From nobody Fri Dec 19 21:13:48 2025 Received: from madrid.collaboradmins.com (madrid.collaboradmins.com [46.235.227.194]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by smtp.subspace.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id 8501A16DEA8; Wed, 29 May 2024 08:26:52 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; arc=none smtp.client-ip=46.235.227.194 ARC-Seal: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716971214; cv=none; b=B3HQnkkfNg56Ei+pwtZtNP7d2RFdE73sLMsgH6ZzwvHlc3AJNhDJQQ1rcLxJBdsyY8HosDyNnGWaNeRbPPxV7uCvaedbcimE9mtS154ff24Z28aPQ+27C6eN5jormgdAr0EW+vjvltjNF16M3v5mt329Mh23wbLFKhm3JlWjb7I= ARC-Message-Signature: i=1; a=rsa-sha256; d=subspace.kernel.org; s=arc-20240116; t=1716971214; c=relaxed/simple; bh=xo7hJILm+E0mjhTp7MColM+1mivxOTyrKbotD+XlvZk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:Message-Id:In-Reply-To:References: MIME-Version; b=NhqIHRY1ogN9DWXdw37hJyBQjx8GPjoLBJNNY+BzKnf/M0G9FKkOxA0qrZCh1yGR2Q+pl6SknNuoxp4GALIya0H8dHqQOYDz28RBNCnPEtFwoZL0+Exz+VMlyJpZcukS/g82IbUhBTW6MY8lfsUzljHf0HO3CMB+A1CRtzqiKGM= ARC-Authentication-Results: i=1; smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=collabora.com; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=collabora.com; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=collabora.com header.i=@collabora.com header.b=pvhRFdf0; arc=none smtp.client-ip=46.235.227.194 Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dmarc=pass (p=quarantine dis=none) header.from=collabora.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; spf=pass smtp.mailfrom=collabora.com Authentication-Results: smtp.subspace.kernel.org; dkim=pass (2048-bit key) header.d=collabora.com header.i=@collabora.com header.b="pvhRFdf0" DKIM-Signature: v=1; a=rsa-sha256; c=relaxed/simple; d=collabora.com; s=mail; t=1716971211; bh=xo7hJILm+E0mjhTp7MColM+1mivxOTyrKbotD+XlvZk=; h=From:To:Cc:Subject:Date:In-Reply-To:References:From; b=pvhRFdf0li9/U1F/lGGeMBZosUB2Ae9p06ZBfYfd88saQ4e/S8C4+fuaPoRAdv+XY 3iLvCzXxG8wPKwcyybf2Mviodo6OOfz0V5EcT2gVMzU3HSdOgS2UgKBi5GMvVPJeq8 /xflE+eswRx+5W7+cs81HHW27h6JyFfq1pV1UN3XbRX+G2iAPYtefj127Hmtq111Zy g14dIIaMTpHHgYNeP1mMNxh8hs5qFTF4KaKfsZlOKCrEx3T+xHto7FUSsBSfejuiSE t0bgLvq5EqZhY4ed7prVo98Avsc/Lhju5yxtMVHLT9QSPGHbPj1LMxJqrFWw9+B/Yu RHZe+Y2lwWKEw== Received: from eugen-station.. (cola.collaboradmins.com [195.201.22.229]) (using TLSv1.3 with cipher TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 (256/256 bits) key-exchange X25519 server-signature RSA-PSS (4096 bits) server-digest SHA256) (No client certificate requested) (Authenticated sender: ehristev) by madrid.collaboradmins.com (Postfix) with ESMTPSA id 0D5253782173; Wed, 29 May 2024 08:26:49 +0000 (UTC) From: Eugen Hristev To: linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-f2fs-devel@lists.sourceforge.net, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, jaegeuk@kernel.org, adilger.kernel@dilger.ca, tytso@mit.edu Cc: chao@kernel.org, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, brauner@kernel.org, jack@suse.cz, ebiggers@google.com, krisman@suse.de, kernel@collabora.com, Gabriel Krisman Bertazi , Eugen Hristev Subject: [PATCH v17 4/7] ext4: Reuse generic_ci_match for ci comparisons Date: Wed, 29 May 2024 11:26:31 +0300 Message-Id: <20240529082634.141286-5-eugen.hristev@collabora.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.34.1 In-Reply-To: <20240529082634.141286-1-eugen.hristev@collabora.com> References: <20240529082634.141286-1-eugen.hristev@collabora.