put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ +#define arch_put_kernel_nofault(dst, src, type, err_label) \ __put_user_nocheck(*((type *)(src)), (__force __user type *)(dst), err_la= bel) =20 static __must_check __always_inline bool user_access_begin(const void __us= er *ptr, size_t len) @@ -460,10 +460,10 @@ static inline void user_access_restore(u * We want the unsafe accessors to always be inlined and use * the error labels - thus the macro games. */ -#define unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, label) \ +#define arch_unsafe_put_user(x, ptr, label) \ __put_user_nocheck(x, (ptr), label) =20 -#define unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label) do { \ +#define arch_unsafe_get_user(x, ptr, label) do { \ __inttype(*(ptr)) __gu_val; 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charset="utf-8" ASM GOTO is miscompiled by GCC when it is used inside a auto cleanup scope: bool foo(u32 __user *p, u32 val) { scoped_guard(pagefault) unsafe_put_user(val, p, efault); return true; efault: return false; } It ends up leaking the pagefault disable counter in the fault path. clang at least fails the build. S390 is not affected for unsafe_*_user() as it uses it's own local label already, but __get/put_kernel_nofault() lack that. Rename them to arch_*_kernel_nofault() which makes the generic uaccess header wrap it with a local label that makes both compilers emit correct code. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Heiko Carstens Cc: Christian Borntraeger Cc: Sven Schnelle Cc: linux-s390@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Heiko Carstens Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h | 4 ++-- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h +++ b/arch/s390/include/asm/uaccess.h @@ -468,8 +468,8 @@ do { \ =20 #endif /* CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT && CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_AOR_FORMAT_FL= AGS */ =20 -#define __get_kernel_nofault __mvc_kernel_nofault -#define __put_kernel_nofault __mvc_kernel_nofault +#define arch_get_kernel_nofault __mvc_kernel_nofault +#define arch_put_kernel_nofault __mvc_kernel_nofault =20 void __cmpxchg_user_key_called_with_bad_pointer(void); From nobody Sat Feb 7 16:39:25 2026 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [193.142.43.55]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0CD6234677D; 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charset="utf-8" User space access regions are tedious and require similar code patterns all over the place: if (!user_read_access_begin(from, sizeof(*from))) return -EFAULT; unsafe_get_user(val, from, Efault); user_read_access_end(); return 0; Efault: user_read_access_end(); return -EFAULT; This got worse with the recent addition of masked user access, which optimizes the speculation prevention: if (can_do_masked_user_access()) from =3D masked_user_read_access_begin((from)); else if (!user_read_access_begin(from, sizeof(*from))) return -EFAULT; unsafe_get_user(val, from, Efault); user_read_access_end(); return 0; Efault: user_read_access_end(); return -EFAULT; There have been issues with using the wrong user_*_access_end() variant in the error path and other typical Copy&Pasta problems, e.g. using the wrong fault label in the user accessor which ends up using the wrong accesss end variant.=20 These patterns beg for scopes with automatic cleanup. The resulting outcome is: scoped_user_read_access(from, Efault) unsafe_get_user(val, from, Efault); return 0; Efault: return -EFAULT; The scope guarantees the proper cleanup for the access mode is invoked both in the success and the failure (fault) path. The scoped_user_$MODE_access() macros are implemented as self terminating nested for() loops. Thanks to Andrew Cooper for pointing me at them. The scope can therefore be left with 'break', 'goto' and 'return'. Even 'continue' "works" due to the self termination mechanism. Both GCC and clang optimize all the convoluted macro maze out and the above results with clang in: b80: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64 b84: 48 b8 ef cd ab 89 67 45 23 01 movabs $0x123456789abcdef,%rax b8e: 48 39 c7 cmp %rax,%rdi b91: 48 0f 47 f8 cmova %rax,%rdi b95: 90 nop b96: 90 nop b97: 90 nop b98: 31 c9 xor %ecx,%ecx