From nobody Sat Oct 4 09:38:02 2025 Received: from smtp.kernel.org (aws-us-west-2-korg-mail-1.web.codeaurora.org [10.30.226.201]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 0A53D27467B; Mon, 18 Aug 2025 18:57:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1755543472; cv=none; b=AEcfLcmsX0lnxP+ZaARRvPqcgHEd2yQ3waM0/1km+pOQAwtwS90BlkaGU8Qjqqu1o4EfqLQ/cunMpNUMKmUnigT6RqMXIXVjsZGGdDxvh2EKwDbH9XbIYKG6+8pdIp9z2d2TalrG+k+bNe2axKyylf4gygGdVRRygJps4TGD204= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1755543472; c=relaxed/simple; bh=nxE7BPv67vk6+O2NN512KZ/22Fu2rCuKLzKSJq7gvSM=; h=From:Date:Subject:MIME-Version:Content-Type:Message-Id:References: In-Reply-To:To:Cc; b=EtYWA7is4wex4nLQ5ZniGoPtLVsRUim5CwRW/RUWAJPvnlJpdQ2Mw61FPOHvP70H+vZBQk7S6AEZRmoscUJTeUHqkzGecjdIHotXAUMQvW7vBtAxqVVG6donr5n56buoIvvI1ebGeEOb8p8GJpK20c42GnDfkOSWiZC3T1ijRUM= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b=sbugmBn5; arc=none smtp.client-ip=10.30.226.201 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=kernel.org header.i=@kernel.org header.b="sbugmBn5" Received: by smtp.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 42EA7C4CEF1; Mon, 18 Aug 2025 18:57:49 +0000 (UTC) DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=kernel.org; s=k20201202; t=1755543471; bh=nxE7BPv67vk6+O2NN512KZ/22Fu2rCuKLzKSJq7gvSM=; h=From:Date:Subject:References:In-Reply-To:To:Cc:From; b=sbugmBn57cQ8lbdaiAd7Gnq66RWDWOqKkW5DIdjslI9YoYxtUjGmaX+o3UbKNnVfp 3H59+D4rVbVntzcMomi0OTb1kyMSqTZqnaXCoT+EEqVURgwDZ7Le6w9rPk614A9cBE 0s/7azogaZGyZkPHExvPlqwzrK3IGuQPUpYnl//JiQsNFEdFDNo7cxvNnOFk6pz2Jq Yu4S/0610rNjEUnXaGRaBCbdf00ID0/QHYN0V4Qx49F32ObzsUtfPWf45Mz5tsoDqd GmZAc8pnH1+5yhqI85cWTUSlQORL09qxaT0Bh41+Y84tj2dT9gk524+6NHKKZ1PuW1 IvKf7NL8HUN5A== From: Nathan Chancellor Date: Mon, 18 Aug 2025 11:57:18 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 02/10] arch/Kconfig: Drop always true condition from RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Message-Id: <20250818-bump-min-llvm-ver-15-v1-2-c8b1d0f955e0@kernel.org> References: <20250818-bump-min-llvm-ver-15-v1-0-c8b1d0f955e0@kernel.org> In-Reply-To: <20250818-bump-min-llvm-ver-15-v1-0-c8b1d0f955e0@kernel.org> To: Andrew Morton Cc: Arnd Bergmann , Kees Cook , Nick Desaulniers , Bill Wendling , Justin Stitt , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, llvm@lists.linux.dev, patches@lists.linux.dev, Nathan Chancellor , linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org X-Mailer: b4 0.15-dev X-Developer-Signature: v=1; a=openpgp-sha256; l=891; i=nathan@kernel.org; h=from:subject:message-id; bh=nxE7BPv67vk6+O2NN512KZ/22Fu2rCuKLzKSJq7gvSM=; b=owGbwMvMwCUmm602sfCA1DTG02pJDBmLyxfyvjymodS3fOtqrmtvYv1tZyowXq8yXmSW/NT50 up0FduWjlIWBjEuBlkxRZbqx6rHDQ3nnGW8cWoSzBxWJpAhDFycAjCRxe0Mv1n39k/csUPrn8aS 69sbPJibF686X5br/LNnwXn130JLbJoYGX5HbqvwvGWRpWb4S0Py/v2rkX5Nohr/lSSeHtqwkp2 7hhsA X-Developer-Key: i=nathan@kernel.org; a=openpgp; fpr=2437CB76E544CB6AB3D9DFD399739260CB6CB716 Now that the minimum supported version of LLVM for building the kernel has been bumped to 15.0.0, the second depends line in RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET is always true, so it can be removed. Signed-off-by: Nathan Chancellor --- Cc: linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org --- arch/Kconfig | 1 - 1 file changed, 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/arch/Kconfig b/arch/Kconfig index d1b4ffd6e085..4935c4c26f09 100644 --- a/arch/Kconfig +++ b/arch/Kconfig @@ -1475,7 +1475,6 @@ config RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET bool "Support for randomizing kernel stack offset on syscall entry" if EX= PERT default y depends on HAVE_ARCH_RANDOMIZE_KSTACK_OFFSET - depends on INIT_STACK_NONE || !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >=3D 140000 help The kernel stack offset can be randomized (after pt_regs) by roughly 5 bits of entropy, frustrating memory corruption --=20 2.50.1