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" From: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi Instead of reimplementing ext4_match_ci, use the new libfs helper. It also adds a comment explaining why fname->cf_name.name must be checked prior to the encryption hash optimization, because that tripped me before. Signed-off-by: Gabriel Krisman Bertazi Signed-off-by: Eugen Hristev Reviewed-by: Eric Biggers --- fs/ext4/namei.c | 91 +++++++++++++++---------------------------------- 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/ext4/namei.c b/fs/ext4/namei.c index ec4c9bfc1057..20668741a23c 100644 --- a/fs/ext4/namei.c +++ b/fs/ext4/namei.c @@ -1390,58 +1390,6 @@ static void dx_insert_block(struct dx_frame *frame, = u32 hash, ext4_lblk_t block) } =20 #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNICODE) -/* - * Test whether a case-insensitive directory entry matches the filename - * being searched for. If quick is set, assume the name being looked up - * is already in the casefolded form. - * - * Returns: 0 if the directory entry matches, more than 0 if it - * doesn't match or less than zero on error. - */ -static int ext4_ci_compare(const struct inode *parent, const struct qstr *= name, - u8 *de_name, size_t de_name_len, bool quick) -{ - const struct super_block *sb =3D parent->i_sb; - const struct unicode_map *um =3D sb->s_encoding; - struct fscrypt_str decrypted_name =3D FSTR_INIT(NULL, de_name_len); - struct qstr entry =3D QSTR_INIT(de_name, de_name_len); - int ret; - - if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) { - const struct fscrypt_str encrypted_name =3D - FSTR_INIT(de_name, de_name_len); - - decrypted_name.name =3D kmalloc(de_name_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!decrypted_name.name) - return -ENOMEM; - ret =3D fscrypt_fname_disk_to_usr(parent, 0, 0, &encrypted_name, - &decrypted_name); - if (ret < 0) - goto out; - entry.name =3D decrypted_name.name; - entry.len =3D decrypted_name.len; - } - - if (quick) - ret =3D utf8_strncasecmp_folded(um, name, &entry); - else - ret =3D utf8_strncasecmp(um, name, &entry); - if (ret < 0) { - /* Handle invalid character sequence as either an error - * or as an opaque byte sequence. - */ - if (sb_has_strict_encoding(sb)) - ret =3D -EINVAL; - else if (name->len !=3D entry.len) - ret =3D 1; - else - ret =3D !!memcmp(name->name, entry.name, entry.len); - } -out: - kfree(decrypted_name.name); - return ret; -} - int ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *ina= me, struct ext4_filename *name) { @@ -1503,20 +1451,35 @@ static bool ext4_match(struct inode *parent, #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_UNICODE) if (IS_CASEFOLDED(parent) && (!IS_ENCRYPTED(parent) || fscrypt_has_encryption_key(parent))) { - if (fname->cf_name.name) { - if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent)) { - if (fname->hinfo.hash !=3D EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de) || - fname->hinfo.minor_hash !=3D - EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de)) { + int ret; =20 - return false; - } - } - return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, &fname->cf_name, - de->name, de->name_len, true); + /* + * Just checking IS_ENCRYPTED(parent) below is not + * sufficient to decide whether one can use the hash for + * skipping the string comparison, because the key might + * have been added right after + * ext4_fname_setup_ci_filename(). In this case, a hash + * mismatch will be a false negative. Therefore, make + * sure cf_name was properly initialized before + * considering the calculated hash. + */ + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(parent) && fname->cf_name.name && + (fname->hinfo.hash !=3D EXT4_DIRENT_HASH(de) || + fname->hinfo.minor_hash !=3D EXT4_DIRENT_MINOR_HASH(de))) + return false; + + ret =3D generic_ci_match(parent, fname->usr_fname, + &fname->cf_name, de->name, + de->name_len); + if (ret < 0) { + /* + * Treat comparison errors as not a match. The + * only case where it happens is on a disk + * corruption or ENOMEM. + */ + return false; } - return !ext4_ci_compare(parent, fname->usr_fname, de->name, - de->name_len, false); + return ret; } #endif =20 --=20 2.34.1