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Howlett" , Vlastimil Babka , Lorenzo Stoakes Cc: linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, oliver.sang@intel.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org, jeffxu@google.com, Michael Ellerman , Pedro Falcato Subject: [PATCH v2 5/6] mseal: Replace can_modify_mm_madv with a vma variant Date: Wed, 7 Aug 2024 22:13:08 +0100 Message-ID: <20240807211309.2729719-6-pedro.falcato@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.46.0 In-Reply-To: <20240807211309.2729719-1-pedro.falcato@gmail.com> References: <20240807211309.2729719-1-pedro.falcato@gmail.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" Replace can_modify_mm_madv() with a single vma variant, and associated checks in madvise. While we're at it, also invert the order of checks in: if (unlikely(is_ro_anon(vma) && !can_modify_vma(vma)) Checking if we can modify the vma itself (through vm_flags) is certainly cheaper than is_ro_anon() due to arch_vma_access_permitted() looking at e.g pkeys registers (with extra branches) in some architectures. Signed-off-by: Pedro Falcato --- mm/internal.h | 6 ++---- mm/madvise.c | 13 +++---------- mm/mseal.c | 17 ++++------------- 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-) diff --git a/mm/internal.h b/mm/internal.h index 90f50f3c4cf..3f9a5c17626 100644 --- a/mm/internal.h +++ b/mm/internal.h @@ -1373,8 +1373,7 @@ static inline bool can_modify_vma(struct vm_area_stru= ct *vma) =20 bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigned long end); -bool can_modify_mm_madv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, - unsigned long end, int behavior); +bool can_modify_vma_madv(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int behavior); #else static inline int can_do_mseal(unsigned long flags) { @@ -1387,8 +1386,7 @@ static inline bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm= , unsigned long start, return true; } =20 -static inline bool can_modify_mm_madv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long = start, - unsigned long end, int behavior) +static inline bool can_modify_vma_madv(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int beh= avior) { return true; } diff --git a/mm/madvise.c b/mm/madvise.c index 89089d84f8d..4e64770be16 100644 --- a/mm/madvise.c +++ b/mm/madvise.c @@ -1031,6 +1031,9 @@ static int madvise_vma_behavior(struct vm_area_struct= *vma, struct anon_vma_name *anon_name; unsigned long new_flags =3D vma->vm_flags; =20 + if (unlikely(!can_modify_vma_madv(vma, behavior))) + return -EPERM; + switch (behavior) { case MADV_REMOVE: return madvise_remove(vma, prev, start, end); @@ -1448,15 +1451,6 @@ int do_madvise(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long s= tart, size_t len_in, int beh start =3D untagged_addr_remote(mm, start); end =3D start + len; =20 - /* - * Check if the address range is sealed for do_madvise(). - * can_modify_mm_madv assumes we have acquired the lock on MM. - */ - if (unlikely(!can_modify_mm_madv(mm, start, end, behavior))) { - error =3D -EPERM; - goto out; - } - blk_start_plug(&plug); switch (behavior) { case MADV_POPULATE_READ: @@ -1470,7 +1464,6 @@ int do_madvise(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long st= art, size_t len_in, int beh } blk_finish_plug(&plug); =20 -out: if (write) mmap_write_unlock(mm); else diff --git a/mm/mseal.c b/mm/mseal.c index 4591ae8d29c..6559242dd05 100644 --- a/mm/mseal.c +++ b/mm/mseal.c @@ -67,24 +67,15 @@ bool can_modify_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long = start, unsigned long end) } =20 /* - * Check if the vmas of a memory range are allowed to be modified by madvi= se. - * the memory ranger can have a gap (unallocated memory). - * return true, if it is allowed. + * Check if a vma is allowed to be modified by madvise. */ -bool can_modify_mm_madv(struct mm_struct *mm, unsigned long start, unsigne= d long end, - int behavior) +bool can_modify_vma_madv(struct vm_area_struct *vma, int behavior) { - struct vm_area_struct *vma; - - VMA_ITERATOR(vmi, mm, start); - if (!is_madv_discard(behavior)) return true; =20 - /* going through each vma to check. */ - for_each_vma_range(vmi, vma, end) - if (unlikely(is_ro_anon(vma) && !can_modify_vma(vma))) - return false; + if (unlikely(!can_modify_vma(vma) && is_ro_anon(vma))) + return false; =20 /* Allow by default. */ return true; --=20 2.46.0