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Peter Anvin" Subject: [PATCH v12 18/24] KVM: VMX: Set host constant supervisor states to VMCS fields Date: Mon, 11 Aug 2025 19:55:26 -0700 Message-ID: <20250812025606.74625-19-chao.gao@intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.47.1 In-Reply-To: <20250812025606.74625-1-chao.gao@intel.com> References: <20250812025606.74625-1-chao.gao@intel.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" From: Yang Weijiang Save constant values to HOST_{S_CET,SSP,INTR_SSP_TABLE} field explicitly. Kernel IBT is supported and the setting in MSR_IA32_S_CET is static after post-boot(The exception is BIOS call case but vCPU thread never across it) and KVM doesn't need to refresh HOST_S_CET field before every VM-Enter/ VM-Exit sequence. Host supervisor shadow stack is not enabled now and SSP is not accessible to kernel mode, thus it's safe to set host IA32_INT_SSP_TAB/SSP VMCS field to 0s. When shadow stack is enabled for CPL3, SSP is reloaded from PL3_SSP before it exits to userspace. Check SDM Vol 2A/B Chapter 3/4 for SYSCALL/ SYSRET/SYSENTER SYSEXIT/RDSSP/CALL etc. Prevent KVM module loading if host supervisor shadow stack SHSTK_EN is set in MSR_IA32_S_CET as KVM cannot co-exit with it correctly. Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson Suggested-by: Chao Gao Signed-off-by: Yang Weijiang Reviewed-by: Maxim Levitsky Reviewed-by: Chao Gao Tested-by: Mathias Krause Tested-by: John Allen Signed-off-by: Chao Gao --- arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h | 4 ++++ arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 15 +++++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 12 ++++++++++++ arch/x86/kvm/x86.h | 1 + 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilitie= s.h index 5316c27f6099..7d290b2cb0f4 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/capabilities.h @@ -103,6 +103,10 @@ static inline bool cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl(void) return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL; } =20 +static inline bool cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl(void) +{ + return (vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_CET_STATE); +} static inline bool cpu_has_vmx_mpx(void) { return vmcs_config.vmentry_ctrl & VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS; diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c index 130ffbe7dc1a..ba44223405cd 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c @@ -4308,6 +4308,21 @@ void vmx_set_constant_host_state(struct vcpu_vmx *vm= x) =20 if (cpu_has_load_ia32_efer()) vmcs_write64(HOST_IA32_EFER, kvm_host.efer); + + /* + * Supervisor shadow stack is not enabled on host side, i.e., + * host IA32_S_CET.SHSTK_EN bit is guaranteed to 0 now, per SDM + * description(RDSSP instruction), SSP is not readable in CPL0, + * so resetting the two registers to 0s at VM-Exit does no harm + * to kernel execution. When execution flow exits to userspace, + * SSP is reloaded from IA32_PL3_SSP. Check SDM Vol.2A/B Chapter + * 3 and 4 for details. + */ + if (cpu_has_load_cet_ctrl()) { + vmcs_writel(HOST_S_CET, kvm_host.s_cet); + vmcs_writel(HOST_SSP, 0); + vmcs_writel(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE, 0); + } } =20 void set_cr4_guest_host_mask(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx) diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c index cc39ace47262..91e78c506105 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c @@ -9845,6 +9845,18 @@ int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops *ops) return -EIO; } =20 + if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) { + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_S_CET, kvm_host.s_cet); + /* + * Linux doesn't yet support supervisor shadow stacks (SSS), so + * KVM doesn't save/restore the associated MSRs, i.e. KVM may + * clobber the host values. Yell and refuse to load if SSS is + * unexpectedly enabled, e.g. to avoid crashing the host. + */ + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(kvm_host.s_cet & CET_SHSTK_EN)) + return -EIO; + } + memset(&kvm_caps, 0, sizeof(kvm_caps)); =20 x86_emulator_cache =3D kvm_alloc_emulator_cache(); diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h index d5b039addd11..d612ddcae247 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.h @@ -50,6 +50,7 @@ struct kvm_host_values { u64 efer; u64 xcr0; u64 xss; + u64 s_cet; u64 arch_capabilities; }; =20 --=20 2.47.1