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Mon, 15 Sep 2025 11:22:08 -0700 (PDT) Received: from manjaro.lan ([2409:40d4:306a:a34:c83e:3326:3473:afa6]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id d9443c01a7336-26310ead07dsm65755295ad.29.2025.09.15.11.22.03 (version=TLS1_3 cipher=TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 bits=256/256); Mon, 15 Sep 2025 11:22:07 -0700 (PDT) From: Pranav Tyagi To: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, peterz@infradead.org, dvhart@infradead.org, dave@stgolabs.net, andrealmeid@igalia.com, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Cc: jann@thejh.net, keescook@chromium.org, skhan@linuxfoundation.org, Pranav Tyagi Subject: [PATCH RESEND v5] futex: don't leak robust_list pointer on exec race Date: Mon, 15 Sep 2025 23:51:54 +0530 Message-ID: <20250915182154.9468-1-pranav.tyagi03@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.49.0 Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" sys_get_robust_list() and compat_get_robust_list() use ptrace_may_access() to check if the calling task is allowed to access another task's robust_list pointer. This check is racy against a concurrent exec() in the target process. During exec(), a task may transition from a non-privileged binary to a privileged one (e.g., setuid binary) and its credentials/memory mappings may change. If get_robust_list() performs ptrace_may_access() before this transition, it may erroneously allow access to sensitive information after the target becomes privileged. A racy access allows an attacker to exploit a window during which ptrace_may_access() passes before a target process transitions to a privileged state via exec(). For example, consider a non-privileged task T that is about to execute a setuid-root binary. An attacker task A calls get_robust_list(T) while T is still unprivileged. Since ptrace_may_access() checks permissions based on current credentials, it succeeds. However, if T begins exec immediately afterwards, it becomes privileged and may change its memory mappings. Because get_robust_list() proceeds to access T->robust_list without synchronizing with exec() it may read user-space pointers from a now-privileged process. This violates the intended post-exec access restrictions and could expose sensitive memory addresses or be used as a primitive in a larger exploit chain. Consequently, the race can lead to unauthorized disclosure of information across privilege boundaries and poses a potential security risk. Take a read lock on signal->exec_update_lock prior to invoking ptrace_may_access() and accessing the robust_list/compat_robust_list. This ensures that the target task's exec state remains stable during the check, allowing for consistent and synchronized validation of credentials. Signed-off-by: Pranav Tyagi Suggested-by: Jann Horn Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-fsdevel/1477863998-3298-5-git-send-emai= l-jann@thejh.net/ Link: https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/119 --- Resending to correct Darren Hart's email. No changes since v5. changed in v5: - added futex_ prefix to function names - changed data type of ret to int - struct task_struct *p initialized at declaration changed in v4: - added task_robust_list() function changed in v3: - replaced RCU with scoped_guard(rcu) - corrected error return type cast - added IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_COMPAT) for ensuring compatability - removed stray newlines and unnecessary line breaks changed in v2: - improved changelog - helper function for common part of compat and native syscalls kernel/futex/syscalls.c | 106 +++++++++++++++++++++------------------- 1 file changed, 56 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-) diff --git a/kernel/futex/syscalls.c b/kernel/futex/syscalls.c index 4b6da9116aa6..880c9bf2f315 100644 --- a/kernel/futex/syscalls.c +++ b/kernel/futex/syscalls.c @@ -39,6 +39,56 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE2(set_robust_list, struct robust_list_head= __user *, head, return 0; } =20 +static inline void __user *futex_task_robust_list(struct task_struct *p, b= ool compat) +{ +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT + if (compat) + return p->compat_robust_list; +#endif + return p->robust_list; +} + +static void __user *futex_get_robust_list_common(int pid, bool compat) +{ + struct task_struct *p =3D current; + void __user *head; + int ret; + + scoped_guard(rcu) { + if (pid) { + p =3D find_task_by_vpid(pid); + if (!p) + return (void __user *)ERR_PTR(-ESRCH); + } + get_task_struct(p); + } + + /* + * Hold exec_update_lock to serialize with concurrent exec() + * so ptrace_may_access() is checked against stable credentials + */ + ret =3D down_read_killable(&p->signal->exec_update_lock); + if (ret) + goto err_put; + + ret =3D -EPERM; + if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) + goto err_unlock; + + head =3D futex_task_robust_list(p, compat); + + up_read(&p->signal->exec_update_lock); + put_task_struct(p); + + return head; + +err_unlock: + up_read(&p->signal->exec_update_lock); +err_put: + put_task_struct(p); + return (void __user *)ERR_PTR(ret); +} + /** * sys_get_robust_list() - Get the robust-futex list head of a task * @pid: pid of the process [zero for current task] @@ -49,36 +99,14 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid, struct robust_list_head __user * __user *, head_ptr, size_t __user *, len_ptr) { - struct robust_list_head __user *head; - unsigned long ret; - struct task_struct *p; - - rcu_read_lock(); - - ret =3D -ESRCH; - if (!pid) - p =3D current; - else { - p =3D find_task_by_vpid(pid); - if (!p) - goto err_unlock; - } - - ret =3D -EPERM; - if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) - goto err_unlock; + struct robust_list_head __user *head =3D futex_get_robust_list_common(pid= , false); =20 - head =3D p->robust_list; - rcu_read_unlock(); + if (IS_ERR(head)) + return PTR_ERR(head); =20 if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr)) return -EFAULT; return put_user(head, head_ptr); - -err_unlock: - rcu_read_unlock(); - - return ret; } =20 long do_futex(u32 __user *uaddr, int op, u32 val, ktime_t *timeout, @@ -455,36 +483,14 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(get_robust_list, int, pid, compat_uptr_t __user *, head_ptr, compat_size_t __user *, len_ptr) { - struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head; - unsigned long ret; - struct task_struct *p; - - rcu_read_lock(); - - ret =3D -ESRCH; - if (!pid) - p =3D current; - else { - p =3D find_task_by_vpid(pid); - if (!p) - goto err_unlock; - } - - ret =3D -EPERM; - if (!ptrace_may_access(p, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS)) - goto err_unlock; + struct compat_robust_list_head __user *head =3D futex_get_robust_list_com= mon(pid, true); =20 - head =3D p->compat_robust_list; - rcu_read_unlock(); + if (IS_ERR(head)) + return PTR_ERR(head); =20 if (put_user(sizeof(*head), len_ptr)) return -EFAULT; return put_user(ptr_to_compat(head), head_ptr); - -err_unlock: - rcu_read_unlock(); - - return ret; } #endif /* CONFIG_COMPAT */ =20 --=20 2.49.0