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Shutemov" To: Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , Borislav Petkov , Dave Hansen , x86@kernel.org Cc: "Rafael J. Wysocki" , Peter Zijlstra , Adrian Hunter , Kuppuswamy Sathyanarayanan , Elena Reshetova , Jun Nakajima , Rick Edgecombe , Tom Lendacky , "Kalra, Ashish" , Sean Christopherson , "Huang, Kai" , Baoquan He , kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, "Kirill A. Shutemov" , Dave Hansen Subject: [PATCHv9 06/17] x86/mm: Make x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_*() return errno Date: Mon, 25 Mar 2024 12:39:00 +0200 Message-ID: <20240325103911.2651793-7-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.43.0 In-Reply-To: <20240325103911.2651793-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> References: <20240325103911.2651793-1-kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com> Precedence: bulk X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org List-Id: List-Subscribe: List-Unsubscribe: MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Type: text/plain; charset="utf-8" TDX is going to have more than one reason to fail enc_status_change_prepare(). Change the callback to return errno instead of assuming -EIO; enc_status_change_finish() changed too to keep the interface symmetric. Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov Reviewed-by: Dave Hansen Reviewed-by: Kai Huang --- arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c | 20 +++++++++++--------- arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c | 9 +++------ arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h | 4 ++-- arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c | 4 ++-- arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c | 8 ++++---- arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c | 8 +++++--- 6 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 26 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c index c1cb90369915..26fa47db5782 100644 --- a/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/coco/tdx/tdx.c @@ -798,28 +798,30 @@ static bool tdx_enc_status_changed(unsigned long vadd= r, int numpages, bool enc) return true; } =20 -static bool tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpage= s, - bool enc) +static int tdx_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, + bool enc) { /* * Only handle shared->private conversion here. * See the comment in tdx_early_init(). */ - if (enc) - return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc); - return true; + if (enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc)) + return -EIO; + + return 0; } =20 -static bool tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, +static int tdx_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int numpages, bool enc) { /* * Only handle private->shared conversion here. * See the comment in tdx_early_init(). */ - if (!enc) - return tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc); - return true; + if (!enc && !tdx_enc_status_changed(vaddr, numpages, enc)) + return -EIO; + + return 0; } =20 void __init tdx_early_init(void) diff --git a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c index 768d73de0d09..870b82fce5ce 100644 --- a/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c +++ b/arch/x86/hyperv/ivm.c @@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ static bool hv_vtom_clear_present(unsigned long kbuffer= , int pagecount, bool enc * with host. This function works as wrap of hv_mark_gpa_visibility() * with memory base and size. */ -static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecou= nt, bool enc) +static int hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long kbuffer, int pagecoun= t, bool enc) { enum hv_mem_host_visibility visibility =3D enc ? VMBUS_PAGE_NOT_VISIBLE : VMBUS_PAGE_VISIBLE_READ_WRITE; @@ -544,7 +544,6 @@ static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long k= buffer, int pagecount, bo phys_addr_t paddr; void *vaddr; int ret =3D 0; - bool result =3D true; int i, pfn; =20 pfn_array =3D kmalloc(HV_HYP_PAGE_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -568,10 +567,8 @@ static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long = kbuffer, int pagecount, bo if (pfn =3D=3D HV_MAX_MODIFY_GPA_REP_COUNT || i =3D=3D pagecount - 1) { ret =3D hv_mark_gpa_visibility(pfn, pfn_array, visibility); - if (ret) { - result =3D false; + if (ret) goto err_free_pfn_array; - } pfn =3D 0; } } @@ -589,7 +586,7 @@ static bool hv_vtom_set_host_visibility(unsigned long k= buffer, int pagecount, bo if (set_memory_p(kbuffer, pagecount)) result =3D false; =20 - return result; + return ret; } =20 static bool hv_vtom_tlb_flush_required(bool private) diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_ini= t.h index b89b40f250e6..4770af4d6015 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/x86_init.h @@ -150,8 +150,8 @@ struct x86_init_acpi { * @enc_cache_flush_required Returns true if a cache flush is needed befor= e changing page encryption status */ struct x86_guest { - bool (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool e= nc); - bool (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool en= c); + int (*enc_status_change_prepare)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool en= c); + int (*enc_status_change_finish)(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, bool enc= ); bool (*enc_tlb_flush_required)(bool enc); bool (*enc_cache_flush_required)(void); }; diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c index a42830dc151b..69413ca37bfe 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/x86_init.c @@ -132,8 +132,8 @@ struct x86_cpuinit_ops x86_cpuinit =3D { =20 static void default_nmi_init(void) { }; =20 -static bool enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages= , bool enc) { return true; } -static bool enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages,= bool enc) { return true; } +static int enc_status_change_prepare_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages,= bool enc) { return 0; } +static int enc_status_change_finish_noop(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, = bool enc) { return 0; } static bool enc_tlb_flush_required_noop(bool enc) { return false; } static bool enc_cache_flush_required_noop(void) { return false; } static bool is_private_mmio_noop(u64 addr) {return false; } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c index 70b91de2e053..d314e577836d 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_amd.c @@ -283,7 +283,7 @@ static void enc_dec_hypercall(unsigned long vaddr, unsi= gned long size, bool enc) #endif } =20 -static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages,= bool enc) +static int amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, = bool enc) { /* * To maintain the security guarantees of SEV-SNP guests, make sure @@ -292,11 +292,11 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_prepare(unsigned lo= ng vaddr, int npages, bool if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP) && !enc) snp_set_memory_shared(vaddr, npages); =20 - return true; + return 0; } =20 /* Return true unconditionally: return value doesn't matter for the SEV si= de */ -static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, = bool enc) +static int amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long vaddr, int npages, b= ool enc) { /* * After memory is mapped encrypted in the page table, validate it @@ -308,7 +308,7 @@ static bool amd_enc_status_change_finish(unsigned long = vaddr, int npages, bool e if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)) enc_dec_hypercall(vaddr, npages << PAGE_SHIFT, enc); =20 - return true; + return 0; } =20 static void __init __set_clr_pte_enc(pte_t *kpte, int level, bool enc) diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c index 80c9037ffadf..e5b454036bf3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/pat/set_memory.c @@ -2156,7 +2156,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long add= r, int numpages, bool enc) cpa_flush(&cpa, x86_platform.guest.enc_cache_flush_required()); =20 /* Notify hypervisor that we are about to set/clr encryption attribute. */ - if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc)) + ret =3D x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_prepare(addr, numpages, enc); + if (ret) goto vmm_fail; =20 ret =3D __change_page_attr_set_clr(&cpa, 1); @@ -2174,7 +2175,8 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long add= r, int numpages, bool enc) return ret; =20 /* Notify hypervisor that we have successfully set/clr encryption attribu= te. */ - if (!x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr, numpages, enc)) + ret =3D x86_platform.guest.enc_status_change_finish(addr, numpages, enc); + if (ret) goto vmm_fail; =20 return 0; @@ -2183,7 +2185,7 @@ static int __set_memory_enc_pgtable(unsigned long add= r, int numpages, bool enc) WARN_ONCE(1, "CPA VMM failure to convert memory (addr=3D%p, numpages=3D%d= ) to %s.\n", (void *)addr, numpages, enc ? "private" : "shared"); =20 - return -EIO; + return ret; } =20 static int __set_memory_enc_dec(unsigned long addr, int numpages, bool enc) --=20 2.43.0