From nobody Thu Oct 2 02:12:40 2025 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 5631F1E8329; Mon, 29 Sep 2025 19:49:14 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1759175359; cv=none; b=V1XMzKRRGMF+iY+Ze2h+O5UaRdVyTE7o/GdNNi/e3Ytaa197qAV8VJlEvg3GnQayp8ysN/AHXHTvSnEmMO+H+655cqOpeTiVMdJlj14bxVS8/ItSJU7Z4D1/8dEzMdDGnyN2IzGfg/E7bnu2LpGAd2xbSonAlgKSQsFp5XCkalY= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1759175359; c=relaxed/simple; bh=U3yYjwjog5ng84yD7ihxb3ySNuLzCjjnYKjYGVPY00I=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=NhM/u8MimODvUkQzx48SuvzKxhuE3xAe1qV8eOcALTtnoBCWgSpKRWITbhKt9uVk3DWhp1Y61n0hGuwJp+fe3aiwe433PyQsCSKYq1sccYTFf7dOA8C5xWUgoG3JnM93l63NDyrJVYRPZl9Z8WJxAkQN1LMrc0RH5UAOEofwwqA= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=mGU91JcG; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="mGU91JcG" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 70C79C4CEF4; Mon, 29 Sep 2025 19:49:14 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1759175354; bh=U3yYjwjog5ng84yD7ihxb3ySNuLzCjjnYKjYGVPY00I=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=mGU91JcGcQRdgPX4y2y/ykI1dDYnDOPCRnEnIop7u/RUcreIuNhbmh5nplPRaR8TN 0NitztZoBLyJ+c07Z14kDAjZtwRGfB422C3Gk2h3au2VBw64c7LUotF11mc9KT5qlI Vjl1runezfWfVpi+lmHkjasL08eUubLk7xgQpKt2TtLBckI/+BaGl9DELg0jM96hUf WMzWPUYn1s4oPxrKzP4mtn+vh6eD6aESyOpRwePBl/I1R/41tjTyPR5W1l+kDLcC1N CJvA+dOkK+4p1qCEOqJghCgY+kn8sP9df3lQxd3pYSXaUjxrjVdFlX1fmqoBfAO4FT zdoLC1f5Vxsvg== From: Jarkko Sakkinen To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org Cc: dpsmith@apertussolutions.com, ross.philipson@oracle.com, Jarkko Sakkinen , Peter Huewe , Jarkko Sakkinen , Jason Gunthorpe , David Howells , Paul Moore , James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , James Bottomley , Mimi Zohar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org (open list), keyrings@vger.kernel.org (open list:KEYS/KEYRINGS), linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org (open list:SECURITY SUBSYSTEM) Subject: [PATCH v3 07/10] tpm-buf: check for corruption in tpm_buf_append_handle() Date: Mon, 29 Sep 2025 22:48:29 +0300 Message-Id: <20250929194832.2913286-8-jarkko@kernel.org> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.39.5 In-Reply-To: <20250929194832.2913286-1-jarkko@kernel.org> References: <20250929194832.2913286-1-jarkko@kernel.org> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" From: Jarkko Sakkinen Unify TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW into TPM_BUF_INVALID flag because semantically they are identical. Test and set TPM_BUF_INVALID in tpm_buf_append_handle() following the pattern from other functions in tpm-buf.c. Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen Reviewed-by: Jonathan McDowell --- v3: - No changes. v2: - A new patch. --- drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c | 14 ++++++++------ include/linux/tpm.h | 8 +++----- security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c | 6 +++--- 3 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c index dc882fc9fa9e..69ee77400539 100644 --- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c +++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm-buf.c @@ -104,13 +104,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_length); */ void tpm_buf_append(struct tpm_buf *buf, const u8 *new_data, u16 new_lengt= h) { - /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) return; =20 if ((buf->length + new_length) > PAGE_SIZE) { WARN(1, "tpm_buf: write overflow\n"); - buf->flags |=3D TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW; + buf->flags |=3D TPM_BUF_INVALID; return; } =20 @@ -157,8 +156,12 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm_buf_append_u32); */ void tpm_buf_append_handle(struct tpm_chip *chip, struct tpm_buf *buf, u32= handle) { + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) + return; + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_TPM2B) { dev_err(&chip->dev, "Invalid buffer type (TPM2B)\n"); + buf->flags |=3D TPM_BUF_INVALID; return; } =20 @@ -177,14 +180,13 @@ static void tpm_buf_read(struct tpm_buf *buf, off_t *= offset, size_t count, void { off_t next_offset; =20 - /* Return silently if overflow has already happened. */ - if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) + if (buf->flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) return; =20 next_offset =3D *offset + count; if (next_offset > buf->length) { WARN(1, "tpm_buf: read out of boundary\n"); - buf->flags |=3D TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR; + buf->flags |=3D TPM_BUF_INVALID; return; } =20 diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h index e72e7657faa2..5283f32781c4 100644 --- a/include/linux/tpm.h +++ b/include/linux/tpm.h @@ -366,12 +366,10 @@ struct tpm_header { } __packed; =20 enum tpm_buf_flags { - /* the capacity exceeded: */ - TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW =3D BIT(0), /* TPM2B format: */ - TPM_BUF_TPM2B =3D BIT(1), - /* read out of boundary: */ - TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR =3D BIT(2), + TPM_BUF_TPM2B =3D BIT(0), + /* The buffer is in invalid and unusable state: */ + TPM_BUF_INVALID =3D BIT(1), }; =20 /* diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trus= ted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c index 8e3b283a59b2..119d5152c0db 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c @@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, /* creation PCR */ tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, 0); =20 - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc =3D -E2BIG; tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); goto out; @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip, goto out; =20 blob_len =3D tpm_buf_read_u32(&buf, &offset); - if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR) { + if (blob_len > MAX_BLOB_SIZE || buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc =3D -E2BIG; goto out; } @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip, =20 tpm_buf_append(&buf, blob, blob_len); =20 - if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW) { + if (buf.flags & TPM_BUF_INVALID) { rc =3D -E2BIG; tpm2_end_auth_session(chip); goto out; --=20 2.39.5