b9a: 8b 07 mov (%rdi),%eax b9c: 89 06 mov %eax,(%rsi) b9e: 85 c9 test %ecx,%ecx ba0: 0f 94 c0 sete %al ba3: 90 nop ba4: 90 nop ba5: 90 nop ba6: c3 ret Which looks as compact as it gets. The NOPs are placeholder for STAC/CLAC. GCC emits the fault path seperately: bf0: f3 0f 1e fa endbr64 bf4: 48 b8 ef cd ab 89 67 45 23 01 movabs $0x123456789abcdef,%rax bfe: 48 39 c7 cmp %rax,%rdi c01: 48 0f 47 f8 cmova %rax,%rdi c05: 90 nop c06: 90 nop c07: 90 nop c08: 31 d2 xor %edx,%edx c0a: 8b 07 mov (%rdi),%eax c0c: 89 06 mov %eax,(%rsi) c0e: 85 d2 test %edx,%edx c10: 75 09 jne c1b c12: 90 nop c13: 90 nop c14: 90 nop c15: b8 01 00 00 00 mov $0x1,%eax c1a: c3 ret c1b: 90 nop c1c: 90 nop c1d: 90 nop c1e: 31 c0 xor %eax,%eax c20: c3 ret The fault labels for the scoped*() macros and the fault labels for the actual user space accessors can be shared and must be placed outside of the scope. If masked user access is enabled on an architecture, then the pointer handed in to scoped_user_$MODE_access() can be modified to point to a guaranteed faulting user address. This modification is only scope local as the pointer is aliased inside the scope. When the scope is left the alias is not longer in effect. IOW the original pointer value is preserved so it can be used e.g. for fixup or diagnostic purposes in the fault path. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Christophe Leroy Cc: Mathieu Desnoyers Cc: Andrew Cooper Cc: Linus Torvalds Cc: David Laight Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- V4: Remove the _masked_ naming as it's actually confusing - David Remove underscores and make _tmpptr void - David Add comment about access size and range - David Shorten local variables and remove a few unneeded brackets - Mathieu V3: Make it a nested for() loop Get rid of the code in macro parameters - Linus Provide sized variants - Mathieu V2: Remove the shady wrappers around the opening and use scopes with automa= tic cleanup --- include/linux/uaccess.h | 192 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++= +++++ 1 file changed, 192 insertions(+) --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ #ifndef __LINUX_UACCESS_H__ #define __LINUX_UACCESS_H__ =20 +#include #include #include #include @@ -35,9 +36,17 @@ =20 #ifdef masked_user_access_begin #define can_do_masked_user_access() 1 +# ifndef masked_user_write_access_begin +# define masked_user_write_access_begin masked_user_access_begin +# endif +# ifndef masked_user_read_access_begin +# define masked_user_read_access_begin masked_user_access_begin +#endif #else #define can_do_masked_user_access() 0 #define masked_user_access_begin(src) NULL + #define masked_user_read_access_begin(src) NULL + #define masked_user_write_access_begin(src) NULL #define mask_user_address(src) (src) #endif =20 @@ -633,6 +642,189 @@ static inline void user_access_restore(u #define user_read_access_end user_access_end #endif =20 +/* Define RW variant so the below _mode macro expansion works */ +#define masked_user_rw_access_begin(u) masked_user_access_begin(u) +#define user_rw_access_begin(u, s) user_access_begin(u, s) +#define user_rw_access_end() user_access_end() + +/* Scoped user access */ +#define USER_ACCESS_GUARD(_mode) \ +static __always_inline void __user * \ +class_user_##_mode##_begin(void __user *ptr) \ +{ \ + return ptr; \ +} \ + \ +static __always_inline void \ +class_user_##_mode##_end(void __user *ptr) \ +{ \ + user_##_mode##_access_end(); \ +} \ + \ +DEFINE_CLASS(user_ ##_mode## _access, void __user *, \ + class_user_##_mode##_end(_T), \ + class_user_##_mode##_begin(ptr), void __user *ptr) \ + \ +static __always_inline class_user_##_mode##_access_t \ +class_user_##_mode##_access_ptr(void __user *scope) \ +{ \ + return scope; \ +} + +USER_ACCESS_GUARD(read) +USER_ACCESS_GUARD(write) +USER_ACCESS_GUARD(rw) +#undef USER_ACCESS_GUARD + +/** + * __scoped_user_access_begin - Start a scoped user access + * @mode: The mode of the access class (read, write, rw) + * @uptr: The pointer to access user space memory + * @size: Size of the access + * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected + * + * Internal helper for __scoped_user_access(). Don't use directly + */ +#define __scoped_user_access_begin(mode, uptr, size, elbl) \ +({ \ + typeof(uptr) __retptr; \ + \ + if (can_do_masked_user_access()) { \ + __retptr =3D masked_user_##mode##_access_begin(uptr); \ + } else { \ + __retptr =3D uptr; \ + if (!user_##mode##_access_begin(uptr, size)) \ + goto elbl; \ + } \ + __retptr; \ +}) + +/** + * __scoped_user_access - Open a scope for user access + * @mode: The mode of the access class (read, write, rw) + * @uptr: The pointer to access user space memory + * @size: Size of the access + * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected. It + * must be placed outside the scope + * + * If the user access function inside the scope requires a fault label, it + * can use @elvl or a different label outside the scope, which requires + * that user access which is implemented with ASM GOTO has been properly + * wrapped. See unsafe_get_user() for reference. + * + * scoped_user_rw_access(ptr, efault) { + * unsafe_get_user(rval, &ptr->rval, efault); + * unsafe_put_user(wval, &ptr->wval, efault); + * } + * return 0; + * efault: + * return -EFAULT; + * + * The scope is internally implemented as a autoterminating nested for() + * loop, which can be left with 'return', 'break' and 'goto' at any + * point. + * + * When the scope is left user_##@_mode##_access_end() is automatically + * invoked. + * + * When the architecture supports masked user access and the access region + * which is determined by @uptr and @size is not a valid user space + * address, i.e. < TASK_SIZE, the scope sets the pointer to a faulting user + * space address and does not terminate early. This optimizes for the good + * case and lets the performance uncritical bad case go through the fault. + * + * The eventual modification of the pointer is limited to the scope. + * Outside of the scope the original pointer value is unmodified, so that + * the original pointer value is available for diagnostic purposes in an + * out of scope fault path. + * + * Nesting scoped user access into a user access scope is invalid and fails + * the build. Nesting into other guards, e.g. pagefault is safe. + * + * The masked variant does not check the size of the access and relies on a + * mapping hole (e.g. guard page) to catch an out of range pointer, the + * first access to user memory inside the scope has to be within + * @uptr ... @uptr + PAGE_SIZE - 1 + * + * Don't use directly. Use scoped_masked_user_$MODE_access() instead. + */ +#define __scoped_user_access(mode, uptr, size, elbl) \ +for (bool done =3D false; !done; done =3D true) \ + for (void __user *_tmpptr =3D __scoped_user_access_begin(mode, uptr, size= , elbl); \ + !done; done =3D true) \ + for (CLASS(user_##mode##_access, scope)(_tmpptr); !done; done =3D true) \ + /* Force modified pointer usage within the scope */ \ + for (const typeof(uptr) uptr =3D _tmpptr; !done; done =3D true) + +/** + * scoped_user_read_access_size - Start a scoped user read access with giv= en size + * @usrc: Pointer to the user space address to read from + * @size: Size of the access starting from @usrc + * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected + * + * For further information see __scoped_user_access() above. + */ +#define scoped_user_read_access_size(usrc, size, elbl) \ + __scoped_user_access(read, usrc, size, elbl) + +/** + * scoped_user_read_access - Start a scoped user read access + * @usrc: Pointer to the user space address to read from + * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected + * + * The size of the access starting from @usrc is determined via sizeof(*@u= src)). + * + * For further information see __scoped_user_access() above. + */ +#define scoped_user_read_access(usrc, elbl) \ + scoped_user_read_access_size(usrc, sizeof(*(usrc)), elbl) + +/** + * scoped_user_write_access_size - Start a scoped user write access with g= iven size + * @udst: Pointer to the user space address to write to + * @size: Size of the access starting from @udst + * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected + * + * For further information see __scoped_user_access() above. + */ +#define scoped_user_write_access_size(udst, size, elbl) \ + __scoped_user_access(write, udst, size, elbl) + +/** + * scoped_user_write_access - Start a scoped user write access + * @udst: Pointer to the user space address to write to + * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected + * + * The size of the access starting from @udst is determined via sizeof(*@u= dst)). + * + * For further information see __scoped_user_access() above. + */ +#define scoped_user_write_access(udst, elbl) \ + scoped_user_write_access_size(udst, sizeof(*(udst)), elbl) + +/** + * scoped_user_rw_access_size - Start a scoped user read/write access with= given size + * @uptr Pointer to the user space address to read from and write to + * @size: Size of the access starting from @uptr + * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected + * + * For further information see __scoped_user_access() above. + */ +#define scoped_user_rw_access_size(uptr, size, elbl) \ + __scoped_user_access(rw, uptr, size, elbl) + +/** + * scoped_user_rw_access - Start a scoped user read/write access + * @uptr Pointer to the user space address to read from and write to + * @elbl: Error label to goto when the access region is rejected + * + * The size of the access starting from @uptr is determined via sizeof(*@u= ptr)). + * + * For further information see __scoped_user_access() above. + */ +#define scoped_user_rw_access(uptr, elbl) \ + scoped_user_rw_access_size(uptr, sizeof(*(uptr)), elbl) + #ifdef CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY void __noreturn usercopy_abort(const char *name, const char *detail, bool to_user, unsigned long offset, From nobody Sat Feb 7 16:39:25 2026 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [193.142.43.55]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D6DC53446BB; 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charset="utf-8" Provide conveniance wrappers around scoped user access similiar to put/get_user(), which reduce the usage sites to: if (!get_user_scoped(val, ptr)) return -EFAULT; Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- V4: Rename to scoped --- include/linux/uaccess.h | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+) --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h @@ -825,6 +825,50 @@ for (bool done =3D false; !done; done =3D tr #define scoped_user_rw_access(uptr, elbl) \ scoped_user_rw_access_size(uptr, sizeof(*(uptr)), elbl) =20 +/** + * get_user_scoped - Read user data with scoped access + * @val: The variable to store the value read from user memory + * @usrc: Pointer to the user space memory to read from + * + * Return: true if successful, false when faulted + */ +#define get_user_scoped(val, usrc) \ +({ \ + __label__ efault; \ + typeof(usrc) _tmpsrc =3D usrc; \ + bool _ret =3D true; \ + \ + scoped_user_read_access(_tmpsrc, efault) \ + unsafe_get_user(val, _tmpsrc, efault); 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a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1761137353; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: references:references; bh=lccNRRk780OLOrvRTmsIIfoLd+zwTDZxXhd+4kcSfCA=; b=jBvd0+8wGhqi9YLp+G44n5XgyHsh8eF5MQnWzMNg30j3PgApN0ylxUrS8tq8eAgva7Gr6V RLwP5H6AG5silIDQ== From: Thomas Gleixner To: LKML Cc: Julia Lawall , Nicolas Palix , kernel test robot , Russell King , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Linus Torvalds , x86@kernel.org, Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Nicholas Piggin , Christophe Leroy , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Heiko Carstens , Christian Borntraeger , Sven Schnelle , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Mathieu Desnoyers , Andrew Cooper , David Laight , Peter Zijlstra , Darren Hart , Davidlohr Bueso , =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A9=20Almeida?= , Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , Jan Kara , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [patch V4 09/12] [RFC] coccinelle: misc: Add scoped_$MODE_access() checker script References: <20251022102427.400699796@linutronix.de> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2025 14:49:13 +0200 (CEST) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" A common mistake in user access code is that the wrong access mode is selected for starting the user access section. As most architectures map Read and Write modes to ReadWrite this goes often unnoticed for quite some time. Aside of that the scoped user access mechanism requires that the same pointer is used for the actual accessor macros that was handed in to start the scope because the pointer can be modified by the scope begin mechanism if the architecture supports masking. Add a basic (and incomplete) coccinelle script to check for the common issues. The error output is: kernel/futex/futex.h:303:2-17: ERROR: Invalid pointer for unsafe_put_user(p= ) in scoped_user_write_access(to) kernel/futex/futex.h:292:2-17: ERROR: Invalid access mode unsafe_get_user()= in scoped_user_write_access() Not-Yet-Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Julia Lawall Cc: Nicolas Palix Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- scripts/coccinelle/misc/scoped_uaccess.cocci | 108 ++++++++++++++++++++++= +++++ 1 file changed, 108 insertions(+) --- /dev/null +++ b/scripts/coccinelle/misc/scoped_uaccess.cocci @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only +/// Validate scoped_masked_user*access() scopes +/// +// Confidence: Zero +// Options: --no-includes --include-headers + +virtual context +virtual report +virtual org + +@initialize:python@ +@@ + +scopemap =3D { + 'scoped_user_read_access_size' : 'scoped_user_read_access', + 'scoped_user_write_access_size' : 'scoped_user_write_access', + 'scoped_user_rw_access_size' : 'scoped_user_rw_access', +} + +# Most common accessors. Incomplete list +noaccessmap =3D { + 'scoped_user_read_access' : ('unsafe_put_user', 'unsafe_copy_to_us= er'), + 'scoped_user_write_access' : ('unsafe_get_user', 'unsafe_copy_from_= user'), +} + +# Most common accessors. Incomplete list +ptrmap =3D { + 'unsafe_put_user' : 1, + 'unsafe_get_user' : 1, + 'unsafe_copy_to_user' : 0, + 'unsafe_copy_from_user' : 0, +} + +print_mode =3D None + +def pr_err(pos, msg): + if print_mode =3D=3D 'R': + coccilib.report.print_report(pos[0], msg) + elif print_mode =3D=3D 'O': + cocci.print_main(msg, pos) + +@r0 depends on report || org@ +iterator name scoped_user_read_access, + scoped_user_read_access_size, + scoped_user_write_access, + scoped_user_write_access_size, + scoped_user_rw_access, + scoped_user_rw_access_size; +iterator scope; +statement S; +@@ + +( +( +scoped_user_read_access(...) S +| +scoped_user_read_access_size(...) S +| +scoped_user_write_access(...) S +| +scoped_user_write_access_size(...) S +| +scoped_user_rw_access(...) S +| +scoped_user_rw_access_size(...) S +) +& +scope(...) S +) + +@script:python depends on r0 && report@ +@@ +print_mode =3D 'R' + +@script:python depends on r0 && org@ +@@ +print_mode =3D 'O' + +@r1@ +expression sp, a0, a1; +iterator r0.scope; +identifier ac; +position p; +@@ + + scope(sp,...) { + <... + ac@p(a0, a1, ...); + ...> + } + +@script:python@ +pos << r1.p; +scope << r0.scope; +ac << r1.ac; +sp << r1.sp; +a0 << r1.a0; +a1 << r1.a1; +@@ + +scope =3D scopemap.get(scope, scope) +if ac in noaccessmap.get(scope, []): + pr_err(pos, 'ERROR: Invalid access mode %s() in %s()' %(ac, scope)) + +if ac in ptrmap: + ap =3D (a0, a1)[ptrmap[ac]] + if sp !=3D ap.lstrip('&').split('->')[0].strip(): + pr_err(pos, 'ERROR: Invalid pointer for %s(%s) in %s(%s)' %(ac, ap, = scope, sp)) From nobody Sat Feb 7 16:39:25 2026 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [193.142.43.55]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id BD796346E72; Wed, 22 Oct 2025 12:49:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=193.142.43.55 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761137370; cv=none; b=CHSwDeQ+84EbMiRZzpiccLFvE6fdiTA21zLvWHzFou6lumQSon0oalk3xd23I4udpFCJMTPSLg3IP6WQnTVRE7Goazk8+a2ijZn2Ssw9ZBDJ/uYmIIDDBSAAqVQnOxVuzr2Yrucgn4/Vy2HJfzSCyeIVCXTaGDS5bRl5k55J2OE= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761137370; c=relaxed/simple; bh=7r3/a/NFbc1wdYwqjmEXZSkW3O7gggboTKfkaRskPyY=; h=Message-ID:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Date; b=cwW0T3tuijcjZAnX2Ag4GghZgDf/2baVPEoP8rl04ORIsuROhd+3AzouCx+0+oTrB27CYlgr7HUTUaOHiC3/JPLF4x+/9+35ZvZmmHCIQbIomeOfTlU1JuFNoQJN1Y7DzOHI14QVg0gCRn6SgHKQ1DTQgN6ZcCBf0xu4aZuVrOA= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linutronix.de; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linutronix.de; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b=YCUM+m2I; dkim=permerror (0-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b=IZpjJMDC; arc=none smtp.client-ip=193.142.43.55 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linutronix.de Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linutronix.de Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b="YCUM+m2I"; dkim=permerror (0-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b="IZpjJMDC" Message-ID: <20251022103112.478876605@linutronix.de> DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020; t=1761137354; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: references:references; bh=CaAPbzoialu5mXFNLErT5ZTF4fpG+LkmcGL7QamE02U=; b=YCUM+m2IJhIlYNc3cw3Ka+JSw1r0rxQfagyYMBCbI5G0Wlrimf1GqVMRdPE4fE3q4DTDLL I3sZqCcSstmzPTAmKHsfJLX2C34OtucmDjHa59k+mhfvh5+9VviczJU5Sds0cipnh9SwfO oWZS+Qqu+HQ4gtdRXc2up+rIBxMO9BqQkbGhl/pgs0VaF5lnHLpP1SJqiRYu7DsIVtGwog iJzQBkR3BVxzibX9Vi4X6eSTOXUzrvM9S2tLua3pO5DkDcic3JptOzX0xEuxlfeEOEsy1h aSrVdebfZCKdTbD1hru16EJ14VbE11jH6OE5kYTFRDrxovf+JUjMjnVnSMwjFw== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1761137354; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: references:references; bh=CaAPbzoialu5mXFNLErT5ZTF4fpG+LkmcGL7QamE02U=; b=IZpjJMDCZvmWlpmGgE3lhdOQmOPckYbthUby0iY/Im/yxFE9DkRTg5O+cgCbWyzDN24LUx wOuZ0lgHzEUESmCA== From: Thomas Gleixner To: LKML Cc: Peter Zijlstra , Darren Hart , Davidlohr Bueso , =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A9=20Almeida?= , kernel test robot , Russell King , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Linus Torvalds , x86@kernel.org, Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Nicholas Piggin , Christophe Leroy , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Heiko Carstens , Christian Borntraeger , Sven Schnelle , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Mathieu Desnoyers , Andrew Cooper , David Laight , Julia Lawall , Nicolas Palix , Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , Jan Kara , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [patch V4 10/12] futex: Convert to scoped user access References: <20251022102427.400699796@linutronix.de> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2025 14:49:14 +0200 (CEST) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable From: Thomas Gleixner Replace the open coded implementation with the new get/put_user_scoped() helpers. No functional change intended Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Peter Zijlstra Cc: Darren Hart Cc: Davidlohr Bueso Cc: "Andr=C3=A9 Almeida" Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- V4: Rename once moar V3: Adapt to scope changes V2: Convert to scoped variant --- kernel/futex/futex.h | 37 ++----------------------------------- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-) --- --- a/kernel/futex/futex.h +++ b/kernel/futex/futex.h @@ -285,48 +285,15 @@ static inline int futex_cmpxchg_value_lo * This does a plain atomic user space read, and the user pointer has * already been verified earlier by get_futex_key() to be both aligned * and actually in user space, just like futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(). - * - * We still want to avoid any speculation, and while __get_user() is - * the traditional model for this, it's actually slower than doing - * this manually these days. - * - * We could just have a per-architecture special function for it, - * the same way we do futex_atomic_cmpxchg_inatomic(), but rather - * than force everybody to do that, write it out long-hand using - * the low-level user-access infrastructure. - * - * This looks a bit overkill, but generally just results in a couple - * of instructions. */ static __always_inline int futex_get_value(u32 *dest, u32 __user *from) { - u32 val; - - if (can_do_masked_user_access()) - from =3D masked_user_access_begin(from); - else if (!user_read_access_begin(from, sizeof(*from))) - return -EFAULT; - unsafe_get_user(val, from, Efault); - user_read_access_end(); - *dest =3D val; - return 0; -Efault: - user_read_access_end(); - return -EFAULT; + return get_user_scoped(*dest, from) ? 0 : -EFAULT; } =20 static __always_inline int futex_put_value(u32 val, u32 __user *to) { - if (can_do_masked_user_access()) - to =3D masked_user_access_begin(to); - else if (!user_write_access_begin(to, sizeof(*to))) - return -EFAULT; - unsafe_put_user(val, to, Efault); - user_write_access_end(); - return 0; -Efault: - user_write_access_end(); - return -EFAULT; + return put_user_scoped(val, to) ? 0 : -EFAULT; } =20 static inline int futex_get_value_locked(u32 *dest, u32 __user *from) From nobody Sat Feb 7 16:39:25 2026 Received: from galois.linutronix.de (Galois.linutronix.de [193.142.43.55]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id DC622347BCF; Wed, 22 Oct 2025 12:49:18 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=193.142.43.55 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761137369; cv=none; b=f/zAwQXRmHk80Meaorhln7cF3OGQdv36jTGyNAir2VgWBg0p9aZSwK+m4D7kD619qNk0FpQhs3OQu/sMe/P43ZljpFMa3kQ+gCARfBtruljLLZjC4qzc0Bn4e5G4uyXnvtxvdx+yWZ8xTdE/642E5d5YtS178wCPI3lK3ewcqhE= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1761137369; c=relaxed/simple; bh=XFbP7c4oWTMLAjnLkkeDQLOvFLNhdk14vwJ7xtqtbVU=; h=Message-ID:From:To:Cc:Subject:References:MIME-Version: Content-Type:Date; b=olEOwaQDM0+dqo2eCwjyz5JLm/LVZZ4WEsGkN+wx30gUBv5dXmgh3ennfZ2hK14fVeMT7gU3lU6POavjQNY9C546lIqUg123PskbtUW7Nj4vAXzboBJqHX1FP7AAN2+0zDdt6UYxb2j1iCcZSy5u5BNDUE7u3V16Do15/PPD5To= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linutronix.de; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linutronix.de; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b=sE058jY4; dkim=permerror (0-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b=LCpBggbX; arc=none smtp.client-ip=193.142.43.55 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=none dis=none) header.from=linutronix.de Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=linutronix.de Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b="sE058jY4"; dkim=permerror (0-bit key) header.d=linutronix.de header.i=@linutronix.de header.b="LCpBggbX" Message-ID: <20251022103112.539017094@linutronix.de> DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020; t=1761137356; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: references:references; bh=uuF1PbflRL7G3epzTRJvFK2AzVPBYAY82eKYUINaU84=; b=sE058jY4nU6VsrYvJYJGWz0GnmS2zddKt81kyGurkLnKI3lTj4IAfwcC7vb0GQE2MKAIC9 06bYY0LlPsompS+ICNa3F0PddkENSI1sjP6uhPMX8hRgmC4QtXBo0vzsziPIKkEfKLUxRz e78CSOuQNN3Z0MNphVxMCQu15iLvF0NdT6dFANIPGRsh1693eM6rjQmEsxH7SYRE9EXGNs aJ1tZ74jsYpp+Dr7L+Q4UvLxfDGI4CvODwLqZcPoIb4kFWxVKbAkhaHmpA/QT/7i7q48Gk i6f0dFKptvOHQUJs1yizaeIwBhEXcT5MWnhDxQOY/prkjd4IGXRTuOAeBOIfPQ== DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1761137356; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: references:references; bh=uuF1PbflRL7G3epzTRJvFK2AzVPBYAY82eKYUINaU84=; b=LCpBggbX1O1nqs3aE6YLPbmxhfEEsetgCmtO5LHIcdjPiL9+7YVxy6NLO1LLLCxGKuvIYc NMSIIhJLPzxbI5Dw== From: Thomas Gleixner To: LKML Cc: x86@kernel.org, kernel test robot , Russell King , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Linus Torvalds , Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Nicholas Piggin , Christophe Leroy , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Heiko Carstens , Christian Borntraeger , Sven Schnelle , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Mathieu Desnoyers , Andrew Cooper , David Laight , Julia Lawall , Nicolas Palix , Peter Zijlstra , Darren Hart , Davidlohr Bueso , =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A9=20Almeida?= , Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , Jan Kara , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Subject: [patch V4 11/12] x86/futex: Convert to scoped user access References: <20251022102427.400699796@linutronix.de> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2025 14:49:15 +0200 (CEST) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Replace the open coded implementation with the scoped user access guards No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: x86@kernel.org Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- V4: Rename once more Use asm_inline - Andrew V3: Adapt to scope changes V2: Convert to scoped masked access Use RW access functions - Christophe --- arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h | 75 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------= ----- 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-) --- --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/futex.h @@ -46,38 +46,31 @@ do { \ } while(0) =20 static __always_inline int arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser(int op, int oparg, = int *oval, - u32 __user *uaddr) + u32 __user *uaddr) { - if (can_do_masked_user_access()) - uaddr =3D masked_user_access_begin(uaddr); - else if (!user_access_begin(uaddr, sizeof(u32))) - return -EFAULT; - - switch (op) { - case FUTEX_OP_SET: - unsafe_atomic_op1("xchgl %0, %2", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efault); - break; - case FUTEX_OP_ADD: - unsafe_atomic_op1(LOCK_PREFIX "xaddl %0, %2", oval, - uaddr, oparg, Efault); - break; - case FUTEX_OP_OR: - unsafe_atomic_op2("orl %4, %3", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efault); - break; - case FUTEX_OP_ANDN: - unsafe_atomic_op2("andl %4, %3", oval, uaddr, ~oparg, Efault); - break; - case FUTEX_OP_XOR: - unsafe_atomic_op2("xorl %4, %3", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efault); - break; - default: - user_access_end(); - return -ENOSYS; + scoped_user_rw_access(uaddr, Efault) { + switch (op) { + case FUTEX_OP_SET: + unsafe_atomic_op1("xchgl %0, %2", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efault); + break; + case FUTEX_OP_ADD: + unsafe_atomic_op1(LOCK_PREFIX "xaddl %0, %2", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efaul= t); + break; + case FUTEX_OP_OR: + unsafe_atomic_op2("orl %4, %3", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efault); + break; + case FUTEX_OP_ANDN: + unsafe_atomic_op2("andl %4, %3", oval, uaddr, ~oparg, Efault); + break; + case FUTEX_OP_XOR: + unsafe_atomic_op2("xorl %4, %3", oval, uaddr, oparg, Efault); + break; + default: + return -ENOSYS; + } } - user_access_end(); return 0; Efault: - user_access_end(); return -EFAULT; } =20 @@ -86,21 +79,19 @@ static inline int futex_atomic_cmpxchg_i { int ret =3D 0; =20 - if (can_do_masked_user_access()) - uaddr =3D masked_user_access_begin(uaddr); 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a=ed25519-sha256; c=relaxed/relaxed; d=linutronix.de; s=2020e; t=1761137357; h=from:from:reply-to:subject:subject:date:date:message-id:message-id: to:to:cc:cc:mime-version:mime-version:content-type:content-type: references:references; bh=Zgu2fA8f5xJPsST4+i4W8NVv6qck0BV/bxjOydsn72k=; b=XL9aqYXe9gwXBer7lMaKuJJPuEejbrtT8VGos4rq/T6Pk40BsJ8Lc68pZAE8duaBoNwxvZ zqjZ+XGAseMveoCg== From: Thomas Gleixner To: LKML Cc: Alexander Viro , Christian Brauner , Jan Kara , linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, kernel test robot , Russell King , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, Linus Torvalds , x86@kernel.org, Madhavan Srinivasan , Michael Ellerman , Nicholas Piggin , Christophe Leroy , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, Paul Walmsley , Palmer Dabbelt , linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org, Heiko Carstens , Christian Borntraeger , Sven Schnelle , linux-s390@vger.kernel.org, Mathieu Desnoyers , Andrew Cooper , David Laight , Julia Lawall , Nicolas Palix , Peter Zijlstra , Darren Hart , Davidlohr Bueso , =?UTF-8?q?Andr=C3=A9=20Almeida?= Subject: [patch V4 12/12] select: Convert to scoped user access References: <20251022102427.400699796@linutronix.de> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Date: Wed, 22 Oct 2025 14:49:16 +0200 (CEST) Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" From: Thomas Gleixner Replace the open coded implementation with the scoped user access guard. No functional change intended. Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner Cc: Alexander Viro Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Jan Kara Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) --- V4: Use read guard - Peterz Rename once more V3: Adopt to scope changes --- fs/select.c | 12 ++++-------- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) --- --- a/fs/select.c +++ b/fs/select.c @@ -776,17 +776,13 @@ static inline int get_sigset_argpack(str { // the path is hot enough for overhead of copy_from_user() to matter if (from) { - if (can_do_masked_user_access()) - from =3D masked_user_access_begin(from); - else if (!user_read_access_begin(from, sizeof(*from))) - return -EFAULT; - unsafe_get_user(to->p, &from->p, Efault); - unsafe_get_user(to->size, &from->size, Efault); - user_read_access_end(); + scoped_user_read_access(from, Efault) { + unsafe_get_user(to->p, &from->p, Efault); + unsafe_get_user(to->size, &from->size, Efault); + } } return 0; Efault: - user_read_access_end(); return -EFAULT; }